1. Introduction

This report deals with the national serious crime figures and ratios for the 2006/2007 financial year. These are compared to the figures recorded during the preceding financial years since 2001/2002. The provincial crime figures are also analysed. More detailed explanatory analysis of some contact crimes is provided. This includes spatial, timeline and docket analysis.

2. The national crime situation

An analysis of the national crime situation is facilitated by grouping the twenty-one serious crime tendencies discussed in this report into the following broad categories:

- Contact crimes (crimes against the person).
- Contact-related crimes.
- Property-related crimes.
- Crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection (also representing phenomena serving as generators of crime).
- Other serious crime.

2.1 Contact crime

2.1.1 Targets and international comparisons

Eight serious crimes are grouped together as contact crime or violent crime against the person of victims. These crimes are murder, attempted murder, rape, assault GBH (assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm), common assault, indecent assault, aggravated robbery and other robbery. The crimes in question account for 33,3% of South Africa's recorded serious crime. These crimes involve physical contact between the victims and perpetrators and such contact is usually of a violent nature. Contact crime frequently impacts on victims in one or a combination of the following ways:

- Death as an immediate or delayed result of the degree of violence employed (some deaths even occurring years after the original crime had been committed).

¹ The South African Police Service website at www.saps.gov.za features 27 serious crime trends, while this report only covers 21 categories of crime. The six trends not discussed are crimen injuria (36 747 cases), culpable homicide (12 871 cases), neglect and ill-treatment of children (4 258 cases), abduction (3 217 cases), kidnapping (2 345 cases) and public violence (1 023 cases). These are not included because (a) less than 5 000 cases of these crimes are reported per annum (public violence, kidnapping, abduction and neglect and ill-treatment of children); (b) the culpable homicide cases occur as a result of accidents without an intention to kill; and (c) crimen injuria is usually an additional or alternative charge to all three kinds of assault. These "crimes" together account for 2,8% of the crimes reflected in Annexures A, B and C on the website.

- Injuries of various degrees, including permanent, disabling injuries.
- Psychological trauma, which is in many cases also of a permanent nature.
- Loss of and/or damage to property, which could under certain circumstances have serious repercussions for (particularly poorer) victims.

The serious consequences of contact crime and the fact that South Africa experiences exceptionally high levels of these crimes are generally acknowledged. The Government consequently decided in January 2004 that each of the contact crimes should be reduced by 7-10% per annum, starting with the 2004/2005 financial year. The present reporting period of 2006/2007 is the third financial year to pass since the determination of these 7-10% reduction targets. These targets were established on the basis of broad comparisons with the crime ratios recorded by other INTERPOL member countries during the late nineties (i.e. the figures reported by those countries which did indeed submit their statistics to INTERPOL) and the increasing/decreasing trends observed locally since 1994.

International comparisons of the incidence of crime are doubtlessly difficult and sometimes simply impossible. This is because (a) definitions of crime differ among countries; (b) reporting levels of crime depend on various factors which might fluctuate over time and are affected by cultural differences in various ways from one country to another (the South African Government e.g. went out of its way over the past 14 years to encourage all citizens to come forward and report the crimes committed against them); (c) crime registration systems differ among states (the Crime Administration System (CAS) in South Africa is a centralized and controlled system with built-in checks and balances. In most countries with decentralized police agencies, statistics are sent to a central point (e.g. the FBI in the USA) for consolidation, without any checks and balances at local level; and (d) less than 50% of even the INTERPOL member countries reported their crime statistics to INTERPOL Head Office in Lyon, France.

The reasons for not basing comparisons on international or even local crime statistics, as already pointed out by the Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) in the late nineties of the previous century, is again emphasized in two recent reports as quoted below:

(a) The GLOBAL PEACE INDEX (GPi): Methodology, Results & Findings published in Australia and released during June 2007 mentions the following on (p 37):

"However, the UN acknowledges that international comparisons of crime statistics are beset by methodological difficulties:

- Different definitions for specific crime types ...
- Different levels of reporting and traditions of policing: This relates closely to levels of development in a society, most clearly reflected in accessibility to the police...
- Different social, economic and political contexts: Comparing crime data from societies that are fundamentally different may ignore key

issues present in the society that impact upon levels of reporting. For example, different social norms in some countries may make it difficult for women to report cases of rape or sexual abuse, while in others, women are encouraged to come forward."

(b) In CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2004: p v-vi) published by the US Department of Justice the following comments are found under the subheading "Caution against ranking" right at the beginning of the report:

"Each year when *Crime in the United States* is published, many entities - news media, tourism agencies, and other groups with an interest in crime in our Nation - use reported figures to compile rankings of cities and counties. These rankings, however, are merely a quick choice made by the data user; they provide no insight into the many variables that mold the crime in a particular town, city, county, state, or region. Consequently, these rankings lead to simplistic and/or incomplete analyses that often create misleading perceptions adversely affecting cities and counties, along with their residents... *The reader is, therefore, cautioned against comparing statistical data of individual reporting units from cities, counties, metropolitan areas, states, or colleges and universities solely on the basis of their population coverage or student enrollment. Until data users examine all the variables that affect crime in a town, city, county, state, region, or college or university, they can make no meaningful comparisons."*

These obstacles notwithstanding, a very broad and rough comparison of South Africa's crime ratios for 2003 with those available for other **INTERPOL** member countries indicates the following:

- (i) South Africa should reduce its contact crimes by 7-10 % per annum for ten consecutive years to reach levels of contact crime comparing favourably with those recorded by the majority of **INTERPOL** member countries. The 7-10% reduction targets were also based on the historical increase/decrease records of the preceding ten years.
- (ii) The country finds itself in a favourable position with regard to the incidence of all non-violent types of crime. The aim in this case should be to prevent any increases in these crimes, although an official government target has not been explicitly formulated in this regard.

Constant remarks by analysts that South Africa's murder rate is still eight times higher than that of other countries is contradicted by the fact that (a) Government in January 2004 decided on a reduction target of 7 - 10% per annum for each contact crime over the period 2004/2005 to 2014/2015 to bring South Africa in line with the majority of **INTERPOL** member countries and not only those most affected by violent crime; (b) some decreases in contact crime occurred in South Africa over the past four years while many other countries recorded increases; and (c) experts explicitly warn against the pitfalls associated with comparisons.

Each contact crime has its own degree of seriousness. It is simply logical that the loss of life as a result of murder is much more serious than when someone is slapped through the face (a case of common assault) during an emotional outburst. Even within each of the eight categories of contact crime a distinction should be made between different degrees of seriousness. Robbery of a motor vehicle during which a passenger is fatally shot and the driver condemned to life in a wheelchair as a result of being shot through the spine is, for example, much more serious than a carjacking in which only the vehicle is taken.

Each of the eight contact crimes also has its own annual frequency. The present average annual incidence of contact crime (calculated over the past three financial years) fluctuates from 18 659 murders to 124 159 aggravated robberies and 234 884 common assaults. Simply counting the different categories of contact crime together could result in a distorted picture. Decreases in the occurrence of the more numerous but less serious contact crimes will easily equalize or cancel out increases in or a failure to reduce the incidence of the less numerous but more serious contact crimes like murder, attempted murder, rape and aggravated robbery. These latter four extremely serious contact crimes are outnumbered 2.5 times by the figures for assault GBH, common assault and other robbery. The eight contact crimes should therefore be measured separately. The differences in the seriousness of incidents within each crime category (e.g. the theoretical case of carjacking referred to above) are cancelled out by the registration of additional charges. This means that the single carjacking during which only the car is robbed will count as one carjacking; while the carjacking during which the car is robbed, the driver paralyzed and the passenger killed, will count as one carjacking, one attempted murder and one murder.

2.1.2 Social contact crime and robberies

A number of the contact crimes are social or domestic in nature and occur in social environments (e.g. the privacy of residences) which are usually outside the reach of conventional policing. These crimes usually occur between people who know each other (e.g. friends, acquaintances and relatives). Docket analysis indicates that 89% of both assault GBH and common assault cases, 82% of murders and 76% of rapes covered by the sample studied, involved people known to one another. In addition, 59% of the attempted murders occurred under similar circumstances (see annual report of the South African Police Service for 2005/2006, p 56).

When reference is made to socially-motivated (or social fabric-related) contact crime, this includes rape, assault (whether GBH, common or indecent), murder and attempted murder. If the figures for these crimes are added together, the result will provide an idea of the extent and distribution of socially-motivated contact crime. However, it should be noted that not all of the cases involving crimes broadly described as socially-motivated crime (particularly not all the attempted murders and murders) are social in nature. Aggravated robbery and intra or inter-group conflict (e.g. gang fights, taxi-related violence and conflict among clans) make a noteworthy contribution to the incidence of murder and attempted murder.

Aggravated robbery is the second-largest generator of contact crimes, particularly attempted murder and murder, because victims are often killed and/or seriously injured during such robberies. The vast majority of house robberies, carjackings, business robberies, cash-in-transit (CIT) and bank robberies are committed with firearms and shots are frequently fired at victims. The latter in many cases return fire in self-defense. A number of attempted murders in particular can consequently be generated during a single case of such robbery. The fact is that a shot or more than one shot fired at a person/s indicates intention to kill or at least seriously hurt, and thus constitutes attempted murder.

This category of crime includes the following subcategories of robbery:

- Carjacking;
- truckjacking;
- robbery at residential premises (house robbery);
- robbery at business premises (business robbery);
- cash-in-transit (CIT) robbery;
- bank robbery; and
- other aggravated robberies not mentioned elsewhere in this list, which are mainly aggravated robberies occurring on the streets and in other public open spaces and are categorised as "general aggravated robberies" in this report.

The Minister for Safety and Security and Members of the Executive Committees (MEC's) in the provinces have since July 2006 repeatedly referred to violent organized crime. This has bearing on most of the cases registered under the first six subcategories of robbery listed before (carjacking, truckjacking, robbery at residential or business premises, CIT robbery and bank robbery). To measure the extent of violent organized crime, figures for these six subtendencies of aggravated robbery have to be added together.

It can be accepted that some aggravated robberies are highly organised in nature (e.g. most CIT and bank robberies, as well as truck and carjackings); while some are committed by groups which may not be organised criminal syndicates in the strict sense of the word (e.g. most house and business robberies); and still others are committed by one to three or four loosely associated or opportunistic individuals (e.g. most street robberies). Those robberies (particularly aggravated robberies) which involve more people (additional expertise) than only the group of criminals who perform the actual robbery (hit), will be much more organized than those in which only the direct perpetrators are involved. The following serves as an example: Three men force a lady out of her car as she arrives at her home, then take her into the house and force her to open the safe. They take an amount of money, jewellery and a firearm, drive away in her car and abandon it along the road five blocks away. They sell the jewellery to a jeweller and spend all the money on liquor, drugs, girlfriends and fast cars over the next week. This is clearly the lowest form of organization,

since it involves nobody else and there is not much of a job specialization. When the very same group takes the car and simply sell it to somebody for a few thousand rand, it will still remain a case of the lowest form of organization.

However, the group could also hijack this specific vehicle at the request of a so-called middle or finger man (the money and jewellery being a bonus). They supply it to the person who ordered it and the car is then changed (e.g. spray-painted) or cloned into another vehicle (which involves the changing of engine and chassis numbers by police and licensing officials) before being sold for a profit. The buyer could either be aware of the fact that it is a stolen vehicle (because of the price), or the transaction is done in such a way that the buyer remains unaware of its real origins. Such a case then clearly involves other people than only the gang of three directly involved in the robbery.

Highly organized crime will *inter alia* subscribe to the following important criteria:

- It involves several people linked together through a businesslike structure and with a clear profit motive.
- Each of the above members will fulfil specialized functions (a high degree of division of labour).
- Corruption/blackmail is used to procure the cooperation of people in positions of authority or able to facilitate matters for the criminals involved.
- Money laundering (usually through the acquisition of expensive vehicles, fixed property and jewellery) is involved.

Partially organised crime may meet some of the above criteria, while a few individuals acting together for criminal purposes may not subscribe to any of these.

 $Table\ 1$ Serious crime between the 2001/2001 and 2006/2007 financial years with the percentage increases/decreases in crime between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

		Incid	dence of crin	ne per 100 (000 of the	populatio	on			Rav	v figures/fre	quencies		
Crime category	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	% Increase/ decrease	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	% Increase/ decrease
	I		l			(Contact crimes							
Murder	47.8	47.4	42.7	40.3	39.5	40.5	2,4	21 405	21 553	19 824	18 793	18 528	19 202	3,5
Rape	121.1	115.3	113.7	118.3	117.1	111.0	-5,2	54 293	52 425	52 733	55 114	54 926	52 617	-4,2
Attempted murder	69.8	78.9	64.8	52.6	43.9	42.5	-3,0	31 293	35 861	30 076	24 516	20 571	20 142	-2,0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	589.1	585.9	560.7	535.3	484.0	460.1	-4,9	264 012	266 321	260 082	249 369	226 942	218 030	-3,9
Common assault	584.3	621.6	605.7	575.0	485.3	443.2	-8,7	261 886	282 526	280 942	267 857	227 553	210 057	-7,7
Indecent assault	17.1	19.4	20.1	21.7	20.9	19.8	-5,5	7 683	8 815	9 302	10 123	9 805	9 367	-4,5
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	260.5	279.2	288.1	272.2	255.3	267.1	4,6	116 736	126 905	133 658	126 789	119 726	126 558	5,7
Common robbery	201.3	223.4	206.0	195.0	159.4	150.1	-5,8	90 205	101 537	95 551	90 825	74 723	71 156	-4,8
						Cont	tact-related crim	es						
Arson	19.5	20.2	19.0	17.6	16.3	16.6	2,0	8 739	9 186	8 806	8 184	7 622	7 858	3,1
Malicious damage to property	324.5	345.6	341.2	323.7	307.7	302.5	-1,7	145 451	157 070	158 247	150 785	144 265	143 336	-0,6
						Prop	erty-related crin	ies		<u> </u>				
Burglary at residential premises	675.3	704.0	645.2	592.8	559.9	526.8	-5,9	302 657	319 984	299 290	276 164	262 535	249 665	-4,9
Burglary at non-residential premises	194.4	162.8	139.3	120.3	116.0	123.3	6,3	87 114	73 975	64 629	56 048	54 367	58 438	7,5
Theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles	216.1	204.9	190.0	180.0	183.3	182.1	-0,7	96 859	93 133	88 144	83 857	85 964	86 298	0,4
Theft out of or from motor vehicles	444.6	431.0	370.8	318.8	296.6	261.7	-11,8	199 282	195 896	171 982	148 512	139 090	124 029	-10,8
Stock-theft	92.9	102.7	89.0	70.1	61.3	60.8	-0,8	41 635	46 680	41 273	32 675	28 742	28 828	0,3

		Inci	dence of cri	ne per 100 (000 of the	populatio	on			Rav	v figures/fre	quencies		
Crime category	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	% Increase/ decrease	2001/ 2002	2002/ 2003	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	% Increase/ decrease
	l			C	rimes hea	vily depe	ndent on police a	ction for de	tection					
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	34.6	34.8	36.3	33.3	28.7	30.3	5,6	15 494	15 839	16 839	15 497	13 453	14 354	6,7
Drug-related crime	118.0	118.4	135.1	180.3	204.1	220.9	8,2	52 900	53 810	62 689	84 001	95 690	104 689	9,4
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	54.8	48.7	53.7	64.2	70.6	80.7	14,3	24 553	22 144	24 886	29 927	33 116	38 261	15,5
						Oth	ner serious crime	s						
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	1286.7	1364.6	1307.4	1151.1	922.7	876.0	-5,1	576 676	620 240	606 460	536 281	432 629	415 163	-4,0
Commercial crime	130.4	123.7	120.4	115.8	115.6	130.2	12,6	58 462	56 232	55 869	53 931	54 214	61 690	13,8
Shoplifting	152.6	151.8	155.0	142.8	137.5	138.2	0,5	68 404	69 005	71 888	66 525	64 491	65 489	1,5
		s	ome subcat	egories of a	ggravated	robbery	already account	ed for under	· aggravated	l robbery ab	ove *			
'Carjacking'	_	-	-	_	-	-	-	15 846	14 691	13 793	12 434	12 825	13 599	6,0
'Truckjacking'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 333	986	901	930	829	892	7,6
Robbery of cash in transit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	238	374	192	220	383	467	21,9
Bank robbery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	356	127	54	58	59	129	118,6
Robbery at residential premises	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9 063	9 351	9 391	10 173	12 761	25,4
Robbery at business premises	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5 498	3 677	3 320	4 387	6 689	52,5

^{*}The ratios for the subcategories of aggravated robbery in this table are too low to calculate meaningful percentage increases or decreases.

