B Sonjica: Special session of the International Atomic Energy
Agency

19 September 2006

Chairman

Allow me to express my appreciation to the Director-General and to the
Secretariat for arranging this important special event.

With the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
almost 50 years ago and in recognition for the increasing importance of nuclear
power generation and the substantial benefits of the atom in other areas of
human development, the founding members had envisaged a central role for this
newly established organisation in facilitating international co-operation in
the peaceful uses of the atom. At the same time, these founding members also
recognised the dual application of nuclear energy for both peaceful and
non-peaceful uses and consequently provided a framework for safeguarding this
important resource and for verifying the non-diversion thereof to non-peaceful
purposes.

Whilst international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
increased and the safeguards system expanded over the years through the
development of the non-proliferation regime, including the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), some of the original ideas set forth by the founding members in
the Statute of the Agency, never came to fruition. Included amongst these was
the notion of the agency acting as a fuel bank to provide and assure the
reliable supply of fuel for civilian use in a fair and equitable manner.

During the years a number of attempts were made to create additional
measures beyond the safeguards system aimed at preventing sensitive
technologies from being misused for non-peaceful purposes. These attempts
included proposals during the 1970s to establish multilateral fuel cycle
centres and an international nuclear fuel authority, which was intended to
guarantee the supply of nuclear power plant fuel to NPT non-nuclear-weapon
States (NNWS), with the proviso that such States renounce national reprocessing
or enrichment plants.

If we examine the subject of today's special event, we have to admit that
history indeed has a way of repeating itself. It is therefore imperative that
during our discussions at this event, we interrogate the central question as to
why these efforts failed and on how we can extract lessons from these
experiences in finding a solution to our common concerns about the abuse of
these sensitive technologies given the new realities of the 21st Century.

As Governments, one of our most important pre-occupations today is energy
security. There is wide recognition for the need to diversify energy supply by
developing advanced, non-polluting, more efficient, affordable and
cost-effective energy technologies, including renewable energy technologies to
meet the rising global demand for energy, particularly in developing countries.
At the recently concluded Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Havana,
Cuba, the Heads of State and Government of these 116 States again underlined
the need to ensure that energy policies support developing countries' efforts
to eradicate poverty. They also emphasised the need to accelerate the
development, dissemination and deployment of affordable and cleaner energy
efficiency and energy conservation technologies, as well as the transfer of
such technologies, particularly to developing countries.

These Heads of State or Government agreed to enhance co-operation with a
view to improving access to energy including alternative sources of energy by
developing countries. At the same time they underscored the sovereign right of
States over the management of their energy resources.

When looking at alternative energy sources, an increasing number of
countries are today recognising the role that nuclear energy can play.

This realisation about the increased relevance of nuclear energy in
contributing to global energy needs prompted a re-evaluation of supply
arrangements. In this regard, studies were recently undertaken to examine the
issue of assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel, including the initiative by
the Director-General of the IAEA to mandate an expert group on look at possible
multilateral approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. As you are aware, this
expert group issued its report during 2005, which included a number of
conclusions and recommendations. Whilst the report contains several interesting
ideas and options that require further consideration, the experts themselves
stated that the desirability or feasibility of multilateral nuclear approaches
and the options identified in the report do not necessarily reflect agreement
by all the experts – a clear illustration of the complexity of the issue.

When the expert panel's report was discussed in the Board of Governors last
year, South Africa emphasised that any decision taken in this regard may not
place any unwarranted restrictions on the inalienable right of States to the
peaceful application of nuclear energy. We also stated that there is a need to
guard against actions, which would merely serve to exacerbate existing
inequalities, including through the creation of another kind of cartel that
would exclude full participation, particularly by States in full compliance
with their safeguards obligations.

Why did the previous proposals especially those of the 1970s not result in
the adoption of such a multilateral mechanism? Most of us would agree that the
one factor that undoubtedly influenced the outcome of these proposals was the
geo-political circumstances of that particular era. Another factor that may
have prevented consensus was the existence of a vibrant market for the supply
of nuclear fuel – a market that sufficiently supplied in the demand. In
addition, the unwillingness of States to relinquish control over their national
capabilities would also have influenced the outcome of these proposals.

