Centre Amphitheatre, Union Buildings, Pretoria
29 January 2007
Middle East and West Asia
South Africa, like the rest of the world, is deeply concerned about the
situation in the Middle East and West Asia reflected in:
* ethnic cleansing and sectarian violence in Iraq which continues with
unacceptable levels of deaths and destruction
* Palestine � Israel � a solution based on United Nations (UN) resolutions
seems elusive
* serious tensions in Lebanon
* violence in Afghanistan is escalating
* crisis regarding Iran's nuclear programme continues.
No country will be immune to the serious consequences of any failure to find
political solutions to these issues.
In our own national interests, and in the interests of international peace
and security, we must globally do everything possible to defuse the very
explosive situation in the region.
Collectively we must seek to find solutions to the problems identified by
the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group.
This report contains much analysis reflective of what many governments,
academics, experts and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been saying
for some time.
Let me deal with some aspects of this report:
Baker-Hamilton Study Group on Iraq Report
To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq War,
and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition caring for
veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of
dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the United
States of America (US/USA) involvement in Iraq. This does not refer to the
human cost to Iraqis and others in the region.
US Coalition and Iraqi Forces
Approximately 141 000 US military personnel are serving in Iraq, together
with approximately 16 500 military personnel from twenty-seven coalition
partners, the largest contingent being 7 200 from the United Kingdom.
Many military units are under significant strain.
By the end of 2006, the Multi-National Security Transition Command�Iraq
under American leadership is expected to have trained and equipped a target
number of approximately 326 000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes
138 000 members of the Iraqi Army and 188 000 Iraqi police.
Despite this, the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.
Attacks against US, Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent and
growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for US forces since January 2005,
with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day,
up from 70 per day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces
in October were more than double the level in January. Attacks against
civilians in October were four times higher than in January. Some 3 000 Iraqi
civilians are killed every month.
Sources of Violence
Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. Sectarian
violence � particularly in and around Baghdad � has become the principal
challenge to stability.
Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. It has
significant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgency has no
single leadership but is a network of networks. The insurgents have different
goals, although nearly all oppose the presence of US forces in Iraq.
Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but
that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck
bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in
Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters are
estimated at 1 300.
Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian casualties.
Sunni insurgent attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. In
some parts of Iraq � notably in Baghdad � sectarian cleansing is taking place.
The United Nations estimates that 1,6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up
to 1,8 million Iraqis have fled the country.
Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial threat to
immediate and long-term stability. Some are affiliated with the government,
some are highly localised, and some are wholly outside the law. The militias
target Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one
another.
National reconciliation
The Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elements of national
reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which prevents many Sunni Arabs
from participating in governance and society; providing amnesty for those who
have fought against the government; sharing the country's oil revenues;
demobilising militias; amending the constitution; and settling the future of
Kirkuk.
One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a
largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be
established later, perhaps including a "Shi'astan" comprising nine southern
provinces. This highly decentralised structure is favoured by the Kurds and
many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is anathema
to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within
the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraq's
energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically
feasible "Sunni region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the
constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while
allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the
regions.
The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting
process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition that the
constitution be amended. In September, the parliament agreed to initiate a
constitutional review commission.
Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country,
but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to
national reconciliation.
Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working
toward a united Iraq. The danger is that leading forces in Iraq are looking to
break Iraq up into three sections � and this is in my opinion, a recipe for
disaster.
Consequences of continued decline in Iraq
If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate we will have severe
consequences for Iraq, United States, the region, and the world.
Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their
borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their
own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could
send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring
independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq
and perhaps gain control of oil fields.
There is the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic
world.
If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in oil
production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and
thus could harm the global economy.
Terrorism could grow. And we have no options for dealing with such increases
in the region and elsewhere.
The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends
further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, US military,
diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failure there could diminish
America's credibility and influence in a region that is the centre of the
Islamic world and vital to the world's energy supply. This loss would reduce
America's global influence at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran,
and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong US leadership of
international alliances. And the longer that US political and military
resources are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in
Afghanistan increase.
Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarisation within the
United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the government's
handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan
for moving forward. The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum
on the progress in Iraq. US foreign policy cannot be successfully sustained
without the broad support of the American people.
Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country
is heading in the right direction, and 79 percent of Iraqis have a "mostly
negative" view of the influence that the United States has in their country. 61
percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on US-led forces.
Governance
The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic
services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, healthcare, and education. In
many sectors, production is below or hovers around pre-war levels. In Baghdad
and other unstable areas, the situation is much worse. There are five major
reasons for this problem:
* �First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian basis.
One American official told us that Baghdad is run like a "Shia
dictatorship."
* �Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure.
* �Third corruption is rampant. Notable steps are being taken.
* Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic class was pushed
out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other skilled Iraqis have
fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, Iraq's elected
representatives treat the ministries as political spoils.
* �Fifth, the judiciary is weak.
The Way Forward
The United States should embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish
an international support structure intended to stabilise Iraq and ease tensions
in other countries in the region. This support structure should include every
country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of
Iraq's neighbours � Iran and Syria among them.
They all share an interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would
flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional
destabilisation.
The Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, and sustaining
itself by relying on US military and economic support alone.
All key issues in the Middle East � the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran,
the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism � are
inextricably linked.
The New Diplomatic Offensive should address these key regional issues.
The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic "Compact
for Iraq" by also emphasising political, diplomatic, and security issues. It
would be co-ordinated with the goals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic
offensive would also be broader and more far-reaching than the "Gulf Plus Two"
efforts currently being conducted.
The United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the
comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of
the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before 31 December
2006.
The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players
should be to:
1. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
2. Stop destabilising interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbours.
3. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighbouring
countries.
4. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq's
borders.
5. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if
possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighbouring
Muslim nations.
6. Energise countries to support national political reconciliation in
Iraq.
7. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where
appropriate, and re-establishing embassies in Baghdad.
8. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the
region (for - example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
9. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.
10. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and
economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national
reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of
militias.
As a complement the Iraqi government should support the holding of a
conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national
reconciliation in Iraq and to re-establish their diplomatic presence in
Iraq.
The US should immediately seek the creation of the Iraq International
Support Group. The Support Group should also include all countries that border
Iraq as well as other key countries in the region and the world.
All Iraq's neighbours are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favour a
unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity but
not so powerful to threaten its neighbours. None favours the break-up of the
Iraqi State.
The Support Group should consist of Iraq including Iran and Syria; the key
regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union (EU); and,
of course, Iraq itself. Other countries for instance, Germany, Japan and South
Korea � could also become members.