2.1.3 Contact crime trends

Tables 1 and **2** indicate that the ratios of **six** of the **eight** contact crimes were decreasing in 2006/2007.

The incidence of common assault met the 7 - 10% reduction target by decreasing with -8,7%, while common robbery (-5,8%), indecent assault (-5,5%), rape (-5,2%) and assault GBH (-4,9%) fell just short of meeting the 7 - 10% reduction target.

Attempted murder (-3,0%) clearly missed the 7 - 10% reduction target.

Robbery with aggravating circumstances increased by 4,6% and murder by 2,4%.

The distinction between the more social contact crimes and robberies is important in this respect. The increase of **4,6%** in aggravated robbery was clearly responsible for some upward pressure on the incidence of attempted murder and murder. As already indicated, not all murders - and especially not all attempted murders - result from violence between people knowing each other (i.e. social contact crime). Aggravated robbery is a growing second generator of attempted murder and murder.

It is also evident from **table 2** that, with the exception of rape and indecent assault, far less significant decreases were recorded during 2006/2007 than during 2005/2006. This is particularly evident in the case of attempted murder, common robbery and common assault. Robbery with aggravating circumstances - which during 2005/2006 decreased by **-6,2%** - proceeded to increase by **4,6%** again during 2006/2007.

It has been argued in this report (see section 2.1.1) that the 7 - 10% reduction target is valid for each separate category of contact crime and should not be applied to the whole group of crimes collectively. However, the decrease from 752 774 cases in 2005/2006 to 727 129 cases in 2006/2007 depicts a reduction of 25 645 in the overall number of contact crimes. This translates into a decrease of -3,4%, which is halfway towards achieving the -7% lower limit of the 7 - 10% reduction target.

During the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 financial years (the first two financial years since the implementation of the 7 - 10% reduction targets in January 2004) the contact crime reduction amounted to -4,4% and -10,7% respectively.

 $\label{eq:Table 2} \mbox{A comparison of the increases or decreases in the ratios of recorded serious crime between the past three financial years}$

Crime Category	2005/2006 compared to 2004/2005	2006/2007 compared to 2005/2006
Contact crime (crimes	against the person)	
Murder	-2,0%	2,4%
Rape	-1,0%	-5,2%
Indecent assault	-3,7%	-5,5%
Attempted murder	-16,6%	-3,0%
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	-9,6%	-4,9%
Common assault	-15,6%	-8,7%
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	-6,2%	4,6%
Common robbery	-18,3%	-5,8%
Contact-rela	ted crime	
Arson	-7,4%	2,0%
Malicious damage to property	-4,9%	-1,7%
Property-rela	nted crime	
Burglary at residential premises	-5,5%	-5,9%
Burglary at business premises	-3,6%	6,3%
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	1,8%	-0,7%
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	-6,9%	-11,8%
Stock-theft	-12,6%	-0,8%
Crime heavily dependent on	police action for detection	,
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	-13,8%	5,6%
Drug-related crime	13,2%	8,2%
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	9,9%	14,3%
Other serio		, , , ,
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	-19,8%	-5,1%
Commercial crime	-0,2%	12,6%
Shoplifting	-3,7%	0,5%
Subcategories of aggravated robbery form	ning part of aggravated ro	bbery above
Carjacking	3,1%	6,0%
Truck hijacking	-10,9%	7,6%
Robbery of cash in transit	74,1%	21,9%
Bank robbery	1,7%	118,6%
Robbery at residential premises	8,3%	25,4%
Robbery at business premises	32,1%	52,5%

The percentage decreases in contact crimes over the past three financial years (2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007) are indicated in **table 3**. If the targets were to have been achieved over the past three financial years, the ratios should have decreased by anything from **-21,0%** to **-30,0%** over this period.

Table 3 Ratios of and overall decrease in contact crimes between 2003/2004 and 2006/2007

Crime		Ra	tios		% Overall
	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007	decrease
Murder	42.7	40.3	39.5	40.5	-5,2%
Rape	113.7	118.3	117.1	111.0	-2,4%
Indecent assault	20.1	21.7	20.9	19.8	-1,5%
Attempted murder	64.8	52.6	43.9	42.5	-34,4%
Assault GBH	560.7	535.3	484.0	460.1	-17,9%
Common assault	605.7	575.0	485.3	443.2	-26,8%
Aggravated robbery	288.1	272.2	255.3	267.1	-7,3%
Common robbery	206.0	195.0	159.4	150.1	-27,1%

In the case of attempted murder (-34,4%), common assault (-26,8%) and common robbery (-27,1%) the cumulative reduction target of between -21,0% to -30,0% over the past three financial years has indeed been achieved. Assault GBH just missed the -21,0% to -30,0% target. The figures for murder, aggravated robbery, indecent assault and rape missed the target by far in only recording the following decreases over the past three financial years:

Aggravated robbery -7,3% Murder -5,2% Rape -2,4% Indecent assault -1,5%

Before a disaggregation of aggravated robbery is done, it is necessary to emphasise that the increase in aggravated robbery was particularly fierce during the first quarter of the 2006/2007 financial year. That occurred in the April - June 2006 quarter during which the security guard strike proceeded. The percentage increase/decrease in aggravated robbery during each quarter of the 2006/2007 financial year, compared to the corresponding quarters of the 2005/2006 financial year, was as follows:

	April - June 2005 vs 2006	July - September 2005 vs 2006	October - December 2005 vs 2006	January - March 2006 vs 2007
Aggravated robbery	12,7%	10,1%	1,5%	-1,2%
Common Robbery	-1,5%	-1,0%	-7,0%	-9,6%

From the above table it is clear that the security guard strike of April - June 2006 probably left a void creating circumstances which made it easier for robbers (involved in both aggravated and common robbery) to commit crime. An end to the strike as well as special operations launched by the South African Police Service since July 2006 had a clear effect on the incidence of all robberies. In January - March 2007 aggravated and common robbery decreased by -1,2% and -9,6% respectively. The strike did not have a similar effect on the more social contact crimes, as nearly 80,0% of these crimes are generated by social conditions.

2.1.4 The subtrends of aggravated robbery

The 4,6% increase in robbery with aggravating circumstances, the even more significant increases in some of the aggravated robbery subtrends and the 2,4% increase in murder need to be explained. The influence of these increases on public perceptions also warrants attention.

As indicated before, aggravated robbery can be disaggregated into different subcategories. The table below (table 4) and figure 1, Annexure A1 depict the following: The number of cases relating to each subtrend recorded during the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years; the percentage contribution of each subtrend to the total aggravated robbery figure during 2006/2007, ordered from the most important contributor (street/public robbery, also called general armed robbery) to the least (bank robbery); the increase in the number of cases recorded for each subtrend; and the **percentage** increase this represents for each of those subtrends.

Table 4
Aggravated robbery disaggregated according to the percentage contribution of each subtrend in terms of raw figures

Subcategory	Cases r	eported	% Distribution per subcategory	Real case increase	% Increase
	2005/2006	2006/2007			
Street/public robbery	91 070	92 021	72,7	951	1,0
Carjacking	12 825	13 599	10,7	774	6,0
Robbery at residential premises	10 173	12 761	10,1	2 588	25,4
Robbery at business premises	4 387	6 689	5,3	2 302	52,5
Truckjacking	829	892	0,7	63	7,6
CIT robbery	383	467	0,4	84	21,9
Bank robbery	59	129	0,1	70	118,6
Total	119 726	126 558	100,0	6 832	5,7

Table 5 The order of police precincts in which a cumulative 40.0% of different subcategories of aggravated robbery occurred during 2006/2007

subcategories of aggrav			7
	Subcategories of a		
General robbery	House robbery	Carjacking	Business robbery
Durban Central CBD ²	Sandton PCBD	Booysens PCBD	Johannesburg Central CBD
Hillbrow PCBD ³	Tembisa T	Mondeor	Booysens PCBD
Johannesburg Central CBD	Midrand	Jeppe PCBD	Sandton NCBD
Mitchells Plain	KwaMashu T	Pinetown	Pietermaritzburg CBD
Pretoria Central CBD	Honeydew	Isipingo	Honeydew
Booysens PCBD	Douglasdale	Umlazi T	Benoni
Sunnyside PCBD	Garsfontein	Johannesburg Central CBD	Randburg
Mamelodi and Mamelodi East T ⁴	Brooklyn NCBD	Empangeni	Kempton Park
Parkweg CBD	Booysens PCBD	Germiston	Midrand
Khayelitsha T	Ivory Park T	Durban Central CBD	Rustenburg NCBD
KwaMashu T	Randburg	Hillbrow PCBD	Germiston
Cape Town Central CBD	Inanda T	Chatsworth	Temba T
Umlazi T	Norwood	Phoenix	Florida
Nyanga T	Wierdabrug	Midrand	Alberton
Point PCBD	Esikhawini T	Lyttelton	Boksburg North
Rustenburg NCBD ⁵	Mondeor	Temba T	Greenwood Park
Tembisa T	Umlazi T	Sandton NCBD	Hillbrow PCBD
Dobsonville T	Bedfordview	Bramley	Bramley
Phoenix	Khayelitsha T	Yeoville PCBD	Phoenix
Pinetown	Kwadukuza T	Sandringham	Umbilo
Moroka T	Temba T	Newlands East	Silverton
Jeppe PCBD	Rustenburg NCBD	Sunnyside PCBD	Bedfordview
Roodepoort	Bramley	Norwood	
Atteridgeville T	Roodepoort	Brakpan	
Galeshewe T	Dobsonville T	Springs	
Empangeni	Sandringham	Kempton Park	
Pietermaritzburg CBD	Nyanga T	Brackendowns	
Thabong T	Sunnyside PCBD	Tembisa T	
Sandton NCBD	Parkview	Kwazekele T	
Humewood PCBD	Linden	Greenwood Park	
Kwadukuza T	Kanyamazane T	Rietgat T	
Kwazekele T	Pinetown	Cleveland PCBD	
Temba T		Brixton	
Ivory Park T		Moroka T	
Alexandra T		Nyanga	
Chatsworth		Wierdabrug	
Harare T		Montclair	
Guguletu T		Kwadukuza T	
Germiston			
Umbilo			
Rietgat T			
Mthatha T			
Brixton			
Meadowlands T			
Kanyamazane T			
Katlehong T			
Yeoville PCBD			
Honeydew			
Woodstock PCBD			
Brooklyn NCBD			
VosloorusT			
Mondeor			
Kempton Park			
Orlando T			
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² CBD means a precinct situated in a central business district.

³ PCBD means a precinct situated on the periphery of a central business district.

⁴ T means a precinct situated in a township (see section 2.1.5.1 (a)).

⁵ NCBD means a precinct situated in a new central business district (e.g. Sandton and Brooklyn).

2.1.4.1 General aggravated robbery (street/public robbery)

Among all the aggravated robbery cases, general aggravated robbery (those robberies against victims outside of their homes, work environments and vehicles and not aimed against banking institutions or CIT companies) account for just more than seven out of ten incidents. The main targets of these robberies remain cash, jewellery, cellular telephones, laptop computers and other valuables that people carry around in public places. This kind of aggravated robbery also missed the 7 - 10% reduction target by increasing with 1,0%.

According to **table 5** and **map 1**, **40%** of these street/public robberies (general aggravated robbery) occur in only **5,1%** of the station precincts in South Africa. Among these precincts, **46%**, **32%** and **22%** are township, central business district (CBD) or CBD periphery and suburban stations respectively. This single largest segment of aggravated robberies (nearly three quarters of all aggravated robberies) only increased by a marginal **1,0%**. It normally does not involve well-known or high-profile victims and is not considered as major contributor to South Africa's violent image at home or abroad. The main damage in this regard is done by robbers who target foreign tourists on the streets and in public spaces in the country.

2.1.4.2 Carjacking and robbery at residential premises

Carjacking (with 13 396 reported cases in 2006/2007) and house robbery (with 12 581 cases) respectively constitute 10,6% and 10,0% of all aggravated robbery cases. Carjacking increased by a significant 6,0% and house robbery by an alarming 23,7% between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 (see table 4). A close association exists between these two subcategories of aggravated robbery for the following reasons: (a) Many typical carjackings (in which the motor vehicle is the sole target) occur at the gates to or in the driveways of houses/flats/townhouses; (b) the car is sometimes the primary target, but the victims are also forced into their homes to rob them of some additional items as a "bonus"; and (c) sometimes certain items in the house are the targets (e.g. money, firearms, computers, jewellery, cellular telephones, etc.) and the car is simply hijacked to serve as a getaway vehicle. In the latter scenario the car is frequently abandoned only a few street blocks away from the crime scene. According to the counting rules and registration procedures for the CAS, the robbery of items from the home and the robbery of the vehicle (carjacking) should be registered as separate counts (i.e. two different crimes) on the CAS. Any other crimes committed during the incident should be added as additional counts. (If one person is e.g. shot and killed during a robbery, that will represent an additional count of murder. If another person is hit by a bullet and wounded during the same incident, this will represent still another count of attempted murder.)

