

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL
OF INTELLIGENCE**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FINAL
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS
OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
LEGALITY OF THE SURVEILLANCE
OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE NIA ON
MR S MACOZOMA**

**EXTENDED TERMS OF REFERENCE
REPORT ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
ALLEGEDLY INTERCEPTED E-MAILS**

**MEDIA BRIEFING
23 MARCH 2006**

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Attached is the expanded summary of a report on the findings and recommendations of the Investigation Team established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence to inquire into the authenticity of e-mails allegedly intercepted as part of Project Avani, a NIA project. The investigation was carried out pursuant to a request from the Minister for Intelligence Services, Mr R Kasrils, to the Inspector-General in terms of the provisions of S 7(7)(c) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994). These provisions oblige the Inspector-General to perform all functions designated to him by a Minister of the designated¹ Intelligence Services. The investigation was carried out as part of an inquiry into the nature of Project Avani which itself was an extension of the investigation into the legality of the surveillance operations carried out by the NIA on Mr Sakumzi Macozoma. As a complete appreciation of our findings and recommendations is only possible through a study of the report taken as a whole and a reading thereof in conjunction with the reports arising from those earlier phases of the investigation, this briefing is only able and is intended only to provide an overall appreciation of the investigation.

Signed on the 23rd of March 2006 at Menlyn, Pretoria.

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The designated Intelligence Services include the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service, and the intelligence divisions of the South African Defence Force and South African Police Services

PART 1

BACKGROUND

1. INTRODUCTION

The Minister for Intelligence Services (Minister) requested the Inspector-General of Intelligence to conduct an investigation into the legality and legitimacy of surveillance operations allegedly undertaken by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) on Mr Sakumzi Macozoma, a prominent South African businessman in which the principal motivation of the NIA for the surveillance was represented as Mr Macozoma's links with a Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) which were inimical to national security.

As a consequence of the Phase One report of the Inspector-General in which the FIS motivation was found to have been without substance and merit, the Minister extended the terms of reference of the investigation to include an inquiry into Project Avani, a project identified as part of the Phase One investigation as having been undertaken by the NIA.

A Phase Two report of the investigation found that the surveillance of Mr Macozoma had been carried out as part of Project Avani, a Political Intelligence National Stability Assessment Project in which intercepted e-mails, authentic or otherwise, played a critical role in re-directing the focus of Project Avani.

This report - a summary of the Phase Three report of the investigation - focuses on the authenticity of e-mails allegedly intercepted as part of Project Avani and reviews the conclusions, findings and recommendations of Phases One and Two in order to align them with the evidence uncovered as part of Phase Three.

The Investigation Team established by the Inspector-General for the purpose of carrying out the extended investigation consisted of the:

- Inspector-General of Intelligence, Mr Z Ngcakani;
- Chief Operating Officer in the Office of the Inspector-General, Mr I Fazel and the
- Legal Advisor to the Office of the Inspector-General, Adv J Govender.

2. TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Office of the Inspector-General was requested by the Minister to include in the scope of the extended terms of reference of the investigation a consideration of:

- The circumstances that gave rise to project Avani;
- An inquiry into the targets identified in terms of the project and
- An evaluation and examination of the intelligence that informed the project.

This report serves, in the first instance, to complete the extended terms of reference and focuses on the examination of the authenticity of e-mails, allegedly intercepted and utilised, in part, as part of Project Avani and in part as part of an undeclared parallel project, and in the second instance, to complete the investigation into the legality of the surveillance operations carried out by the NIA on Mr S Macozoma. **Our scope was limited to an examination of the authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails and matters connected therewith and did not extend to include an inquiry into the existence of the overall conspiracy projections they sought to convey.**

3. INVESTIGATION APPROACH

3.1. Approach to establishing the authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

The authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails was evaluated primarily through an **examination of the veracity of the content of the e-mails to demonstrate their plausibility at face value**, together with an evaluation of the **technical feasibility of them being intercepted products**.

Incidental to the primary objective of determining their authenticity, we also sought to determine **whether or not the 'intercepted' e-mails were acquired through a formal project of the NIA** and if so, to **trace** the source or **agent of the NIA**. We also sought to **trace** the **source of the 'intercepted' e-mails** (if not the same person), the identity of the interceptor or fabricator as the case may be and whether or not he or she was in any way **assisted by the NIA or others in his/her e-mail (interception or fabrication) activities**.

3.1.1. Veracity of content of allegedly intercepted e-mails

The examination of the veracity of the content of the 'intercepted' e-mails was confined to the hard copy of the e-mails and included:

- A sample evaluation of the accuracy with which known real events were portrayed;
- An evaluation of the accuracy of e-mail document text- as communicated in a conversational manner;
- An evaluation of date and time fields together with the frequency of and intervals during messages and
- Matters connected therewith.

