R Kasrils: International community and building peace in Sudan

8 November 2006

1. Introduction

Africa is determined to play its role in finding African solutions to the
continent's challenges whilst working with international partners.

The African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have put
enormous efforts into the facilitation of negotiations for peaceful resolution
of existing conflicts and the effective implementation of peace agreements. As
a result there has been a steady decline in the number of active conflicts on
the African continent and an increasing demand for the consolidation of peace,
reconstruction and development.

Notwithstanding a long and sometimes tortuous path, Sudanese decision makers
at the end of 2006 face important strategic decisions that will determine the
future shape and nature of the country after 2011 and the manner in which the
intervening years will unfold. In fact the fate of Africa's largest country,
one that bridges the north with the south, the east to the west, is a powerful
determinant of the continents future as important as that of securing progress
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

2. Taking stock

The political scaffolding has been put in place Africa's longest civil war
formally ended on 9 January 2005 at Naivasha in Kenya with the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Government of National Unity (GNU) was
established by mid 2005, the Sudanese and Southern Sudan Constitutions were
adopted, conflict in the South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile regions ended.
All of this was achieved with the assistance of Africa and the international
community. It is imperative now that with the political superstructure in place
both domestic and international role players shift their focus into post
conflict construction.

For these reasons, the AU is focusing more attention on measures that
consolidate peace and pave the way for growth and regeneration. These AU
efforts are informed by past practice of the Organisation for African Unity
(OAU) in reconstruction efforts and all relevant OAU/AU mandates and decision
including, Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, on the basis of which the
Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established and the OAU/AU decision to
establish a ministerial committee for the reconstruction of the Sudan. But
first let us place the AU's position in a broad based context.

3. Post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD)

This AU policy on PCRD derives from the reality of Africa making greater
progress in resolving conflicts on the continent. The 9th ordinary session of
the Executive Council (ExCo) in Banjul, Gambia from 28 to 29 June 2006 adopted
the PCRD document.

The objective of the PCRD is "to improve timeliness, effectiveness and
co-ordination of activities in post conflict countries and to lay the
foundation for social justice and sustainable peace in line with Africa's
vision of renewal and growth".

The PCRD is, therefore, conceived as a tool to:

a) consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence
b) help address the root causes of conflict
c) encourage and fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction
activities
d) enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors
engaged in PCRD processes.

The PCRD principles are African leadership, national and local ownership,
inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, co-operation and cohesion and
capacity building for sustainability. The promotion of human security is at the
basis of all PCRD activities. This policy must be pursued within the global
context of the search for peace and security and hence complement existing
international initiatives.

The PCRD draws on lessons learned from past African reconstruction efforts,
which indicate weaknesses from the conceptual to the strategic and operational
levels. Most reconstruction models have been borrowed from outside Africa and
have lacked comprehensiveness, favouring some aspects of PCRD to the exclusion
of others, sometimes risking the resumption of conflict. Taking this into
account there is critical need for PCRD processes to translate the commitment
to peace into tangible benefits. This is dependent on the formulation of
comprehensive integrated strategies and approaches that require substantial
institutional and human capacities in the implementation of PCRD.

This PCRD will reduce pressure on affected countries by providing a
consistent and coherent strategy that will fast track the planning and
implementation of quick impact programmes, consolidate peace in the
emergency/transition phase and hence increase the chances of successful long
term sustainable development.

This policy must provide parameters to improve coherence and co-ordination
of all action between State and non-State actors operating at local, national,
regional and/or international levels during all phases of PCRD.

Against this background, I would like to dwell on some of the challenges
facing Sudan and the south in particular and venture some thoughts on what
needs to be done urgently to bring about sustainable development, viable and
functioning government and security structures and address the vexing
challenges of human security affecting the southern Sudan.

Of course we must not be deflected from the CPA/Southern Sudan efforts, the
success of which must serve to interlock with resolving all of Sudan's regional
challenges including that of Darfur.

4. Challenges facing southern Sudan

If we are to do Sudan as a whole a service we need to take an unvarnished,
critical look at the situation in the south after which I will briefly return
to the wider national context. I would propose doing so by looking at a range
of issues.