Both categories of robbery under discussion, and robbery at residential premises in particular, occur in the most private surroundings. These crimes are committed within the privacy of a victim's housing unit or motor vehicle. Such crimes are responsible for perceptions that one cannot even sleep safely in one's own bed and further that a considerable risk exists of being hurt, maimed or killed in one's own bedroom. This represents the acme of insecurity, because there is no choice involved.

A mere 3,3% of the police precincts in South Africa generated 40,0% of the carjackings in 2006/2007, while an even smaller number of 2,8% of the country's precincts generated 40,0% of the house robberies recorded over the period in question (see table 5). Among the 3,3% of precincts that generated 40,0% of South Africa's carjackings, 55,0% are suburban, 24,0% are located in CBD's or in areas on the periphery of CBD's and 21,0% are in townships. Among the 2,8% of stations that generated 40,0% of the house robberies during 2006/2007, 47,0% are suburban, 38,0% township and 15,0% CBD stations or serving areas on the periphery of CBD's.

The distribution of carjackings and house robberies indicates that these mainly occur at residential premises in the wealthier and middle class suburbs (e.g. Sandton, Bramley, Honeydew, Douglasdale, Garsfontein and Brooklyn). In the modern world, newspapers and other media are also published on the worldwide web of the internet. A house robbery at the home of a well-known person creates media interest, particularly if that person is killed or injured. (Sometimes even housebreakings are reported as house robberies, e.g. the burglary at Bishop Desmond Tutu's home over the weekend of 8 - 9 June 2007.) Reports on such incidents will appear on the front page or at least one of the first three pages of the newspapers and in the main reports of the electronic media. It will also within hours travel around the world. Such an exclusive/newsworthy/sensational event will be linked to the broad crime statistics released annually and helps create a perception that South Africa is a dangerous and violent country.

2.1.4.3 Robbery at business premises

During 2006/2007 a total of 6 227 aggravated robberies at business premises were reported, compared to 4 387 cases reported during 2005/2006 (see table 4). This represents a major increase of 52,5%. The crime involved is one of the most concentrated violent crimes recorded in South Africa. Forty percent of these 6 689 cases occurred in only 22 of the 1 105 police precincts in South Africa - that is 2,0% of all police precincts. Six (27,3%) of these are CBD stations, 15 suburban stations and one a township station (Temba). When people hear of a business robbery, they tend to think in terms of media reports on the phenomenon - i.e. a robbery committed by a large group of perpetrators (say 10) at a shopping mall or supermarket. Typical recent examples recorded during the current reporting period are the following:

- The business robberies at a West Rand mall which led to the Jeppes Town killing of four police officers;
- the shooting at the Fourways Mall which continued for 10 15 minutes; and
- the armed robbery at a carpet shop in the Epsom Downs Centre, which resulted in a large part of the shopping centre (including a Nedbank branch) burning down after being set alight by the perpetrators.

Most of the times **ATM** blasts, of which one was reported almost every day since the beginning of 2007, are also reported as if either business or bank robberies were involved. Almost all of these blasts actually constitute malicious damage to property and theft of money cases (if the explosion succeeds in opening the **ATM** safe). If

somebody is injured because of the explosion (an eventuality which occurred in very few cases up to now), a charge of attempted murder will be added. If a victim dies as a result of this, a murder charge will be added - but this has not yet occurred.

A docket analysis of **2 273** cases of business robbery (covering cases finalized during the period 1 October 2004 - 30 September 2005) *inter alia* revealed the following:

- (a) A total of **54,2%**, **28,5%** and **10,1%** (i.e. almost **93,0%**) of the business robberies occurred in CBD's (inner cities); suburbs/residential areas and townships respectively.
- (b) The types of business targeted were as follows:

Category of business	N	%
Private company/factory	557	24,5
Conventional shop (e.g. butchery)	361	15,9
Garage/petrol station	295	13,0
Supermarket	199	8,8
Fast food outlet	114	5,0
Spaza shop	109	4,8
Clothing store	96	4,2
Liquor store	94	4,1
Large retail dealers	79	3,5
Cellular telephone shop	73	3,2
Restaurant	68	3,0
Bar/pub/shebeen/tavern	47	2,1
Other	173	7,5
Unknown	8	0,4
Total	2 273	100,0

It was found that many of the private companies/factories and conventional shops targeted, were smaller companies located in the quieter industrial areas/subareas as well as in residential areas (suburbs). These enterprises will find it difficult to implement more stringent security measures because of the costs involved and the fact that they have to be accessible to their clients. In the majority of cases (83,2%) entry was gained without employing any force. Victims cooperated in 90,8% of the cases, the perpetrators' threats being sufficient to obviate the use of physical violence. In nearly all cases (96,9%) firearms were used to threaten the victims. These firearms were rarely fired or used to hit the victims. Among the 4 200 victims involved in the 2 273 cases studied, only 225 (5,4%) were injured. Fourteen (0,3% of all victims) among the latter sustained fatal wounds, while another 52 (1,2%) and 29 (0,7%) sustained gunshot wounds and stab wounds respectively. It should be emphasized that the eventual number of fatalities may have been slightly higher (say between 0,3-1,0%) because some of those who sustained injuries may later have succumbed to these.

The items most frequently stolen during business robberies were the following:

ITEM*	N	%
Cash/other legal tender	1 949	85,7
Cellular telephone/accessories	686	30,1
Food/alcohol/cigarettes	255	11,2
Jewellery	185	8,1
Computer equipment	133	5,9
Vehicles	98	4,3
Visual/sound equipment	97	4,2
Firearms/ammunition	84	3,7
Other/unknown	141	6,2

^{*}More than one item or class of items could have been robbed during a single robbery at business premises. The N value therefore exceeds the sample number of 2 273.

The results of the docket analysis do not confirm the media image of typical business robberies being attacks on shopping malls by gangs of more than ten robbers.

2.1.4.4 Bank and cash-in-transit (CIT) robbery

Bank and cash-in-transit robberies increased by 118,6% and 21,9% respectively between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007. It should again be emphasized that in this report the national annual real figures for bank and cash-in-transit robberies are comparatively very low. A total of 129 bank robberies and 467 CIT robberies were reported during the 2006/2007 financial year. The increase in actual cases for these two crimes was therefore also small in numerical terms.

Bank robberies increased by **70** cases from **59** cases in 2005/2006 to **129** cases in 2006/2007, and robberies of cash-in-transit by **84** cases from **383** in 2005/2006 to **467** in 2006/2007. If the two categories are added together as bank-related robberies, the increase of **154** cases between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 is very similar to, but slightly lower than, the **164** cases increase between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006.

The release of crime statistics during September 2006 coincided with a number of nasty CIT robberies (e.g. the CIT robbery on the road to Ellisras during which four security guards were burnt to death), which starkly illuminated the 74,1% increase in

CIT robberies between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 (a reporting period which ended a good six months earlier). Threats of strike action by the CIT guards caused Government and particularly the SAPS to schedule meetings with the guards and the CIT companies. Strike action was averted because the CIT companies and SAPS took some action to curb this crime, resulting in inter alia the successful arrest of various CIT robbers during October 2006 and January 2007. SABRIC and SBV figures also indicated a clear reduction in CIT cases. One of the best examples of the police successes achieved towards the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 was the arrest of 26 heavily armed CIT heist suspects (14 of them by only five brave police members) at the Umvoti Toll Plaza in KwaZulu-Natal in the early morning hours of 3 October 2006. This particular incident actually involved various CIT robberies. The first occurred on Monday, 2 October 2006 at about 19:00 on the N2 North freeway near KwaMbonambi. A Fidelity Guards vehicle was knocked over, but the suspects did not succeed in removing the cash. While the robbery was in progress, a Maxim Security vehicle passed by and the robbers opened fire on it, killing one security guard. A local councilor, Mr Masango, drove past and his double-cab van was hijacked. They kidnapped his 22-year-old daughter, Nothile, in the process, but both the van and Nothile were later recovered unharmed. The police were still clearing up the scene of the first heist when a second heist occurred 30 km away at Mtubatuba. Another Fidelity Guards vehicle was rammed from behind, causing it to roll over. One security guard was injured during the collision. While the suspects were busy robbing the money, an SAPS KwaMsane vehicle approached the scene. The suspects opened fire on the police vehicle, riddling it with bullets and leaving it useless. The police returned fire and hit one suspect. The suspects thereupon absconded with their injured buddy and the cash before meeting their match at the Umyoti Toll Plaza. The crimes added to the "crime scoreboard" for that one night (from ±19:00 at KwaMbonambi to just past midnight at Umvoti) and contributed by a single group of criminals amounted to the following:

- Two CIT heists ("tap-tap method") on Fidelity Guards vehicles:
- one attempted CIT robbery on a Maxim Security vehicle;
- one murder (Maxim guard);
- five attempted murders at the minimum, counting only wounded people;
- one kidnapping (Mr Masango's daughter, Nothile);
- one hijacking at the scene of the original heist (Mr Masango's double-cab van);
- seven cases of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition; and
- one case of malicious damage to property (SAPS van from KwaMsane).

The following stolen or hijacked vehicles were recovered at the two heist scenes at KwaMbonambi and Mtubatuba:

- Nissan bakkie;
- Isuzu bakkie;
- Mercedes Benz sedan;
- BMW 525i sedan; and
- Two BMW 7-series cars.

The following firearms were seized:

- two AK 47 rifles;
- one LM5 rifle;
- one Z88 pistol;
- two Luger pistols; and
- one .38 Rossi revolver.

This one incident on a single evening indicates that it does not take hundreds of perpetrators to commit **467** CIT robberies and **129** bank robberies as reported for the 2006/2007 financial year. These robberies are repeat offences committed by experienced perpetrators at the request of syndicate leaders.

The arrest of only the Umvoti 26 in early October 2006 had a significant effect, with CIT robberies decreasing by a third (32%) in KwaZulu-Natal during November and December 2006. Special focus on the arrest of suspects wanted in connection with CIT robberies and a renewed effort to oppose bail in such cases had a salutary influence on CIT trends during 2006/2007.

The percentage increase/decrease in CIT and bank robberies during 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 on a quarterly basis:

Crime	Quarters						
	April - June 2005 vs 2006	July - September 2005 vs 2006	October - December 2005 vs 2006	January - March 2006 vs 2007			
CIT Robbery	75,0%	44,1%	7,3%	-30,6%			
Bank Robbery	-7,4%	191,7%	126,7%	600,0%			

From the table above it is abundantly clear that the focused arrest of CIT robbers and the vigorous opposition of their bail applications at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 had a significant impact on the quarterly fluctuations in the incidence of CIT robberies during 2006/2007. This is a very clear sign that (a) this specific kind of robbery is committed by a relatively small pool of perpetrators; and (b) this is the one type of crime for which effective prosecution, opposition to bail applications and prevention of escapes are essential cures.

From the above table it further seems as if greater focus on and success in curbing CIT's caused a shift towards bank robberies. Bank robberies dramatically increased as the CIT robberies decreased. However, the extremely low N values involved have again to be emphasised.

Common sense dictates that it is purely logical and a sound business principle for some sections of the media to always report on the dramatic and sensational. A number of dramatic photographs of crime scenes serve as a first prize⁶. A large colour photograph of a security van lying on its side and a motor car - usually a badly damaged eighties model 5-series BMW or E-series Mercedes Benz - on the front page (or at least somewhere among the first three pages) of newspapers has become an almost weekly occurrence in South Africa (and these images are indeed travelling around the world). Against this background one cannot blame members of the public if they start believing that CIT robberies mainly involve such cash heists during which 12 - 17 men armed with AK 47's in three - four vehicles bump into a cash van, overturning it before emptying their rifles into it, cutting it open and disappearing with millions. This image has become so embedded that even academics in South Africa increasingly start to believe that there may be some other considerations than pure criminality involved. Hough (2007:7)⁷ in a recent article writes as follows: "...and the *modus operandi* followed in cash-in-transit robberies (larger groups of up to ten or more robbers, using guerrilla-style ambushes and attacks, often armed with automatic rifles) approximate the use of "conventional" terror tactics, now used by criminals. In fact, there are indications that in some cases, the attackers had received prior military training, either in South Africa or in neighboring countries".

Case analysis of CIT and bank robbery incidents reported during 2006 by SABRIC and the CIAC revealed *inter alia* the following:

In the majority of CIT cases (55,5%) the security officers were either held at gunpoint or overpowered by armed perpetrators, while in 8,0% the perpetrators opened fire on the security officers and in another 7,2% the security officers were actually shot and seriously injured. By far the majority of the above 70,7% of cases involved instances in which the security officers were busy collecting money from businesses or carrying the cash to/from the armoured vehicles (i.e. so-called cross-pavement robberies). In a further 16,3% of incidents the armoured vehicles were rammed by other vehicles while on the road, in most cases with heavy vehicles such as old (eighties) 5-series BMW or Mercedes Benz E-series sedans equipped with air bags, before the perpetrators opened fire on the vehicles. In another six cases (1,1%) the armoured

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⁶ Or even gunshots heard over the radio.

⁷ Hough, M. 2007. *ISSUP Bulletin 2/2007: Criminal Terror in the RSA?* Institute for Strategic Studies. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

vehicles were rammed, doused with petrol and set alight. This means that the cases regularly depicted in colour photographs on the front pages of newspapers (and which lead to the deduction by even analysts that the CIT robberies are the work of militarily trained guerrillas committing acts of terrorism) apply to less then one out of every five cases.

In less than 10% of CIT and bank robberies there are more than eight or even more than six perpetrators involved. Groups of between two to five perpetrators were involved in 73% of the CIT robberies and 78% of the bank robberies.

In 71,7% of bank robberies and 70,2% of CIT robberies respectively the amounts of money robbed were less than R200 000-00. In only 6% of bank robberies and 10% of CIT robberies did the amounts robbed exceed R1 000 000-00.

According to the Crime Administration System (CAS) there were no fatalities during the bank robberies recorded for 2006, while **19** fatalities occurred during **15** CIT robberies in the same year. These figures do not seem to support the notion that terror is involved. In typical acts of terror all the guards will be killed in a most brutal way as a signal to those still willing to guard CIT vehicles and cash.

