11 September 2007
Chairperson,
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Board on this important
matter.
As Board Members are aware, the declaration on 19 December 2003 by Libya
that it had been involved in nuclear weapons activities, led to the exposure of
an illicit international nuclear weapons proliferation network (the so-called
AQ Khan Network). This Illicit Network apparently operated in more than 30
countries and comprised of several entities and individuals of different
nationalities.
In this context, Board Members may recall, that we reported during September
2004 that an investigation had been undertaken with regard to the contravention
of South Africa's Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993
(Act No. 87 of 1993) and Nuclear Energy Act, 1999 (Act No. 46 of 1999). At that
time I informed the Board that these investigations were taking place in the
context of the so-called AQ Khan Network, as well as information obtained
following Libya's announcement of the abandonment of its nuclear weapons
programme.
We share the view of the Director General, ElBaradei, and others that the
Illicit Network presents a serious challenge to the NPT. It is for this reason,
Chairperson that the South African government in co-operation with a few other
countries, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), undertook
a thorough and urgent investigation into the contravention of relevant South
African non-proliferation legislation with the aim of prosecuting those
involved in these illicit activities. This is yet another demonstration of
South Africa's commitment to the Treatyâs non-proliferation provisions.
Chairperson,
The allegations that were investigated initially related specifically to the
import and export of a controlled flow-forming machine, as well as the
production and attempted export of certain components associated with a
centrifuge enrichment plant without the necessary permits and
authorisation.
The South African authorities instituted an intensive investigation into the
possible involvement of two South African registered corporate entities, namely
Krisch Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd and Tradefin Engineering CC, with the network's
procurement activities for Libya.
This led to a search being carried out at the premises of Tradefin
Engineering on 1 September 2004. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal
systems and machine header piping systems, as identified in Part 1, Annex B,
5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively, of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines
(published in IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev. 8/Part 1) were found, as well as
documentation relating to the import and export of a flow-forming machine,
classified as 'nuclear related dual-use equipment' as described in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2. Both the flow-forming machine and the systems formed
part of Libyaâs undeclared nuclear activities. One of the Directors of
Tradefin, who had been responsible for the manufacture of the systems, Jam
Meyer, was arrested.
The charges against him were withdrawn after he revealed that he had been
acting on behalf of Krisch Engineering when he took part in the above
activities. He was given the status as a cooperating, complicit witness and on
the strength of his evidence, the Managing and Design Directors of Krisch
Engineering, namely German citizen, Gerhard Wisser and Swiss citizen, Daniel
Geiges, were arrested and charged with contravening South Africaâs
non-proliferation legislation.
Wisser is a mechanical engineer and has a diploma in engineering. In 1971 he
established a company which is now known as Krisch Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd in
Randburg. On 12 March 1971, he became a Director of the company and at the time
of the commission of these offences, he was its Managing Director. For many
years, Krisch Engineering had been the local agent for Leybold Heraeus.
Geiges is also a mechanical engineer. In the 1970's, he joined Krisch
Engineering and became a Director on 10 July 1981. At the time of the
commission of these offences, he was a project manager in the company, working
on the instructions of Wisser in his capacity as Managing Director.
At a preliminary hearing after their arrest, both Messrs Wisser and Geiges
declared their intention to plead not guilty to all the charges and indicated
that the systems in question related to a water purification plant. In order to
counter this argument, the South African authorities embarked on an extremely
thorough and expensive investigation. During the course of the investigation,
the South African authorities received assistance from a few countries.
Co-operation by the authorities of affected countries was, unfortunately,
uneven. Whilst some authorities co-operated fully, others that were ideally
placed to provide evidence, either provided limited assistance or declined to
provide any assistance whatsoever.
Chairperson,
Upon the seizure of the systems and documentation, the South African
Government immediately reported the investigation to the IAEA and the Agency
provided continuous and valuable assistance during the course of the
investigation.
The investigation revealed that during the period 1986 to 1995 the accused
supplied controlled nuclear equipment to Pakistan. These activities by the
Illicit Network later led to the attempted supply to Libya of controlled items
in contravention of South Africa's non-proliferation controls. It is important
to note in this context that the former South African apartheid regime only
joined the NPT in 1991, during the period of transition, and the relevant
legislation and regulations were only promulgated in 1994, in the year when the
first democratic Government came to power in South Africa.
As a result of the investigation, the National Prosecuting Authority
indicted the accused on 10 charges, six of which were related to the Libyan
activities and the remaining four to Pakistan. The indictment alleged that the
accused had acted in concert with other members of the network outside the
country.
When the National Prosecuting Authority was ready to proceed with the
prosecution in early 2006, the two accused sought postponements for various
reasons. In late 2006, one of the accused, Daniel Geiges, was diagnosed as
being terminally ill with cancer, which resulted in him not being able to
attend certain trial hearings.
Chairperson,
I am glad to report to the Board that on 4 September 2007, the other
accused, Gerhard Wisser, entered into a Plea and Sentence Agreement with the
National Prosecuting Authority in terms of which he was convicted of seven
counts relating to his activities with both Libya and Pakistan and sentenced to
three years' correctional supervision, as well as a total of 18 years'
imprisonment, suspended for five years on conditions which, inter alia, require
him to cooperate fully with the authorities as far as further investigations
into the networkâs activities are concerned. A Confiscatory Order was made in
respect of his proceeds of crime to the amount of EUR2.8 million and R6
million.
The case against Daniel Geiges was separated and postponed until 21
September 2007, pending medical reports concerning his health status and
ability to stand trial.
Gerhard Wisser, in his plea of guilty, confirmed that his crimes had in one
way or another contributed to the Illicit Networkâs activities and admitted
that he had acted in concert with other members of the network outside the
country. His plea of guilty was only tendered after he was supplied with
conclusive evidence which destroyed his initial defence argument that he had
only been involved in water purification activities.
In conclusion, Chairperson,
South Africa is highly appreciative of the major contribution of the IAEA
and for its assistance in bringing the case against Wisser to a close. We also
wish to recognise the co-operation received from all Governments involved in
the investigation.
What is now required from all countries affected by the Illicit Network, is
enhanced efforts by the respective authorities, in close co-operation with the
IAEA. It is only through resilient action that we will be able to achieve the
successful prosecution of all the major actors involved in these global illicit
networks that will lead to the complete elimination of the Network.
As one of the first successful cases against those involved in the so-called
AQ Khan Network, South Africaâs experience has illustrated the value of the
IAEA and of effective information-sharing. We believe that this type of
co-operation will contribute to the prevention, combating and eradication of
such illicit activities.
Extracts from the Terms of Agreement related to the Plea and Sentence
Agreement of Gerhard Wisser will be circulated as an annex together with this
statement.
We request that this update and the annex be circulated as an official
document of the Agency.
I thank you
Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs on behalf of Abdul Minty,
Chairperson-SA Council on Non-Proliferation
11 September 2007