(i) Governance in the south

The success of the CPA will depend to a large degree on two difficult
transitions, the one for the government of Sudan to become an effective
Government of National Unity (GNU), the other for the government of southern
Sudan to participate meaningfully in the GNU and develop institutions to
effectively govern the south. We in South Africa have some experience of this
with respect to our own transition and experience of a GNU in the first two
years of democracy. At present the government of southern Sudan lacks the core
institutions, infrastructure and capacity that it must have if it is to
effectively govern and respond to the needs of its citizens. To assist the
south, a trilateral partnership has been created between South Africa's
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the University of South Africa (UNISA).
DFA provides political and financial support to the programme and UNISA serves
as an implementing agent and is responsible for the conceptualisation and
development of training material. Thus far, key South African departments
involved include the departments of finance, public service and administration,
communications, justice, correctional services and the South African Police
Service (SAPS). Four hundred and twenty three delegates have participated in
the programme.

There is still a pressing need for attention to be given to creating and
capacitating financial and judicial institutions and economic and social
infrastructure to provide essential services. There is a need to equip the
government of the south to manage significant revenues including establishing
donor co-ordination mechanisms. Equally important is the ability of the
government of the south to communicate government processes, decisions and
priorities to the people of southern Sudan. The CPA specifies that a census
must be completed by July 2007 with elections to be held no later that July
2009. Capacity must be created to conduct a reliable census which will be an
important instrument in providing citizenship, correctly targeting government
programmes, protecting the rights of displaced persons and ensuring democratic
representation of the people through elections.

(ii) Wealth sharing

Revenue sharing as provided for by the CPA and Wealth-Sharing Agreement of 7
January 2004 is capable of contributing to the establishment of new
institutions, construction in the South, infrastructure development and
essential services. The peculiarity of Sudan's newly acquired oil wealth is
that it is set to become one of Africa's wealthiest states but has some of the
continent's most negative development indicators. The international community
should assist the government of southern Sudan to increase its capacity to
absorb, distribute and utilise these revenues. Care will have to be taken that
oil revenues are not susceptible to corruption and do not lead to the
entrenchment of unaccountable elites as has happened elsewhere which is no easy
task. The government of the south needs independent means of verifying whether
it is in fact receiving 50 percent of the net revenue from southern oilfields
to which it is entitled if confidence and trust are to develop. The
international community could assist here in tracking the flow of oil revenues
and assisting the government of the south to gain insight into existing oil
contracts. Whereas increased oil revenue ought to ease budgetary constraints,
it will not remove the political sensitivities attached to the distribution of
the revenue. It will be important to ensure that the status of the oil rich
three areas, namely the provinces of Abyei, Blue Nile State and the Nuba
Mountains are resolved amicably.

(iii) Post conflict construction

I use the word construction consciously here. The under-development of
southern Sudan is the result, among others, of decades of marginalisation and
protracted conflict between Sudan's centre and wider national periphery.
Efforts to respond to the situation in southern Sudan take place within the
parameters of the CPA and are supported by the World Bank – United Nations (UN)
Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), which has compiled an assessment of what needs
to be done. The AU set up a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee (PCRC)
chaired by South Africa to effect construction efforts. Despite the best
intentions of those involved, the expectations at grassroots level have so far
been disappointed. Construction efforts on the ground have been inadequate to
date because of a lack of functioning governance systems to mobilise resources
and capacity. This results in a mismatch between the efforts of government
institutions and development agencies and the expectations of the people. Going
a step further, the ineffectiveness of construction efforts tarnishes the image
and legitimacy of both the central government and international efforts and
easily creates a sense of abandonment and isolation in the minds of the people
of the south.

