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Building on the work of the 2014 *Memories of the Future* project, Scenarios 2025 aims to stimulate discussion about some of the challenges South Africa might face after 30 years of democracy.

A companion piece to the *Towards a Fifteen Year Review* report reflecting on impact of public policies, *South Africa Scenarios 2025, The Future We Chose?* looks ‘back’ at three paths that the country may have traversed by 2025. The research presented, the scenarios envisaged, and the question mark in the title are all meant to provoke discussion and debate.

Scenarios are not predictions, nor roadmaps; they are constructed stories about a particular point in the future and some informed speculation about the crosscutting paths that might get us there.

The power of scenarios lies in provoking a sense of what might be possible and in combining probabilities in ways we might not have thought of previously.

They often allow the detection of faint signals that may disrupt even the most thorough planning cycles. They are designed to help identify pitfalls and options, and factors in the future we may choose to adopt or avoid.

We invite you to use these scenarios as part of a process of thinking about what we can and should do, now and in the near future, to avoid risks, obstacles, bottlenecks and blockages, and to achieve more than we can currently imagine.

The research for this scenario exercise started with a concerted attempt to understand a wide range of forces at work in the world and in South Africa in 2008. This involved 65 interviews with well-placed South Africans, as well as a series of working sessions with a core group of about 40 people,

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1 65 Interviews were conducted between October 2006 and March 2007 with people from the following backgrounds: Government: 9; Political Parties: 5; Business: 8; Media: 4; State owned enterprises: 9; Trade Unions: 3; Academics: 9; Sportspeople: 3; The Arts: 7; NGO’s and Civil Society: 8. Confidentiality was guaranteed, so as to encourage frank discussions. All interviews were transcribed, and elements of the transcripts, edited so as to protect the interviewees’ identities, will be available on the Scenarios 2025 website.
drawn from academia, business, unions, political parties, and think tanks. As a result, we were able to identify 24 ‘variables’, or factors that are key shapers of our reality and which we need to understand in order to construct views of the future.

Key trends for each variable were identified. These variables and trends are outlined in the Appendix.

From these 24 variables, seven Key Driving Forces (KDFs) were identified. These KDFs are aggregations of trends that are likely to be the most fundamental shapers of our world and our country to 2025, and that are most likely to create the context that the 7th democratically elected Government and society at large will face in the middle of the 2020s.

The KDFs form the bedrock of the scenario storylines. While some KDFs identify factors that can be influenced through the agency of Government, great attention is paid to those variables with the highest levels of uncertainty and impact.

As such, what these storylines depict are just three of the possible combinations of the various KDFs. There are many more combinations that can be devised, but these stories have been constructed to provide the most plausible but challenging narratives of what hurdles the country might have to go through, in the build-up to 2025.

These scenarios are not ‘worst-case’ scenarios – a technique often used to contemplate unlikely, but not impossible, turns of events in the future. Worst-case scenarios can be very useful, and in debating the storylines, some important ‘outriders’ can be explored in more detail, and some such storylines can, indeed, be generated. The scenarios presented here only occasionally hint at such ‘Black Swan’ events.

According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who coined the phrase, a Black Swan event is a large-impact, hard-to-predict, and rare occurrence beyond the realm of normal expectations. The Internet, the invention and rapid popularity of the PC, the First World War (but not the Second), the September 11 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centers are some examples of Black Swan events.
A deliberate effort has also been made to avoid positing a ‘best-case’ scenario. Similarly, ‘outriders’ of outcomes better than the most optimistic of the three storylines can be generated through debate.

These scenarios are therefore neither ‘worst-case’ nor ‘best-case’ scenarios and try to avoid the simple polarities of ‘high road’, ‘low road’ scenario making. Rather they steer towards various plausible combinations of events from clear antecedents in 2008. Every element that emerges fully formed in later years – in these scenarios – has its roots in some current reality.

We could do worse than any of the ‘worse case’ elements that might form part of a particular scenario. We may do considerably better than any of the most optimistic elements described in any of the three scenarios.

Having ‘seen’, at least in our mind’s eye, some worked-out glimpses of the future, we might be moved to try to anticipate some outcomes and secure others. Indeed, these scenarios are meant to provoke introspection about long-term planning, about how policy is translated into action in order to help avoid calamity and to embrace opportunities more fully.

‘We could do worse than any of the ‘worse case’ elements that might form part of a particular scenario. We may do considerably better than any of the most optimistic elements described in any of the three scenarios.’
While this appears likely to be the case, there are significant dangers too: China and Russia may be as cavalier in their disregard for democracy and human rights as the USA and ex-colonial powers have been in the past.

Trade as a percentage of global GDP is shifting upwards at an accelerated rate. By 2025, trade in goods and services will account for more than half of global GDP. The ability to trade with others is becoming more important to any country’s ability to grow than ever before.

Africa’s economic clout also grows significantly by 2025; the key question is how much of this is driven by South Africa, or how much others take the lead over time as other continental powers grow faster, or are led better, than South Africa.

Key Driving Forces (KDFs) most likely to shape South Africa to 2025

KDF 1. Shifts in global economic power

The rapid industrialisation and growth of China and India, and their burgeoning demand for resources and markets, is changing the world in profound ways.

By 2025, given current trends, China’s GDP is expected to be about the same as the USA’s (the USA’s GDP is currently more than double the GDP of China and India combined) reflecting three decades of Chinese growth at more than double the rate of the USA and the EU.

Will the growth of Brazil, Russia, India and China and the oil bounty of many Middle East countries do more for the economic growth of Africa in the next 20 years than 60 years of Western investment and aid have achieved?
KDF 2. Shifts in global political power

While shifts in international power relationships partly reflect shifting economic power, they do not do so in mechanical ways. The USA military budget is still larger than those of the next 15 largest economies, including China, combined. By 2025, the USA has still by far the most formidable armed force in the world, although on a much smaller scale than in 2008.

Despite this, a multi-lateral approach to global problems is likely to have taken root, with an expansion of early intervention mechanisms, the rapid deployment of peace keepers, and more united action by formations such as the UN, the G5, G8, G13 and G20.

Current trends suggest far fewer armed conflicts than ever before in human history over the next decade or so. But it is also possible that conflicts over resources disturb this trend: are there sudden resource tipping points that would propel otherwise peaceful nations into war?

And how much more powerful will Africa, or key African states or blocs become as world players, and what will shape this?

South Africa’s leading role in re-shaping elements of international discourse over the past 15 years, and in re-imagining Africa, may be challenged by other fast-growing power blocs in East and West Africa, and by South Africa pursuing more narrow national and regional interests in the future.

KDF 3. Resource constraints

The world is already caught in an energy gap between the age of fossil fuels, particularly oil, and the slow development of the coming age of alternative fuel sources.

By 2025, nuclear, hydrogen, solar and wind will be the predominant emerging
energy sources. But, on current trends, the transition may not be well managed. Higher costs of food production may become ever more entrenched, and international tourism and mobility are likely to be negatively affected.

The growing shortage and deterioration in quality of other critical resources, particularly soil, air and water, are also highly likely to become key global issues.

Locally, three additional KDFs mirror these global drivers.

KDF 4. South Africa’s economic growth

An elemental shaper of the future of South Africa is our economic performance. How fast does the economy grow and along what paths? How competitive and productive does it become?

The way in which the fruits of this growth are shared is as important as growth itself: is the economy ever able to create decent and sustainable jobs at a rate greater than the growth of the labour force?

Faced with persistent long-term structural unemployment, what measures will the new Government adopt? How responsive will the private sector be to national imperatives?

Will the rapid decline in South Africa’s manufacturing, mining and agricultural sectors in relation to their relative contribution to GDP be arrested and reversed – and how?

As critical as these internal factors are, South Africa’s relationship with Africa will be as important. Can our economy become more integrated into Africa?
KDF 5. Governance

How able, competent, efficient, honest and legitimate is Government going to be in 2025, and in the years leading to 2025? Is it able to promote national competitiveness and drive the economy forward, or does it inhibit innovation, productivity and social inclusion?

How well does it deal with the key issues of health, education, crime and corruption over time?

Related to this are matters pertaining to electoral politics and dynamics within the largest political alliances: the tone of political discourse, the conduct of the leadership and centripetal and centrifugal trends tugging at the ruling party. Ultimately will leadership engender a greater sense of purpose and unity?

KDF 6. Social fabric

The state has the resources to fashion at least a basic sense of nationhood, and a sense of human solidarity that cuts across class, gender, race and ethnic divisions.

It can do this, among other ways by providing citizens, especially the youth, with the skills to operate in a 21st century economy, increasing citizens’ average levels of wellness, and creating a sense of security and belonging.

Government can also help invoke a sense of pride and aspiration by articulating an engaging national narrative and by standing for the highest good.

But there are limits in this regard. Many of the dynamics that impact on social cohesion depend on value systems within society. Their forging is the domain of educational, religious, community and other sectors, including the nation’s arts and cultural productions.

How will Government interact with these socialising forces for maximum national benefit?
Technology and the Road to Tomorrow

A key crosscutting driver is technology.

By 2025, billions of people will have access to always-on, high bandwidth communication devices, which will allow users to network and connect in dynamic new ways.

This is already rapidly changing the way people work, where they work, how much they travel to and from work (and on work-related trips), how they make and market their goods and even how they form and foster relationships.

