A Minty: IAEA meeting on implementation of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons safeguards agreement in Iran

4 February 2006

Chairperson,
At the outset, I would like to express through my brother, Ambassador Ramzy,
heartfelt condolences and sympathy to the families and friends of those
passengers and crew that tragically died or were injured in the Egyptian ferry
disaster that took place yesterday.

Chairperson,
South Africa fully associates itself with the statement made on 2 February 2006
by the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. We also appreciate the informative
and comprehensive factual report given at the beginning of our special session
by the Deputy Director-General on recent developments regarding the nuclear
programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Chairperson,
The resolution that is before the Board would represent a watershed in the
Agency’s efforts to deal with the outstanding issues related to the Islamic
Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme. This resolution seeks to
initiates a process whereby the Security Council will become more substantially
involved in the Agency’s verification activities in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for
the Board.

We have made it clear in the run-up to this special meeting that South
Africa has, as always, work for the adoption of consensus decision by the Board
on the Islamic Republic of Iran. South Africa, together with many others made
every effort to achieve this and consensus was well within our grasp.

This was a lack of agreement on the formulation of operative paragraph 2 and
consensus could have been possible if this action could have been deferred to
March, consistent with the improvement in operative paragraph 8.

Chairperson,
South Africa believes that in the absence of a definitive assessment by the
Agency on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its NPT
Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, the Board cannot now consider referring a
report or reports to the Security Council and General Assembly.

The best approach is for the Board to adopt decisions by consensus that
would reinforce the work of the Agency and create a climate conducive to
resolve the outstanding issues pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
peaceful nuclear programme.

Chairperson,
South Africa’s concerns related to the basic thrust and content of our work
between now and March are mainly based on the following;

Firstly, the impact on the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of
the Agency. Secondly, the impact and consequences of our actions and decisions
on the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement
voluntary, non-legally binding confidence building measures to facilitate the
process to find a long-term sustainable solution to its peaceful nuclear
programme.

Thirdly, the impact on the NPT in the context of the role of the Agency,
including the Board, in the process to verify the non-diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

Chairperson,
South Africa is seriously concerned about the impact and consequences of the
decision by the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran to resume research and development
activities in January 2006. Tensions have heightened and we have entered into a
virtual confrontation mode. We need to keep focus on the big picture and when
emotions run high, facts and common sense often become blurred, preventing us
from finding a sustainable and peaceful solution to this matter. We must guard
against jeopardising the role and responsibility of the Agency.

South Africa places a great importance on the role, authority, impartiality
and integrity of the Agency and we would not wish to do anything that would
reduce or undermine its solemn responsibilities. We believe it is imperative
that the Director-General and the Agency should be permitted to complete its
verification work without undue pressure and hindrance and that should be our
primary concern.

I wish to recall for the attention of the Governors a very important
decision that was taken by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which
is directly relevant to this matter and I quote “The Conference reaffirms that
IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in
accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance
with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of
their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that
nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.
States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards
agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns,
along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider,
investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance
with its mandate.”

This decision reaffirms the special responsibility that rests on us to
ensure that our decisions and actions should not jeopardise the role and
responsibility of the Agency.

Chairperson,
The reports by the Director-General on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the recent update given by
the Deputy Director-General, has shown a positive and continuing trend of
co-operation by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Agency. It is recognised
that as a result of the corrective actions taken by the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Agency was able to clarify many, but regrettably not yet all, of the
outstanding issues.

South Africa expects that the co-operation given by the Islamic Republic of
Iran to the Agency in clarifying these outstanding issues will continue. Such
proactive co-operation and support to the Director-General and his staff would
allow the Agency to bring this matter to a close and to restore confidence in
the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

We call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement its
voluntarily, non-legally binding confidence building measures, including the
suspension of its enrichment related activities.

South Africa welcomes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued
implementation of the Additional Protocol as if it had been ratified and urges
the Islamic Republic of Iran to complete the ratification process as soon as
possible.

Ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol and the continued
full implementation of all the voluntarily, non-legally binding confidence
building measures, as called for by the Board in its previous consensual
decisions, are considered essential measures to facilitate the process to
clarify the issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme.

Chairperson,
The total elimination of all nuclear weapons is our common objective and
therefore, the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are
inextricably linked to each other. This should not be considered as some
outdated position, since the reality is that those who have nuclear weapons
should not ever threaten non-nuclear-weapon States with the use of nuclear
weapons, but eliminate them.

Our concerted efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should
be matched by a concurrent effort to eliminate, in a verifiable and
irreversible manner, of all nuclear weapons and of the universal adherence to
the NPT.

In terms of the application of the inalienable right to the peaceful use of
nuclear technology, NPT States Parties have undertaken to pursue a nuclear
programme for peaceful purposes in conformity with their obligations under
Articles I and II of the NPT. In verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
non-nuclear-weapon States have to conclude INFCIRC/153 type safeguard
agreements with the Agency. It is the responsibility of the Agency, as the
competent authority, to verify in accordance with these type of agreements, the
fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the NPT by these States
Parties.

Governors should note in particular that the Agency’s verification of or
inability to confirm the non-diversion of nuclear material by a
non-nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the INFCIRC/153 type safeguards
agreement, will determine the further measures the Board may adopt, including
those measures outlined in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In this regard,
the Board at its discretion may decide to notify the Security Council and the
General Assembly.

The Agency’s investigation being undertaken in the Islamic Republic of Iran
is therefore undertaken in the context of verifying the non-diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency.

The focus of the Agency’s investigation is not to provide arguments or
reasons for punitive actions to be undertaken against the Islamic Republic of
Iran. The focus is rather to facilitate a process whereby the Islamic Republic
of Iran could undertake corrective action within a reasonable time, to enable
the Agency to verify non-diversion. A process currently ongoing and which the
Board will assess at its first regular meeting in March this year.

Chairperson,
We need to recognise that the issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear
programme is a unique and special case and therefore decisions adopted by the
Board in this regard should not be regarded as setting a precedent for future
cases to be dealt with by the Board.

The implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain non-legally
binding confidence building measures is essential to addressing the outstanding
issues regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme.

However, South Africa has also consistently urged Members not to equate
voluntary measures undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the legally
binding obligations stemming from Members’ safeguards agreements with the
Agency.

In this regard South Africa has welcomed initiatives aimed at restoring
confidence in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme,
including the initiative by the Russian Federation for a co-operation agreement
with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the enrichment of uranium.

South Africa strongly believes that this initiative is aimed at restoring
confidence in the peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear
programme and has no applicability beyond this framework. All States Parties of
the NPT in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty have the right to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.

In conclusion Chairperson,

Regardless of the content of the decision adopted today through a vote,
South Africa continues to believe that we must resolve differences through
dialogue and negotiations, thereby avoiding a confrontation that could escalate
into a spiralling conflict with uncontrollable consequences.

I thank you.

Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs
4 February 2006