3.1.2. Technical feasibility of allegedly intercepted e-mails

The examination of the technical feasibility of the 'intercepted' e-mails focused on both the hard copy of the e-mails and accessible electronic media (retrieved from the computers of individuals suspected of having possibly handled the allegedly intercepted e-mails) and included:

- A validation of computer generated artefacts of a general nature on hard copy e-mails including among others inconsistencies and incorrectness observed in date and time stamps; protocol encapsulation; chat log-on/log-off protocols; the occurrence of spurious data and unusual computer generated characters;
- An examination of computer generated artefacts usually present and associated with intercepted products on the hard copy of the e-mails;
- Verification of the IP (internet protocol) address details of alleged e-mail participants;
- A forensic evaluation of the source computer/s that may have been utilized to execute the alleged interceptions or computers that may have been utilized to view, edit or print these for evidence of either interception or fabrication activity and
- Matters connected therewith.

To a limited extent forensic examinations were carried out on computers that may have been utilized by certain targets to allegedly compose and transmit e-mail and chat-room conversations (that were then allegedly intercepted) in order to trace and validate the origins of these e-mails, if indeed they were ever communicated or transmitted on a network, the internet or stored on relevant servers.

3.2. Sources of information

The Investigation Team also conducted recorded interviews with members of the NIA associated with Project Avani, other persons relevant to the intercepted e-mail aspect of the investigation and independent experts in the field of data interceptions. Where appropriate, these interviews were supported by the sworn testimony of interviewees.

It was also found necessary to pursue the access to information provisions of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) (sections 7 (8) (a), 7 (8) (c) and 7 (9)) through the courts to secure information and evidence relevant to the investigation as a necessary alternative to voluntary cooperation.

3.2.1. Interviews of members of the Project Avani Team

The Investigation Team conducted recorded interviews with the relevant members of the Project Avani Team over the duration of the period of the investigation.

3.2.2. Interviews of members of the NIA

The Investigation Team conducted recorded interviews with the relevant members of the NIA over the duration of the period of the investigation.

3.2.3. Utilisation of expert opinion

Recorded interviews were conducted and opinion was sought from relevant experts in making a determination of the authenticity of the e-mails in question. These, where appropriate, have been supported by sworn affidavit. Experts utilised during the investigation include the Senior Superintendent and National Commander, Cyber Unit: South African Police Services; an IT expert and a Forensic Criminologist.

The forensic examination of relevant electronic evidence acquired during the investigation was carried out by the Cyber Unit of the crime intelligence division of the South African Police Services (SAPS) under our supervision.

3.2.4. Interviews of members of the public who were targeted for e-mail interception

Two individuals allegedly targeted by the NIA for e-mail interception were interviewed during February 2006. On the [10th of February 2006](#) Mr S Macozoma, who initially lodged the complaint about being placed under physical surveillance and who was also a prominent NIA target of the e-mail interceptions was requested to provide a written response to our query and questionnaire on his whereabouts during the periods during which he was alleged to have been communicating by e-mail which were then allegedly intercepted. He did so on the [17th of February 2006](#).

3.2.5. Interviews of members of the public associated with the ‘intercepted’ e-mails and others associated with them

An individual who was suspected of being the agent of the NIA for the acquisition of the allegedly intercepted e-mails (and possibly also the interceptor) was traced with the assistance of the SAPS. He was questioned informally during the search and seizure operations carried out at his home on the [1st of December 2005](#). At a formal interview on the [2nd of December 2005](#), on the advice of his attorneys who were present, he declined to tender his cooperation to the Investigation Team and refused to answer any questions.

Members of the public who enjoyed a close working relationship with this individual and who, according to information in our possession, may have had an intimate knowledge of his work activities were contacted and interviewed formally and telephonically on and between Monday the [13th](#) and Wednesday the [15th of February 2006](#). They included:

- A work colleague at the agents former place of work and
- His former supervisor.

The selection of members of the public and individuals from outside of the intelligence services for interview by the investigation team was based on their relevance to the investigation and availability for interview. The use of more convenient alternative investigative procedures other than formally recorded interviews also played a role in the selection.

3.2.6. Documentation and authorisations acquired from the NIA

The Investigation Team also examined relevant Project Avani documentation; minutes of project meetings; payment and project authorisations and other documentation associated with the allegedly intercepted e-mails.

With the assistance of the NIA, a search was also conducted on designated offices and computers at the NIA on the [6th of February 2006](#) to retrieve documentation and evidence relevant to the investigation.