(iv) Human security

There is much that the international community can do here. There is a
desperate need for basic services such as potable water, primary healthcare,
education, and food aid. The World Food Programme estimates that 26 percent of
the Sudanese population is malnourished with food security expected to remain
critical due to increased demand from displaced people returning to their
homes, the lack of structures to properly market agricultural produce, unstable
commodity prices and weak public and social services in the south. The
international community should, for example, assist with the creation and
adoption of legal and institutional frameworks to resolve the conflicts and
tensions that will inevitably arise when returnees claim land and water rights
that now have new owners. The international community should also be investing
in essential services and local infrastructure to stabilise the vast war
affected rural areas of the south where refugees and returnees are expected. We
should also be preparing for people to migrate to urban centres in search of
employment and access to public and social services as properly managed urban
development could create significant opportunities for economic recovery. There
is also place for international efforts to support dialogue between citizens,
civil society and government, to promote the role of women and marginalised
groups and communicate messages of tolerance, anti-corruption and peace
building through civic education.

(v) Security

It is important to note the security development nexus here and make the
point that not only does security enable development but that development also
creates security. If continued insecurity in southern Sudan is not to undermine
the gains of the peace process and affect previously stable regions much work
still needs to be done in integrating former rival armies into joint units to
serve in what were garrison towns and in disarming, demobilising and
reintegrating formal and informal militias. Political tension will increase if
the reintegration process is incorrectly handled and the issue of command and
control of the security forces is not properly managed between the north and
south. There is also a pressing need for securing funding for security sector
reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. It
is also unrealistic to expect police in the south to provide protection and
security to citizens if their capacity problems are not addressed. There is the
need to ensure the military is subject to civilian control.

5. The national context

In brief may I highlight the following three national requirements for
Sudan's success not only with respect to the south:
(i) the necessity for power and wealth sharing throughout Sudan
(ii) the importance of inclusive resolution of conflict and ending
marginalisation throughout this great country
(iii) the need to resolve the problems affecting Sudan and finding a
sustainable solution by ensuring unity, stability and equitable development
throughout the country.

In this respect may I state the following, despite the present international
focus on Darfur, it is necessary to remain committed to the implementation of
the CPA. Events elsewhere in Sudan should not divert the international
community's attention away from assisting the two sides with the CPA
implementation.

With regard to the apparent impasse over the disputed oil producing region
of Abye, we must encourage both the SPLM and NCP to resolve their differences
and implement the CPA. Once solved, the north-south border should be speedily
finalised.

The dispute over the secretariat of the National Petroleum Commission (NPC)
likewise needs to be resolved, including revenue sharing in a transparent
manner.

The recent violent incidents near Juba are of concern. It is symptomatic of
the wider problem of militias, some remain unaligned whereas others have not
yet been amalgamated into the SAF/SPLM. However, the formation of Joint
Integrated Units (JIUs) and the withdrawal of SAF/SPLM forces have on the whole
proceeded smoothly and needs to be completed.

6. Conclusion

In closing I would like to emphasise the importance of ensuring that the
peace dividend expected by the Sudanese people after years of conflict actually
emerges. Winning popular support is critical to the success of the CPA and the
future of Sudan. We do not have the luxury of time if we are to make unity
attractive to the people of southern Sudan. To date shortcomings in
implementing the CPA have been outweighed by the benefits of peace between the
north and south but there is a risk that over time, delays and disputes may
undermine the legitimacy of the agreement in the eyes of the people of the
south. The international community must assist in delivering tangible results
to people on the ground, or see the return of disillusionment and alienation.
In so doing we also need to be thinking about how we narrow the diverging
international positions and perceptions of the AU, UN, European Union (EU),
United States (US), China and Middle East players involved in Sudan. Finally we
need to also ensure that the implementation of the CPA takes place within the
PCRD framework and is not overshadowed and undermined by events in Darfur. It
goes without saying that effort there to bring all the protagonists on board in
a win-win solution is essential.

In closing, President Thabo Mbeki made the claim in his State of the Nation
address to the South African Parliament in February this year that our country
had entered an 'age of hope'. It is our desire as South Africans to ensure that
other African States are also able to experience their own ages of hope on a
continent where conflict becomes but a memory. South Africa is willing to
contribute in co-operation with the international community to finding African
solutions for African problems and creating a brighter future for Sudan and all
Sudanese.

I thank you!

Issued by: Ministry for Intelligence Services
8 November 2006
Source: Ministry for Intelligence Services (http://www.intelligence.gov.za)