2.1.5 Social contact crime

In section 2.1.2 of this report it was indicated that six of the eight contact crimes were actually predominantly social in nature. A further calculation revealed that at least two thirds of all contact crimes are social in nature. It was further indicated that there was a slight increase in murder cases and decreases in the incidence of all the other social contact crimes, although recorded figures for five of the latter did not meet the 7 - 10% reduction target. In this section some possible theoretical explanations for the occurrence of social contact crime and the results of docket, spatial and time analysis done by the CIAC of the SAPS are provided in an effort to highlight the complexities of socially-motivated contact crime and to indicate that conventional policing alone can never be the solution to or remedy for this type of crime

2.1.5.1 The generators of and conditions associated with social contact crime

International criminological, sociological and psychological literature on criminal behaviour and social pathology cite elaborate lists of possible explanations and partial explanations for crime in general and specific crimes in particular. Academic or theoretical debate and discourse on these sometimes opposing explanations generally outweigh real empirical confirmation of specific relationships between suggested explanations and the actual occurrence of crime or specific crimes. Lack of research to test and thus confirm or reject the supposed relationship between some of the mentioned generators of and factors conducive to the incidence of crime is internationally the norm. Despite an almost daily debate on the seriousness (or not) of the local crime situation, South Africa is no exception in this regard.

Consensus generally exists among scholars that crime and the specific forms it may assume are extremely complex phenomena. The dependent variable (the crime that

has to be explained) has to be studied within the context of numerous independent or explanatory variables (those factors and conditions influencing the phenomenon being studied), as well as intermediate variables. The factors and conditions listed under the latter two categories of variable are also intertwined to such a degree that it is exceptionally difficult to disaggregate them and to determine the weight or influence of each on the occurrence of crime in isolation.

The factors and conditions discussed below are usually mentioned as causes of crime in general or of specific crimes.

2.1.5.1 (a) Urbanization

Urbanization, particularly rapid urbanization⁸, causes urban unemployment, a massive growth of informal settlements (especially in or adjacent to existing poor areas) and the disappearance of the rural subsistence economy and social support network. It also creates rising expectations and new needs (e.g. for a cellular telephone as status symbol or possibly as an essential means of communication with relatives who live far away and for the exploration of employment opportunities). The result is often a strong growth in relative deprivation caused by the marked and visible contrast between rich and poor (e.g. the difference between circumstances in Alexandra and Sandton, which are basically only separated by a highway).

The absence of the subsistence economy and social support network (frequently existing in the rural areas) in the urban environment increases absolute poverty. This creates circumstances promoting the occurrence of crimes of need (e.g. small-scale theft, housebreaking and shoplifting in order to procure basic necessities such as food).

Informal settlements (squatter areas) are usually erected in the backyards of formal houses, in any available open space between formal housing or on the periphery of townships⁹. These are extremely difficult areas to police because there are no fixed

⁸ The pace of urbanization in South Africa since the eighties, which probably ranks amongst the highest in the world, is further stimulated by (a) compacted urbanization as a result of years of influx control; (b) a massive influx of foreigners; and (c) a more recent (and ongoing) decay/slump in the rural agricultural economy.

⁹ "Township" in this document refers to built-up residential areas (suburbs) which are still dominantly (+95,0%) inhabited by black people. Under the apartheid policy focusing on separate development, these areas were originally reserved for black people only. When they were established during the fifties and sixties they were never intended to grow into fully developed and independent communities with a complete infrastructure (e.g. shops, community and recreational facilities, work places, etc). They were seen as dormitory towns for mainly male migrant workers from the then homelands. Today most of them still include a more stable, higher socio-economic (chiefly lower middle class) area inhabited by people who have lived there for a long time or whose parents/relatives had lived there since the establishment of the township. These older and more established areas may have developed features such as taverns, clubs, recreational facilities and churches, which have turned such areas into fully fledged communities. However, around or next to such areas more informal settlements and "matchbox" developments sprang up over the past two decades (e.g. Vosman next to Kwaguqa which served as the original township of Witbank). Although not intended, these differ little from the original dormitory towns. In the fifties, sixties and seventies separate townships were also built for the Coloured and Indian population groups. These townships (like Phoenix and Chatsworth for Indians and Hanoverpark, Mitchells Plain and Eldoradopark for Coloured people) were mainly populated by people removed from so-called white areas (e.g. people removed from District Six and Sophiatown). From the beginning they differed from the black townships in the sense that they did not experience the mass

(and documented) addresses, street names, stand numbers or house numbers. When the police or other emergency services are urgently called to an address in such an area, this is consequently difficult to find. The result is that assistance may arrive long after somebody had e.g. been involved in a domestic argument and resultant fight. If such a person dies of the injuries sustained during a fight because of such delay, a murder is registered in a case that could otherwise have been only a serious assault. Without addresses it is also extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to plot the incidence of crime on a crime map for crime prevention purposes. The frequent lack of proper streets and street lighting in informal settlements furthermore threaten the safe and free movement of people at all hours, but particularly after dark. This turns even police patrols in such areas into a high risk undertaking. The situation is aggravated by the fact that public transport and even private vehicles cannot drop people off at their homes, causing them to have to walk through dark alleys. This makes it easy for robbers and rapists to strike. The shacks or informal structures in these settlements also do not provide adequate protection against criminals. The latter can easily penetrate such structures (particularly those occupied by dominantly female families, single-parent families and families consisting only of children) to steal, rob, kill, assault or rape the occupants.

Informal settlements exhibit an increased probability of attracting a higher concentration of people who subscribe to the following criteria:

- Those who have just (or relatively recently) moved to the city from rural areas.
- People with lower educational levels who are less skilled for work in the city.
- People who are unemployed.
- People of foreign origin.
- People who are underfed and in poor health.
- Those who are frustrated with what assistance or lack of assistance they receive from Government and consider government officials (including the police) as part of their problem and not the solution.

In informal settlements as well as newly-established housing schemes built to accommodate people who had formerly lived in informal settlements, there is a lack of social cohesion. People do not know or trust one another and therefore do not form a unified front against criminals. The latter will also be less known and more difficult to identify among members of the community if social cohesion is low. It is an accepted fact among police officials that criminals who could actually afford to live in middle class or even well-to-do suburbs (e.g. Mathe and the Sandton knife gang) prefer to live and hide their loot in informal settlements. The motivation for this is found in the lack of social cohesion, a low police presence and a "mind-your-own-business" attitude found among those living in these areas. There the criminals are

influx from rural South Africa and later from even further afield. Since the abolition of influx control in 1986 many black people started to squat next to these Indian and Coloured areas, while particularly since 1994 (or even before that date) many Indians and Coloured people moved into previously "white" areas (or the areas where they had lived prior to the 50's). More and more black squatters subsequently moved into these former Indian and Coloured "group areas".

surrounded by an aura of either fear or appreciation. Members of communities are either intimidated; swayed by occasional acts of kindness or charity (often as a result of the deliberate cultivation of an image of caring for the fate of the poor and destitute); or awed by the high-flying lifestyle the criminals pursue on the proceeds of their nefarious activities. To impressionable youths in particular, the criminal gangs hiding in their settlements may consequently even serve as role models.

People are sometimes only moved from these informal settlements to new developments after having lived there for quite a number of years. Having possibly developed some social cohesion in the settlements, they are then again thrown into a situation totally lacking cohesion. It is difficult to create a real community in such areas. Usually the street gangs step in to provide so-called protection to those in given geographical areas against outsiders from other areas. The very same social mistake made decades ago under apartheid is therefore repeated when a well-established community (even with its share of crime) is displaced to a newly-built sub-economic township development marked by very high levels of violent crime.

A central characteristic of informal settlements, but even more so of newly-developed sub-economic townships in which squatters are resettled, is the extremely small size of the housing units, the large number of people accommodated in these structures and the consequent total lack of privacy. Marital conflict and sexual behaviour e.g. do not occur out of sight, thus exposing children to these influences at a tender age. No wonder that such conduct is subsequently imitated by even very young children. Most child rapes and indecent assaults on children are committed by other children imitating behaviour they had either seen among adults in their own homes, observed on TV or found published in adult magazines.

Lastly, but not least, is the total lack of sport or other recreational facilities and cultural entertainment in informal settlements as well as the new townships. People and children in particular have nothing to do in such an environment but to visit taverns, bars and shebeens or attend parties.

2.1.5.1 (b) Poverty and unemployment

Unemployment, particularly in an urban environment where it is more likely to be characterized by high levels of relative deprivation, may generate factors conducive to crime. In urban areas its effects are also not mitigated by the existence of a subsistence economy and social support network to fall back on.

If government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGO's) provide no relief, absolute deprivation (extreme poverty), causing people and their families to suffer hunger and cold, can motivate the deprived to commit shoplifting, theft and housebreaking to supply in their most basic needs. (These can under such circumstances be labelled "crimes of need".)

Economic hardship (unfulfilled needs) is frequently associated with tension, conflict, arguments and eventually physical confrontation (common assault and assault GBH

which may even result in attempted murder and murder) in marital and other personal relationships and among members of families and closed communities.

Prolonged unemployment has psychological influences with sometimes devastating consequences for people, but particularly the male ego in a world in which the male is expected to act as the breadwinner and take care of his spouse and offspring. Someone (particularly a male "breadwinner") who remains unemployed for a prolonged period will start feeling worthless because he/she cannot provide what is expected from him/her. Under these circumstances a person who develops and experiences a poor self-image will either opt out and leave the family to look after itself or develop mechanisms to cope with the bad self-image. Such conditions usually stimulate the development of a macho-man image. This manifests in a subculture in which the male is always right and dominant, the female is considered as a sex object and liquor and drugs provide an escape from the realities of life.

The above conditions facilitate a tendency for matriarchal (female dominated) families to develop in some poor communities. This again stimulates marital and other conflict in personal relationships and serves to further weaken the male self-image and foster the growth of macho-man attitudes.

A measure of correlation probably exists between high urbanization; poverty; prolonged unemployment; malnutrition; family abandonment; the development of macho-man attitudes; female dominated and single parent families; increased substance abuse to escape realities; a proliferation in unprotected, multi-partner (forced and consensual) sexual activity; and the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases (STD's), including HIV/AIDS. A consequence is also an escalation in the number of families consisting solely of children (which is the latest development to cause serious concern). It needs no sociologist, child development practitioner or educational expert to spell out the future implications of resultant socialization patterns on the incidence of crime in South Africa. To illustrate the ramifications, two examples will suffice: (i) A child (male or female) acting as head of a household consisting only of other children will tend to use brute/excessive force to maintain discipline in the household; and (ii) may prostitute her/himself in order to provide food for the family. A qualitative study in Mamelodi, Thohoyandou and Bolobedu in 2004 revealed a growing number of child families and found that child rape is closely associated with this phenomenon.

2.1.5.1 (c) **Vigilantism**

The fear of crime and feelings of insecurity resulting from high levels of violent crime, gangsterism and low police visibility in particularly informal settlements, may cause some people to lose confidence in the official structures of law enforcement. This could cause them to start creating their own parallel structures to enforce safety and security, or to utilize existing organizations such as taxi associations for this purpose. The result is a growth in the phenomenon of vigilante groups. Court records in various provinces reveal that hundreds of cases of assault GBH, common assault, attempted murder, malicious damage to property, arson and even a number of murder cases can be linked to vigilante action. When vigilantes "arrest" somebody, they do not bother with niceties such as due process. In their eyes the "suspect" is guilty and

should be punished. The "arrest" and punishment frequently cause the suspect to be assaulted. Crimes of the above nature are usually generated as a result.

When people feel unsafe and insecure, they will tend to at least arm themselves. Frequently anything that can be used as a weapon is employed, from a knobkierie to a firearm. Should they then experience an immediate threat (even from a friend, relative or acquaintance), they may be disposed to use such a weapon. The consequences are usually serious (such as severe injury or even death).

2.1.5.1 (d) Previous offenders

A huge majority of offenders in South Africa hail from communities such as those described above and will upon completion of their sentences return to these communities. However, offenders serving jail sentences are subjected to various influences and experiences while in prison¹⁰. These form part of the baggage they carry back with them into their communities and increase the probability of exoffenders and parolees again committing crime, and even more serious crime than before. This is particularly true of a community which does not necessarily welcome them back with open arms and is not duly concerned about facilitating their reintegration into society. An analysis of the CRIM (Criminal Record) system seems to indicate that most violent criminals apprehended by the Police have a record of previous convictions in connection with other violent crimes.

2.1.5.1 (e) Alcohol and drugs

The dire conditions people experience in the areas and circumstances described above and the prevalent cultural activities or practices associated with certain subcultures increase the likelihood of people abusing alcohol, drugs or a combination of both. Under the influence of some of these substances violence can easily be committed. Research is urgently needed to investigate the relationship between various drugs, different types (and quality) of alcohol and violent behaviour. It is often stated that some European countries have a higher per capita alcohol consumption than South Africa, but that in those same countries the levels of violence are extremely low. People in Europe, for example, regularly consume quantities of liquor, apparently without noticeable violent side effects. The reason for this can probably be found in one or a combination of the following circumstances:

- Influences exerted by and pressures to join prison gangs.

A lack of or no opportunities for rehabilitation.

 The chance to become acquainted with new crimes, learn additional tricks, establish criminal associations and appropriate innovative *modus operandi* from fellow inmates.

¹⁰ Prisoners face the following influences and experiences in jail:

⁻ Indecent assault or "male rape" during which HIV/AIDS may be transmitted. Such experiences can generate uncontrollable grudges and feelings of hatred towards society (according to experts the chances of transmitting the HIV virus through unprotected homosexual (and also violent) intercourse are much higher than during ordinary heterosexual mating).

- (a) The type and quality of alcohol involved differ (in France a good quality of wine is consumed, whereas in South Africa the poorer drinkers tend to rely on cheap, low quality or "papsak" wine). This may even be more widely applicable in South Africa (the traditional sorghum beer or even illegal concoctions consumed in the rural areas of *inter alia* KwaZulu-Natal may e.g.have the same impact than the "papsak" wine in the Northern and Western Cape.
- (b) The combination of alcohol and drugs used, could be another key to violent behaviour. According to the evidence in a number of court cases relating to child rape in the lower Orange River area (between Upington and Augrabies), it seems as if consumption of a combination of cheap wine, cannabis and mandrax might have had a decisive influence.
- (c) The social context in which drinking occurs, could be important. The probability of violence occurring among good friends, who are properly socialized in accordance with and conforming to the cultural norms and practices of the society they keep, are possibly lower than among people not well-acquainted with one another, thoroughly adapted and integrated into their social surroundings. The matter is complicated if a social activity involves highly heterogeneous individuals not subscribing to commonly accepted rules or a shared and well-established culture and value system.

Dependency on drugs, but even alcohol, can become very expensive, particularly for someone without a regular income. Such dependency may consequently motivate people to become involved in criminal activities in order to afford their exorbitant habits. More than enough evidence exists both internationally and in South Africa to conclude that drug dependency will more often than not lure addicts into entanglement with some form of crime.