3.2.7. Legal remedies employed for access to information

With the assistance of the SAPS, a search and seizure of electronic and physical documentation was carried out on the [1st of December 2005](#) at the home of the suspected agent of the NIA and likely source of the allegedly intercepted e-mails, under the provisions of section 7 (8) (c) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) read together with the warrant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977). The search and seizure was executed to secure information relevant to the investigation held by a third party and in pursuit of clarifying the mode of interception or fabrication operations, if indeed such operations had been carried out. The examination of items seized included electronic storage media, laptop computers and relevant documentation which have since formed a significant part of the scope of the overall investigation.

As a result of information obtained from the seized cell-phone of the suspected agent of the NIA (and possible source of the allegedly intercepted emails) and from the authorisation and payment records of the NIA, a subpoena was obtained by the SAPS in terms of Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) and served on his former employer to submit the laptop computer previously utilised by him whilst

he was employed by the company. The company duly complied with the request and the laptop was subjected to forensic examination for the purpose of the investigation.

3.3. Scope of investigation

We believe that the scope of our inquiry and investigations are adequate to support the opinions and conclusions we have reached.

PART 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PHASE 1: Chronology of events during the first phase of the investigation: 5th of September 2005 to the 14th of October 2005.

1.1. Receipt of a complaint

On Monday the 5th of September 2005, the Minister, who was abroad at the time, received a telephonic complaint from Mr S Macozoma. Mr Macozoma informed the Minister that he had been harassed by the NIA from Monday the 29th to Wednesday the 31st of August 2005 and that he and his family had been subjected to surveillance over that period. At that stage, it is understood that the Director-General of the NIA, Mr B Masetlha had not informed the Minister that Mr Macozoma was under surveillance by the NIA or that the surveillance operation had been compromised.

On Wednesday the 7th of September 2005, the Minister received correspondence from private attorneys informing him they had been instructed by Mr Macozoma to interdict the NIA from harassing their client and any member of his family. As a result the Minister instructed the Director-General of the NIA to formally report on the alleged surveillance operation conducted on Mr Macozoma. This report was forwarded to the Minister on Friday the 16th of September 2005.

1.2. Request for an investigation in terms of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act

On the 20th of September 2005 the Minister formally requested the Inspector-General to investigate the allegations made by Mr Macozoma. The request was formally directed in terms of the provisions of section 7 (7) (c) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) which obliges the Inspector-General to perform all functions designated to him by a Minister of the designated Intelligence Services, of which the Minister for Intelligence Services is one.

1.3. Nature of surveillance operations and misleading of the Inspector-General

In a Phase One report addressed to the Minister on the 14th of October 2005 the Investigation Team reported that the NIA had in fact carried out a surveillance operation directed at Mr Macozoma between the 29th and the 31st of August 2005. This operation was not authorised in terms of existing NIA operational policy and was therefore un-procedural.

The reasons advanced by the Director-General, Mr B Masetlha and members of the senior management of the NIA as to why Mr Macozoma was placed under surveillance at all had been found by the Investigation Team to be without substance and merit. The Investigation Team noted with concern attempts to conceal the fact that Mr Macozoma was specifically targeted for surveillance by the NIA and to mislead the Minister and the Investigation Team as to the true nature of events surrounding this particular operation. The Investigation Team as a result concluded that the surveillance operation was both un-procedural and - as an intrusive measure had been deployed without proper justification - lacked legitimacy and based on the facts before us, was therefore unlawful.

1.4. Recommendations of the Inspector-General

Based on our findings, the Investigation Team recommended that the Minister consider taking disciplinary steps against the management team of the NIA and that the NIA continue with an internal investigation into the circumstances which resulted in the surveillance operation against Mr Macozoma being compromised. The Investigation Team also identified the need for a policy review in specified areas of concern that included operational policy on the authorisation of surveillance targets, in particular the identification of and authorisation required for secondary targets identified during the course of a surveillance operation and a policy framework in support of target identification for Counter-Intelligence Investigations.

Although the purpose of the first phase of the investigation had been to determine the circumstances and facts that led to Mr Sakumzi Macozoma being placed under surveillance by the NIA, during the course of the investigation the need was identified for a further investigation into the possible link between the surveillance of Mr Macozoma and the so-called Project Avani - which the NIA had carried out at about that time.

2. PHASE 2: Chronology of events during the extended terms of reference, Phase Two of the investigation: 20th of October 2005 to the 14th of December 2005.

2.1. Review of Project Avani

Against this background, on the 20th of October 2005 the Inspector-General received an extension to the initial terms of reference from the Minister which included a review and evaluation of Project Avani.

