South Africa, at the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) on agenda item 5: Nuclear Verification (B): Report by the
Director-General on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Vienna
8 March 2006
Chairperson,
South Africa fully associates itself with the statement made on behalf of
the Non-Aligned Movement. We should also like to mark International Women's
Day, which should be of importance not only for women but to humanity as a
whole. As long as half of humanity is subjected to discrimination and exclusion
we shall all be derived of this major human resource. Thus we are proud that
the African Union at its inception had decided that at least half of its
Commissioners should be women. Maybe there is important work to be done in
other multilateral bodies.
We appreciate the informative and comprehensive report by the
Director-General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran as contained in document GOV/2006/15. South Africa
wishes to thank the Director-General and his staff for their continued and
dedicated efforts to investigate the remaining outstanding issues relevant to
the peaceful nuclear programme of Iran. I should also like to express my
appreciation for the continued co-operation extended by the Iranian authorities
to the Director-General and his staff.
Chairperson,
At the outset I am sure that we all recognise and confirm that the IAEA is the
sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance
with its Statute and the safeguards system, compliance with the safeguards
agreements which States Parties undertake in fulfilment of their obligations
under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Chairperson,
South Africa notes from the Director-General's report that since the previous
update on developments in Iran, it is clear that some additional progress has
been made in resolving the outstanding issues pertaining to Iran's nuclear
programme. Although we welcome the reconfirmation by the Agency that all the
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for and that the Agency
has not seen any diversion of such material to nuclear weapons, we regret the
fact that the Agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.
We note that although steady progress has been made on the two critical
issues of contamination and the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, these issues
still require further clarification in order to enable the Agency to provide
the necessary assurances regarding the nuclear programme in Iran.
With regard to the issue of contamination, South Africa notes that the
Agency is also awaiting additional information from another Member State and we
trust that with their continued assistance, the Agency will be able to finalise
this outstanding matter soon. With regard to the second outstanding issue
pertaining to the centrifuge programme, we note that further clarifications are
awaited from Iran.
However, the clarification of these outstanding issues will continue to
require the assistance and co-operation not only of Iran but also of third
parties and South Africa encourages all concerned to accelerate their
co-operation with the Agency, to finalise these matters without delay.
Chairperson,
South Africa recognises the need for further investigation of the clandestine
supply network is required in order to corroborate the information that Iran
has provided, so as to enable the Agency to conclude its assessment of the
extent of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme.
We share the international community's concern over the illicit transfer of
nuclear and nuclear dual-use technology and materials that could be used in
weapons of mass destruction. The Director-General also clearly stated that the
experience of the illicit trade in nuclear technology to manufacture nuclear
weapons presents a serious challenge to the Treaty on the NPT. At the 2005 NPT
Review Conference, South Africa made proposals to deal with this issue in the
context of the NPT but due to the failure of the Conference the issue was
regrettably not taken up.
South Africa agrees that we should collectively act to strengthen
international efforts against weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear
weapons. In this regard, in dealing with this illicit network, estimated to be
operating in numerous countries world-wide, it is important to tighten controls
over nuclear material, technologies and equipment to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation and illicit trafficking and to review existing penalties for such
grave offences.
It should be a matter of serious concern for all of us that with so many
countries involved there appears to be few arrests and prosecutions and that
undoubtedly reflects on a possible lack of investigative capacity and
co-operation between countries including information sharing. Indeed, if there
is a need we should work out ways and means to assist such countries.
South Africa's experience with this network has shown that no control
regime, no matter how comprehensive, can fully guarantee against abuse.
Therefore, the success of such controls remains dependent on effective
information sharing and co-operation among relevant parties and the IAEA. It is
imperative that the Board considers this matter and as a matter of priority the
governors initiate a process on how this enhanced co-operation and information
sharing can be achieved within the framework of the IAEA. The Agency needs to
be at the centre of this process and it is therefore imperative that all
parties provide it with the necessary information.
In addition to proliferation concerns as a result of illicit nuclear
networks, South Africa believes that the international community should
redouble its efforts in dealing with nuclear disarmament. The existence of
nuclear weapons and the threat to use them prompts States to desire possessing
these weapons at the peril of nuclear disarmament and the global establishment
of nuclear weapon free zones, including in the Middle East.
Chairperson,
South Africa shares the concern of the Agency that the uncertainties related to
the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme have not been clarified after
nearly three years of verification activities undertaken. South Africa fully
supports the efforts of the Agency in executing its investigative mandate in
Iran and we believe that an enhanced process of co-operation between Iran and
the Agency would facilitate the efforts by the Agency to reach a conclusion
that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.
South Africa appreciates Iran's continued co-operation with the Agency in
resolving the remaining outstanding issues in the context of its Safeguards
Agreement and we urge Iran to continue to expeditiously provide the information
required by the Agency.
Chairperson,
Whereas South Africa recognises the inalienable right of all NPT States Parties
to utilise the atom for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations
under the Treaty, South Africa also believes that States with advanced nuclear
capabilities have the obligation to build confidence with the international
community in the peaceful purposes of their activities.
We are pleased that Iran has been able to facilitate the work of the Agency
in clarifying the outstanding issues pertaining to its nuclear activities,
which should naturally continue including through the provisional
implementation of the Additional Protocol as if it has been ratified.
Furthermore, the continued implementation of relevant non-legally binding
confidence building measures are useful measures to also facilitate the process
to clarify the issues related to Iran's nuclear programme.
Chairperson,
In resolving the tensions surrounding Iran's peaceful nuclear programme and to
avoid a confrontation South Africa believes that it is important to work for an
inclusive and sustainable negotiated agreement that respects the legitimate
sovereign interest of all the countries concerned, as well as the imperative to
reduce regional and global conflicts and tensions.
South Africa welcomes the initiatives aimed at restoring confidence in
Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including the initiative by the Russian
Federation for a co-operation agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on
the enrichment of uranium.
Notwithstanding the importance of these initiatives, they have no
applicability beyond this framework. All States Parties of the NPT in
conformity with their obligations under the Treaty have the right to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
In conclusion Chairperson,
The Board in its previous decision in February 2006 reaffirmed its and I quote,
"resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear
issue". South Africa therefore believes that through continued dialogue and the
demonstration of the required political will by all concerned would ensure that
the uncertainties surrounding Iran's nuclear programme is brought to a peaceful
closure without resorting to, or to threaten to use coercive action, thereby
avoiding a confrontation that could escalate into a spiralling conflict with
uncontrollable consequences.
The Agency is central in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue in accordance
with the IAEA Statute. Also in February 2006, the Board underlined the fact and
I quote, "that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's declarations is ongoing".
It is incumbent upon us not to hinder nor place undue pressure on the Agency to
complete its work within artificially set deadlines.
We also commend and we all recognise the high quality and competence of the
Agency in dealing with its verification mandate under the Statute and its
reports are indispensable in any serious consideration of matters related to
nuclear verification.
In this regard, the Board plays a crucial role in assessing the corrective
action taken by Iran and based on this assessment, the Board may thereafter
decide on any further measures Iran may need to take to ensure the full
implementation of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Although the
Board requested in February 2006 the Director-General to convey his report to
the Security Council, South Africa continues to believe that all IAEA reports
and resolutions related to Iran's nuclear issue should also be conveyed to the
United Nations (UN) General Assembly.
Therefore, I request that the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran be placed on the Agenda of the next regular
meeting of the Board and that the Director-General provide the Board at that
meeting with an updated report on developments on the implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in Iran.
Chairperson, I thank you.
Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs
8 March 2006
Source: SAPA