2.1.5.2 Results of analysis pertaining to social contact crime

Empirical research to test the relationship between any of the foregoing conditions or any combination of these circumstances and specific types of crime or crime in general (and specifically violent crimes against the person) is largely lacking in South Africa and abroad. It nevertheless seems as if a close relationship exists between the said conditions and at least some contact crimes, particularly all categories of assault (GBH, common and indecent), as well as murder, rape and attempted murder. However, among these six categories of crime the relationship is less clear as far as attempted murder is concerned. Despite the majority of attempted murders (±60,0%) also being social in nature, a larger portion of this category of crime is generated by other violent behaviour, namely aggravated robbery (which could not only involve the violence committed by perpetrators, but also elicit a violent response from victims) and fighting among gangs, clans, factions and other interest groups such as taxi associations. Those involved in such frays frequently shoot at one another (which essentially constitutes an element of attempted murder), with those on both sides invoking their belief in the right to self-defence.

Over the past eight years the Crime Information Analysis Centre of the SAPS conducted ongoing strategic analyses of crime and other available data at national and provincial level, while daily and weekly operational analyses are done as a matter of routine at station level. These tasks include docket, geographical and timeline analyses.

(a) Docket analysis

Docket analyses at national and provincial level *inter alia* revealed that a large majority of the assaults (both GBH and common), rapes, murders and up to **60%** of attempted murders occur among people knowing one another. The results of the most recent major docket analysis to confirm this were published on page 56 of the South African Police Service Annual Report 2005/2006. The results that emerged from the **9 623** dockets analysed are summarised in the table below.

Table 6

Results of docket analysis pertaining to social contact crime

Crime	% of perpetrators known to victim	% of perpetrators being relatives, friends or acquaintances of victim	% Relatives as perpetrators
Murder ¹¹	81,5	61,9	20,1
Attempted murder	59,4	41,1	8,8
Rape	75,9	56,9	16,2
Assault GBH	89,1	71,5	25,2
Common assault	89,3	66,4	25,8

The above clearly attests to the fact that murder, rape and assault (GBH and common) in particular, but also attempted murder, are mainly manifestations of the effects of the social conditions and dynamics described earlier in this report with regard to the incidence of social contact crime in South Africa (see **section 2.1.5.1**).

The aforementioned and a whole range of other docket analyses done by the national as well as provincial CIAC offices confirm the role played by the abuse of alcohol and other substances on the occurrence of crime. People, in many cases friends or relatives, start arguing about petty issues, calling one another names. The argument then escalates into assault, which often ends up in murder. This observation is further supported by the findings reached during the same docket analyses that a majority of the assault, rape and attempted murder cases involving people known to one another are withdrawn by prosecutors at the request of victims who become reconciled with their assailants. The prosecutors know that the chances of successfully prosecuting a

.

¹¹ The number of unknown suspects involved in murder cases is proportionally higher than in the case of the other crimes featuring in this table. In **27,5%** of murder dockets the relationship between victims and perpetrators could not be established. The indicated percentages reflect the distribution of suspects in murder cases who are known to the police.

perpetrator are slim indeed once a victim turns into a hostile witness. Another highly significant fact emerged from the docket analysis related to the findings contained in **table 6**. In **57,2%** of the murder cases registered during 2000 which went to court and ended in a guilty verdict, the accused were indeed found guilty as charged. In **34,6%** and **5,7%** of the cases the accused were found guilty of culpable homicide and assault GBH respectively.

(b) Geographical analysis

In **tables 7** and **8** the provinces are ordered from those that recorded the highest crime ratios and raw figures to those with the lowest ratios and raw figures in respect of each contact crime. From **tables 7** and **8** the following can be deduced:

(i) The highest social contact crime ratios (crimes per 100 000 of the population) are recorded in the Western Cape in respect of murder (60.7), indecent assault (59.1) and common assault (739.3); and in the Northern Cape in respect of attempted murder (107.6), rape (142.8) and assault GBH (1 091.2). Aggravated robbery and common robbery are clearly a problem in the more economically affluent province of Gauteng. The lowest ratios as far as all eight contact crimes are concerned, were recorded in Limpopo.

The crime ratios (per capita figures, or number of crimes per 100 000 of the population) equals out the differences in population size and are a better indication of the presence of conditions conducive to and serving as generators of specific crimes than raw crime figures. Ratios also provide an indication of the chances of a crime occurring in a specific province (or other geographic entity) compared to other provinces. The chances of an indecent assault occurring in the Western Cape are nearly 12 times higher than in Limpopo, while the chances of an aggravated robbery occurring are ten times higher in Gauteng than in Limpopo. This pattern of provincial crime ratios remained basically the same over the past twelve years and can probably be explained by the social, economic and socio-demographic factors described in section **2.1.5.1.** Earlier analyses according to the former policing areas (there were 43 such areas) also indicated social contact crime ratios 3 - 10 times higher in the policing areas of the Northern Cape, Western Cape and southern parts of the Eastern Cape. It seems as if a particularly strong relationship exists between the spatial distribution of social contact crime and alcohol abuse.

(ii) The highest raw contact crime figures/frequencies pertaining to each contact crime are recorded in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. An average of 62,0% of the eight contact crimes are reported in these three provinces. These raw figures indicate the workload facing the Police in each province. Gauteng with 203 401 contact crime cases logically needs more police resources to address the crime problem than the Northern Cape with 21 453 contact crime cases. On the other hand, the geographical size and the prevalence of conditions conducive to and serving as generators of crime in the Northern Cape (which, according to the ratios in table 7, are high) should also be considered in decisions concerning the allocation of resources.

Table 7 Provinces ordered from the highest recorded crime ratios for specific crimes during 2006/2007 to the lowest crime ratios (crimes per 100,000 of the population)

Contact crime			P	rovinces horizont	ally ranked accordi	ing to crime ratios			
Murder	Western Cape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Northern Cape	Gauteng	Free State	North West	Mpumalanga	Limpopo
	60.7	52.5	50.6	43.6	39.8	32.2	27.3	25.3	14.1
Attempted murder	Northern Cape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape	Mpumalanga	Free State	North West	Eastern Cape	Limpopo
	107.6	58.3	53.6	43.1	40.2	33.7	31.0	30.9	15.1
Rape	Northern Cape	North West	Free State	Gauteng	Western Cape	Mpumalanga	Eastern Cape	25.3 Eastern Cape	Limpopo
	142.8	131.3	121.3	120.7	120.6	119.0	110.6	98.5	80.6
Indecent assault	Western Cape	Northern Cape	Gauteng	Free State	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	North West	Mpumalanga	Limpopo
	59.1	41.5	21.4	19.7	16.0	14.0	12.6	9.4	5.1
Assault GBH	Northern Cape	Mpumalanga	Western Cape	Free State	Gauteng	Eastern Cape	North West	KwaZulu-Natal	Limpopo
	1 091.2	547.7	545.9	540.7	510.6	510.0	488.9	311.7	285.4
Common assault	Western Cape	Free State	Northern Cape	Gauteng	Mpumalanga	KwaZulu-Natal	North West	Eastern Cape	Limpopo
	739.3	672.0	663.8	618.5	427.5	323.8	319.1	304.3	227.4
Aggravated robbery	Gauteng	Western Cape	KwaZulu-Natal	Mpumalanga	North West	Free State	Eastern Cape	Northern Cape	Limpopo
	574.6	320.9	268.9	207.3	198.8	144.8	131.8	112.5	56.7
Common robbery	Gauteng	Western Cape	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Free State	North West	Eastern Cape	KwaZulu-Natal	Limpopo
	264.4	183.3	157.6	152.9	142.0	114.1	110.2	108.7	81.7

Provinces ordered from the highest recorded raw crime figures to the lowest crime figures

Table 8

Contact crime	Provinces horizontally ranked according to raw crime figures										
Murder	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	Gauteng	Western Cape	North West	Free State	Mpumalanga	Limpopo	Northern Cape		
	4 923	3 705	3 666	2 881	1 053	953	824	797	400		
Attempted murder	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	Western Cape	Mpumalanga	North West	Free State	Northern Cape	Limpopo		
	5 367	5 213	2 182	2 046	1 306	1 196	998	980	854		
Rape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	Western Cape	North West	Limpopo	Mpumalanga	Free State	Northern Cape		
	11 114	9 587	7 796	5 722	5 065	4 573	3 871	3 589	1 300		
Indecent assault	Western Cape	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	Free State	North West	Northern Cape	Mpumalanga	Limpopo		
	2 806	1 970	1 554	991	583	486	378	307	292		
Assault GBH	Gauteng	Eastern Cape	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape	North West	Mpumalanga	Limpopo	Free State	Northern Cape		
	47 033	35 964	30 331	25 905	18 861	17 815	16 187	15 999	9 935		
Common assault	Gauteng	Western Cape	KwaZulu-Natal	Eastern Cape	Free State	Mpumalanga	Limpopo	North West	Northern Cape		
	56 971	35 083	31 510	21 459	19 883	13 903	12 893	12 311	6 044		
Aggravated robbery	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape	Eastern Cape	North West	Mpumalanga	Free State	Limpopo	Northern Cape		
	52 924	26 171	15 226	9 297	7 672	6 742	4 284	3 218	1 024		
Common robbery	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape	Eastern Cape	Mpumalanga	Limpopo	North West	Free State	Northern Cape		
	24 356	10 578	8 697	7 769	5 127	4 632	4 404	4 201	1 392		

For analysis and research to establish the relationship between conducive conditions, generators of crime and crime itself, the crime ratios (crime per 100 000 of the population) are much more suitable than the raw figures.

Unfortunately, ratios at a lower level of policing than provinces are highly questionable for the following reasons:

- Given the very high and rapid levels of urbanization in South Africa, as well as the added influx of foreigners¹², the 2001 census data are already outdated, particularly at precinct level. According to figures provided to the SAPS by Statistics South Africa (SSA), the Hillbrow, Johannesburg Central, Durban Central and Pretoria Central police precincts have only 115 453; 43 240; 40 653; and 45 195 people residing in them respectively. It does not need much logic to realise that these figures may be a gross underestimation of the number of people residing there. The real number of residents could well exceed the indicated figures by two to three or even four times. Since 2000 many high-rise office blocks had been transformed into housing units. The old CBD areas suddenly became high density residential areas, particularly aimed at accommodating a young, very cosmopolitan population. Furthermore, thousands of foreigners, street children and homeless people have flooded into these CBD's. The latter are now part of the resident population. Township precincts such as Tembisa, Khayelitsha, Galeshewe and Inanada also grow by the day. Informal settlements in and around the townships are mushrooming. This is why the official count for 2001 is considered to be already outdated.
- At precinct level the daily mobility patterns are of such a nature that ratios based on the resident population can be totally distorted. Most of the population (particularly those of an economically active age) of a suburb like Garsfontein would (especially on weekdays) be at work in the Pretoria CBD or the new CBD area created in Brooklyn, or even in the Johannesburg CBD or the new CBD in Sandton. During the early hours of the evening a percentage of these people would be in other precincts doing shopping, visiting places of entertainment or eating out, while others would be back at home. Thousands of people from the Temba precinct (in 2006/2007 still part of the North West province) will similarly on a daily basis commute from there to CBD areas in Gauteng. From North West they could travel through two areas of Gauteng (namely the Pretoria and North Rand Areas) to destinations in Area Johannesburg, probably workplaces in the Johannesburg Central precinct). These people may become victims of crime in any of a number of station precincts they pass through on their way to and from work.

Having indicated the factors complicating such an endeavour, the geographical analysis below is based on raw crime figures or frequencies.

Geographical analyses according to the crime distribution per precinct in the RSA are reflected in **tables 9**, 10 and 11 and maps 1-4. The results are discussed below.

¹² The number of undocumented immigrants in South Africa may vary between **3 - 6** million people. These people were not counted, but could still commit crime. Because they are not counted as part of the population, the population figures on which the crime ratio calculations are based, are too low. This means that the crime ratios may be inflated by **10 - 20%**.

Table 9
Precincts generating 40% of socially-motivated contact crime in South Africa (ordered from the highest to the lowest number of reported cases)

Murder	Attempted murder	Rape	d cases) Assault GBH			
Nyanga	Umlazi	KwaMashu	Hillbrow			
KwaMashu	Nyanga	Inanda	Galeshewe			
Inanda	KwaMashu	Umlazi	Moroka			
Umlazi	Tembisa	Tembisa	KwaMashu			
Khayelitsha	Hillbrow	Temba	Thohoyandou			
Harare	Kwadukuza	Moroka	Atteridgeville			
Guguletu	Moroka	Katlehong	Umlazi			
Mthatha	Empangeni	Thohoyandou	Vosman			
Kwazakele	Galeshewe	Nyanda	Johannesburg Central			
Tembisa	Esikhawini	Kwazakele	Temba			
Esikhawini	Temba	New Brighton	Nyanda			
Plessislaer	Bloemspruit	Orange Farms	Meadowlands			
New Brighton	Gelvandale	Seshego	Tembisa			
Delft	Atteridgeville	Hillbrow	Worcester			
Kraaifontein	Alexandra	Plessislaer	Kanyamazane			
Katlehong	Kanyamazane	Mankweng	Inanda			
Hillbrow	Delft	Galeshewe	Ivory Park			
Mfuleni	Mitchells Plain	Khayelitsha	Kwanobuhle			
Empangeni	Mamelodi	Bethelsdorp	Dobsonville			
Durban Central	Bethelsdorp	Kwadukuza	Alexandra			
Alexandra	Jeppe	Tonga	Kwazakele			
Mariannhill	Durban Central	Evaton	New Brighton			
Kwadukuza	Johannesburg Central	Dobsonville	Rietgat			
Duncan Village	Guguletu	Rietgat	Empangeni			
Moroka	Phoenix	Jouberton	Grahamstown			
Lusikisiki	Bishop Lavis	Mamelodi	Duncan Village			
Bethelsdorp	Inanda	Bloemspruit	Tonga			
Dobsonville	Chatsworth	Mitchells Plain	Ikageng			
Temba	Ivory Park	Guguletu	Mitchells Plain			
Ivory Park	Masoyi	Meadowlands	Rustenburg			
Kanyamazane	Booysens	Atteridgeville	Rosedale			
Chatsworth	Kagisanong	Empangeni	Kliptown			
Erasmia	Katlehong	Motherwell	Mthatha			
Kwamakhutha	Rabie Ridge	Alexandra	Jouberton			
Motherwell	Khayelitsha	Harare	Randfontein			
Kwadabeku	Harare	Tsakane	Jeppe			
Mountain Rise	Kwamsane	Kwanobuhle	Evaton			
Ezakheni	Dobsonville	Kanyamazane	Gelvandale			
Sundumbili	Mthatha	Ivory Park	Thabong			
Mpumalanga KZN	Rustenburg	Mthatha	Booysens			
Langa	Mariannhill	Rustenburg	Kimberley			
Strand	Kwazakele	Thabong	Mdantsane			
Msinga	Kraaifontein	Kagiso	Seshego			
Mitchells Plain	Roodepoort	Westonaria	Bethelsdorp			
Meadowlands	Kwambonambi	Randfontein	Guguletu			
Jeppe	Mabopane	Bolobedu	Kagiso			
Tsakane	Manenberg	Sebokeng	Boithuso			
Rustenburg	Sundumbili	Mfuleni	Pretoria Central			
Thabong	Erasmia	Roodepoort	Krugersdorp			
Bizana	Kagiso	Kabokweni	Siyabuswa			
Kwamsane	Ladysmith	Vosloorus	Khayelitsha			
Philippi East	Akasia	M.W. Makhubela	Plessislaer			
Evaton	Kwadabeka	Ikageng	Roodepoort			
Lingelethu West	Meadowlands	Grahamstown	Mmabatho			
Engcobo	Wierdabrug	Vosman	Delft			
Johannesburg Central	Duncan Village	Loate	Lenasia			
Mount Frere	Nongoma	Kraaifontein	Kraaifontein			
Bloemspruit	Isipingo	Durban Central	Phoenix			
Galeshewe	Rietgat	Mmabatho	Mamelodi			
Port Shepstone	Vosman	Delft	Daveyton			
Westonaria	Cato Manor	Akasia	Upington			

