Denel explosion inquiry paints a picture of structural shortcomings, defective designs and unnecessary overtime
The inquiry into the Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) accident which killed eight people and injured others was told this week of structural shortcomings, defective designs as well as unnecessary overtime being put in when there were no large orders. It also heard of the necessary risk assessment not being carried out for key plant fittings.
The former site manager and chairperson of the health and safety committee, Lewis Minaar told the inquiry that at the time of the incident there was no need for workers to be working overtime.
Minaar told the commission that at the time of the incident the plant was not remotely under pressure in terms of volumes.
“We had large orders and we were producing 20 000 chargers per month for eight, nine months in a row but at the time of the incident, the plant may be for three months before and three months after was not making more than close to 20 000. I would say closer to about 5000 so the plant was definitely not running at high production. Not at all,” Minaar told the inquiry.
When probed if he was aware that there were people required to work overtime over the weekend Minaar said “I heard about that. Let me be clear about it, there is no management requirement. Management was not aware of people working overtime,” said Minaar.
Advocate Erasmus further probed why would management pay people working overtime and then overtime was not approved. Minaar said “well, when I was there, no overtime was worked without prior approval. My information says that the overtime that was worked was not approved,” emphasised Minaar.
Earlier this week the inquiry heard testimonies from a number of employees who testified that the weekend leading to the explosion there was a push for production as employees had to work overtime for material to be ready to be used for production at the N16 plant where the CBI single-base propellant was blended.
Kevin Williams who worked with Nico Samuels the deceased who was a supervisor at the N16 plant at the time said, they were working overtime in order to finish the blending of the CBI.
“When I asked Nico why we have to work on a weekend he said there was a CBI that needed to be finished,” Williams told the inquiry.
The four-day inquiry resumed on Tuesday 19 October at Community House in Salt River after an adjournment in May where 13 witnesses were cross-examined before the commission.
This time around, 17 witnesses comprising of current and former employees and technical experts were lined up to give evidence.
Giving testimony today, Civil Engineer Stephen Lapage, a specialist in the structural engineering field told the inquiry that the traverse at RDM meant to form a barrier that will set at a low angle hiding fragments from an explosion was not in agreement with what the modern rules of what a traverse design would be.
According to his statement in the investigation report he compiled, traverses can also play a role at the explosive sites away from the explosion by protecting personnel from low-end fragments, debris and providing protection from blast and flame.
If personnel are being protected by a traverse, then its design will need to ensure that it does not present additional hazards like generating several fragments. To be effective, a traverse must be constructed according to recognised specifications.
Presiding officer Mphumzi Dyulete asked if the traverse at RDM met the safety standards according to recognised specifications, Lapage responded “No. not according to modern specification.”
“The pillar of the concrete walls had the most tragic consequence of the explosion. The walls did not offer any resistance to the effect of the explosion and the collapse of the wall allowed the blast to spread to the building space. At the same time, the blast carried lethal fragments as a consequence the building collapsed and fatalities occurred,” read the statement in the report by Lapage.
He said the one basic principle in protection against explosion is distance. “The further you move away from the centre of the explosion the more you gain protection. And that increase of protection that is dramatical with the distance. A few meters would be a completely different situation. But if I remember correctly we were talking less than a meter of those walls in there. This could be verified but we were very close to those walls,” said Lapage.
The inquiry is spearheaded by the Department of Employment and Labour to investigate events leading into the Rheinmetall Denel Munition fatal incident which claimed the lives of eight employees.
Some of the information that emerged from the inquiry is that a risk assessment procedure to have a new valve fitted at the N16 plant of Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) had not been commissioned and completed at the time of the incident.
During the week, the inquiry heard that the butterfly valve had been replaced with the new valve on Friday and the explosion occurred the following Monday.
The inquiry closed its second sitting today after hearing evidence from the last two witnesses. Dyulete said of the 17 witnesses, the department learned at a later stage that one had since passed on but it was not related to the incident.
Dyulete said it was vital for the enquiry to hear evidence from various witnesses before compiling a recommendations report that will be handed over by the Department’s Provincial Chief Inspector and to the National Prosecuting Authority.
“We are hoping that with the evidence provided by the witnesses that we will be able to somewhat determine what could have transpired on that fatal day. It’s been quite a long journey especially for the families who are looking to find closure on this matter,” said Dyulete.
The next sitting will be announced in due course.
Media enquiries contact:
Mapula Tloubatla
WC Provincial Communication Officer
0609897509
Mapula.Tloubatla@labour.gov.za