On the same day the Director-General of the NIA, Mr B Masetlha was suspended and was at once instructed in writing by the Minister to provide relevant Project Avani information to the Inspector-General to enable him (the Inspector-General) to carry out his extended investigation. This request was due on the 24th of October 2005 and was not met. It is understood that a condition of his suspension was his cooperation with the investigation of the Inspector-General into Project Avani.

2.2. Nature of Project Avani

On the 24th and 25th of October 2005 the Investigation Team formally interviewed selected members of the Project Avani team. These initial and subsequent interviews had established that Project Avani was a project legally constituted under the provisions of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act 39 of 1994) and the Intelligence Services Act, 2003 (Act 65 of 2003) to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse intelligence in order to identify any threat or potential threat posed by the presidential succession debate, foreign services interests there-in, the impending Jacob Zuma trial and poor Service Delivery impacts and dynamics to the security and stability of the Republic and it's people. The project was also seen as an extension of the counter-intelligence mandate of the NIA. Project Avani did not initially identify any specific targets and assumed a **so-called 360-degree horizon with no bias**. The primary intelligence, among other considerations that informed Project Avani included the political dynamics within the ANC, other inter-party dynamics with a potential impact on service delivery and good governance in South Africa.

Project Avani was initially conceived by the Director-General of the NIA - without informing the Minister - during **early July 2005** (post the National General Council of the ANC) as an environmental scanning project without specific targets. The stated

primary objectives of Project Avani were to assess and evaluate the effect that the presidential succession debate was having on the political climate and stability of the country.

2.3. Targeting of a specific nature: Interception of Data Communications and their impact on Project Avani

The introduction of the allegedly intercepted e-mails during the early part to the [middle of August 2005](#) seemed to have had a profound impact on Project Avani as it introduced an element of conspiracy to the investigative, collection and assessment hypothesis. According to the official records of the NIA, the targets for the interception of data communications (e-mails) were identified and selected by the NIA for onward interception in an outsourcing arrangement known only to the Director-General of the NIA and an another member of the NIA. It was apparent that the Project Avani team, in particular it's most senior members, had not readily and gullibly accepted the authenticity of the resultant 'intercepted' e-mails which remained in the exclusive domain and custody (with minor exceptions) of the Director-General of the NIA and another person. Attempts to verify the authenticity of the e-mails were reportedly met with the 'sleight of hand' obstructionist tactics of the Director-General - who wanted the team to believe that they were true, and who with another member of the NIA, vouched for their authenticity.

These tactics included:-

- Tight control over the limited 'intercepted' e-mails introduced into the NIA and the management of the document flow by the DG and maintaining a read-only policy in some instances - especially for members engaged in operational activities;
- Naming the source as the Secretary-General of the ANC so as to enhance their credibility and
- Triggering a 'still-born' dialogue and investigation of the e-mails between the NIA and the SAPS with no serious follow-up.

Although only two sets of e-mails had been initially introduced to the Avani Team/Project, the senior officials participating in the Avani team had had sight of at least four sets of e-mails mainly during [August 2005](#). It is apparent however that a far

greater collection of e-mails had been received and which remained in the exclusive custody of the Director-General of the NIA. As far as we have been able to establish, these had not been distributed to any member of the NIA, although exceptions had been noted.

The e-mails, introduced during [August 2005](#) resulted in the direct and invasive targeting of individuals, largely, although not exclusively due to their 'participation' in the allegedly intercepted e-mails. This included the targeting of political parties, officials and various leaders - both ruling and opposition - through the bulk electronic interception of their voice communications and physical surveillance of their activities.

2.4. Targeting of a specific nature: Physical Surveillance Operations

Physical surveillance operations were launched on at least three civilians, one of whom was a journalist, the other a politician and Mr S Macozoma, who was seen as central to a political conspiracy. As these operations were not properly sanctioned in terms of the operational policy of the NIA, they are un-procedural. Our initial investigation found that attempts were made to mislead the Minister and the Investigation Team as to the true nature of events surrounding the Macozoma operation. This, together with evidence since uncovered is overwhelming in support of the assertion that Mr Macozoma was placed under surveillance as a 'conspirator' identified as part of Project Avani rather than as part of an attempt to identify and investigate his links with a foreign intelligence agent. These alleged links were in fact a 'Legend', designed for external consumption as an explanation for the botched surveillance operation, and was communicated to the Minister and Inspector-General and according to the minutes of Project Avani, was officially cleared with the Director-General of the NIA.