Technology is also likely to fuel democracy and openness, increase human lifespan and allow for both greater productivity and more leisure time.

Although access to technology is likely to continue to be uneven, a key trend already evident is that the poor everywhere are embracing technology as fast as they can afford to, exploiting it as a key avenue out of disconnectedness and penury.

South Africa also stands to benefit if fuel-cell technology becomes an important source of energy, or if, as the oil age gives way to the hydrogen age, South Africa’s Pebble Bed nuclear technology is more widely applied.

Summary

The story of 2025 – of what South Africa faces then, and the routes we took to get there – will be told mostly in reference to these Key Drivers.

How did we respond to environmental degradation and the challenges of energy sources?

How did we negotiate our way between the competing demands for our resources and access to markets?
How did we educate people and grow the economy?

How did we improve the quality of people’s health?

How did we measure and improve governance, using the metrics of legitimacy, participation and efficiency?

These are some of the questions that will need to be addressed, and that will no doubt be answered in the great Thirty-year Review that will be published as the nation prepares to celebrate 30 years of democracy in 2024.

Will it be a review of celebration?

Will we rue opportunities lost, or revel in their seizure?

Will we be living longer, better, and in greater harmony with others?

Will Government be doing more with less, staffed by the brightest and the best?

Or will we be stuck in a culture of sluggishness and mediocrity?

The answers to these questions will describe the paths we travel to the 7th democratic election in 2024, and to the South Africa and the world we live in by 2025. The scenarios outlined in these pages reveal the broad contours of three of these possible paths.

These three stories have been chosen to characterise three specific balances between the main KDFs focussed on, and a variety of other factors that will shape the reality that all South Africans will face.

Critically, they have been woven together taking into account the degree of plausibility of the various combinations.

But they are not exhaustive by any means.

We hope that they begin a dialogue about the future we choose.
Notes
SCENARIO 1: Not yet Uhuru

A Government strongly committed to accelerating economic growth struggles in the face of deteriorating global conditions and severe ecological challenges...
Starting points: going for growth

Looking back from 2025, it is now clearer than ever that the 2009-2014 period was pivotal in South Africa’s history. The political and business elites were more divided than ever before – within and between their groups.

The key dividing line, when stripped of all the ideological positioning and personal sniping, was between those who wanted more Government control over the economy, and those who believed in the primary role of private capital.

In the slipstream of the 2009 elections, the Government found itself bombarded by lobbyists urging a new spirit of prudence in the drafting of economic policies.

They argued the country needed massive foreign investment and foreign skills. As urgently, it needed growth in manufacturing and exports. There was much talk about the need for a ‘re-seeding and re-blossoming’ of its long-stagnant agricultural sector.

At the same time, with greater urgency than ever before, it was also clear that Governments needed to play a much greater role as global partners with a global mission: to save the world itself from the prospect of an environmental catastrophe.

This scenario takes its name from a song by the legendary South African singer, Letta Mbulu, who left South Africa as part of the legendary “King Kong” cast in the early 1960s, and came back home to lend her rousing voice to the celebrations that accompanied the country’s transition to democracy.

Her song in turn draws its inspiration from the stirring and provocative title of a book by Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga, the first Vice-President of Kenya.

Oginga Odinga argued that the people of a nominally free Kenya had in fact simply exchanged one form of oppression for another in post-Colonial Africa, and that the continent’s true ideal of freedom was still a long time coming.
Holding Firm on Fiscal Discipline

Despite fierce debate and much mud-raking, and despite protestations from elements within the Tripartite Alliance, it was eventually agreed that the fiscal discipline of the pre-2009 era needed to be maintained, especially because of the dark clouds hovering above the world economy.

The new post 2009 Government was clear that it could, at best, create 100,000 jobs a year between growing the public service and public works programmes. The other 400,000 to 500,000 new jobs needed each year simply had to come from the private sector.

Government had to continue to unblock constraints, boost education, reduce crime, and attract investment, both foreign and local. It had to work hard to become much more a regional hub, and did enjoy some early successes in providing access, finance, capital, and knowledge for those wishing to invest in Africa.

It also had to shape an approach to husbanding the natural resources of the country, and create and enforce a new set of rules to limit the impact of economic development on the environment.

Of course, there was never any question that the worst poverty had to be ameliorated and the state had to be ‘developmental’, by directing the path of national development. New poverty reduction plans
Not yet Uhuru

were introduced, and public works programmes were substantially expanded.

But the nature of the ‘developmental’ state was fiercely contested. Some direct Government intervention in the economy through Eskom and Transnet and massive investments like Coega and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor continued, with widespread focus on state leadership in the supplier industries for major infrastructure programmes.

But beyond that, ‘developmental’ became more a useful political catchphrase, rather than a descriptor of a highly effective activist state.

The Sky is Falling, the Sky is Falling!

The consequences of climate change and global warming, thought of as little more than distant theoretical possibilities in the early years of the 21st Century, rapidly worked their way into the everyday realities of global politics and economics.

With the world’s population edging towards 8-billion, the pressure on space, resources, and the natural environment reached a point where cataclysm was no longer to be regarded as the mere stuff of science fiction.

Merchants of Doom vs Merchants of the Boom

The developed countries, which were able to develop without constraints or too much consideration for the needs of future generations, found it hard to convince their developing counterparts that they needed to put the brakes on growth.

Leading nations such as the USA and China chose to ‘go it alone’ on environmental action, and the corrective actions in many parts of the globe suffered even further as a result.
After her cover feature on TIME magazine, the President is even considering declaring a public holiday, although with 14 national public holidays already on the calendar, business is braying for other ways of honouring her.

Despite this, Tshepiso has been dismayed by the popular reaction to her achievements. Youth in the townships have reacted with derision: they know she is a daughter of the BEE mogul. He was alleged to have greased his way into billionaire-dom; and for the township kids, nothing much has improved in their education, despite 31 years of freedom.

Her TIME magazine article made much of her humble origins and early struggles, but everyone in South Africa knows this was a little economical with the truth.

The popular local newspapers, particular the Daily Comet, have had a field day with comments such as “the elite celebrate their own while township schools pass-rates fall below 40%”.

Tshepiso had a feeling this could be one of the longest days of her life…

Tshepiso’s story

Professor Tshepiso Kgomotso
Team Leader
Nano-synthesizer development: University of California, Berkeley

Born in Bloemfontein April 28th 1994

Part 1

This should have been one of the best days of Tshepiso’s life. Back in South Africa to be honoured by the President with the country’s highest award, Tshepiso’s fame was growing.

She had always been a superstar, right from school, skipping grades and landing scholarships.

Now in 2025, at 31, she has just been made the youngest Professor of Nanotechnology at Berkeley University, in the USA.

Her team has made a breakthrough of the century, weaving together the building blocks of a nano-synthesiser. (Some are calling this a discovery to rank with the light bulb and antibiotics!).
Saving Ourselves Today, Saving the World Tomorrow

In South Africa, soil degradation, water pollution and wastage, and reliance on coal and coal-to-fuel for the nation's energy needs, impacted more and more heavily on economic growth.

With growth rates hovering around 3.5% for much of the second decade of the 21st Century, mitigation strategies which promised to shave off 0.5% to 1% of GDP growth per year, were deemed too expensive. As fuel-cell technology assumed prominence, South Africa’s platinum became both a blessing and a curse, as the world’s powers sought to use various forms of political and economic manipulation to influence the country’s direction.

A Global Grow-Slow

Adding to the ‘Perfect Storm’ of impending environmental meltdown, the global economy was itself trapped in stagnant waters, at least compared to the boom years of the early part of the 21st century.

For four or five years, slower economic growth in China, and sub 2% annual economic growth in most developed countries, had a profound effect on the African continent.

Global economic conditions remained flat until 2014, and despite a long and often resounding recovery, world growth averaged about 2.5% per year between 2009 and 2025, compared to the 3.5% average achieved in the five years up to 2008.
Behind the BRIC Curtain

It is important to note that this trend was bucked to some extent by the BRIC countries – the emerging economic super-powers of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Brazil averaged 4.5% over this period, with India managing between 6% and 7%, suggesting some form of disengagement if not decoupling.

Chinese growth, although down by 3% to 4% per year from its 2005/2006 highs, still averaged between 7% and 8% over these 16 years.

Russia’s growth fluctuated wildly, averaging about 5% to 6% per annum over this period.

In this context, Africa battled. But the downswing also brought mixed blessings, as it encouraged some areas in Africa to further develop the coherence of their own internal markets. Many nations took advantage of the challenges to reduce barriers to trade within and between African countries.

Slowly, and painfully, many African nations also committed to the trillion dollar upgrade in infrastructure – particularly roads, trains, ports and telecoms – for which experts had long lobbied. Unlike the grand infrastructure plans of the past, these were mostly managed better, with deeper efforts to involve citizens and NGOs, and avoid some of the pitfalls of corruption and debt that plagued the last great investment in infrastructure in the 1980s.

This ‘counter-cyclical’ investment positioned Africa well for the eventual upturn in the world economy in the mid 2010s and greatly improved inter-continental trade.
Tsепiso was angered by the tone of the Press interview questions.
Should she have not accepted the Mandela/Rhodes Scholarship in 2014?
What were her obligations to her brothers and sisters in the township?
After all, all the real science in the world was being done in China, India and some outposts in California.
Could you be world-class in 2025 and stay at home?
It was not her fault that her father, having benefited from BEE, had positioned himself perfectly for the construction boom of the 2010s.
The ‘dollar billionaire’ accusations about her dad were particularly hurtful - and they were nonsense anyway, she thought to herself.
Maybe he was worth a billion Rand, but what was that in 2025 dollars, these days? $50 million? And in any case, everyone these days measured themselves in Yuan and Rupees.