The United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as his
representative.
A new diplomatic offensive involving countries of the region and, where
necessary, those outside, is being advocated.
Dealing with Iran and Syria
In diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to
try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests.
Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its
diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.
Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and they will require
a balancing of interests.
The United States should also consider incentives to try to engage them
constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya.
The United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try
to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other
regional issues. The United States should consider incentives, as well as
disincentives.
Iran: The United States and Iran co-operated in Afghanistan, and both sides
should explore whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq.
Syria: On the 28 January 2007 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's Special
Reperesentative Ashraf Qazi, and Foreign Minister Walid Muallim discussed
recent developments in Iraq and their impact on the region. The Special
Representative's visit to Damascus is part of a regional tour aimed at hearing
the views of Iraq's neighbours and encouraging them to contribute to the
Government's successful efforts to reduce violence, bring greater stability and
promote national reconciliation.
Mr Qazi stressed the need for greater regional engagement in support of the
efforts by the Government of Iraq in reducing violence, bringing greater
stability and promoting national reconciliation among all Iraqis.
According to a New York Times article, following the historic visit of the
Iraqi President to Iran, Iran's Ambassador on Sunday, 28 January 2007, to
Baghdad outlined an ambitious plan to greatly expand its economic and military
ties with Iraq.
The Ambassador Hassan Kazemi Qumi said Iran was prepared to offer Iraq
government forces training, equipment and advisers for what they called "the
security fight." In the economic area, Iran was ready to assume major
responsibility for Iraqi reconstruction, a failure on the part of the US since
American-led forces overthrew Saddam Hussein nearly four years ago.
"We have experience of reconstruction after war," Mr Qumi said referring to
the Iran-Iraq wars in the 1980s.
Mr Qumi said Iran would soon open a national bank in Iraq, in effect
creating a new Iranian financial institution. A senior Iraqi banking official,
Hussein al-Uzri confirmed that Iran had received a licence to open the bank,
which he said would apparently be the first "wholly owned subsidiary bank," of
a foreign country in Iraq.
An agricultural bank and three private banks also intend to open branches.
Other elements of new economic co-operation included plans for Iranian
shipments of kerosene and electricity to Iraq and a new agricultural
co-operative involving both countries.
Iran's offer of military assistance to Iraq included increased border
patrols and a proposed new "joint security committee."
Basic Positions
The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to
build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This
diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding
a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbours. Iraq's neighbours and key
states in and outside the region should form a support group to reinforce
security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can
achieve on its own.
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and
their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to
engage them constructively.
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi
security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While
this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should
significantly increase the number of US military personnel, including combat
troops, embedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness
to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq's security forces and to
continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government
does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on
national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should
reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi
government.
The report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include
improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the US
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the US budget process, the training of US
government personnel, and US intelligence capabilities.
It would be wrong for the US to abandon the country through a precipitate
withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure would
certainly produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of
conditions. The near-term results would be a significant power vacuum, greater
human suffering, regional destabilisation and a threat to the global economy.
Al Qaeda would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and
Iraq descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require
the US to return.
Following the Baker-Hamilton Report, President Bush announced his new Iraq
Strategy in his State of the Union address on Tuesday, 23 January 2007:
"We're carrying out a new strategy in Iraq � a plan that demands more from
Iraq's elected government, and gives our forces in Iraq the reinforcements they
need. Our goal is a democratic Iraq that upholds the rule of law, respects the
rights of its people, provides them security, and is an ally in the war on
terror.
The Iraqi government must stop the sectarian violence. But the Iraqis are
not yet ready to do this on their own. So we're deploying reinforcements of
more than 20 000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq. The vast majority
will go to Baghdad, where they will help Iraqi forces to clear and secure
neighbourhoods, and serve as advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units. With Iraqis
in the lead, our forces will help secure the city by chasing down the
terrorists, insurgents, and the roaming death squads. And in Anbar Province,
where al Qaeda terrorists have gathered and local forces have begun showing a
willingness to fight them, with orders to find the terrorists and clear them
out.
Iraq's leaders know that our commitment is not open-ended. They pledged that
they will confront violent radicals of any faction or political party. They
have committed themselves to a series of benchmarks to achieve reconciliation,
to share oil revenues among all of Iraq's citizens, to put the wealth of Iraqi
into rebuilding Iraq, to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's civic
pride, to hold elections, and to take responsibility for security in every
Iraqi province. But for all this to happen, Baghdad must be secure.
If American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi government
would be overrun by extremists on all sides. A contagion of violence could
spill out across the country � and in time, the entire region could be drawn
into the conflict.
I propose to establish a special advisory council on the war on terror, made
up of leaders in Congress from both political parties."
The Democratic Party's response to President Bush's speech: Senator Jim
Webb
"This country has patiently endured a mismanaged war for nearly four
years.
Many warned even before the war began that it was unnecessary, that it would
take our energy and attention away from the larger war against terrorism, and
that invading and occupying Iraq would leave us strategically vulnerable in the
most violent and turbulent corner of the world.
The President took us into this war recklessly
We are now, as a nation, held hostage to the predictable � and predicted �
disarray that has followed.
The majority of our nation no longer supports the way this war is being
fought � nor does the majority of our military.
We need a new direction.
Not one step back from the war against international terrorism.
Not a precipitous withdrawal that ignores the possibility of further
chaos.
But an immediate shift toward strong regionally-based diplomacy, a policy
that takes our soldiers off the street of Iraq's cities, and a formula that
will in short order allow our combat forces to leave Iraq.
It is clear that the call for a new diplomatic strategy involving all
role-players is being increasingly echoed by many players in the US body
politik and internationally.
The Baker-Hamilton Report emphasises the point that the problems in the
Middle East and Asia are integrated and a key aspect to a regional solution is
the Palestinian issue.
It observes that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in
the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President
Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and
Palestine.
* There is no military solution to this conflict.
* The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a nation
perpetually at war.
* No American administration will ever abandon Israel.
* Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli
dispute.
* The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of "land for
peace."
* The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as Israel
has achieved with Egypt and Jordan.
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment to a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts
This effort should include the unconditional calling and holding of
meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the
United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel
and Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who
acknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these
meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in
1991, and on two separate tracks.
Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peace should
include:
* Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the
principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving
peace.
* Consolidation of the ceasefire reached between the Palestinians and the
Israelis in November 2006.
*�Support for a Palestinian national unity government.
* Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines
of President Bush's two-state solution, which would address the key final
status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the
end of conflict.
The importance of the Baker-Hamilton observations is given greater urgency
by the continuing crisis in the Middle East."