2.5. Targeting of a specific nature: Interception of Voice Communications

The Investigation Team found that the bulk interceptions facilities of the National Communications Centre (NCC) were deployed in the furtherance of Project Avani and later received the transcripts of certain interceptions of voice communications and the telephone numbers of other targets which were loaded onto the interception system. The voice communications of at least thirteen members of the public including senior members of the ruling party, the opposition, businessmen and officials in the public service were so intercepted.

The targeting of South African individuals through the interception of their voice communications by means of the bulk scanning facilities of the National Communications Centre (NCC) was not in keeping with the practice and culture of bulk interceptions, the normal focus of which is the targeted bulk interception of foreign communications. These facilities were used in a way that constituted a gross abuse of the bulk interception facilities of the NCC and constituted a circumvention of the legal interceptions regime provided for in the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act 127 of 1992) in force at the time and which requires the authority of a Judge for the interception of such communications. It is important to note that the Director-General of the NIA was also at the time the Acting Executive Director of the NCC.

2.6. Implications of interception activities

The outsourcing of the interception of the e-mails of selected targets constituted an unlawful transfer of intelligence functions to third party private interests, effectively placing them outside the oversight regime. These activities amount to statutory contraventions.

2.7. Risk of abuse of intelligence apparatus

Although Project Avani was conceptually considered to be within the legal mandate of the NIA, the exclusion of the Minister for Intelligence Services in its conceptualisation, planning and execution resulted in a void in the requisite executive supervision and oversight of an extremely sensitive project. Furthermore, given the selective Project Avani clientele of the Director-General and the potential for crossing the line between intelligence collection in the interest of national security and intelligence collection camouflaged as counter-revolutionary threats (or for that matter threats against particular political interests), the risk of undermining constitutionally protected party political freedoms and of descending into the abyss of abuse of state resources and compromise of intelligence mandate integrity with a project of this nature calls into question the activity of Political Intelligence gathering that underpinned Project Avani. In a young democracy such as ours, the questions it raises are whether it should be practiced at all, and if so, what the parameters should be that define and encompass national security interests.

2.8. The implications resulting from the presence of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

The introduction of the allegedly intercepted e-mails and associated 'conspiracy' agendas they project - regardless of whether they were authentic or not- would seem to point to a real threat to the integrity of our constitutional democracy together with a possibility of the abuse of state resources and institutions. Should they (the e-mails) be found to have been fabricated however, this fabrication of a conspiracy, of counter-revolutionary threats - and consequent launching of associated intelligence operations - would constitute a very serious matter.

2.9. Discontinuance of Project Avani

From what we have been able to establish, Project Avani was discontinued within the NIA around the [5th of September 2005](#) subsequent to the compromised surveillance operation carried out on Mr S Macozoma although no formal decision to abandon the operation had been taken at the time. We have been informed that the Minister had subsequently issued an instruction to terminate the project.

2.10. Recommendations of the Inspector-General

Together with a recommendation for the preferring of disciplinary and criminal charges against certain individuals, the investigation team also recommended the need for the appropriate superintendence and oversight of the conceptualisation, planning and execution of Political Intelligence Projects and to establish the defining parameters and a regulatory framework for it's practice.

3. PHASE 3: Chronology of events during the second extended terms of reference Phase Three of the investigation: 15th of December 2005 to the 28th of February 2006.

3.1. Determining the authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

During the first extension to the terms of reference phase (Phase Two), the e-mails allegedly intercepted and utilised as part of Project Avani were accepted as having been intercepted by a third party on behalf of the NIA and their authenticity was not examined as part of the investigation. This second extension to the terms of reference

(Phase Three) of the investigation into the legality of the surveillance operation carried out by the NIA against Mr S Macozoma sought to determine the authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails.

3.2. Projection of a conspiracy

It is apparent that the e-mails introduced into the NIA during mid-August 2005, had begun to pre-dominate the thinking and collection approach towards Project Avani. The e-mails purport to demonstrate a conspiracy directed against Mr J Zuma, Mr K Motlanthe and Mr B Masetlha and were concentrated in the months of [August, September and October 2005](#), although it is primarily the [August 2005](#) 'intercepts' - particularly those introduced towards the end of the month - that enjoyed the most attention within the NIA through Project Avani. The remaining 'intercepted' e-mails, under an apparent NIA stamp of authenticity, serve to further demonstrate the overall conspiracy agenda.

The conspiracy agenda fed to Project Avani was allegedly pursued by two groups of conspirators, one lead by a Xhosa faction in business and government and the other by the leader of the opposition, media and white reactionaries in the Scorpions. The Xhosa faction was motivated by a plan, incorporated in a strategy document 'The Final Solution' to assume control by [2007](#) and is lead by businessman Mr S Macozoma. The groups purported objective is the destruction of all those who may impede the implementation of their solution and include Mr J Zuma, Mr K Motlanthe and Mr B Masetlha.