Of course it was true that she had avoided public schools; didn’t everyone who could do exactly that? She was still proud to be a ‘born free’, having arrived in this world one day after the elections in 1994.

But everyone knew that Government had struggled to provide education and health services and it wasn’t just the BEE crowd who ‘privatised themselves’ by embracing private health, education, security, pensions and justice...

You Can’t Hurry Uhuru
In this context, growing the South African economy initially became even harder than everyone expected.

It was certainly much harder to attract foreign capital and harder to get up to speed with plans and strategies to increase South Africa’s ability to trade non-resource based goods.

There was also massive pressure on wages, as world-wide inflation crept upwards, and the basic necessities of life became more and more expensive.
In this context, it was not surprising that the hard work of choosing really new and bold growth paths, and funding the cost of environmental mitigation, was left to another generation to contemplate.

Politically, the discourse continued to be rancorous and sometimes infantile. The fierce debate on economic policy in 2009, and the ‘defection’ of some key left-leaning leaders to the more pragmatic approach of what came to be sardonically known as ASGISA II, kept levels of animosity and sniping high into the late 2010s.

The ‘outsourcing’ of more and more state services, although popular with the various middle class strata, and even elements of the more prosperous sector of the working class, was opposed by the political left until late into the 2010s.

The success of some of these semi-privatisation experiments, against the backdrop of mediocre services by the public sector, was just too overwhelming to oppose.

Losing Out to the More Innovative & Desperate

South Africa’s ‘investor-friendly’ measures and incentives were not able to match those of more stable, more innovative or more desperate countries.

Although some private businesses rose to the challenge posed by Government, by boosting local investment, many businesses were unable to find the kind of innovative mechanisms to create decent jobs and temper excessive profit-taking.
They were not helped, at least not internationally, by perceptions that crime and corruption were out of control. This, together with a general Afro-pessimism in the West, including the reputation of organised labour as the most militant and cohesive union movement in Africa, pushed international investment to lower than anticipated levels.

These negative sentiments were even shared by some of the BRIC countries, but at least their investments in Africa and South Africa increased in real terms over the decades, unlike most of their Western counterparts.

Sadly, even such mega-projects as the power generation plants were not exciting enough to stir the global investment community into action.

Tshepiso’s story: part 3

Maybe she could announce a new scholarship scheme in her speech? Be seen to be ‘doing something’ for the youth here. Or maybe people would find that patronising. There was so much anger, so many riots around service delivery. The poor seemed to be living in another country.

Tshepiso remembered her own grandmother had been a domestic worker. She should mention that in her speech. She should remind them. She should inspire them, she thought. ‘You too can rise up and succeed, no matter what your background!’

Her phone rang: it was time to go to President’s house in Cosmo City, where the ceremony was going to be held. The poor President, she thought to herself. She also has these same problems as me, this envy, if that was what it was.

When the President decided to shift her official residency to Cosmo City, to be ‘closer to the people’, everyone had applauded the idea. But as the 26-room building went up, there were howls from every quarter about its lavishness.

How difficult it was to please everyone, or even anyone, in the new South Africa...
Big Bucks for the Elite, Small Change for the Masses

This had highly localised implications too. South Africa needed clearer strategies to attract deeper and longer-term domestic and foreign investments. But the inefficiency of national and provincial investment agencies, from developmental funding institutions to youth development funds, continued to make capital hard to come by for small farmers and entrepreneurs.

This inability to attract high levels of investment, along with the continued caution of local business when it came to large-scale, long term investing, and the inefficiency of local funding and facilitating agencies, all played a role in ensuring that the wealth of the nation still lay predominantly in white hands, even after 31 years of democracy.

Likewise, real diversity in management was not achieved anywhere in the economy: in Government, senior management had long been almost exclusively black, while in the Private Sector it had remained more than 60% white. These figures have changed little from those in 2010.

Outsourcing Uhuru

It is perhaps no coincidence that 1994, the year of South Africa’s transition to democracy, was also the year when the cellular telephone was introduced to the country.

Despite high prices, the private sector had provided convenient communication to the masses, with more than 90% of South Africans already having access to a cell phone by 2008.

It was examples like this that gradually made Government more comfortable with ‘outsourcing’ aspects of high priority services, from social grant payments, hospital provision, running prisons, housing, and, eventually, even schools and universities, to the private sector.
Smile, You’re Working for the Government

Although dubbed privatisation by stealth by trade unions, Government increasingly embraced the innovation and capacity of the private sector and the discipline of the markets, in an attempt to ensure that the population had access not just to a service, but to services of decent quality, delivered with a smile rather than a scowl.

Thus, by 2025, more than 15 million South Africans were accommodated in the private health care system (double that of 2008), while 20% of learners in private schools, up from just 2.8% in 2008.

Private security guards out-numbered the police 4 to 1, compared to the 2 to 1 ratio of 2008. And by 2024, private contractors were running all but one prison in South Africa.

As the cost to Government for these services ballooned, the initial successes of many of these schemes came under pressure as the super-profits of some of the private service providers were exposed. Government regulation and oversight had to be tightened considerably and keeping tender processes fair and incorruptible proved to be a particular challenge.

The Government Helps Those Who Help Themselves

As quickly as they could, the upwardly mobile Middle Classes embraced as much private education, private security, private retirement funding and private health as they could afford.
Tshepiso’s story: part 4

Tshepiso stood waiting in the wings of the great reception room at the Presidential residence, waiting for her turn to be honoured.

She had heard the ‘nano-what?! no-no!!’ comments on the radio talk shows on the drive over. South Africans really had fallen far behind the rest of the world, even behind other countries in Africa, she thought.

She had read somewhere that many other countries on the continent were getting better maths and science outcomes than South Africa!

She had decided she would announce a scholarship scheme, a new foundation, something to inspire South Africa’s youth out of their obsession with material wealth. They would be Maths and Science focussed. There would be 100 scholarships a year to local universities.

Her Dad had already agreed in principle. In fact, he acknowledged he should have done more with his money philanthropically.

Tshepiso would name the scholarship after her grandmother, that grand old lady she could now barely remember, but who had sacrificed so much for them as a family.

Her father was so proud of her: her doctorate at 24, the magazine covers, that B-magazine special on South Africa’s new generation of scientific superstars (Beyonce has assumed an Oprah cult status by 2025).

Yes, it was sad that all of them were working at various universities and institutions abroad, she thought to herself, but that’s just for a while.

One day, if things would just settle down a bit, she was sure that she, and the rest of them, would all come back.
Some elements in Government were quietly pleased to see greater numbers of people ‘doing it for themselves’, as and when they could afford it, as this removed some burden from the state sector.

Tax breaks for private healthcare and retirement provision were extended, and even introduced for the costs of private security and private education.

‘The free-market led development strategy was simply too gradual for the vast majority of poor to feel any substantial progress, particularly in terms of access to well-paying jobs, even by 2025.’

The road we travelled

Despite a commitment to better Government, and to the more effective redistribution of wealth, the reality of a slowing world economy made it difficult for Government to keep up with the expectations it had itself created. Growth never got off the ground in the ways promised, and jobs and poverty targets were missed.

In this context, outside of the middle class, and despite some gains in improving public education and the continued alleviation of abject poverty through social grants and public works (and partly helped by shifting millions of South Africans to getting their services from the private sector), the massive inequality bequeathed by apartheid continued to deepen social anomie over time.

Those in the lowest social rungs were most alienated. The free-market led development strategy was simply too gradual for the vast majority of poor to feel any substantial progress, particularly in terms of access to well-paying jobs, even by 2025.
While the middle class grew quickly in the 2010s, so did the labour force, bolstered by immigration and by greater numbers of women seeking paid employment.

The levels of unemployment were hardly dented. Social protests and pressure from below ticked up as patience of the working class and unemployed in particular wore out.

People still wanted decent jobs. Many were angry when they still did not have them, 20 years into the new South Africa. Government exacerbated this situation, as inefficiency combined with a commitment to personal success gripped careerist elements within the ruling party.

For some of those, the motto seemed to become ‘we have arrived and the masses must applaud’. This merely encouraged the aspirations among most youths to acquire and display more brands and more bling, by fair means or foul.

In 2013, disappointed with this trend and the conduct of the leadership that left for Government in 2009, and having failed in 2012 to do what their predecessors did in Polokwane in 2007, a group of leading trade unionists formed a Left Party, with much fanfare. The party enjoyed some sympathy among union members, and it was soon joined by the larger faction of the SACP.

However, despite the media hype, the new party could only secure 10% of the votes in 2014 compared to the ANC’s 55%, and, after some debate, the two entered into an electoral pact.

The ANC, though, was shaken. In 2017, after years of drift, the resolutions of the National Conference of 2007 were dusted off, re-examined, modified slightly and brought back into service. The battle began to find ways to turn them into effective Government policy, while getting the ‘market-led’ focus of the past decade producing better results for more people.
The key question then became: when will South Africa be able to meet all those ambitious targets it set itself for 2014?

Some of them indeed only become possible by 2024. Six-million jobs were created, but in percentage terms, relative to a faster moving world, the country had been marking time.