It is important to recall that the negotiation of this instrument resulted
in a carefully crafted treaty that, although discriminatory in nature due to
the creation of two distinct categories of States, provided a delicate balance
between the rights and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States - the haves and
the non-nuclear-weapon States - the have-nots. As part of the deal, the treaty
not only created obligations for everyone on nuclear non-proliferation, it also
included obligations on nuclear disarmament and rights on the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.

In the latter regard, Article IV of NPT states that, nothing in the treaty
shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II. As such, the
NPT provides a framework of confidence and co-operation within which the
development of the peaceful uses of the atom can take place.

In terms of the non-proliferation provisions of the treaty, it should be
noted that the NPT did not seek to limit access to any advanced or sensitive
technologies by States Parties that are in conformity with their
obligations.

This principle is made clear in Article IV. The non-proliferation provisions
therefore specifically seek to prevent the diversion of material to any nuclear
weapons programmes or other nuclear explosive devices.

When we examine the proposals of the 1970s, these also included conditions
for access to the reliable supply of nuclear fuel - conditions that were
clearly in direct conflict with the inalienable right of States “to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”, as
provided for in the NPT. Unfortunately, we have noted that some of the most
recent proposals on supply mechanisms contain similar conditions. Although the
prevailing proliferation concerns may prompt us to consider alternative
arrangements on supply mechanisms, these may under no circumstances impose
unwarranted restrictions and controls over the legitimate peaceful use of
nuclear energy.

One of the approaches suggested in the most recent proposals on supply
arrangements is the possible establishment of regional multinational
centres.

Whatever the outcome of the discussions on the most appropriate approach, it
is imperative that we ensure that no arrangement would prevent any country or
region from full participation.

In view of the statutory mandate of the IAEA, I believe that the
establishment of any credible mechanisms to assure the reliable supply of
nuclear fuel should be considered in the context of the agency. Not only does
the agency have a legitimate role to encourage and assist the practical
application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with its
statute, it also has a special responsibility to take into consideration the
needs of the developing areas of the world.

Our discussions on the need for such a mechanism, as well as a possible
framework to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel, should therefore not
involve any preconditions that would even hint at the possibility that
non-nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under the
NPT, should forego their inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. If we agree to such conditions, we may well be contributing to
undermining the very bargains on which the NPT was founded and further disturb
the delicate balance of rights and obligations under this instrument.

The decision by States not to pursue domestic fuel cycle activities is a
sovereign one. The availability of nuclear fuel in the market or the existence
of mechanisms that facilitate reliable supply may well contribute to such a
decision. Although it is argued that those already pursuing uranium enrichment
activities would in any event not be utilising this mechanism, it should be
remembered that some might choose to pursue sensitive fuel cycle activities in
a limited way or only for research purposes.

However, those States that may decide to pursue domestic sensitive fuel
cycle activities for peaceful purposes and in conformity with their
international legal obligations should not be discriminated against by
excluding them from the possible benefits that may derive from such mechanisms.
In addition, we should guard against the notion that sensitive technologies are
safe in the hands of some, but pose a risk when others have access to them.

The pursuance of energy security is not only a right of all states, but also
a global responsibility. In recognising the potential role that nuclear energy
can play in this context, it is our duty to ensure that no unwarranted
restrictions are imposed. Further modalities for preventing the diversion of
these sensitive technologies may be required in order to ensure that we can
pursue such activities without fear and with the necessary assurances. What is
required in this regard is a non-discriminatory approach that would assure the
supply of nuclear fuel, whilst fully respecting the choices of States and
protecting their inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
consistent with their non-proliferation obligations.

I would like to conclude by appreciating the dynamism of this debate, and
that it is still work in progress, but listening to my colleagues' proposals I
could not help asking myself the following questions, maybe from the
realisation of the vulnerability of developing countries. If it were not for
the multilateral instruments that are in place:

* To what extent will the establishment of the Gross National Product (GNP)
or international centres undermine the multilateral tools like the IAEA?
* What would the implications be for the developing and more vulnerable
countries?
* Would these new bodies not give more control to the developed nuclear power
states – making the developing countries even more vulnerable?
* Would these new bodies not also widen further the inequality gap between the
developed and developing countries?

I hope that these questions can and will be responded to honestly, as this
is a matter where all nations are directly or indirectly involved or
affected.

I thank you.

Issued by: Department of Minerals and Energy
19 September 2006
Source: Department of Minerals and Energy (http://www.dme.gov.za)