Attempted murder	Rape	Assault GBH
Orange Farms	Esikhawini	Bolobedu
Evaton	Maake	Mankweng
Vosloorus		Protea Glen
2		Mfuleni
		Sophiatown
	<u> </u>	Westonaria
	-	Kopanong
		Bloemspruit
- 11		East London
		Harare
		Yeoville
		Embalenhle
<u> </u>		Kamesh
-		Tokoza
		Orange Farms
		Kabokweni
		Katlehong
		Kagisanong
		Mahwelereng
		Tsakane
211.011011		Kwadabeka
***		Motherwell
Etwatwa		Esikhawini
		Lusikisiki
		Botshabelo
		Khutsong
	ĕ	Buffalo Flats
		Orlando
		Akasia
		Durban Central
		Ermelo
		Bethlehem
		Witbank
		Masoyi
		Kwadukuza
		Phokeng
		Barberton
		Kirkwood
		Diepkloof
		Vryburg
		Kwanhlanga
		Vosloorus
		Mamelodi East
		Jabulani
		Cradock
		Loate
		Oudtshoorn
		Eldorado Park
		Graaff-Reinet
		Sasolburg
	Gelvandale	Kanana
	Kleinvlei	Ladysmith
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani	Ladysmith Roodepan
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi Madadeni
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi Madadeni Nelspruit
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi Madadeni Nelspruit Lichtenburg
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi Madadeni Nelspruit Lichtenburg Selosesha
	Kleinvlei Ngqelani De Deur	Ladysmith Roodepan Chatsworth Queenstown Reigerpark Cambridge Mhluzi Madadeni Nelspruit Lichtenburg
	Orange Farms Evaton	Orange Farms Esikhawini Evaton Maake Vosloorus Etwatwa Honeydew Siyabuswa Cleveland Calcutta Garsfontein Mahwelereng Loate Masoyi Lyttelton Kwadabeka Philippi Vanderbijlpark Tsakane Mariannhill Mtulani Erasmia Kranskop Duncan Village Krugersdorp Ritavi Thohoyandou Mamelodi East New Brighton Orlando Pretoria Central Mdantsane Benoni Phokeng Kwamakhutha Kliptown Mountain Rise Ga-Rankuwa Butterworth Kopanong Silverton Booysens Philippi East Kwamhlanga Etwatwa Kagisanong Bhekithemba Madadeni Krugersdorp Nongoma Kwamakutha Johannesburg Central Bethlehem Mabopane Osizweni Daveyton Queenstown Ermelo Embalenhle Dennilton Mangaung Diepkloof Boithuso Rabie Ridge Verulam Tokoza Pretoria Central Piet Retief Jabulani Kanana Lebowakgomo Mogwase Jeppe

Forty percent of murders, attempted murders, rapes and assaults GBH occur in 8,6%, 7,5%, 10,4% and 11,4% of the 1 105¹³ police station precincts in the RSA respectively (see table 10). These crimes are thus extremely concentrated in their distribution. By far the majority of these crimes occur in predominantly black megatownships in South Africa's metropolitan areas. These precincts usually include large and growing informal settlements (squatter areas).

The top stations affected by socially-motivated contact crime to a lesser extent also include those serving the central business districts (CBD's) of the metropoles and areas on the periphery of the latter (e.g. Hillbrow and Johannesburg Central) with large and concentrated resident populations. The occupation density of housing units in such areas is often extremely high and overpopulation frequently occurs. The populations of the precincts in question mainly consist of black and/or Coloured people. These are the two groups most affected by unequal distribution of wealth as a result of the historical past of South Africa and by rapid urbanization. These factors create conditions as described earlier in this document.

A further analysis during which weights were allocated to murder, attempted murder, rape and assault GBH, was also done. The top 124 stations (see **table 11**) which account for **40%** of the social contact crime weight were analysed and reveal that respectively **89,0%**; **59,0%**; **62,0%**; and **47,0%** among the top **10%**, second **10%**, third **10%** and fourth **10%** were black megatownships. Among the top **10%** of precincts contributing to the weighted social contact crime, none were located in suburbs and suburban precincts only accounted for **11,0%**; **18,0%** and **38,0%** among the second, third and fourth **10%** segments respectively.

Local analysis at police station level consistently reveals an association between drinking places (e.g. shebeens, taverns, etc) frequented by socially dislocated youths, particularly from informal settlements, and social contact crime. Analysis of information linked to the geographic information system (GIS) at station level also indicates a concentration of incidents of both assault GBH and common assault in the vicinity of some shebeens.

(c) Timeline analysis

Timeline analyses of all categories of serious crime have become a matter of routine by the CIAC at all levels of policing, because it forms the basis of operational planning.

Timeline analyses pertaining to murder, rape and assault GBH in South Africa over the period January 2001 to March 2007 are reflected in **graphs 1**, **2** and **3**, while an analysis per day and hour of occurrence for the period 1 January to 31 March 2007 is reflected in **graphs 4** and **5**.

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¹³ This figure indicates the number of police precintes demarcated on the geographic information system (GIS) at the time this analysis was done.

From all these graphs it can be deduced that the peak times of occurrence of murder, rape and assault GBH are as follows:

- The summer holiday season (November January) and the long weekends during March April;
- Saturdays in particular, but also Sundays and Fridays; and
- evenings (18h00 22h00).

It seems as if a relationship exists between the occurrence of these social contact crimes and peak times of social interaction during which alcohol, drugs or both are more likely to be involved.

Table 10 A quinary stratification of the distribution of socially-motivated contact crime according to intensity of occurrence per precinct based on recorded raw figures as illustrated on maps 1 - 4

	Murder		Attempted murder		Rape		Assault GBH		Common assault		Indecent assault	
	N*	%	N*	%	N*	%	N*	%	N*	%	N*	%
Top 20%	30	2,7	28	2,5	42	3,8	47	4,3	34	3,1	27	2,4
Second 20%	65	5,9	55	5,0	73	6,6	79	7,1	64	5,8	59	5,3
Third 20%	106	9,6	90	8,1	118	10,6	123	11,1	103	9,3	94	8,5
Fourth 20%	159	14,4	158	14,3	193	17,5	200	18,1	182	16,5	159	14,4
Fifth 20%	745	67,4	774	70,0	679	61,4	656	59,4	722	65,3	766	69,3
	1 105	100,0	1 105	100,0	1 105	100,0	1 105	100,0	1 105	100,0	1 105	100,0

^{*&}quot;N" indicates the number of precincts accounting for any given segment of crime: It e.g indicates that only 30 precincts (2,7% of all precincts) account for 20% of all murders reported in South Africa; 95 precincts (less than 9,0%) account for 40% of all murders, etc.

Table 11
Distribution of weighted social contact crime among 124 precincts accounting for 40% of such crime in South Africa

Segments of top 40% of weighted social crime	Distribution of precincts		Nature of precincts			
	No of accountable stations	% of top 124 stations	Black townships	Other townships*	CBD areas	Other
Top 10%	18	14,5	89%	-	11%	-
Second 10%	27	21,8	59%	26%	4%	11%
Third 10%	34	27,4	62%	9%	12%	18%
Fourth 10%	45	36,3	47%	13,0	2%	38%
Total	124	100,0	N/A			

^{*}Formerly almost exclusively inhabited by Coloured and Indian people.

2.2 Contact-related crimes

Contact-related crimes cover arson and malicious damage to property. These crimes are closely associated with all kinds of assault and intergroup (or even intragroup) violent conflict, e.g. taxi-related violence and clan feuds. An example of this is a bar fight during which the furniture, liquor bottles and glasses are broken and customers' clothes torn and damaged. As a result, various assault and damage to property complaints may be laid, possibly even at various police stations serving the areas in which the different customers involved reside.

According to **tables 1** and **2**, the incidence of arson increased by **2,0%** while malicious damaged to property decreased by **-1,7%**. During 2005/2006 both of these crimes decreased, namely arson by **-7,4%** and malicious damage to property by **-4,9%**. It should also be noted that the numerous malicious damage to property cases exceed arson cases by more than **18** times in number.

2.3 Property-related crimes

South Africa experiences relatively lower levels of property-related crime than many other **INTERPOL** member countries. It was and is still accepted that levels of these crimes should simply not increase. Tables **1**, **2** and **12** indicate that two of the five property-related crimes decreased markedly, namely theft out of or from motor vehicle by a significant **-11,8%** and burglary at residential premises by **-5,9%**. This is an improvement on 2005/2006, particularly in the case of theft out of or from motor vehicles.

Table 12
Decreases in property-related crime

Crimes	Change in raw figures	Decrease in ratios
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	-10,8%	-11,8%
Burglary at residential premises	-4,9%	-5,9%
Stock-theft	0,3%	-0,8%
Theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles	0,4%	-0,7%

The ratios for of stock-theft and theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles decreased marginally by -0,8% and -0,7% respectively, but the raw figures actually reflect a slight increase. The slight decrease in theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles (-0,7%) is an improvement on the marginal increase of 1,8% recorded during 2005/2006.

Burglary at business premises increased by **6,3%** during 2006/2007. This is particularly worrying against the background of a **-3,6%** decrease recorded during the 2005/2006 financial year. A large part of this increase was caused by a significant increase of **15,3%** in burglary at business premises during the security guard strike lasting almost three months (April – June 2006) during the first quarter of the 2006/2007 financial year. Burglary at business premises decreased to such an extent during particularly the second and third quarters (but also the fourth quarter) of 2006/2007 that some of the damage done during the first quarter was reversed.

2.4 Other serious crime

Other serious crimes, which account for 24,8% of South Africa's total serious crime, include all theft not mentioned elsewhere, commercial crime and shoplifting. All theft not mentioned elsewhere (also called "other theft") basically refers to all theft excluding theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles, theft out of or from motor vehicles, housebreaking at both residential and non-residential premises and stocktheft (i.e. the crimes discussed as property-related crime). With 415 163 registered cases during 2006/2007, this is the single largest category of crime among the 27 categories featuring on the SAPS website at www.saps.gov.za. (This means that this category of theft accounts for 19,0% of all South Africa's recorded serious crime.) The fact that other theft accounts for so much of South Africa's serious crime is not unique to South Africa. The 1999 Interpol Report e.g. mentions inter alia that other theft accounts for the following percentages of all crime recorded in different countries: South Africa (25,7%); Denmark (54,8%); Australia (45,9%); France (41,3%); Germany (30,3%); Finland (29,8%); Canada (28,3%); and Norway (25,3%). Other theft covers anything from stealing kilometres of copper cable (costing with sometimes extremely serious/consequences such as an electrical substation ±R30 million going up in flames and causing prolonged failures over large areas) or aircraft engines worth millions to taking a pen, ashtray, beer glass and/or towel from a hotel/resort as a souvenir. Various docket analyses done in the past indicated that the items most frequently taken during cases of other theft are the following:

- Cellular telephones;
- money;
- jewellery; and
- tools (especially garden tools).

The figures for other theft are probably as high as they are for the following reasons:

- It covers the stealing of virtually everything not mentioned under the five property-related crimes discussed in **section 2.3** of this report.
- People can very easily put aside, store, mislay, lose or leave items like cellular telephones, money, jewellery and tools somewhere and then later believe such items to have been stolen; or report the loss as due to theft in order to claim from insurance.
- Organised syndicates commit some types of other theft at a high frequency. This can generate literally hundreds and even thousands of dockets over a very short period of time. An example of the latter is the stealing of brass water (reading) meters almost every few minutes during the night at different addresses in the same neighbourhood. By the next morning the culprits may have stolen a considerable number of water meters at different addresses, causing the home-owners affected to all lay complaints at the same or different police stations and resulting in numerous other theft cases being added to the crime statistics. The same applies to cable theft.

Commercial crime covers all kinds of fraud, forgery and uttering, misappropriations and embezzlement. Universally, the modern trend in commercial crime is for it to be handled "internally" as far as possible (i.e. within the company or industry affected) and to only hand cases over to the police for prosecution, if these are reported to the police at all. Many companies, particularly those in the financial sector which are entrusted with safeguarding the financial interests of their clients, do not want it to become publicly known if they have a number of rotten apples in their own baskets. They will consequently investigate cases internally and even deal with culprits in their own ways (e.g. by way of dismissal, forcing them to pay back defrauded sums and transfers).

Shoplifting is defined as consisting of stealing articles offered for sale by self-service shops during the shopping hours of such shops. It is necessary for the perpetrator to remove an article from the shelf, move past the cashier without paying for it and have the intention to steal such item. It is therefore actually logical that the majority of shoplifting cases are identified by the security staff and surveillance systems of such shops, sometimes with the assistance of customers. In most cases a perpetrator is arrested by the security staff and handed over to the police, who then open a case

docket (and thus add a case of shoplifting to the statistics). As in the case of commercial crime, the police are in the vast majority of cases only involved in the prosecution part of the case.

According to **tables 1** and **2**, other theft decreased and shoplifting increased marginally (it actually stabilized), as can also be seen in **table 13**. Commercial crime increased by a significant **12,6%**, after having decreased by **-0,2%** in 2005/2006.