**Synopsis**

- **Me first, you later.** While Government strove to deliver on its commitment to the poor, ideological divisions and a ‘me-first’ spirit of rank materialism within the political leadership compromised its good intentions.

- **The Have-Lots vs the Have-Nothings.** The poor made up a slightly smaller demographic in 2025, but their disenchantment with the system soared to volatile new levels, as the gap between the ‘have-lots’ and the ‘have-nothings’ grew wider than ever. This acute sense of relative deprivation, in the context of a world obsessed by brands and ‘getting and spending’, made South Africa more combustible than ever.

- **Black Power, White Money.** Senior management in Government was almost exclusively black in 2025, but the nation’s wealth still lay overwhelmingly in white hands. The economy remained divided along racial lines, with white management occupying more than 60% of the boardroom seats of power.

- **The Earth Lies Screaming.** For the first time in history, as the natural environment buckled under the strain of more than 200 years of rampant industrialisation, the doomsday nightmare of an environmental cataclysm appeared to be on the verge of coming true.
SCENARIO 2: Nkalakatha

Determined to play a more central role in the economy, Government prioritises poverty reduction and skills enhancement by articulating a national vision and fostering partnerships…
Starting points: holding hands or making fists

Looking back from 2025, it is hard to remember how divided and demoralised South Africans were in 2009.

At one stage, it seemed that many gains from the past were unravelling. Crime and corruption made more and more South Africans fearful and suspicious. Levels of trust in strangers, in Government, and in politicians, were low and falling.

Unemployment, if immigrants were properly accounted for as a portion of the labour force, was creeping upwards. Schools were not adequately equipping students for the challenges of life in the 21st century. Many internationally comparative Human Development Indicators seemed to be heading in the wrong direction.

With the vulnerabilities of society exposed more starkly than ever before, it was clear that from its first days in office in 2009, the 4th Government of a free South Africa would have little choice but to put in place exceptional programmes to revitalise education, health provision, and effect crime reduction, while simultaneously addressing poverty and job creation more creatively than ever.

Many of the old approaches, and existing ways of implementing policy, were simply not working well enough or fast enough, especially against the backdrop of the global and South African slowdown that had started in 2008.

It was make or break for South Africa, the last great chance to turn around the fortunes of a country that was once so sure it was destined for greatness.

Government got to work, putting new vigour into addressing poverty, promoting job creation and reduce crime.

This scenario takes its name from the song that launched the crossover career of one of South Africa’s most popular and controversial musical artists, Mduduzi Tshabalala, better known as Mandoza. “Nkalakatha” is a song of celebratory energy and swaggering self-confidence.
Let’s Do It Together: Forging the Great National Compact

The impact of Government interventions turned out to be strikingly effective. This was by no means guaranteed at the time of their conceptualisation and implementation.

‘Although painted as far more left leaning than previous administrations, Government was in fact pragmatic and shrewd, and worked hard to balance the needs of the people and the conditions for prosperous private enterprise.’

Everyone now agreed that none of these successes would have been possible without great national dialogue the new Government was able to coordinate, albeit haltingly at first.

In retrospect, these discussions were comparable only to the negotiations of 1990-1993 period. Although painted as far more left leaning than previous administrations, Government was in fact pragmatic and shrewd, and worked hard to balance the needs of the people and the conditions for prosperous private enterprise.

Give It Up Now, Get It Back – with interest – Later

In convention halls, retreats, summits and on the airwaves of talk-radio and TV, every part of society got involved in agreeing what they had to give up if South Africa was to prosper in the longer term.

Government was able to engender an appreciation among all stakeholders that short-term sacrifice was needed from all parties; it could not just be the workers and poor that were always required to compromise.

Moreover, Government got everyone to agree that social partnerships, as the new president said often, could not be speculated about and wished for; they needed to be forged in action.
Dumisani’s story

Dumisani Mazibuko
Chief Executive Officer of South Africa’s largest on-site catering company
Born in Tembisa, November 11 1994

Part 1

Dumisani couldn’t believe they would take away his contract over such a small technicality. He had been waiting for hours outside the room where the Departmental Tender Committee was convening to try and decide the matter.

How could this be happening to him? Entrepreneur of the year in 2022, Young CEO of the year in 2024, he and his partners had saved the school feeding schemes from ruin.

Someone calculated that the provinces had lost R100 million over the years, just on feeding scheme fraud, so Dumisani agreed that the rules had to be tight. But this was ridiculous.

He called his partner to tell him the committee was still deliberating. It was his partner who had made the accounting error; anyone could see it was an honest mistake. Well, thought, Dumisani, anyone but the tender committee’s auditors.

Their company was only 5 years old, and already it had contracts in 5 of South Africa’s provinces, providing everything from school meals to clean linen for hospitals. Dumisani was part of the ‘turn-around generation’. Now just 31, his company was proud that it got its contracts on merit, not on any political savvy or connectivity.

This after all, was the age of delivery, and public-private partnerships had boomed like never before.

If only he had checked the accounts himself, he thought, as the doors to the committee room opened...
As Government, business and the organised working class strove to create common solutions, after a series of action-orientated summits, fixed investment increased and industrial policy was implemented systematically in the context of an emergent social compact.

Government was able to shape a new kind of state response and ensure special interest groups did not stifle key initiatives at every turn.

**A New State of Urgency**

Rural and agricultural development too found a place in the sun, with real resources ploughed into supporting small and medium scale farmers.

With the economy decisively rebounding in 2010, and with a clear long-term growth path, services to the poor were ramped up speedily, as were cash transfers of every kind.

Emergency educational interventions, primary health and hospital revitalisation programmes, bold public works programmes, large early childhood development programmes – mostly planned by previous Governments but not resolutely implemented – were rolled out with a new and stunning urgency.

**By the People and with the People**

What was also refreshing was that these kinds of developmental and redistributive priorities were clearly articulated, widely debated and quickly elevated above optimising conditions for private profit.

Because of this, despite the re-ordering of Government priorities and warnings of ‘dire consequences’ by free marketeers, local and international business gradually fell in line as key supporters of Government’s plan.

**Taking Charge of Business**

Business was clearer than ever that nothing threatened their longer-term accumulation potential more than the growing threat of insurrection and social turmoil brought on by poverty and inequality. But they, like the nation at large, needed firm direction by a ‘take charge’ Government.
In the increasingly important area of environmental sustainability, Government was initially slow at putting principles into practice, arguing that growth and redistribution came first.

But leadership in this matter soon improved, as Government found itself egged on by civil society action in developed countries, and the profit-driven initiatives of some businesses locally.

Before long, every Government initiative, whether building a new house, a new school or a new road had to answer the question: is this being done in the most sustainable way?

Some of these initial thrusts at sustainable development yielded good results; others petered out as idealistic experiments.

**The Age of Application**

Over time, private enterprise and opposition parties embraced the new approach as social tensions were noticeably lowered and crime was reduced. They could not have done it without our co-operation and support, the opposition parties argued, and in any case they stole some of our ideas!

The fresh sense of urgency introduced by Government was widely hailed, and the new spirit of ‘can do’ quickly raised the bar for productivity and service in the Public Sector.

The era of pontificating was over; the age of application had come to pass.

‘The fresh sense of urgency introduced by Government was widely hailed, and the new spirit of ‘can do’ quickly raised the bar for productivity and service in the Public Sector.’

Nkalakatha
As part of the ‘Let’s do this together’ spirit, private capital was invited to join in the quest for social reconstruction. Companies large and small were made to feel consulted, appreciated and important.

The trade union movement complained about aspects of public policy, but most agreed that, on balance, the direction was one they could live with and support. Not quite a ‘decade of the workers’, but the improvements were obvious.

Government went out of its way to talk, convening joint working groups and conventions that focussed on practical results and reported real progress.

While this worked more often than not, some hostility remained from companies who felt constrained by BEE targets and Charters.

Can We Talk?

This inclusive approach was reflected in, and facilitated by, a more collegial political discourse, with extreme and vengeful rhetoric tempered by the realities of governance after 2009. There was a realisation, too, that all cadres were required to play an active role.

A variety of criminal and civil trials affecting some political leaders in 2009-2011 were speedily resolved, giving the ruling party a bedrock of focussed and determined people who worked hard to heal the divisions of the past.

The ANC 2012 National Conference reflected a movement much more engaged on the ground, and more open to a deep and equitable social compact in which all stakeholders would feel valued and esteemed.
The world economy growing in fits and starts

World economic growth was fairly stable, although off its historic highs, for most of the 2009-2013 period.

But the USA, after enduring a downturn in 2008 – 2010, got mired in mediocre growth despite the growth spurt of 2014 to 2018. Things could have been worse, had it not changed its foreign policy direction and had consumers’ short memories not resulted in a new wave of over-exuberance in the four years leading to 2018.

Political instability in oil producing regions, and a rapid decline in available oil, caused energy prices to spike to over US$200 per barrel by 2014.

The Slippery Slope of Oil

Political instability in oil producing regions, and a rapid decline in available oil, caused energy prices to spike to over US$200 per barrel by 2014.

The full impact of all the renewable and other green energy strategies, although starting to come through, lagged five or more years behind the demand for fuels.

As a consequence of this, over the 16-year period to 2025, average annual global growth of around about 4% per annum was achieved.