The UN Under-Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari in a report to the Security
Council said:
"None of us can afford another year like the last one in Lebanon and the
Middle East," he stressed. Therefore a resumed political process between Israel
and the Palestinians was a clear priority. The Secretary-General encouraged the
two leaders to build on their progress to date by implementing agreements and
by starting to address the fundamental issues of the conflict. Solutions were
urgently needed to the political impasses, both among the Palestinians and in
Lebanon. The Secretary-General encouraged leaders in both contexts to overcome
their differences and find a way to move forward, which served the best
interests of their people. Lebanon, as its people knew too well, could ill
afford any further deterioration. For many Lebanese ugly spectres of the past
had begun to emerge. All sides had a shared responsibility to resolve their
political differences through the democratic process and in a peaceful manner,
in order to spare their populations further anxiety, insecurity and
turmoil."
Lebanon
For many Lebanese ugly spectres of the past had again begun to emerge, he
said, stressing the shared responsibility of all sides to resolve their
political differences peacefully through the democratic processes in order to
spare their populations further anxiety, insecurity and turmoil.
The demonstrations that had started in Beirut on 1 December 2006 were
largely peaceful until Tuesday, 23 January 2007. Following a call from the
opposition for a general strike, thousands of Lebanese from opposing political
factions had faced each other, often violently, on the streets. Few regions of
the country had been spared by the unrest that had led to at least three dead
and more than 100 injured � some very seriously. Major roads throughout the
country had been effectively blocked by burning tyres and earth barriers. A
tense calm had returned to Beirut following the decision by the opposition to
suspend the strike, but tensions remained high. The opposition had stated that
further escalation would occur unless government acceded to its demands.
General stability had returned to southern Lebanon due to the deployment of
the enhanced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese
Armed Forces, which continued to enjoy a high level of co-operation.
Israel's violations of Lebanese airspace continued. Civilians continued to
be killed and injured by the cluster munitions dropped on Lebanon during last
year's conflict. At least 840 individual cluster strike locations had been
identified to date, each containing up to hundreds of individual bomblets or
sub-munitions.
Israel � Palestine
The ceasefire in Gaza, agreed to remains in place although militants had
continued to fire rockets into southern Israel in the past two months.
The ceasefire had not been extended to the West Bank and operations to
arrest or kill wanted Palestinians continued regularly. During the reporting
period, 28 Palestinians had been killed and more than 130 injured in Israeli
military operations, while 10 Israelis had been injured by Palestinian
militants. Egypt continued to lead efforts for the release of the Israeli
corporal captured last summer and of Palestinian prisoners in Israel.
Prime Minister Olmert had undertaken to transfer to President Abbas's office
US$100 million of the more than half a billion dollars withheld by Israel; to
intensify the upgrading of crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel; and to
ease checkpoint procedures in the West Bank while removing a number of
roadblocks. However, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
had reported a modest easing in the operation of a few West Bank checkpoints
and the anticipated removal of roadblocks had yet to be observed.
Furthermore, Israel approved the repopulation of a settlement deep in the
Jordan Valley, in violation of the Roadmap. While that decision had been put on
hold after international protests, settlement activity continued, and the
number of West Bank settlers, excluding those in East Jerusalem, had increased
by nearly 6% since 2005. Moreover, the Government's pledges to remove outposts
remained unfulfilled, and the construction of the barrier on the Occupied
Palestinian Territory continued, despite the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice.
In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, factional tensions had risen to acute
levels in mid-December and early January. A total of 43 people had been killed
in Palestinian-on-Palestinian conflict. The Israel Defence Forces Chief of
Staff had resigned and an official inquiry into the conduct of last summer's
conflict with Hizbollah continued.
Professor Gambari said the implementation of those understandings had
proceeded slowly. Israel, in the past few days, had transferred the US$100
million. The office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs had reported
a modest easing of the operation of a few West Bank checkpoints, but the
anticipated removal of roadblocks had yet to be observed. Access and movement
should be improved. During the first 16 days of 2007, the average exports out
of Karni stood at approximately 46 trucks a day. That represented an improving
trend, but still reflected only 11% of the target of 400 per day. He encouraged
further progress in this regard. In the same period, Rafah had been opened
primarily for pilgrims for only 32% of the scheduled opening hours. Finally,
there had been no discernable improvement in movement for Palestinians in the
West Bank. According to the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), the number of barriers currently on the ground � 527 �
represented a 25% increase over the course of 2006.
He said that internal violence had been accompanied by heightened and
negative political rhetoric and threats, and strengthening of factional forces.
President Abbas had announced that the Hamas-affiliated Executive Special
Force, under the Ministry of Interior, was illegal unless immediately
integrated into existing security services. Tensions had also flared in late
December, and the President had called for early presidential and parliamentary
elections unless agreement was reached on a National Unity Government.
Nevertheless, each time factional fighting had threatened to spin out of
control, President Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had reached
understandings to de-escalate tensions.
Efforts to form a Palestinian National Unity Government had resumed,
involving dialogue in Gaza, as well as in Damascus, he continued. It appeared
the main issues of disagreement were over control of the interior ministry and
the strength of the language concerning the commitment to Arab and
international resolutions. While refusing to countenance recognition of Israel,
exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashal recently told news outlets that Israel's
existence was a reality and that, with the formation of a Palestinian State on
the 4 June 1967 borders, "there will remain a State called Israel, this is a
matter of fact."
He said that President Abbas had recently met Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad in Damascus and subsequently met Khaled Mashal. A joint statement
issued after that meeting had stated that progress had been made towards a
National Unity Government; the leaders had called for an end to internal
fighting. The statement had also rejected the concept of an interim Palestinian
State with provisional borders. President Abbas had subsequently reaffirmed
that early elections remained on the table if a National Unity Government was
not formed.
Public institutions built up by the international community had been
severely weakened by a lack of operational funds, energy shortages and military
damage.
The worsening situation on the ground had underscored the limits of what
international assistance could accomplish, he said. Without greater freedom of
access and movement, and without a political process that was carrying the
parties towards a two-State solution, the most aid could do was contain, for a
limited time, the spread of grievances and instability. The experience of the
past year showed that that type of investment brought rapidly diminishing
returns.
Efforts to stop the inter-Palestinian conflict and to form a government of
national unity have not met with much success.
President Abbas and the Syrian born leader of Hamas, Khaled Mishaal met in
Syria on Sunday, 21 January 2007.
Hamas indicated that it would relinquish the position of Foreign Minister as
this Ministry works closely with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)
process, which Hamas is outside of and would therefore not be in the position
to use effectively. Second, Hamas would also relinquish the position of Finance
Minister.