Table 13 Fluctuations in the incidence of other serious crime

Crimes	Decrease/increase based on raw figures	Decrease/increase based on ratios
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	-4,0%	-5,1%
Commercial crime	13,8%	12,6%
Shoplifting	1,5%	0,5%

2.5 Crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection

The crimes fitting this category are the following:

- Illegal possession of firearms.
- Drug-related crimes (these cover both the use, possession of and dealing in drugs).
- Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

The above crimes are usually not reported to the police by members of the public. These crimes come to attention primarily as a result of police actions like road-blocks and searches. An increase in these crimes may actually indicate that the police are more active, whereas a decrease may indicate reduced police activity. Other explanations may also exist for decreases and increases observed in relation to these crimes. Decreases may e.g. result from a change in strategy among gunrunners and drug pedlars (e.g. to avoid road-blocks), a real decrease in these phenomena, or the impact of previous actions like "arrive alive" campaigns on people's drinking and driving behaviour.

Crimes heavily dependent on police action for detection are also indicators of the availability or presence of some of the generators of crime (particularly social/contact crimes). Research and docket analysis, as well as time and spatial analysis over the past decade, clearly indicate a link between alcohol and drugs on the one hand and crime on the other in South Africa. People under the influence of drugs and alcohol may become aggressive and/or start arguments, which could turn into physical confrontations resulting in assault, rape, attempted murder or murder. Drugs and even alcohol can further be quite expensive. For people who become addicted, it may become a very expensive habit. Addicts may consequently be driven to property-related crime and even robbery to get hold of the money needed to buy drugs. Drugs

are also the primary substance fuelling organised crime and causing turf wars among gangs. However, an increase in illegal possession of firearms and drug-related crime cases might not necessarily indicate an increase in the volumes of illegal firearms or drugs available in society. Similarly, a decrease does not necessarily indicate shrinking volumes of such firearms and drugs. To determine the true extent (volume) of drugs and illegal firearms floating around in any country will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

All three crimes dependent on police action for detection, which at the same time also serve as generators of other crime, increased in 2006/2007. Driving under the influence, drug related crime and illegal possession of firearms increased by 14,3%, 8,2% and 5,6% respectively. In the case of both driving under the influence and illegal possession of firearms the increases were much more significant during the current reporting period (2006/2007) than during the preceding financial year. The increase of 8,2% in drug-related crimes during 2006/2007 was less than the 13,2% increase recorded in 2005/2006. This can be explained against the background of major increases in drug-related crime since 2002/2003. Between 2002/2003 and 2005/2006 a 72,4% increase (i.e a 24,1% average annual increase) in drug-related crimes was recorded. It will be difficult to maintain similar percentage increases from such a high baseline.

3. The provincial crime situation

The provincial serious crime ratios for the 21 serious crimes under consideration during the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years, as well as the percentage decreases and increases calculated on the basis of these ratios, are reflected in **table 14**.

Table 14 and the raw figures or frequencies in **tables 15 - 28** and on the South African Police Service website (www.saps.gov.za) are self-explanatory. Only a few comments are therefore made in this section on increases and decreases in the incidence of crime. The focus is on the most serious contact crimes and some subtrends.

The eight contact crimes and six of the high-profile subcategories of aggravated robbery are analysed per province in **tables 15 - 28**. In each of these tables the provinces are ranked from the one with the highest decrease in the incidence of the specific crime featured in that particular table to the one with the highest increase. The degree to which the nine provinces achieved (or failed to achieve) their contact crime reduction targets is briefly discussed below.

Fluctuations in serious crime trends between the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years per province

Crime category	Eastern Cape			Free State			Gauteng		
	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%
			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease
			Contact crime (C						
Murder	52.9	52.5	-0,8	29.5	32.2	9,2	38.0	39.8	4,7
Rape	127.3	110.6	-13,1	125.6	121.3	-3,4	128.2	120.7	-5,9
Indecent assault	14.6	14.1	-3,4	22.1	19.7	-10,9	22.2	21.4	-3,6
Attempted murder	36.4	30.9	-15,1	35.4	33.7	-4,8	59.6	58.3	-2,2
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous	538.0	510.0	-5,2	572.1	540.7	-5,5	534.5	510.6	-4,5
bodily harm									
Common assault	326.3	304.3	-6,7	759.1	672.0	-11,5	673.9	618.5	-8,2
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	131.6	131.8	0,2	141.1	144.8	2,6	552.1	574.6	4,1
Common robbery	117.7	110.2	-6,4	138.0	142.0	2,9	270.8	264.4	-2,4
	Contact-related crime								
Arson	19.4	18.8	-3,1	15.0	15.8	5,3	21.1	21.7	2,8
Malicious damage to property	212.4	224.8	5,8	348.5	324.7	-6,8	473.5	456.5	-3,6
				ty-related crin	ne				
Burglary at residential premises	476.0	454.6	-4,5	592.8	544.6	-8,1	800.0	707.7	-11,5
Burglary at business premises	84.6	75.5	-10,8	139.1	138.9	-0,1	142.6	152.9	7,2
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	78.4	80.5	2,7	102.4	96.9	-5,4	456.5	451.7	-1,1
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	184.0	168.4	-8,5	224.7	193.1	-14,1	503.8	425.3	-15,6
Stock-theft	110.6	100.7	-9,0	150.2	158.8	5,7	5.5	5.6	1,8
		C	rime heavily depende	nt on police ac	ction for detec	tion			
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	22.3	20.8	-6,7	13.1	11.5	-12,2	35.0	39.6	13,1
Drug-related crime	106.8	103.7	-2,9	171.8	184.6	7,5	147.1	120.2	-18,3
Driving under the influence of alcohol	54.0	67.7	25,4	44.9	42.2	-6,0	78.6	79.6	1,3
or drugs									
			Other	r serious crime	 ;				
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	577.9	543.3	-6,0	931.4	816.8	-12,3	1 474.1	1 383.1	-6,2
Commercial crime	64.1	81.3	26,8	82.1	78.1	-4,9	266.8	287.9	7,9
Shoplifting	95.4	93.9	-1,6	111.0	104.3	-6,0	197.2	195.8	-0,7

Table 14

Table 14 (continued)
Fluctuations in serious crime trends between the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years per province

Crime category		KwaZulu-N	Natal		Limpop	0		Mpumala	nga
	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%
			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease
		•	Contact crime (C	rimes against	the person)				
Murder	50.2	50.6	0,8	12.5	14.1	12,8	27.1	25.3	-6,6
Rape	100.8	98.5	-2,3	78.4	80.6	2,8	123.9	119.0	-4,0
Indecent assault	17.0	16.0	-5,9	4.7	5.1	8,5	11.2	9.4	-16,1
Attempted murder	54.7	53.6	-2,0	14.8	15.1	2,0	42.0	40.2	-4,3
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous	318.1	311.7	-2,0	292.3	285.4	-2,4	571.4	547.7	-4,1
bodily harm									
Common assault	350.3	323.8	-7,6	258.7	227.4	-12,1	448.3	427.5	-4,6
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	255.0	268.9	5,5	53.8	56.7	5,4	206.8	207.3	0,2
Common robbery	121.1	108.7	-10,2	84.5	81.7	-3,3	159.0	157.6	-0,9
			Contac	ct-related crim	ie				
Arson	12.6	12.6	0,0	13.1	12.5	-4,6	18.1	20.4	12,7
Malicious damage to property	196.6	186.8	-5,0	139.4	133.6	-4,2	272.6	270.5	-0.8
			Proper	ty-related crin	ne				
Burglary at residential premises	419.3	403.8	-3,7	236.5	227.6	-3,8	624.5	590.3	-5,5
Burglary at business premises	94.1	97.8	3,9	84.8	85.0	0,2	91.2	105.9	16,1
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	155.4	144.6	-6,9	24.0	25.9	7,9	107.3	101.6	-5,3
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	192.2	160.6	-16,4	81.0	68.8	-15,1	209.5	182.6	-12,8
Stock-theft	74.9	74.6	-0,4	21.3	27.7	30,0	78.1	83.3	6,7
		C	rime heavily depende	nt on police a	ction for detect	tion			
Illegal possession of firearms and	44.5	47.2	6,1	8.6	7.8	-9,3	17.0	17.6	3,5
ammunition									
Drug-related crime	240.3	268.7	11,8	34.4	38.3	11,3	57.7	64.3	11,4
Driving under the influence of alcohol	81.7	100.1	22,5	14.6	18.8	28,8	35.6	42.5	19,4
or drugs									
·				serious crime		<u> </u>			
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	570.6	524.1	-8,1	345.2	330.3	-4,3	937.8	868.7	-7,4
Commercial crime	85.5	109.0	27,5	34.2	39.3	14,9	82.7	90.9	9,9
Shoplifting	110.9	109.2	-1,5	64.4	61.8	-4,0	111.6	121.7	9,1

Table 14 (continued) Fluctuations in serious crime trends between the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years per province

Crime category		Northern (Cape		North West			Western Cape	
	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%	2005/2006	2006/2007	%
			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease			Increase/decrease
			Contact crime (C	Crimes against	the person)				
Murder	41.4	43.9	6,0	25.0	27.3	9,2	59.2	60.7	2,5
Rape	155.7	142.8	-8,3	130.9	131.3	0,3	132.3	120.6	-8,8
Indecent assault	39.8	41.5	4,3	11.7	12.6	7,7	65.6	59.1	-9,9
Attempted murder	115.4	107.6	-6,8	32.3	31.0	-4,0	39.9	43.1	8,0
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	1 178.3	1 091.2	-7,4	504.6	488.9	-3,1	613.0	545.9	-10,9
Common assault	728.7	663.8	-8,9	360.3	319.1	-11,4	822.8	739.3	-10,1
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	119.8	112.5	-6,1	214.2	198.8	-7,2	278.7	320.9	15,1
Common robbery	197.2	152.9	-22,5	136.2	114.1	-16,2	202.1	183.3	-9,3
•			Contac	ct-related crim	e				
Arson	20.8	19.8	-4,8	15.3	17.1	11,8	12.8	13.2	3,1
Malicious damage to property	394.8	361.3	-8,5	242.6	227.0	-6,4	600.0	615.9	2,6
			Proper	ty-related crin	ne				
Burglary at residential premises	633.4	559.3	-11,7	490.5	432.0	-11,9	882.6	909.1	3,0
Burglary at business premises	210.8	219.7	4,2	125.6	130.1	3,6	171.0	213.2	24,7
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	33.4	31.3	-6,3	87.6	90.8	3,7	275.4	284.7	3,4
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	298.8	287.8	-3,7	179.6	143.8	-19,9	745.8	708.6	-5,0
Stock-theft	170.5	144.4	-15,3	70.9	74.6	5,2	18.0	16.4	-8,9
		Cı	rimes heavily depende	ent on police a	ction for deten	tion			
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	9.5	7.5	-21,1	17.8	17.9	0,6	48.5	53.2	9,7
Drug-related crime	222.3	216.8	-2,5	158.1	191.6	21,2	748.8	865.4	15,6
Driving under the influence of alcohol	104.5	110.2	5,5	52.0	55.0	5,8	174.7	201.9	15,6
or drugs									
				r serious crime			1		
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	975.4	843.8	-13,5	731.2	681.7	-6,8	1 937.9	1 966.4	1,5
Commercial crime	78.5	87.0	10,8	66.0	70.8	7,3	153.7	164.8	7,2
Shoplifting	268.3	232.3	-13,4	98.0	92.9	-5,2	271.6	294.0	8,2

- Murder (table 15): No province achieved the 7 10% reduction target. Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape achieved decreases below the target, while the remainder of the provinces experienced an increase in the incidence of murder. Some of these increases are marginal, but those in the Western Cape, Gauteng, the Northern Cape, Free State, North West and particularly Limpopo (13,5%) are significant.
- Rape (table 16): In the Eastern Cape (-13,0%), Northern Cape (-7,5%) and Western Cape (-6,9%) the 7 10% reduction target was met and even exceeded. Although decreases were recorded in most of the other provinces, these did not meet the target of a 7 10% reduction.
- Attempted murder (table 18): The Eastern Cape (-14,7%) exceeded the reduction target a significant margin, while most of the other provinces recorded some reductions without meeting the 7 10% reduction target. In the Western Cape a 10,3% increase in attempted murder was recorded.
- **Assault GBH (table 19)**: All nine provinces recorded reductions, but only the Western Cape and Northern Cape achieved the target of a 7 10% reduction.
- Common assault (table 20): All the provinces with the exception of Mpumalanga, which experienced only a -3,7% decrease, achieved the 7-10% reduction target.
- Robbery with aggravating circumstances (table 21): The only provinces recording decreases in the incidence of this crime were North West (-6,3%) and the Northern Cape (-5,3%). Only North West achieved the 7 10% reduction target as far as aggravated robbery is concerned. The remaining seven provinces recorded increases ranging from a marginal 0,4% for the Eastern Cape to an extremely worrying 17,6% (that is 2 281 cases) for the Western Cape. The 6,3% increase in Gauteng is also quite significant, representing 3 140 more cases.
- Common robbery (table 22): Five of the nine provinces either achieved or exceeded the 7 10% reduction target. The Northern Cape and North West far exceeded the target by respectively achieving a -21,8% and -15,4% reduction in common robbery. Limpopo and Gauteng only achieved marginally reduced common robbery levels. Mpumalanga and the Free State recorded marginal increases of 0,1% and 3,1% respectively.

The percentage increases/decreases in the incidence of the six high-profile subcategories of aggravated robbery (figures for which are already included in the overall aggravated robbery figures) are also provided in order from the highest decrease to the highest increase in **tables 23** – **28**. Three of these six subtrends accounted for more than 6 000 cases of crime each during the 2006/2007 financial year. These are carjacking with **13 599** cases; robbery at residential premises (house robbery) with **12 761** cases; and robbery at business premises (business robberies) with **6 689** cases. These three subtrends of aggravated robbery form the focus of a special initiative against armed robbery launched towards the end of February 2007 (in Gauteng known as Operation Trio). If tables **23**, **27** and **28** are scrutinized, the following seems evident:

- Almost **80,0%** (**77,3%**) of all carjackings recorded during 2006/2007 occurred in Gauteng (**51,1%**) and KwaZulu-Natal (**26,2%**). These two provinces recorded a **0,9%** and **15,8%** increase in carjackings respectively.
- Nearly **80,0%** (**79,3%**) of robberies at residential premises during 2006/2007 also occurred in Gauteng (**58,5%**) and KwaZulu-Natal (**20,8%**), with these provinces respectively recording a **26,3%** and a **47,8%** increase in the incidence of this particular subcategory of crime. These increases are a matter of serious concern, because these are the types of robberies which hit the media headlines on a daily basis and create a feeling that one is not even safe in the sanctity of one's own residence (as commented upon by the President in his State of the Nation address).
- Virtually **80%** (**79,5%**) of robberies at business premises during 2006/2007 occurred in Gauteng (**64,6%**) and KwaZulu-Natal (**14,9%**) as well, with these provinces recording a **40,9%** and **92,8%** increase respectively.