The EU, Japan, and the USA, could barely eke out more than 3% growth in most years.
representation, South Africa took the lead in many areas of international contestation, with well-thought out positions that helped move things forward.

In the formidable international jostling for resources, South Africa shrewdly navigated the interests of the USA, EU, China and India for the best deal, not just for itself, but also increasingly for the region.

Indeed, were it not for South Africa’s strong stance on these issues, there is no doubt that the four great economic powers would have cut far more unilateral deals in the 2010s than they ultimately did.

The Meritocracy Mindset

Looking back from 2025, South Africans of the ‘Nkalakatha Nation’ were able to take some pride in the way they pulled back from the abyss of poverty and low growth.
Against the background of the reprioritisation of Government’s key deliverables, coupled with a strong redistributive approach, commendable annual GDP growth was achieved. In phases, the growth was roughly 5% (2009 – 2012); 6% (2013 – 2019); and 3% (2020 – 2024).

But the true revolution in the South African economy was not measured in percentages. It was measured in mindset.

**The Virtuous Cycle**

Through all of these challenges, Government never lost sight of its key theme of solidarity and participation.

School governing bodies, for example, demanded greater results and were emboldened by Government to abandon the misplaced tendency to turn a blind eye to educators who were not producing results.

Negotiating environmental, poverty and other crises became part of the culture of governance.

The Strong, Weak, Strong formulation of Governmental tiers was enforced in the face of huge outcries from provincial fiefdoms, with key provincial functions relocated upwards and downwards.

In this context, more strong mayors worked more directly with central Government to ensure that programmes were implemented.

School governing bodies, for example, demanded greater results and were emboldened by Government to abandon the misplaced tendency to turn a blind eye to educators who were not producing results.

The culture of ‘no excuses’ started to take root in communities who demanded that schools become secure places of learning and excellence.
The Walls of Accountability

Success created a virtuous cycle, inspiring others to do the same. As security committees faced up to crime and violence, Government invested heavily in community crime reduction initiatives.

While less than 100,000 police were on active crime-reducing duty at any given time in 2007, Government succeeded in doubling the police force by 2020, and funding community police forums around every police station.

‘The tactic of publishing monthly station results on specially built ‘accountability walls’ in front of every police station, reduced crime more rapidly than anyone thought possible.’

Intense pressure was placed on the police to do their jobs well and to be accountable for every metric, both to the public they served and the Government that employed them.

The tactic of publishing monthly station results on specially built ‘accountability walls’ in front of every police station, reduced crime more rapidly than anyone thought possible.

Building a Healthier Nation

When it came to the nation’s health and wellness, mayors started to emulate their South American counterparts, taking the lead on ‘group walks’ and ‘national jogs’.

The message of healthy and active living began to grip the national imagination, and the national waistline came down two sizes in just four years!

Meanwhile, HIV and TB treatment was rolled out to more than one million people by 2014.
In 2016, the hysteria around news of an anti-HIV vaccine based on nanotechnology was tempered by warnings that it may be too invasive and may cause cancer in the long run.

The great wait began. No proof of adverse effects emerged, nor was any scientist prepared fully to vouch for the vaccine’s safety.

South Africa, guinea pig of the world, took the plunge. Although it needed careful monitoring, the vaccine appeared to work for most of the people, most of the time. By 2025, the rates of HIV incidence were sharply down in South Africa and the rest of the sub-continent. Was this due to the vaccine used in South Africa or a change in behaviour especially among the youth?

TB and malaria were now both under firm control and much of these successes were achieved with the support of civil society and the private sector.

A Bigger Civil Service

At the same time, the State was reluctant to privatise elements of many core services, such as education, health and security. Instead, it took an active part in launching new major industries connected to the massive infrastructure using new and old State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

In the area of employment, Government’s ambitious targets were not achieved in full, even after adding 400,000 public sector jobs by 2025.

Another million permanent jobs were created through long-term public works projects, adding 100,000 new job opportunities per year from 2010 onwards.
Mainly teachers, nurses and community development workers, these new employees had taken the number of people employed in the Civil Service to 2.5-million, comparable to the size of the Public Service in many developed countries.

Another million permanent jobs were created through long-term public works projects, adding 100,000 new job opportunities per year from 2010 onwards.

There was a special focus on early childhood development, youth mentoring, community enhancement/public space beautification, road maintenance, and environmental mitigation projects.

In addition to accelerated public sector and public works job creation, increased cash transfers to the poor also reduced poverty, although not as rapidly as some had hoped.

**Government’s Greatest Achievement Since 1994**

Compared to 2008, about four million more people were receiving some form of social grant by 2017. But fewer people were solely dependent on social grants, as unemployment was reduced to 12% by 2019.

This breaching of the 15% unemployment rate, despite slow economic growth after 2017, was widely hailed as the greatest achievement by Government since 1994.

But for the 12% of the population still without jobs, and for the youth, whose unemployment level was still above 20%, much of this was cold comfort.

Renewed vigour and urgency were put into the delivery of quality housing, and to the upgrading of the RDP housing stock built in the first 15 years of democracy, with a variety of options including rental stock and commercially-driven low-income bonds factored into the equation.
In 2021, Government acknowledged that it still had much to do to fulfil its driving vision of a Better Life For All, and the search for new strategies, post 2024, began in earnest.

**The World’s Number One Growth Industry: Babies**

The world population kept growing by about 210,000 people per day, with the population topping the 8-billion mark by 2025. By 2015, Africa’s population soared past the 1-billion mark.

Indeed, Africa’s proportion of the world’s population almost doubled by 2025, as populations declined in more developed countries. One in 10 people alive in 2009 was an African; by 2025, the ratio was one in 6.

In this context, there was a rapid decline in bio-diversity and resource constraints proved to be much clearer obstacles to growth. This was particularly true in Africa, Asia and South America.

Oil production declined precipitously, with prices defying all predictions.

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**Dumisani’s story: part 2**

Dumisani braced for the worst. The contract was worth a billion rand a year, employed 6,000 people, and fed a million school children a day. Based on a network of small and micro-enterprises, it was so well run that it quickly became the model for other provinces.

Now all this could be lost, along with the reputation of his company nationwide.

The Tender Committee’s chair began to speak: ‘unadvisable’, ‘serious breach of reporting requirements’, ‘disappointing standards of analysis’.

Dumisani could hardly follow the torrent of words. With global food price challenges, his solution of ‘growing local, feeding local’ had been the spark that let thousands of food gardens bloom.

The school kids had better food, seldom grown or cooked more than a few kilometres from the school concerned.

In the context of a 2025 world battling with recession, it was exactly these kind of locally-driven, but centrally coordinated initiatives that were making all the difference. Now it could all be going down the drain...
Plenty of Pots, But Not Enough Chicken

The number of people worldwide who suffered the effects of various types of pollution and soil and water degradation increased dramatically in the 2010s.

South Africa was particularly affected by even the small rise in temperatures that marked this decade, with the already declining carrying capacity of the soil being further impacted by dry spells.

Because of this, food security, once taken for granted, became an urgent national challenge. Even in the 2000s, South Africa was not able to produce, for example, all the chicken its population consumed.

This lamentable situation spread to many of the other basic sources of protein and carbohydrates, until a national food emergency was declared and more sustainable policies were introduced. Many feel that this is too little, too late.

Having promised a chicken in every pot, and then having to import the birds, embarrassed the Government into action.

In retrospect, this was seen as one of Government’s biggest failings. For all its promises and noble intentions, it was rightly accused of ‘chickening out’ when it came to putting environmental resolutions into practice.
The road we travelled

Most public servants and society at all levels learned to accept and welcome the rigorous meritocracy that was introduced into public life, as cooperation and cross-functional management improve.

Participation was highly valued and encouraged. Where possible, formal support was given to community structures around security and health, civics, youth organisations, women’s organisations and other sectors.

There was a great emphasis on creating capacity in organisation, including political party branches.

‘In 2012, skilled South Africans had started to return in large numbers, as high economic growth, lower crime rates and a new spirit of solidarity pervaded the nation.’

The End of the Road for BEE & Affirmative Action

To the surprise of many, in 2021 Government started to talk seriously about the ‘end of the transition from apartheid to democracy’ by 2025, and the consequent removal of BEE charters and affirmative action programmes from the workplace. The target date of 2025 to 2035 was set, depending on the industry.

With 30% black ownership in land and the JSE achieved, and 40% of managers and professionals being black, the call was made for ‘previously disadvantaged’ (an expression now much ridiculed by the youth) to be creative and forceful in helping to grow the nation.

In 2012, skilled South Africans had started to return in large numbers, as high economic growth, lower crime rates and a new spirit of solidarity pervaded the nation. By 2019 South Africa was already a beacon for ‘Afropolitans’ everywhere.
Then came the downturn. It was during the southern autumn of 2018, when the global financial markets crashed. It started with the collapse of the second biggest bank in the world, headquartered in Mumbai. The contagion was fast and furious, shocking even the most pessimistic.

In South Africa, a Government heavily in debt by 2022 needed to ask whether it should default on its loans, or cut back on its high rates of spending on health, education, and social welfare.

Faced with this global and domestic environment, and after much debate, Government bit the bullet and introduced austerity measures. This included additional mandatory savings by citizens, compulsory youth service, large tariffs on imported luxuries, and reduced Government expenditure.

Expensive fake leather bell-bottom trousers and suits (a craze that started in the second half of the 2010s), imported from Russia, gave way to home-made jeans processed from hemp.