The problematic issue however, was the position of Interior Minister.
President Abbas informed Mishaal that any new government/Interior Minister,
should not recognise the Executive Force, which was created by the current
Interior Minister, Said Siam, as he (President) does not regard it as a legal
structure since its creation was not sanctioned through his office, which is a
requirement of the Basic Law (Palestinian constitution).
President Mahmoud Abbas, speaking at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos
said, "We are at a junction now, either yes or no. I would tell you, this
doesn't need more than two weeks, maximum three weeks � if we fail to achieve a
national unity government that allows us to lift the siege, I will call for
presidential elections."
More than 30 Palestinians have been killed in fighting between the rival
groups since Abbas called last month for presidential and parliamentary
elections.
President Abbas and Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas, pledged on Sunday,
21 January 2007 to curb Palestinian bloodshed, however the violence
continues.
The Hamas government has also been crippled by Israel withholding
Palestinian tax revenues amounting to over US$500 million.
The Palestinian president also said he expects to hold talks with the US and
Israel within a month on the framework for establishing a Palestinian
State.
Rejection of Temporary Borders Plan by President Mahmoud Abbas
In December 2006, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni proposed setting up a
provisional Palestinian state, with a border based on the separation barrier
Israel is building in the West Bank.
The idea of provisional borders forms part of the second stage of the US
Roadmap. During the first phase, Israel is supposed to stop building
settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Palestinian Government would
dismantle and disarm all militant groups.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on Sunday, January 14 2007,
during a meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, adamantly
rejected "any temporary or transitional solutions, including a state with
temporary borders." Palestinian officials in recent weeks have grown
increasingly wary of the idea, fearing they will be stuck indefinitely with a
truncated state.
Meeting of the Quartet: 2 February 2007
Secretary of State Rice will host a meeting of the Quartet on 2 February
2007 in Washington. The meeting of the Quartet Principals � Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, High
Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, the
European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner � will
discuss recent developments in the Middle East since their last meeting on 20
September 2006 and in particular � ways to energise international engagement in
support of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and progress in accordance with the
Roadmap.
It is time that the Quartet begins to seriously address challenges. I do not
believe that the Quartet has worked urgently and consistently enough. It is now
the time for decisive action and the Quartet must begin to take serious
action.
Failure to do so, surely must force us to reflect on what President Mbeki
wrote in the ANC Today (vol. 6:49) stated the grave situation in the Middle
East and West Asia demands the concerted attention and action of both the
countries in the region and the rest of the world. The question can no longer
be avoided � is it not time that the United Nations, genuinely representing all
nations assumes its rightful position and leads a global process to address all
the inter-connected challenges facing the peoples of the Middle East and West
Asia.
None of us is entitled to succumb to a destructive paralysis by resigning
ourselves to the expectation that the sister peoples of the Middle East and
West Asia are ineluctably condemned to be consumed by an unstoppable
conflagration, foretold by current events as an impending and modern
frightening apocalypse, as a result of which mere anarchy would be loosed upon
the world.
Global challenges that threaten the whole world demand multilateral
solutions.
It is in the context of what I have just said that I want to raise some
issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme:
Resolution 1737 (December 2006)
* It requires Iran to co-operate fully with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in resolving the outstanding questions surrounding Iran's nuclear
programme and to take steps necessary to build international confidence in its
nuclear programme.
* It requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities and to stop work on all heavy water related projects, including
construction of a heavy water research reactor. This suspension is subject to
IAEA verification and the Security Council has requested the IAEA
Director-General to report to the Security Council on Iran's compliance by 23
February 2007.
* It prohibits all Member States from supplying Iran with items, including dual
use equipment, which could contribute to these proliferation sensitive
activities and Iran's alleged development of a nuclear weapon delivery system.
Iran is similarly prohibited from exporting such equipment or technology to
other countries.
* For those few items not included in this ban, such as components for light
water reactors and their fuel, notification of their export must be reported to
the Sanctions Committee established by resolution by the Member States in
question prior to the transfer.
* The resolution requires that all States prevent the provision to Iran of any
technical assistance, training or financial services related to those
activities covered under the ban.
* Finally, the Resolution requires States to freeze the assets of individuals
and entities identified in Annex A to the resolution, or subsequently added to
the list by the Sanctions Committee, as having a significant role in Iran's
nuclear and missile programmes, as well as to provide notification to the
Sanctions Committee of any travel by these individuals to their State.
* UN member states are obliged to report to the Security Council within 60 days
of the passing of Resolution 1737 on the measures that they are taking to
implement this resolution.
* If Iran fails to comply with this resolution within 60 days from the date of
its adoption (23 February 2007), the Security Council will review the situation
and consider the adoption of additional, tougher measures in response to this
non-compliance.
Iran's response
* Iran has said that it is open to "unconditional negotiations" with the
USA; however it would participate in such talks within the boundaries of Iran's
rights as a nation. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmeddinejad said, "The Iranian
nation has chosen its own way in line with the international conventions and no
one can create obstacles for them."
* After Resolution 1696 was adopted, Iran's representative to the UN in Vienna
asserted that its peaceful nuclear programme posed no threat to international
peace and security, and, therefore dealing with the issue in the Security
Council was unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility. Iran
said that the action by the Council, which was the culmination of efforts aimed
at making the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory, violated
international law, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA
resolution.
* The Security Council passed Resolution 1737 on 23 December imposing sanctions
on Iran for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. President Ahmeddinajad
said on Sunday, 21 January 2007 that the UN Resolution was born dead and even
if they adopt 10 more of such resolution it will not affect Iran's economy and
policies.
Iran's statement came days after the US announced that it would deploy a
second aircraft carrier, the USS Stennis, to the Gulf.
An unnamed Iranian military commander, reported to the have said this is
"aimed at evaluating defensive and fighting capabilities of the missiles."
Sunday's test (21 January 2007) would be the first since the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) imposed limited sanctions on the country in December
2006, banning the sale of materials and technology that could be used in
nuclear and missile programmes.
"As our Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] said, no Iranian official
has the right to back down on Iran's nuclear right."
"On 8 January, Khamenei rejected the UN resolution, vowing that the Islamic
Republic would not back down in its nuclear drive."
* Mohammed Saeedi, Deputy Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran
was annoyed by the UNSC's Resolution 1737. Iran believes that the resolution is
"illegal and unfair."
* Despite the action against Iran, on 15 January 2007, there were reports of
Iran's intention to phase in 3000 centrifuges more at the Natanz nuclear plant
over a period of time. Iranian government spokesman has denied this.