Table 15 Provincial murder figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Mpumalanga	874	824	-5,7
Eastern Cape	3 726	3 705	-0,6
KwaZulu-Natal	4 847	4 923	1,6
Western Cape	2 748	2 881	4,8
Gauteng	3 430	3 666	6,9
Northern Cape	374	400	7,0
Free State	871	953	9,4
North West	956	1 053	10,1
Limpopo	702	797	13,5
RSA Total	18 528	19 202	3,6

Table 16 Provincial rape figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Eastern Cape	8 960	7 796	-13,0
Northern Cape	1 405	1 300	-7,5
Western Cape	6 145	5 722	-6,9
Gauteng	11 562	11 114	-3,9
Free State	3 709	3 589	-3,2
Mpumalanga	3 991	3 871	-3,0
KwaZulu-Natal	9 731	9 587	-1,5
North West	5 007	5 065	1,2
Limpopo	4 416	4 573	3,6
RSA Total	54 926	52 617	-4,2

Table 17 Provincial indecent assault figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Mpumalanga	361	307	-15,0
Free State	653	583	-10,7
Western Cape	3 047	2 806	-7,9
KwaZulu-Natal	1 639	1 554	-5,2
Eastern Cape	1 030	991	-3,8
Gauteng	2 001	1 970	-1,5
Northern Cape	359	378	5,3
North West	448	486	8,5
Limpopo	267	292	9,4
RSA Total	9 805	9 367	-4,5

Table 18 Provincial attempted murder figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Eastern Cape	2 559	2 182	-14,7
Northern Cape	1 041	980	-5,9
Free State	1 044	998	-4,4
Mpumalanga	1 352	1 306	-3,4
North West	1 237	1 196	-3,3
KwaZulu-Natal	5 276	5 213	-1,2
Gauteng	5 374	5 367	-0,1
Limpopo	833	854	2,5
Western Cape	1 855	2 046	10,3
RSA Total	20 571	20 142	-2,1

Table 19 Provincial assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm figures ranked from highest to lowest decreases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease	
Western Cape	28 479	25 905	-9,0	
Northern Cape	10 632	9 935	-6,6	
Free State	16 895	15 999	-5,3	
Eastern Cape	37 868	35 964	-5,0	
Mpumalanga	18 397	17 815	-3,2	
Gauteng	48 205	47 033	-2,4	
North West	19 296	18 861	-2,3	
Limpopo	16 470	16 187	-1,7	
KwaZulu-Natal	30 700	30 331	-1,2	
RSA Total	226 942	218 030	-3,9	

Table 20 Provincial common assault figures ranked from highest to lowest decreases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Limpopo	14 575	12 893	-11,5
Free State	22 417	19 883	-11,3
North West	13 776	12 311	-10,6
Western Cape	38 226	35 083	-8,2
Northern Cape	6 575	6 044	-8,1
KwaZulu-Natal	33 805	31 510	-6,8
Eastern Cape	22 967	21 459	-6,6
Gauteng	60 776	56 971	-6,3
Mpumalanga	14 436	13 903	-3,7
RSA Total	227 553	210 057	-7,7

Table 21 Provincial robbery with aggravating circumstances figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
North West	8 192	7 672	-6,3
Northern Cape	1 081	1 024	-5,3
Eastern Cape	9 262	9 297	0,4
Mpumalanga	6 658	6 742	1,3
Free State	4 166	4 284	2,8
Limpopo	3 030	3 218	6,2
Gauteng	49 784	52 924	6,3
KwaZulu-Natal	24 608	26 171	6,4
Western Cape	12 945	15 226	17,6
RSA Total	119 726	126 558	5,7

 $Table\ 22$ Provincial common robbery figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Northern Cape	1 779	1 392	-21,8
North West	5 208	4 404	-15,4
KwaZulu-Natal	11 688	10 578	-9,5
Western Cape	9 387	8 697	-7,4
Eastern Cape	8 284	7 769	-6,2
Limpopo	4 761	4 632	-2,7
Gauteng	24 420	24 356	-0,3
Mpumalanga	5 121	5 127	0,1
Free State	4 075	4 201	3,1
RSA Total	74 723	71 156	-4,8

 $Table\ 23$ Provincial carjacking figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Northern Cape	4	3	-25,0
Western Cape	965	911	-5,6
Gauteng	6 890	6 951	0,9
North West	582	648	11,3
Mpumalanga	557	623	11,8
KwaZulu-Natal	3 077	3 562	15,8
Eastern Cape	525	608	15,8
Free State	96	123	28,1
Limpopo	129	170	31,8
RSA Total	12 825	13 599	6,0

Table 24 Provincial truck hijacking figures ranked from highest decreases to highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Eastern Cape	64	23	-64,1
North West	95	85	-10,5
Western Cape	10	9	-10,0
KwaZulu-Natal	91	85	-6,6
Free State	48	50	4,2
Mpumalanga	89	93	4,5
Gauteng	425	532	25,2
Limpopo	6	12	100,0
Northern Cape	1	3	200,0
RSA Total	829	892	7,6

Table 25 Provincial robbery of cash-in-transit figures ranked from the lowest to the highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
North West	33	20	-39,4
Limpopo	44	23	-47,7
Eastern Cape	26	20	-23,1
Mpumalanga	19	18	5,3
Gauteng	141	172	22,0
KwaZulu-Natal	66	121	83,3
Western Cape	53	78	47,2
Free State	1	14	1 300,0
Northern Cape	0	1	-
RSA Total	383	467	219,9

 $Table\ 26$ Provincial bank robbery figures ranked from the lowest to the highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Gauteng	45	76	68,9
KwaZulu-Natal	6	11	83,3
Eastern Cape	2	5	150,0
Mpumalanga	2	7	250,0
Western Cape	1	5	400,0
Free State	1	5	400,0
Limpopo	1	6	500,0
North West	1	13	1 200,0
Northern Cape	0	1	-
RSA Total	59	129	118,6

Table 27 Provincial robbery at residential premises figures ranked from the highest decreases to the highest increases between the years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease
Eastern Cape	644	356	-44,7
Free State	111	64	-42,3
Limpopo	192	199	3,6
North West	729	853	17,0
Gauteng	5 909	7 461	26,3
Mpumalanga	354	505	42,7
KwaZulu-Natal	1 796	2 655	47,8
Western Cape	434	658	51,6
Northern Cape	4	10	150,0
RSA Total	10 173	12 761	25,4

Table 28 Provincial robbery at business premises figures ranked from the lowest to the highest increases between the financial years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007

Province	2005/2006	2006/2007	% Increase/decrease	
Eastern Cape	232	241	3,9	
Limpopo	85	105	23,5	
Gauteng	3 068	4 322	40,9	
Northern Cape	8	13	62,5	
Western Cape	110	197	79,1	
KwaZulu-Natal	517	997	92,8	
North West	277	579	109,0	
Mpumalanga	67	173	158,2	
Free State	23	62	169,6	
RSA Total	4 387	6 689	52,5	

4. Acts of violence against the farming community

The figures pertaining to incidents involving acts of violence against and murders of members of the farming community (according to the definition employed by the security forces) in each province from the 2001/2002 financial year to the 2006/2007 financial year are depicted in **Tables 29** and **30** respectively. Incidents of violence against the farming community and murders of farm dwellers increased by **24,8%** and decreased by **24,8%** respectively if figures for 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 are compared. This indicates a lower mortality rate per incident.

The analysis per province indicates that violent incidents against the farming community increased significantly in North West - by 94,1% (from 68 to 132 cases); the Free State - by 63,3% (from 30 to 49 cases); Gauteng - by 57,2% (from 215 to 338 cases); and KwaZulu-Natal - by 39,0% (from 59 to 82 cases). In Mpumalanga, incidents increased by 8 cases. In all the other provinces reported acts of violence against the farming community decreased. Murders increased by 12 in Mpumalanga, 10 in the Free State, 7 in KwaZulu-Natal and 2 in North West.

According to analysis done by the Crime Information Analysis Centre of the SAPS more than 90,0% of the acts of violence against the farming community are linked to robbery. In most respects the cases under discussion therefore correspond with the overall phenomenon of robbery at residential premises (house robbery) discussed in section 2.1.4.2.

Total number of incidents per province

Table 29

Province	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
Gauteng	313	245	188	216	215	338
KwaZulu-Natal	130	83	119	73	59	82
Mpumalanga	280	291	198	169	133	141
Eastern Cape	76	36	43	26	46	14
Western Cape	41	49	39	31	32	17
Northern Cape	10	12	7	11	11	2
North West	132	82	70	84	68	132
Limpopo	59	64	49	47	42	19
Free State	28	41	60	37	30	49
Total	1 069	903	773	694	636	794

Total number of murders per province

Table 30

Province	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
Gauteng	34	24	33	30	32	23
KwaZulu-Natal	24	19	18	12	9	16
Mpumalanga	23	21	9	14	2	14
Eastern Cape	18	1	4	1	5	3
Western Cape	10	7	4	4	11	3
Northern Cape	2	2	0	1	3	0
North West	17	14	4	3	8	10
Limpopo	7	9	7	9	12	1
Free State	5	6	9	8	6	16
Total	140	103	88	82	88	86

5. Escapes from police custody

The number of escapes from police custody, the number of escapees who escaped during these incidents, those re-arrested and the total number of people held in police custody during the 2003/2004, 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years are respectively indicated in **Table 31**. From the table it is clear that although the number of people in police custody increased by **9,7%** between the 2005/2006 and the 2006/2007 financial years, the number of escapes decreased by **-18,3%**. The number of escapees involved in these escapes also decreased by **26,2%** between the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years. The following becomes evident when figures for the 2003/2004 and the 2006/2007 financial years are compared:

- The number of incidents decreased by 42,7%.
- The number of escapees decreased by 47,1%.
- The number of people in police custody increased by **9,6%**.

The significant improvement in the capacity of the SAPS to retain people in custody is further confirmed by the fact that only **0,1%** - that is less than one out of a thousand - of people in police custody managed to escape during 2006/2007.

Escape incidents only increased in KwaZulu-Natal. The number of escapes in the province increased by 17 incidents, from 162 to 179.

6. Attacks on and murders of members of the SAPS

The numbers of attacks on members of the SAPS recorded during the 2001/2002, 2002/2003, 2003/2004, 2004/2005, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial years were 737, 906, 717, 721, 1 274 and 769 respectively. The numbers of members killed during attacks over the corresponding period were 139, 150, 108, 94, 95 and 108 respectively (tables 33 and 34 indicate the provincial figures). This means that while there was a 39,6% decrease in the number of attacks on SAPS members, the number of murders increased by 13,7% (from 95 to 108 members murdered). The number of attacks (769 for 2006/2007) actually decreased to the same level as during the financial years 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 when an average of 770 cases was recorded per annum. In 2005/2006 it reached an unnaturally high number of 1 274 cases as a result of the service delivery riots.

The proportion of fatal attacks (incidents in which one or more police officers succumb to injuries sustained during attacks) during 2006/2007 stood at 14,0%, which also represents a return to the same levels as recorded between 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. The low proportion of fatalities in 2005/2006 should be considered against the abnormal number of attacks (1 274) as a result of service delivery riots which were not aimed against SAPS members as such.

Table 31 Escapes from police custody during the 2003/2004, 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 financial year

Province		1. Inc	idents		2. Escapees					3. Re-arrests			4. SAPS custody			
	Financial Year															
	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007	2003/ 2004	2004/ 2005	2005/ 2006	2006/ 2007
Eastern Cape	160	130	106	69	286	261	218	139	142	136	103	36	319 027	295 818	263 735	272 368
Free State	104	66	63	40	193	113	90	52	176	55	42	23	155 665	134 481	129 401	107 963
Gauteng	315	240	164	123	469	335	250	223	57	48	31	33	404 976	577 238	462 499	562 070
KwaZulu-Natal	241	189	162	179	437	419	280	242	82	46	25	166	250 966	172 017	148 965	281 708
Mpumalanga	173	150	152	144	379	312	319	260	134	78	63	73	145 953	244 089	140 615	132 830
Northern Cape	79	66	63	52	108	75	80	61	57	33	34	13	90 171	82 797	74 886	59 596
Limpopo	77	77	67	54	128	160	173	91	25	25	89	79	128 718	148 132	163 491	250 360
North West	163	121	127	92	335	237	265	166	95	71	97	88	157 854	160 054	191 873	180 628
Western Cape	268	246	204	152	328	294	233	174	115	130	84	80	569 047	666 873	644 786	589 193
Total RSA	1 580	1 285	1 108	905	2 663	2 206	1 908	1 408	883	622	568	591	2 222 377	2 481 499	2 220 251	2 436 716

Proportion of fatal attacks on SAPS members

Table 32

2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
18,9%	16,6%	15,1%	13,0%	7,5%	14,0%

An analysis of attacks on police officials clearly reveals that most police officials are attacked while they are in hot pursuit of suspects, on the point of arresting suspects or during the course of making arrests. There is no research evidence to support the myth that police officers are mainly killed for their firearms or that there is a relationship between police corruption and the murder of police officials. Although most police officers are attacked while they are on duty, an analysis of those attacks during which police officers are killed indicates that most police officers are murdered while they are off-duty. When police officers are off-duty they are most at risk of being killed, because they usually do not wear bullet-proof vests, do not enjoy the protection afforded by being in the company of colleagues and are less vigilant than when they are on duty.

Attacks on members of the SAPS

Table 33

Province	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
Gauteng	243	291	157	188	223	177
KwaZulu-Natal	84	127	61	79	288	115
Mpumalanga	57	105	74	80	136	85
Eastern Cape	141	86	74	69	125	86
Western Cape	89	173	229	228	265	145
Northern Cape	28	9	13	0	87	52
North West	47	67	65	43	92	50
Limpopo	25	21	35	27	32	10
Free State	23	27	9	7	26	49
Total	737	906	717	721	1 274	769

Members of the SAPS murdered

Table 34

Province	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
Gauteng	47	54	38	16	26	38
KwaZulu-Natal	45	41	21	28	23	32
Mpumalanga	5	5	5	7	7	7
Eastern Cape	13	19	14	14	16	6
Western Cape	15	16	11	10	10	6
Northern Cape	0	0	0	0	1	3
North West	8	6	11	12	7	8
Limpopo	4	5	5	4	4	2
Free State	2	4	3	3	1	6
Total	139	150	108	94	95	108