Dumisani’s story: part 3

‘We have decided not to rescind your tender, but rather to extend it only for one year, rather than three. If there are no further breaches of reporting, you will be able to tender again in 12 months’.

Dumisani wanted to cry with relief.

Although his company was now big, and could ride out the financial losses of this contract, their reputation for excellence and honesty would have been shot. Even as it was, they would have to manage the reporting of this decision carefully.

As he left the tender meeting and hurried to phone his partners, he thought that Government was finally finding the balance. The insistence on top quality delivery, and on partnership with the private sector for every kind of service, while still expanding the public service, had worked.

‘Tough but fair’, he thought, grateful for the enlightened approach from which he had just benefitted.

In the last five or six years, everyone in South Africa had really pulled together. It was great to be part of something working so well...
The solidarity and spirit built up in the past 10 years saw South Africa through the crisis. At the 30th anniversary of freedom (2024), a grumbling populace evinced a grudging acceptance of the austerity measures, with some popular optimism that the downturn was dissipating.

Synopsis

- **The Dreamers become the Do-ers.** Narrowing the gap between vision and delivery, Government set the pace for a new era of action and application. Gradually, the notion of the developmental state edged towards everyday reality.

- **One Nation, One Destiny.** While there were significant trade-offs to be made in the pursuit of a Better Life For All, Government succeeded in reducing the once-widespread sense of social alienation, by clearly articulating its vision and placing a deep emphasis on participation and a common national destiny.

- **The environment matters too.** Although growth and redistribution remained on top of the national agenda, Government began to take a more proactive stance on matters of environmental change and sustainability, with mixed results.

- **Time to Bite the Bullet.** In the aftershock of a global economic collapse, Government cut spending and introduced tough austerity measures. But the nation bit the bullet and worked together to weather the crisis.
SCENARIO 3: Muvhango

Despite an initial resurgence of the economy, and positive world conditions, the Government battles to govern well...
Starting points: trying harder is not enough

After the elections of 2009 and the successful Soccer World Cup, the annual growth rate in South Africa breached 5.5%.

But in spite of the favourable conditions, and some four years of excellent growth, substantial current account deficits and daunting levels of cumulative debt steadily weighed down the state.

By 2012 the paucity of capacity, poor planning and coordination, and bureaucratic inertia, overlaid with startling levels of animosity among politicians, started to filter through to the still strongly performing economy.

In retrospect, this was largely because the divisive events of 2005-2009 – ANC National General Council (NGC), National Conference, List Process and complex court cases – resulted in continuing acrimony and suspicion in the ruling party.

A large number of politicians and senior public sector workers left Government. The general reaction: good riddance!

Despite attempts at unity, new senior public service managers joined the more than 70% brand new Ministers and 90% brand new Premiers in 2009, with two urgent priorities: ensuring that South Africa shone at the 2010 Soccer World Cup, and that the key areas of emphasis as outlined in ANC policy resolutions of December 2007 found practical expression in all of Government’s work.

This scenario takes its name from one of South Africa’s most fervently-watched TV drama series, broadcast four days a week to an audience of millions on SABC2.

Chronicling the fortunes and misfortunes of a divided family, torn apart by jealousy, betrayal, and the quest for money and power, ‘Muvhango’ is set in a nation where the true battle is a battle of values...

A battle between deeply-ingrained traditions of respect, self-sacrifice, and humanity towards others...

And a thriving new culture of materialism, ruthless ambition, and self-enrichment at the expense of anyone who stands in your way.

‘Muvhango’ is fiction, heightened for entertainment value and emotional impact, and any resemblance to real people and actual situations... is probably just a little too close for comfort.
Making the World a Better Place

The world of the early 21st century was a place of faster networks and connections, with trade routes linking nations around the clock, and traffic on the Great Electronic Highway erasing previously held notions of time and space.

‘The world of the early 21st century was a place of faster networks and connections, with trade routes linking nations around the clock, and traffic on the Great Electronic Highway erasing previously held notions of time and space.’

It was a world where the destinies of nations were, more than ever before in history, inextricably interlinked. This did not mean, however, that all nations shared the same destiny.

Quinton’s story

Quinton Cornelius
Born in Athlone, May 27th 1994

Part 1

Quinton had been there and done that, all before he turned 30.

After dropping out of university: he had been unemployed; been part of the gangs; joined political youth organisations; thrown bottles during meetings and done much more; and for his ‘qualities of cadreship’ got a job in Government for which, if he was really honest with himself, he was not qualified.

But he’d facilitated some deals and made some good money. Sadly that was mostly gone now.

Having lost his Government job and, with his car repossessed, he was walking down the dusty roads of the same area he’d been born in 30 years ago, just a month after the first democratic election.

He was on his way to a job interview, hoping for some help from some old comrades who were now running a hotel on the outskirts of the township, hoping to cash in on South Africa’s bid for the 2032 Olympics...
For a while, South Africa and its neighbouring states enjoyed the benefits of sound economic growth, driven in part by a more stable and upbeat global economy. By reducing energy demand substantially by the mid 2010s, the world economy was not as badly affected by high-energy prices as feared. The USA also recovered well from sub-prime and other credit crunches, and China and India in particular handled their growth well. In addition, more concerted multilateralism helped mitigate global environmental degradation, and world growth averaged about 4.5% per annum for the 16-year period to 2025. The BRIC economies did far better, averaging 9% growth among them for this 16-year period.

A Better Environment for Growth

In Africa, better governance, and strong economic performance, particularly in Southern Africa, characterised the African continent of this period. After the resolution of the Zimbabwean and Kenyan crises, closer regional integration, and better terms of trade negotiated from collective strength, allowed Southern African economies to sustain 5% plus growth rates for a good few years. This was helped by a greater openness to new ways of growing that took environmental concerns into account.

Boom Times at Home

Bolstering South Africa’s exports, world demand for resources grew steadily into the 2010s, even by the measures of the early part of the century. At home, growth was stimulated by Government infrastructure investment, an accelerated mass housing programme, and critical shifts to carefully
planned areas of investment where South Africa was internationally competitive.

Better terms of trade and more efficient use of technology, along with time-zone advantages, helped South Africa sell more services internationally. These included call-centre operations, customer-relationship management and software development.

**Saving the Earth from Ourselves**

Fear of environmental tipping points, first seen in large scale with the depletion of certain fish stocks in the late 1990s, and the terrible loss of forestation in 2005-2015, made ‘saving the earth’ a dominant theme in political and social discourse, even in non-democracies.

With bold leadership from the USA, EU and China, the world made progress in slowing global warming.

There was unprecedented pressure for countries and cities to clean up their acts, as international treaties and NGO sponsored ‘boycott polluting cities’ campaigns took effect.

It might have been a long time coming, but in most countries there has been enough of a shift to ensure a future for the generations to come.

However, South Africa, despite its rhetoric, has battled to keep up with international norms.

**A Wink is all it takes**

On reflection, notwithstanding the will to succeed in Government, it is clear that a core reason for failure was the negligible consequences for inefficiency. Poor performers were shielded by unions and political connections.

‘Performance management’ remained an HR veneer, rather than a meaningful practice inside Government.

Cleverer but less productive staff took advantage of the uncertainties at senior management level. Often a wink, hinting at political connections, made supervisors back off.
Incompetence is its Own Reward

Excellent hospital managers and excellent school principals, for example, were treated no differently from their more mediocre peers in terms of recognition and reward. Able Ministers and DG’s fumed as less competent but politically connected individuals were lauded.

The Key Performance Agreement system was honoured mostly in the breach and eventually collapsed in 2015.

In addition, not enough was done to check public sector corruption, such as tenders going to companies with overt connections to well-positioned individuals and groups within the ruling party, or to curb personal enrichment by people working in Government at all levels.

Big increases in the size of the public service, with 400,000 new positions filled in less than a decade, helped create jobs and reduce backlogs, but didn’t significantly improve the speed and efficiency of delivery.
The Age of Anything-Goes

Successive Governments battled to articulate clearly and, more importantly, to actively model the social values that encourage solidarity.

Indeed Government often did the opposite and celebrated or condoned vulgar displays of wealth and privilege.

While politics was awash with leftwing rhetoric in the 2010s, the actual lifestyle and conduct of many high-profile leaders sometimes evinced rank corruption.

Elements in the judiciary and investigating agencies were either cowed or co-opted into what became a permissive era, despite South Africa’s earlier track record of promoting accountability and campaigning against corruption.

The private sector at first showed signs of being appalled, but the bottom-line drove many to adapt to the new environment and find creative ways of getting the politicians to play ball.

The Unweaving of the Nation

South Africa in 2025 was marked mostly by a sense of what could have been, rather than a celebration of what had been achieved.

For a while there was certainly a useful tension between the freshness and optimism of the ‘new guard’ of 2009-2014, and the experience and resourcefulness of those hands that remained.

But soon enough, heavy workloads, and the temptations of the private sector, started to reduce Government’s capacity in critical areas.
This lessening of capacity had profound effects on the popularity and legitimacy of the State, given that skills were always at a premium, and the ability to execute agreed plans and spend agreed budgets was unevenly spread across Government.

Politics and politicians didn’t help. Despite calls for unity, the divisions in the ANC were accentuated by a number of messy criminal trials in 2009-2011, and the discovery of outbreaks of corruption by individuals both in the old and new guard.