* On Monday, 22 January 2007, it was announced that Iran had rejected 38 IAEA
inspectors. All IAEA members receive lists of designated inspectors annually
and have the right under their safeguards agreements not to accept the
inspectors proposed by the Agency.
* Mr Ali Larijani, head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, has stated
that Iran will continue co-operation with the IAEA based on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Safeguards Agreement.
* The next meeting of the Board of Governors will take place in March 2007 and
a further report by the IAEA Director General is expected in time for the
meeting.
On Sunday, 28 January 2007 UN Atomic Head Mohamed ElBaradei told a Davos
Forum that military action against Iran's nuclear sites that Washington has not
ruled out, would be crazy and the two sides should stop flexing muscles and
start direct dialogue.
Iran said on Sunday it needed time to review a suggestion by the Dr
ElBaradei of a "timeout" under which Iranian nuclear work and UN sanctions
would be suspended together.
"Iran needs time to review such an initiative to see whether it has the
capacity to resolve Iran's nuclear issue," Iran nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani
said when asked about the "timeout" proposal.
"Iran's nuclear issue is a multi-faceted issue and we cannot say yes or no
to such a suggestion."
"ElBaradei's initiative to have a 'timeout' can be considered, and through
this suggestion a political solution can be found to this (nuclear) issue."
Reports of Iran barring nuclear inspectors
The IAEA "requested Iranian authorities to reconsider their decision."
The US on Monday denounced Iran's barring some inspectors as an attempt to
"dictate terms" to the international community.
IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said the IAEA sent a letter last week
calling for all 38 inspectors to be reinstated after an announcement on Monday
that Iran was blocking them from entering the country.
Iran has sent a letter to the IAEA officials overseeing the IAEA's
inspection of the Iranian nuclear programme.
Iran had banned Christian Charlier, an official overseeing the IAEA's
inspection of the Iranian nuclear programme, who is Belgian, last April from
entering the country in retaliation for alleged leaks to the press.
Iran has said in recent months that it want Charlier no longer even to see
reports on Iran at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna.
In December 2006 the Iranian parliament had adopted a bill requiring the
government to revise its co-operation with the IAEA in retaliation after the UN
Security Council that month passed a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran for
its refusal to end its uranium enrichment work.
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told reporters on Monday that
"any country had the right to refuse inspectors."
Last July, Dr ElBaradei said that 200 inspectors were charged with
investigating Iran's nuclear activities.
The banned inspectors are from Britain, France, Germany � the three EU
countries which have led nuclear talks with Iran as well as Canada and the
US.
UN resolution implications for South Africa
* South Africa is obliged to report on its compliance with Resolution 1737
to the Security Council Committee by the end of February 2007.
* The obligations (in Resolution 1737) for Member States are extensive and are
contained in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12 and 17. Essentially the
obligations are to restrict the transfer of certain listed items to or from
Iran, freeze assets or certain listed persons, and monitor their travel.
* One of the important aspects of the resolution is the decision, set out in
operative paragraph 18, to establish a Committee of the Security Council
consisting of all members of the Council, including South Africa. The mandate
of the Committee is to:
- Seek from all States, and in particular those in the region and those
producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in
the resolution, information regarding the sanctions taken by them to implement
the sanctions and whatever other information the Committee may consider
useful.
- Examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of the sanctions.
- Consider and decide upon requests for exemptions.
- Determine additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be
specified.
- Designate additional individuals and entities subject to the measures
imposed.
- Promulgate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the sanctions,
including a requirement that States proposing the addition of individuals and
entities against whom sanctions are to be imposed, provide a motivation.
- To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on
the implementation of this resolution, providing observations and
recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the
sanctions.
* Some have expressed concerns at aspects of Resolution 1737 (2006)
including:
- Although the resolution recognises the legal right of States to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it contradicts this through various measures
that impact directly and almost completely constrain Iran's ability to engage
in any nuclear activity, even relating to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
- Without providing any evidence of the existence of a weapons programme or the
involvement of persons or institutions in support of such activities, the
resolution includes a list of individuals and entities that are subject to
travel restrictions and/or whose assets need to be frozen.
Outside of United Nations Security Council measures there are actions taken
by the USA against Iran:
* President Reagan on 29 October 1987, issued Executive Order 12613 imposing
a new import embargo on Iranian origin goods and services. Section 505 of the
International Security and Development Co-operation Action of 1985 was utilised
as the statutory authority for the embargo, which gave rise to the Iranian
Transactions Regulations, Title 31 Part 560 of the US Code of Federal
Regulations.
* President Clinton issued Executive Order of 12957 prohibiting US involvement
with petroleum development in Iran as in the opinion of the US "Iranian
sponsorship of international terrorism and Iran's active pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction." On 6 May 1995 he signed Executive Order 12959, pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as well as substantially
tightening sanctions against Iran.
* On 19 August 1997, the President signed Executive Order 13059 confirming that
virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran are prohibited.
* Corporate criminal penalties for violations of the Iranian Transactions
Regulations can range up to US$500 000 with individual penalties of up to
US$250 000 and 10 years in jail. Civil penalties of up to US$11 000 may also be
imposed administratively.
* Transfers to any of the "States of concern" automatically trigger US
sanctions laws. The statutory provisions described below mandate actions that
must be taken by the US President or his designee when proliferation-related
activity occurs that triggers the provisions. The US President or his designee
has the authority to waive the imposition of sanctions if certain criteria are
met. The sanction laws include:
- Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
1. The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Action of 1992 mandates sanctions
against governments or persons that transfer or re-transfer goods or technology
so as to contribute knowingly and materially to efforts by Iran or Iraq to
acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or destabilising numbers and
types of certain advanced conventional weapons. Sanctions against persons
consist of two-year bans on United States Government (USG) procurement from or
exports to the person.
2. In the case of transfers by foreign governments, the mandatory sanctions
include:
* for a period of one year, suspension of US assistance (except for urgent
humanitarian assistance)
* suspension of co-development, co-production and military and dual-use
technical exchange agreements
* suspension of exports to the country of items on the US munitions list; and
US opposition to multilateral bank assistance to the country.
- Iran and Syria Actions Act
1. The mandatory non-proliferation related sanctions regarding Iran is
triggered by transfers that:
* contribute to Iran's acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction
* advanced conventional weapons
* enhance Iran's military or paramilitary capabilities
* enhance Iran's ability to develop their petroleum resources
* enhance Iran's ability to maintain their aviation capabilities.
- Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000
1. The Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000 provides for sanctions against any
foreign person if there is "credible information" that the foreign person
transferred to Iran items listed by the multilateral export control regimes
(Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group,
Wassenaar Arrangement), regardless of whether the item is used in Iran's
weapons programme. All such transfers must be reported to Congress every 6
months.
2. Sanctions against the foreign person may include:
* Prohibition on US Government procurement
* A ban on foreign assistance
* A ban on imports
* A ban on licenses of arms exports and dual-use items
- Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994
1. Section 821 of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 provides
for procurement sanctions against any US or foreign person that knowingly and
materially contributed through exports of goods or technology, to the efforts
of any individual, group or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear
explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material.
- Symington Amendment
Section 101 of the AECA prohibits the US Government from providing various
types of foreign assistance to any country that the US President determines has
delivered or received nuclear enrichment equipment materials, or technology
unless certain conditions apply to the non-proliferation transfer.
- Glenn Amendment
1. Section 102(b) of the AECA requires sanctions against:
* A foreign country that transfers a nuclear explosive device (or components
or design information for such a device) to a non-nuclear weapon state.
* A non-nuclear weapon state that receives a nuclear explosive device (or
components of design information for such a device).
* A non-nuclear weapon state that detonates a nuclear explosive device.
2. Sanctions include:
* termination of various types of foreign assistance
* termination of certain arms sales
* restrictions on the provision of USG credit, credit guarantees, and loans
from US banks to the foreign government
* USG opposition to loans from international financing institutions
* restrictions on US dual-use exports.
* In August 2006 the US imposed sanctions on two Russian firms for allegedly
passing on equipment to Iran that could be used in a nuclear weapons
programme.
* The US on 5 January 2007 announced sanctions against 24 foreign entities
including Russian, Chinese and North Korean firms for allegedly selling banned
weapons to Iran and Syria. The measures were imposed under the 2005 Iran and
Syria Non-Proliferation Act.
* Three Chinese State-run companies, two other Russian firms and a Russian
individual, as well as, entities from Iran, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, Malaysia
and Mexico were also imposed with the sanctions. The measures took effect as of
28 December 2006.
* "The introduction of umpteen sanctions against us is a form of unfair
competition targeting our company and all Russia," said Valery Kartavtsev, a
spokesman of Rosoboronexport.
* The Russian aircraft firm Sukhoi was also targeted by those measures,
however those sanctions were lifted against the jetmaker in November 2006 after
angry protests. Kartavtsev said Rosoboronexport adhered strictly to
international and Russian law and had not yet received any official
notification of sanctions.
* Re-exports of items containing more than 10% US content are also
prohibited.
* The US announced on 9 January 2007 that it had frozen the assets of Bank
Sepah (based in Iran) Bank Sepah International PLC (based in the UK) and Ahmed
Derakhshandeh (Chairperson and Manager of Bank Sepah International PLC), Shahid
Hemmat Industries Group and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group � companies that
have been designated under USA Executive Order 13382 for having been involved
in proliferation activities.
* South Africa will continue to participate in the work of the UNSC and the
1737 Committee with a view to support ongoing dialogue and a peaceful
resolution of this issue.
* The world cannot afford further escalation of conflict in the Middle East
region and South Africa will continue to work with all parties in an effort to
resolve this issue in a sustainable manner.
Increasing US military presence
On 18 January 2007 a second US aircraft carrier the USS John C Stennis, was
deployed to the Persian Gulf. The current US administration is making no secret
of the fact that the amount of American military might that is being
concentrated in the region is intended to bring pressure to bear on Iran, which
the it blames for the failure of its mission in Iraq.
According to US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, the build-up of American
military power in the Persian Gulf is intended to get Iran's attention. He was
quoted as saying "By all appearances, the Iranians believe that we are bogged
down in Iraq and that they possess the initiative giving them the ability to
pressure us in various ways."
The New York Times has reported that the United Kingdom will follow suit by
adding minesweeping vessels and magnetic "sleds" carried by helicopters to
improve the ability to counter Iranian mines that could block oil-shipping
lanes.
The Baker-Hamilton Report has called for a new diplomatic offensive to
include Syria and Iran as the only realistic way of achieving regional peace
and security.
Is this not the way forward?
Africa
Somalia
The Ethiopian government announced that Ethiopian troops have begun to
withdraw from Somalia on 23 January 2007.
The statement said that Ethiopian troops were forced to move into Somalia on
24 December 2006 in a counter-offensive to repulse the two-pronged offensive of
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) forces and their extremist allies on Baidoa.
The Ethiopian troops went into Somalia with a clear mandate from the
Ethiopian legislative body, the Parliament. The mandate makes it clear that the
Executive Branch has an obligation to withdraw the troops immediately upon the
completion of the mission with involves the removal of the clear and present
danger to Ethiopia's security. The mission has been completed.
US Airstrike
The US had conducted a second airstrike in Somalia.
The new airstrike came two weeks after an AC-130 plane killed what
Washington said were eight Al-Qaeda affiliated fighters hiding among Islamist
remnants pushed to Somalia's southern tip by Ethiopian and Somali government
forces.
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said, "We're going to go after al-Qaeda and
the global war on terror, whatever it takes us."
On Wednesday, 24 January 2007 US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger met
Somalia Islamic Courts Council (SICC) leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who was being
held by Kenyan intelligence.
Ranneberger, also responsible for Somalia, has said Ahmed was among those
who could play a role in the inclusive reconciliation process Washington and
many diplomatic players, believed was necessary to unify Somalia's multiple
factions.
Ahmed, one of the most visible faces of the SICC during its 6 month rule of
most of southern Somalia, surrendered at the Kenya-Somalia border
African Peace Mission
Nigeria is readying hundreds of troops for deployment to Somalia for
possible participation in an African peacekeeping force: "There are indications
that we might be asked to contribute troops for peacekeeping in Somalia. A
battalion is being prepared in the event that we are asked," Colonel Ayo
Olaniyan, a spokesperson for the Nigerian army said.
Mozambique is reconsidering whether it will contribute troops to
peacekeeping forces deployed in Sudan and Somalia, Defence Minister
Major-General Tobias Dai said: "We have ordered a thorough study to be
conducted before we intervene, then we will decide � we need to know the
region, the nature of the conflict, and its evolution and also understand
different efforts that we would propose."
Sudan
Rebel commanders in northern Darfur said on Monday, 22 January 2007 that
government aircraft has hit three villages over the weekend � claims the
Sudanese government strongly denied.
In an exclusive BBC interview President Bashir confirmed his troops had
carried out the bombardments.
He said the government had no option but to strike as 80% of attacks on
civilians in the region were carried out by rebel groups, undermining security:
"They are not supported by the government. The government is fighting
them."