The second group are purportedly brought together by the 'Whitemans Struggle' and the afrikaaner members of the group in particular subscribe to 'Die Laager Projek'. The group is focused on fomenting the ANC divide and apparently work together as White South Africa to avoid the trap of dark Africa. They too target Mr J Zuma, Mr K Motlanthe and Mr B Masetlha and to a lesser extent, others associated with the ANC.

The discourse of the two groups captured in the e-mails and chat rooms follow similar patterns. The groups would appear to be collaborating with each other largely through intersections in their respective causes and in their effecting their dark agendas through the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO). With exceptions, each group communicates and is organised independently of the other. The e-mails portray the

abuse of state institutions through the control of the levers of state power and manipulation of certain elements in the media; political groups and public servants in the perpetration of a purported grand conspiracy.

3.3. E-Mail Interception Targets and Frequency of Occurrences

Group A	No*	Group B	No*
Saki Macozoma	17	Tony Leon	7
Leonard MCarthy^	3	Gerrie Nel^	10
Bulelani Ngcuka	2	Izak du Plooy	9
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka	12	Johan du Plooy^	11
Joel Netshitendze**	1	Antony Harber	3
Frank Chikane**	1	Matthew Bucland	6
Vusi Pikoli	7	General Roos	4
Peter Vundla**	1		
Ronnie Kasrils	2		
Trevor Manuel**	1		

*representing the number of allegedly intercepted e-mails/chat-rooms the individual participated in.

** individuals on the periphery of a particular group, having only communicated with specific group members.

^ cross communication

3.4. Overview of e-mail content

The language, terminology and spelling of the names of targets and other text associated with the e-mails is represented in this part of the report as they appeared in the allegedly intercepted e-mails and chat rooms examined as part of the investigation.

Month	P	Focus and Theme of the chat rooms and e-mails
February	1	The e-mails open with the 'Death Knell' e-mail package between Macozoma and B Ngcuka where the 'nailing of the Zulu bastard' and the 'promise of the promotion for Mlambo-Ngcuka' are discussed.
March	0	No activity
April	3	The April e-mails centre around collaboration between Macozoma and Mlambo-Ngcuka on 'the promise' and exchanges between Macozoma and Netshitendze on the speed of the 'plan to nail the Zuluboy'.
May	0	No activity
June	0	No activity

July	0	No activity
August	5	The August e-mails comprise of primarily the 'Whitemans Struggle' conspiracy group (Group B) who enter the fray and collaborate on their cooperation with the media and DSO in the furtherance of 'nailing Zuma and dividing the ANC'. A single e-mail exchange between Chikane and Pikoli focuses on the imminent raid at the Zuma residences.
September	14	The focus of both groups during the month of September is dominated by the 'Motlanthle and Masetla questions' (including the NIA) together with the nailing of the two.
October	14	The October e-mails open with the 'Laager Projek' members of the 'Whitemans Struggle' group collaborating about DSO activities. With discussions on 'Zuluboy's' case and the 'Kamphepe Commission' in the background, this months e-mails and chat rooms are then dominated by the Xhosa group who focus their attentions on the Masetla problem and to a lesser extent on Motlantle.

P - number of chat rooms or e-mail packets - multiple e-mails of at least two, together representing a homogeneous conversation exchanged.

PART 3

PRIMARY FINDINGS: E-MAILS

1. Authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

Based on our evaluation of the veracity of the content of the e-mails to demonstrate their plausibility at face value together with our evaluation of the technical feasibility of them being intercepted products, in our opinion the allegedly intercepted e-mails and chat rooms were in fact faked mock-ups that sought to resemble the on-line communications of the 'targets selected for interception'.

1.1. Veracity of content of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

1.1.1. Errors in e-mail content and inconsistencies with which known real events are portrayed

Our selected sample examination of the veracity of the content of the 'intercepted' e-mails identified significant errors in the accuracy of e-mail document text (primarily systematic misspelling of names across the groups); irregularities in date and time fields and inconsistencies with which certain real events - known to the investigation team and concerning the suspension of Mr Masetlha - were portrayed and together provided a significant degree of persuasive evidence that the e-mails allegedly intercepted, are not authentic. These errors, some of which are included in annexure A, are typographical errors in the process of fabricating as opposed to intercepting of e-mails.