**Things Fall Apart**

As new scandals unfolded, it seemed that more energy was spent sniping at each other than on governing effectively, as factions within the ANC hardened and grudges got recycled into waves of passivity or aggression.

In those conflictual circumstances, and facing a dearth of skills at every level, provinces continued to send back billions of Rand in unspent funding.

The high expectations in healthcare and education floundered on the same inability to enforce

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**Quinton’s story: part 2**

Quinton was early for this job interview. He went into a small spaza shop and was shocked, as he always was, at just how much prices had increased, in just a few months. Inflation really was out of control.

This was a terrible time to be unemployed, he thought.

How had it all gone wrong for him? And how had Government let so many advantages slip out of its hands?

Quinton laughed. When he was in Government he knew just about everyone in his department was coasting, even those who had a modicum of real experience and skill. People who pulled their weight were teased and mocked; they soon fell into line.

Wasn’t Government like this everywhere in the world, he wondered; a refuge from the real world of work...
consequences for poor performance, or to come up with the right corrective measures.

There was little by way of clear central planning and coordination either. Government, despite ministerial clusters and cross-functional makgotla, failed to nurture a shared vision of growth and development in society.

Government also did not take long-term planning seriously enough, nor did it have robust mechanisms to enforce cooperation across the three spheres of Government.

A Nation Outside the Mainstream

The world economy bounced back, time and time again, finding ways to mitigate environmental resource constraints, soaring fuel prices and ingrained protectionism, particularly for agricultural products.

China, India, Brazil did more for African growth in twenty years, than the West did in 80 years since the end of WWII.

This demand, and support, and solidarity, helped Africa slowly improve its governance, entrenching democracy in more places, and noticeably reduced bureaucracy and corruption.

But in South Africa, these relatively advantageous global and continental contexts were not fully exploited.
A Back-hand to the Future

A key perk of any Government job has long been private medical cover.

But in the ‘Muvhango Nation’, the situation assumed farcical proportions, with public sector health staff, including nurses, going on strike because GEMS did not give them good enough coverage plans for private healthcare.

The mass of the people was rightly sceptical. If those in Government refused to partake of its own services, coveting instead private security, private health and private schools, why should the people have any faith in public institutions?

Beyond the divided political elite, the ethnic divisions of apartheid diminished only slightly, and were partly played out in some provincial political edifices that largely failed as administrative units, but succeeded in creating ‘communities of interest’ on ever-smaller scales.

The Majority Still Rules, But Only Just

People were increasingly appalled by the unfairness of the system, as corruption took root. This sense of iniquity often expressed itself as hostility to outsiders and as a cynicism about politics and politicians.

Trends in elections started to show tactical voting especially by young people and the middle strata.

Support for the ruling party at national and provincial levels was used discriminatorily, depending on whether voters accepted the personalities in leadership.

Opposition was as fractious as ever, but nonetheless the ANC majority was drastically reduced, hovering for a while around 50-60% at national level, with three provinces intermittently ruled by coalitions of opposition parties.

Ominously, voter participation was low and falling.
Money Fixes Everything

The informal sector was also hobbled by crime and, ironically, by the growing efficiency and generosity of the partly outsourced and privatised social welfare system.

Even those in formal employment were unable to generate enough income to save much.

Many still relied on one or more family members receiving direct state cash transfers, and on the use of inexpensive state hospitals and schools.

Over the years, South Africa’s professional class

‘The informal sector was also hobbled by crime and, ironically, by the growing efficiency and generosity of the partly outsourced and privatised social welfare system.’

Quinton’s story: part 3

As disillusioned as Quinton was, there was a part of him that was inspired by recent political developments and by the pockets of excellence that he knew still existed in Government.

There were places with a buzz, places where staff got in early and were still pushing hard to deliver into the night. They seemed to have camaraderie and a sense of achievement that he’d never got in his stint in Government.

Maybe it was time to go back; get this job at his friend’s hotel, save a bit, maybe study part-time and get that elusive degree, go back to Government and this time make his mark.

He wondered if they would let him join Home Affairs, the most widely admired department in Government.

Now that would be something: those guys were like warriors, they set the standards and from the Minister down, they were hailed as heroes.

If he could just get into a team like that...
started to use the country as a mere ‘base of operations’, as they plied their trade in more favourable climes internationally.

Most alarming for many citizens was the steady growth of ‘everyday’ corruption during the 2010s. South Africans started to accept how a little money could lubricate the ‘friction’ out of the system.

Corruption, once limited to rogue elements in a few departments, increasingly became the norm in Government services.

Winning tenders without a backhander to someone became nearly impossible.

**A Slow Coach to Tomorrow**

Inefficiency also increased, and slow turnaround times for basic services were stymieing economic growth.

After a decade of improvements in the delivery of services, it once again started to take unacceptably long to deliver an ID book, fill a prescription at a State hospital, appoint a new teacher, or prosecute a criminal case.

The gap between planning and implementation, and between intention and effect, grew apace.

*‘The gap between planning and implementation, and between intention and effect, grew apace.’*

**An Environment of Good Intentions**

Government throughout the 2010s wanted to do more to protect the environment, and many admirable projects were initiated.

These included mega-projects to husband water and soil resources, build wind farms and solar stations, and encourage citizens to save electricity.
As foreshadowed by the waves of violence against people who were ‘other’ in 2008, including those who were nonetheless South Africans, and by a creeping ethnic-overlay to various forms of political expression, society was much more fragmented by the late 2010s.

But Government struggled to implement mitigating strategies for containing environmental damage, and taking advantage of South Africa’s natural resources in a sustainable way.

Public transport was promoted at a Metro level, with some notable successes, particularly as solar powered rapid transport buses became more viable.

But again, the State ran into resource constraints of its own. Adverse environmental impact studies were easy to bribe away, and the well-connected evaded environmental protections and Best Practice without fear.

South African planning largely ignored long-term environmental implications, even in 2025.

Social Bonds Come Unstuck

Too little attention was paid to ethnic and regional senses of difference, which were exacerbated by periodic economic crises and erratic delivery of state services.

‘Too little attention was paid to ethnic and regional senses of difference, which were exacerbated by periodic economic crises and erratic delivery of state services.’

Not all of the lines of division unfolded in predictable ways. The advent of women-only gyms, for example, of which there were 600 by 2009, coincided with women’s-only carriages on the Gautrain and other
forms of public transport, and later into a more militant ‘men are the problem’ feminism.

Youth sub-cultures, always slippery and transient, started hardening at their boundaries. So much so, that many came to resemble gangs in their hold over their adherents.

This took place as membership of trade unions, churches, sports clubs, political parties and social clubs fell sharply.

Only security associations, and neighbourhood-watch type organisations, which were very loosely and informally organised, saw any rise in voluntary participation.

Older people, and a few younger people too, clung to their ethnicity and religion with greater defensiveness, as South Africa descended into the easy use of the language of exclusion in everyday situations.

The number of causes and of classes and clans that people were prepared to ‘die and kill for’, if only figuratively, grew alarmingly.

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**Tomorrow is Another Day**

Symbolising the nation’s political power struggles, and the slow extinguishing of the Great South African Dream, planned electricity outages became a way of life in the ‘Muvhango Nation’ by 2015.

In the urban sprawls, informal settlements grew in leaps and bounds, with no-go areas similar to some of the worst Latin American favellas.

In the broader economy, inflation stayed in double digits for years, with the differentials between the domestic rate of inflation and those of our trading partners seeing the rand depreciate to 15-1 against the US dollar by 2017.

While this currency depreciation helped some manufacturing industries, and certainly gave a much needed boost to agriculture-based output, formal unemployment was not able to dip below
20% of the labour force, even by 2024. In fact, the rate increased during the latter half of the 2010s. Even the extraordinary development of fuel cell technology, which enhanced the long-term value of South Africa’s platinum endowment, was not sufficient to lift GDP per capita by more than a few dollars a month.

Southern and West Africa as well as the Maghreb emerged as centres of growth. In particular, Nigeria, Angola, the DRC, Tunisia and Egypt experienced growth rates of 9% to 12% per annum for many years.

Growing on average by 3.5% over the 16-year period, South Africa’s proportion of continental GDP declined, so that by 2020, both Nigerian and Egyptian economies eclipsed a South African GDP that had dwarfed them as recently as 2010.

South Africa had, by 2025, seen its major financial services, health care, mining and retail companies sold to foreign multinationals and private equity funds, particularly in the global boom years of the 2010s.

Now, a Chinese consortium was offering a 40% premium for 75% control of SASOL. Nothing had come of the threatened nationalisation touted earlier. After a decade of to-ing and fro-ing, successive ‘Ministers of the Developmental State’ strangely found technical excuses to defer the decision.

Eclipse of an African Giant

In this period, most countries in Africa sustained an average growth of 5% per annum.
Anger on the Streets


Ironically, the very civics and youth organisations that the ANC helped revitalise post-2009, started mobilising people against the careerism and corruption that seemed to have gripped the political elite.

As the situation deteriorated over time, there were many outbreaks of mass anger and impatience: marches, strikes, riots, and xenophobia. Some of this mobilisation caught the ANC and Government by surprise.

Despite this, the election in 2014 went relatively well, notwithstanding the factionalism in the ANC. But the ANC majority was reduced. Just 55% of voters were prepared to trust the ANC to govern for another five years to 2019.