After the signing of the peace agreement with a leading rebel group in May
2006, rival rebels formed a new alliance called the National Salvation Front,
President Bashir told BBC.
President Bashir said the group had received "massive military support in
full view of the international community" and set out to target those who had
signed the peace deal.
Militias have since carried out large-scale attacks on Sudan Liberation
Movement positions in northern Darfur, controlling its movements, the president
said: "We heard no condemnation of this movement or the countries supporting
it. But as soon as we were forced to send armed troops to deal with it we heard
talk of violations and a ceasefire breach."
Cote d'Ivoire
The leaders of the G7 met on Thursday, 18 January 2007 following the call of
the New Forces for a consultation of the opposition.
The G7 expressed their concern about the deadlock in the peace process since
the adoption of resolution 1721/2006 by the UN Security Council.
This deadlock is characterised by:
* the freezing of the implementation of the integration of the commanding
unit of the two armies
* the non-issuance of birth and nationality certificates � the process has
stalled
* the failure to launch the identification process and the production of the
electoral list
* the non deployment of the administration
* the freezing of the military dialogue
* the failure to dismantle the militia groups
* the delay in the implementation of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and
Reintegration)
* the delay in the restructuring of the army
* the confiscation of State Media by the Presidential camp.
The G7 also expressed their concern that the obstacles in the peace process
could lead to a delay in the production of the electoral list and the
organisation of the elections.
The leaders of the G7 affirmed their approval of this proposal for a direct
dialogue with the Head of State and encouraged the Secretary General of the New
Forces in that regard in order to play a part in breaking the current stalemate
within the strict provisions of resolution 1721/2006.
The G7 agreed to strengthen their alliance and effectively contribute in the
implementation of the various accords, notably Resolution 1721/2006 for the
organisation of free and transparent election by 31 October 2007. They decided
to form a commission in charge of making proposals.
Burundi
* agreements have been reached with the Paliphehutu-FNL regarding their
participation in the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM)
* all outstanding issues have been resolved
* the Facilitator is ready to set new dates and will begin consultations in
this regard
* it is expected that by mid-February the processes of demobilisation,
disarmament and re-integration of the Paliphehutu-FNL will begin in
earnest.
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Political
The political scene is dominated by speculation around the continued delay
in the announcement of the new Government for the DRC. This uncertainty is also
copiously fed by the media to the extent that the Office of the Prime Minister,
through the spokesperson Mr Godefroid Mayobo, issued a statement on Thursday,
25 January 2007, for the second time during the last two weeks, to call on the
population to be patient. According to Mr Mayobo, the Prime Minister Mr Antoine
Gizenga, wants to ensure that the new Government is announced in a "proper
manner" and that it will be able to respond to the expectations of the
population. The Prime Minister, according to the statement, is working closely
with the President on the finalisation of the Government and there is
absolutely no truth in the rumour of friction between the two parties. The
President and the Prime Minister agreed on six "phases" that would lead to the
formation and announcement of the new Government. The last phase is now being
finalised and the Government will thus be announced within the following few
days.
The six phases are the following:
1. agreement on the configuration of the team
2. the distribution of governmental responsibilities
3. consultations with coalition partners
4. allocation of posts to parties
5. proposal of candidates
6. choice of appropriate candidates.
According to Vital Kamerhe, President (Speaker) of the National Assembly,
the new Government will be announced on Tuesday, 30 January. He does not see a
real "delay" in the announcement of the Government as it was clear from the
start that such an announcement would only be done after the elections of the
Senators (Friday, 19 January) and the Provincial Governors and Deputy Governors
(Saturday, 27 January). As expectations for posts within the AMP Alliance of
the President are high, it was important to get a sense of the strength of the
Alliance in these institutions and to see which personalities could be
accommodated here before the Government is finalised. It should be recalled
here that the AMP Alliance has gained a majority of Senators in 7 of the 11
provinces with the remaining 4, including the town-province of Kinshasa, going
to the UN (Union for the Nation) of Jean-Pierre Bemba (who was also elected
Senator for Kinshasa). The results of the elections for Governors and
Deputy-Governors will be available as from Sunday, 28 January.
In the meantime however, the election of Governors and Deputy Governors are
already marred by controversy because of a decision by the DRC Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC) to exclude two UN candidates, both members of the
MLC party of Jean-Pierre Bemba, from the election because of their dual
nationality. According to a complaint lodged at the IEC, Mr Dominique Kanku, UN
candidate for Kasai Oriental and Alex Kande, UN candidate for Kasai Occidental,
have not renounced their Belgian citizenship and therefore, in terms of
Congolese law, they are not eligible for election. The election in these two
provinces have consequently been postponed till 10 February
Vital Kamerhe also informed the Mission that he is planning to call an
extraordinary session of Parliament on Monday, 29 January. The aim of this
session would be to finalise parliamentary operational rules and to start
working on the 2007/2008 programme. The idea is also to put pressure on the
Prime Minister not to delay the announcement of Government beyond Tuesday, 30
January.
The United Nations Secretary General, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, arrived in Kinshasa on
Friday, 26 January on his first official visit to Africa. In his address to the
DRC Parliament on Saturday morning (27 January), he congratulated the Congolese
population for the "spectacular progress" made during the last seven years. He
warned however that this is in fact only the start of the process and that much
remained to be done. He took the opportunity to ensure the Congolese population
of the support of the United Nations and the international community for the
"gigantic task" of reconstruction and development that lies ahead. The United
Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) flew to Kisangani where he will be meeting
with President Joseph Kabila Kabange.
Election of the DRC Senators: On 19 January 2007, 108 Senators were elected
during the elections which were free of political incidents. These senators
were elected out of 26 electoral constituencies representing 26 provinces as
provided by the Constitution. In the exception of Kinshasa that provided 8
seats, each province provided 4 seats. The coalition led by President Kabila
garnered 58 seats and that of Mr Bemba 21 seats. The President's party, the
PPRD, acquired 22 seats whilst the MLC had 14 seats. The RCD garnered 7 seats
where the Prime Minister Designate Mr Gizenga's party got just 1 seat which may
weigh negatively on him regarding the composition of the new Government. The
significance of the Senatorial elections is that 4 Senators are experienced
former Prime Ministers during Mobutu's reign.
Election of Governors and Deputies: Though the IEC still has to officially
announce the results today, 29 January 2007, on 27 January 2007 elections were
conducted in the DRC to elect Governors and Deputies. Throughout the eleven
Provinces, only two Kasai Provinces' elections were postponed to 10 February
2007. Of the nine Provinces where elections were held, Senator Bemba's
Coalition only won the Equateur Province and the rest of the provinces were won
by President Joseph Kabila's AMP Party. In Kinshasa, the Governor is from the
PPRD and his Deputy from PALU, Kinshasa is thus under the control of President
Kabila's AMP Party.