1.1.2. The predictive nature of some of the 'intercepted' e-mails

Flawed as they might be, the 'intercepted e-mails' generally portray certain real events, or at least aspects of those events, reasonably well. The allegedly intercepted e-mail and chat room content provide interesting insights and predictions that are intended to provide a veneer of authenticity. The predictive nature of the 'intercepted' e-mails was heavily relied upon to promote their authenticity. We found that media articles seen to have been predicted in the 'intercepted' e-mails were not necessarily predicted but seemed to follow general themes in keeping with the general themes and areas of interest of the journalists concerned and were written well after the event being predicted and dated before the relevant event. Members of Project Avani who were privy to those e-mails seen to predict future events conceded that they had had sight of the e-mails with 'predictive qualities' well after the events

concerned had materialised. Other 'predictive events' - such as media articles - were couched in such general terms that they could not be seen to be predictive at all.

Other events captured throughout the 'intercepted' e-mails might have appeared as predictive. The unfolding of the saga leading to the suspension of the Director-General of the NIA, the battles unfolding at the Khampepe Commission, the advance preparation for the change in the seat of the Deputy Presidency (together with its associated events) and the financial support structures of the Secretary-General of the ANC embody either the unknown truth or fact mixed with fiction. The latter would represent either the knowledge of one or more e-mail 'compilers' with an inside track or one with hind-sight, or perhaps both - suggesting serious back-dating and fabrication of mock-up's of 'intercepted' e-mails. The status of either eventuality - i.e. the unknown truth or fact mixed with fiction - is dependent on the authentic or fabrication status of the e-mails.

1.1.3. Analysis of the style and language used in the allegedly intercepted e-mails

A reputable Forensic Criminologist in private practice who was requested to analyse the style and language used in the allegedly intercepted e-mails expressed the opinion that the e-mails and chat room sessions were not authentic and stated that authentic e-mails of a very confidential nature were usually in a more cryptic style. Acronyms and initials are used and one would expect that people in so-called high positions in the document communicating with each other would be acutely aware of the security risks associated with e-mail traffic - even more so with ordinary e-mail communication. She observed that that the writers(s) is/were attempting to convey a message in a naive way by repeating the full names of the so-called conspirators and by continuously including unnecessary detail.

From an academic point of view, she observed that the author(s) has/have little academic background and a bad command of both the English and Afrikaans languages. She found it highly unlikely that any of the people whose names were mentioned were in fact the authors. On a conceptual level the authors(s) "storyline" (or the real conspiracy) appears infantile and naïve. Seen within the frame of reference of the author, his/her style of writing and the inclusion of unnecessary details, he/she probably believes it lends plausibility and authenticity to the document. According to her, it would have been easy for the author to lend authenticity through the use of

more cryptic language and by using less exuberant and over-the top traits to the characters in his 'story'.

She further states that: "It is my opinion that there are two writers and probably another person who 'feeds' the writer(s) with information. The document reminds her of the way in which a 'soapie' is written for television - there is head author/writer, who provides the daily 'story-line' to different script writers. Reasons for this arises from the different writing styles, spelling and proficiency in English and Afrikaans.

1.2. Technical feasibility of the e-mails having been intercepted

1.2.1. Analysis of inconsistencies, incorrectness and spurious data

A reputable computer scientist studied the series of printed messages and chat sessions under consideration and in accordance with our request, his analysis focussed on whether or not the information presented to him represented authentic intercepted data communications, as would be expected to appear in a hardcopy of intercepted electronic mail and chat sessions. His findings are summarised below.

TERMINOLOGY USED

Angled brackets - only a single pair of angled brackets is required to delimit e-mail addresses. This is the format that e-mail clients and web mail applications use to submit e-mail address during the SMTP session.

Timestamps - these are in a standard format in the SMTP protocol. The e-mail client may render them differently. The format and consistency should however be the same.

Headers - the SMTP envelope includes information on the route traversed by the message. This data may be hidden by the e-mail client (even when printed) but is present nonetheless in the e-mail message. This is important information that cannot be easily faked (to appear authentic) and its absence in the evidence is curious, especially if the messages were intercepted.

Spurious Data - the concept of protocol encapsulation should be evident and strictly adhered to in the presented interceptions i.e. spurious data should be absent from the body of the messages. If the message is incorrectly received then a mail client would not correctly interpret it i.e. e-mail protocols work in a strict all-or-nothing fashion. Furthermore, spurious data preceding an e-mail message does not comply with the protocol encapsulation principle nor with the e-mail transfer protocol itself.

A. E-MAILS

1. Angle bracket inconsistencies

Numerous instances of multiple angled brackets were found, indicating that the e-mails were handcrafted as opposed to being intercepted. A comprehensive list of **angled bracket inconsistencies** is listed in annexure B.