This was after a group calling themselves the ANC-pPMv (post-Polokwane and post-Mangaung victims) broke away, having failed to capture the party in 2012.

After being hounded out of Government, with their businesses unable to thrive because of political targeting, the Group started mobilising on a middle class ticket, joining up with the Black Consciousness groupings to attain 6% of the vote.

Faced with this, the ruling party went to its 2017 Conference calling for serious organisational renewal. But it was too late to change public attitudes!

Climbing Back From the Abyss

By winning the 2019 election with just over 55% and seeing four provinces, including Gauteng, captured by a coalition of the Opposition, or going into bed with the ANC-pPMv which many hated with a passion, the ANC was galvanised into even more radical introspection.
The rancorous National Conference in 2022 finally produced a revitalisation of the idealism of politics. The ANC, SACP and ANC-pPMv forged a pact and soon merged into one party.

The climb-back had been slow for the country as a whole, but some beginnings of high economic growth started to revive the long-lost optimism of spirit in South Africa.

As for politics, the attitude of many had become: as long as they do not mess up, and they implement policies that improve social cohesion, the rest is free entertainment.

Synopsis

- **Bang Goes the Boom.** In the slipstream of the 2009 elections and a successful 2010 World Cup, the economy boomed, and the growth rate breached 5.5%. But the euphoria was short-lived, as poor planning and coordination, exacerbated by political in-fighting, started taking their toll on the economy.

- **Politician vs Politician.** Service delivery suffered, and corruption increased, as animosity among politicians reached startling new levels. Efficiency levels declined, as measured by unqualified audits, proportion of budgets spent and citizen satisfaction surveys.

- **The Champ Slips Up.** The economy, after a few good years, was on the skids. Foreign multinationals and private equity funds began cherry-picking key South African assets. South Africa’s proportion of continental GDP declined to such an extent, that by 2025, the country lost its unrivalled pre-eminence on the continent.

- **The Brink of a New Era.** Standing at the edge of a cliff, a new ANC went back to the nation, humbly, and demonstrated signs of a revival of idealism.
Appendix

Critical variables impacting on South Africa in 2025

South Africa Scenarios 2025 began its research phase in 2006. Initially, 65 interviews were conducted with prominent South Africans, including academics, business leaders, politicians, unionists, artists, and sportspeople. These interviewees helped identify the most important variables that might shape South Africa’s future.

Further research was commissioned to examine these variables. This research was shared at a Research Conference in June 2007, following which a Scenarios 2025 ‘core group’ met regularly to consider the variables and rank their possible impact on South Africa’s future.

The following variables were grouped into the 7 Key Driving Forces discussed at the beginning of this publication:

1. WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH
Is the world economy likely to remain resilient? Will economic growth be less volatile than in previous decades? How might resource constraints and high energy prices impact on economic growth? How likely is it that absolute poverty might be eliminated by 2025?

2. TERMS OF TRADE
Are Terms of Trade likely to become more favourable for developing countries? How will the conflicting demands of protectionism and free trade be balanced as the 21st century progresses?
3. AFRICAN ECONOMY
Is demand from the East likely to continue to stimulate African economic growth? If current projections continue, how might the change in the balance of economic power in Africa reshape political and economic relations on the continent?

Will continent-wide cooperation and greater African unity develop significant momentum?

4. SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Will South Africa better exploit its resource base and shifts to a more diversified, knowledge-based economy, and will the country prove capable of sustaining high real growth rates?

How will we cope with skills shortages, an uncompetitive and volatile exchange rate, complicated trade tariffs, the barriers to entry of new investment, and structural capacity constraints?

How will the nation’s road, rail and port infrastructure, and the high cost of communications impact on growth rates?

In the context of global warming, how might ‘resource ceilings’ on energy, water, and arable land, impact on economic development?

5. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY
Against a background of slow but steady transformation, how closely will ownership and control of the economy mirror the demographics of South Africa in 2025?

What might be the political impact of white South Africans still controlling 50% or more of the economy in 2025?

6. GLOBAL POLITICS
What are the implications of shifts in global power relationships? Given the rise of China and India and the resurgence of Russia, how likely is it that the ‘War on Terror’ and other global anti-crime initiatives will continue to raise draw-bridges?

How will China’s growing economic and military power influence global politics? Will the global democratisation trend continue; and how will the
dynamic of ‘illiberal’ versus ‘liberal’ democracies play itself out?

7. CONTENT AND FORM OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

With the growing middle class seemingly ‘privatising’ key elements of their relations with the state, by embracing private schools, private security, private retirement provision and private health care, will they become less involved and less interested in formal politics?

If there is growing political disengagement, what will happen to the the tri-partite alliance? Will political discourse become more strident or more accommodating?

8. CRIME

To what extent will the burden of South Africa’s history, and the social and political tensions in the country, play a role in fuelling crime? What state responses might prove most effective in combating crime?

Will better organised community responses, and more cohesive responses from private and public crime prevention forces, make all the difference?

9. CORRUPTION

Will the vigorous exposing and prosecution of corruption continue, and will South Africa be able to escape the epidemic of ‘underhand dealings’ and ‘undue influence’ that characterises the relationship between state and private business in many developing and developed countries?
10. CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL COHESION

While many international NGOs grow in confidence and power, how will trade union membership be affected by outsourcing, off-shoring and casualisation in the global and local economy?

Will there be an upsurge in ‘bonding’, ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ within classes, while inter-class solidarity declines?

Will the trend towards smaller families and smaller households continue? With a third of South African children living in families where the ‘parents’ in the house are either not married, or are not joint biological parents of the children in the household, will our social structures be able to provide the support and guidance needed by a new generation of South Africans?

11. THE YOUTH

By 2025, will 30 years of freedom and a long period of economic growth have led to the creation of a new generation of ‘born-frees’, with a non-racial ethos and a stronger sense of common identity?

If class consciousness increases as ethnic consciousness recedes, will there be more antagonism between the majority of youth who are poor, and the smaller and more articulate group who have ‘made-it’?

12. INEQUALITY

Assuming that massive social welfare initiatives are likely to have taken some of the sting out of poverty, how likely is it that there will be a dramatic increase in the number of indigent South Africans?

Will the well-to-do put more ‘open space’ between themselves and the poor? In a global economy where there are fewer opportunities for the marginally skilled or unskilled, will the Gini coefficient widen again after the 2010 World Cup?
13. POVERTY
Will social welfare programs, state services and income support blunt the impact of poverty? Will they help to negate the sense of being excluded from the ‘better life’ that has been promised to all South Africans?
While the number of poor South Africans may decline sharply by 2025, will this be counterbalanced by a rising number of ‘working poor’ and a steady flow of poor migrants from Africa?

14. URBANISATION
With some 70% of South Africans living permanently in urban areas by 2025, how will the shift to an almost three-quarters urban-based population impact on politics, food security, and service delivery?

15. FOOD SECURITY ISSUES
With tremendous disparities in food security, despite strong Government efforts to address developmental issues, how will high oil prices, environmental degradation and the bio-fuels industry impact on food prices.

16. THE CAPACITY OF THE STATE
Although the state is transformed and skill levels are much higher, how will Government continue to attract and retain the brightest and the best?
How will Government measure itself and make the performance management system work across all tiers of Government?

17. LOCAL/PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
How will the relationship between National, Provincial and Local Government change to better serve the needs of South Africans?
18. SKILLS AND EDUCATION

As the first class of students born in 1994 leave school in 2012, will the substantial investment in Early Childhood Development and primary school education start to pay off? Will South Africa be producing more young people who are ready for the world of work?

How will South Africa be challenged by the siren call of globalisation? Will the best graduates be lured to the Middle East, North America, Asia and the EU?

What new approaches will be developed to create a sufficiently large pool of skilled people and graduates ahead of the ‘demand curve’?

19. INFRASTRUCTURE

In the context of steady urbanisation and a growing economy, will South Africa’s roads, ports, power supply, and rail and telecommunications networks be able to keep pace with demand?

20. HEALTH (including HIV AND AIDS)

What will be the balance between the number of South Africans whose health needs are served by the public and private sectors? How will our responses to HIV and AIDS and other infectious diseases change?

With life expectancy expected to increase to the early 60s for men and women, will South Africa be able to provide quality primary and secondary care to an aging population?

21. ENERGY/OIL PRICES

Will the rapid decline in oil reserves push prices to unexpectedly high levels?

Will the paradox of exponential growth, where each doubling cycle consumes as many resources as all the preceding cycles, bring the world head-to-head with resource constraints?
22. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT/CLIMATE CHANGE

How will high average annual economic growth rates take their toll on the South African landscape? How will Government and the private sector deal with soil quality and capacity, water availability, and the impact of global warming on the amount of arable land in South Africa?

23. TECHNOLOGY

As South Africa struggles to keep pace with global technological innovation, despite being world-class in niche areas such as power generation, and coal/gas to liquid fuel, what will need to be done to ensure that we become a nation of pioneers and innovators?

Will our communications technology be liberated from the limited range of suppliers and the high prices that currently prevent all but 5-million South Africans from going online?

24. MIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS

What will the coming African ‘youth bulge’ mean for South Africa?

How will the violence against some non-South Africans in 2008 impact on long-term migration patterns?

How will migrants from Africa grow South Africa’s population? Will South Africa’s low population growth continue?

How will South Africa attract and retain skills in a world where the average age of the population will be much older than at any time in history?
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