Security in the East: The security situation in the Eastern DRC has become
bearable due to the mediation role initiated by Rwanda between the government
of the DRC and the rebel group led by General Laurent Nkunda. The initiated
mediation has produced a peace deal between the government and General Nkunda.
General Nkunda has made a commitment that his fighters would be integrated into
the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). The commitment comes against the backdrop
that General Nkunda's warrant of arrest (issued via Interpol for his alleged
war crimes committed by his forces in 2004 in Bakuvu) is still pending. By
implication, the peace deal initiated by Rwanda, could bring less tension
between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda long accused of backing General
Nkunda. Over a thousand of Gen Nkunda's soldiers from 81st and 83rd brigades
have begun their integration into the National Army. Negotiations are ongoing
particularly regarding Gen Nkunda's reported demand for his warrant of arrest
and his future role in the DRC. It was earlier reported that he was demanding
for the withdrawal of warrant of arrest and indicated his intention to go into
exile.
On the whole, the security situation in the country seems to be calm
following the resumption of negotiations with Gen Nkunda. However, the
situation can change any time, as evidenced by the reported fighting between
two groups of General Nkunda's forces, those that are against and for the
integration within the FARDC.
There has been another pocket of violence in the Eastern Part of the DRC
carried out by dissident soldiers from the DRC Armed forces. The fighting began
on 27 January 2007 in the North Kivu villages of Luke and Murambi. MONUC is
monitoring the situation as it unfolds. The challenge remains the security
sector reform in the country.
Military
In this regard, two issues have dominated the headlines and discussions
during the last two weeks, namely the urgency of a proper programme of
integration for the Army and the "mixing" of the troops of General Laurent
Nkunda.
In eastern DRC, the "mixing" as opposed to "integration" of the troops of
rebel General Laurent Nkundabatware started on Friday, 19 January. The team of
Captain Sonica Van Rooyen South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has
started the physical registration of Nkunda's first 1 000 troops. In an
interview with RFI, General Nkunda committed himself to have all his troops
"mixed" with the FARDC. It seems however that negotiations concerning his own
situation and future are still continuing. The Mission has picked up that
President Kabila is not too eager about having Nkunda integrated into the
FARDC. Nkunda for his part, wants the international warrant of arrest against
him lifted. (During his speech in Parliament today, the UNSG said "it is
imperative to resolutely attack the problem of foreign armed groups who
continue to operate in the country and commit crimes against the population."
The DRC Members of Parliament responded to this shouting "Nkunda, Nkunda")
There is increasing speculation that Nkunda will be given political asylum in
South Africa or in Rwanda.
UN Support in DRC
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, on his first official trip abroad, told a
meeting of the National Assembly in the DRC, "Now, DRC is a true source of hope
for all of Africa," while acknowledging the 'gigantic' tasks ahead, including
improving health, education, basic services and infrastructure across the
massive country, while providing jobs and using revenue generated from natural
resources for improving living conditions.
He pledged to help the DRC push back poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy,
environmental degradation and discrimination.
"But as strong as the support of the international community may be, the key
to a better future in the DRC is in your hands," he said urging those present
to enter into a contract with themselves and the people they represent, as well
as global partners. This should focus on good governance, he added, because
re-establishing State authority is key to consolidating peace and
democracy.
"I ask therefore that all of the parties represented in this august Assembly
and all the leaders of the country work together, placing the interests of the
Congolese people above all."
He said the creation of an army and police is essential so that the UN
Mission in DRC (MONUC) can transfer its responsibilities to the government
based on an agreed timetable.
Creating a true national army requires first that all former combatants be
disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into Congolese society, he noted. In
parallel, it is essential to resolutely tackle the problem of armed foreign
groups which continue to operate in the country and to commit crimes against
the people.
Questions and answers
Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, what are you hearing from Addis Ababa
regarding the tabling of South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
report?
Answer: The report was tabled yesterday. As with any country report being
tabled, the country in question is given the opportunity to respond to the
report. This report is now being studied by other Heads of State and Government
and will be further discussed at the next meeting.
It is unfortunate that elements of the report have already been reported in
the media as a result of leaks.
The APRM process is a very important process. It is our view that it should
not be compromised just because it has been leaked and selectively reported
on.
Question: Deputy Minister, did President Mbeki respond to the report?
Answer: Yes, President Mbeki would have had an opportunity to respond to the
report as the President of the country.
Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, you indicated many instances of US
unilateral sanctions against Iran. To what extent do such actions undermine the
work of the United Nations Security Council?
Answer: Over the years there have been many independent actions against
Iran, Libya, the late Saddam Hussein and North Korea � which are outside the UN
Security Council framework.
The Baker-Hamilton Report now indicates that these actions are not enabling
progress despite billions of dollars being invested.
A new diplomatic offensive is certainly required and we must ensure that any
actions against Iran and Syria are not counter-productive and creates obstacles
rather than solutions.
Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, what is South Africa's position on Sudan's
chairmanship of the African Union?
Answer: Our view, is that the AU, like its predecessor the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU), has many other more pressing issues with which to deal
like poverty and underdevelopment.
Sadly, the debate over who will chair the body, which is prevalent in many
major international newspapers today, is diverting attention from many more
important issues that must be dealt with � precisely the issue of Darfur,
Somalia, and as the discussions in Davos have indicated, how to progress in the
World Trade Organisation talks.
I am convinced that African Heads of State who will meet to discuss this
matter, will emerge with an African position that is in the best interests of
the African continent and people.
Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, do you think the murder of Mr Rattray will
lead to tourists being sceptical of visiting South Africa?
Answer: We must at the outset express shock and concern at the murder of Mr
Rattray since such acts only strengthen perceptions that crime is out of
control both in South Africa and beyond its borders. I believe that many
sections of the international media would have covered this story.
The Cabinet Lekgotla has just emerged with the view that crime can only be
handled comprehensively if it is dealt with holistically. There are many
reasons for crime � poverty and underdevelopment, the erosion of the social
fabric of society.
We all have a role to play in combating this phenomenon. We need a
partnership against crime.
The government, civil society, and religious leaders, must intensify our
efforts to inculcate values that will strengthen our social fabric.
Manusha Pillai
Department of Foreign Affairs: Media Liaison
Tel: (012) 351 0269
Cell: 082 389 3587
E-mail: pillaim@foreign.gov.za
Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs
29 January 2007