2. Inconsistencies in timestamp formats and incorrectness

The **inconsistency in timestamp formats and incorrectness** lead him to conclude that the timestamps were not generated by a computer program and were handcrafted. A comprehensive list of inconsistencies and incorrectness are provided in annexure C.

3. Spurious data

He concluded that the **spurious data had been manually inserted into the e-mail messages**. The following table provides a comprehensive list of inconsistencies in terms of protocol encapsulation (spurious data occurrences):

Based on his observations and analysis of inconsistencies, incorrectness and spurious data, his concluding opinion on the e-mails is that they were not intercepted but were handcrafted. He found twelve instances of angle bracket inconsistencies, forty eight instances of time-stamp inconsistencies and seventeen instances of spurious (garbage) data occurrences in the allegedly intercepted e-mails.

B. CHAT SESSIONS

1. Header, timestamp and spurious data

He found that header, timestamp and spurious data issues repeat themselves throughout the evidence with a few exceptions. These inconsistencies and anomalies suggest hand crafted messages rather than the output of any computer program. The table included as annexure E provides a comprehensive list of inconsistencies and incorrectness identified in the chat sessions.

Based on the inconsistencies and incorrectness observed in terms of the time stamps, protocol encapsulation, chat logon/logoff protocols and the occurrence of spurious data, he held the opinion that the chat sessions were handcrafted and not a result of intercepted communications. He found thirteen instances each of timestamp inconsistencies and spurious data occurrences in the allegedly intercepted chat room sessions.

1.2.2. Confirmation of e-mail addresses displayed in the allegedly intercepted e-mails

Confirmation of mail addresses: messages sent by the by Cyber Unit of the SAPS to mail addresses bulelani@yahoo.com, sakim@safika.co.za and phumzile@yahoo.co.uk indicated that all three returned to the e-mail account from which it was sent (and which was specifically created for the purpose of this investigation procedure) as undelivered. Both e-mail addresses bulelani@yahoo.com and phumzile@yahoo.co.uk were returned as undelivered confirming that these accounts do not exist.

As part of his evaluation, the independent computer scientist utilised as part of the investigation reported his *finding in terms of domain names in e-mail addresses is that, in certain e-mail messages, reference is made to non-existent domains. In particular, these include yahoo.uk.com and laager.org.uk.* As such it can be concluded that the mail address joelN@yahoo.uk.com; nelg@P**^&%0)098 laager.org.uk; phumzile35@yahoo.uk.com and sakim33@yahoo.uk.com do not exist.

In the final analysis, practically all of the mail addresses utilised and displayed in the message headers of the allegedly intercepted e-mails do not exist and were poorly fabricated. The address sakim@safika.co.za may exist but could not have been utilised in the ‘intercepted’ communications as it was almost always used to communicate with a non-existent address. As a result of domain name deficiencies, ALL of the e-mails with disclosed e-mail addresses have false e-mail addresses and as a result could not have been transmitted and intercepted (12/13 e-mails with the 13th mail probably also having a non-existent domain name).

1.2.3. A forensic investigation of computers of participants

A forensic investigation of the laptop computers of two alleged e-mail participants found that NO e-mail communication took place between them on the respective dates and times referred to in the e-mail entitled 'Final Assault' on Monday the 15th of August 2005 purporting to represent a discussion between two individuals on the imminent raid at the Zuma residences. Although the examination of the computers of participants in the allegedly intercepted e-mails was able to discount the possibility that the computers examined were used to communicate such e-mails it must be recognised however that the forensic examination constituted limited value as e-mail communications are possible from any quarter with access to the internet, including internet cafés. Where such communications never existed - as is now evident under the circumstances - these examinations are a waste of valuable resources.

Our findings, taken as a whole serve to support our overall assertion that the allegedly intercepted e-mails were faked to resemble authentic e-mail and chat room communications of carefully selected targets.

2. Acquisition of the e-mails through an official NIA project

We have found that the fabricated e-mails were officially acquired by the NIA through an outsourcing arrangement for the interception of the e-mail communications of targets selected by the NIA. The acquisition of the allegedly intercepted e-mails was therefore an official NIA project whose end-products were underhandedly incorporated by the Director-General of the NIA, in part with a Political Intelligence gathering project, named Project Avani and also in a 'hidden hand, StratCom-like' project directed at the ruling party, the ANC.

3. Means of acquisition of the e-mails

Based on direct evidence, we have found that an Agent was contracted by the NIA to intercept the e-mails of targets or e-mail addresses associated with targets identified by the NIA and for which he was paid by the NIA (the primary agent or source of the NIA).

4. The source of the allegedly intercepted e-mails

The identity of the unregistered source has been established. The artefacts of e-mails and chat room sessions found on his computer through forensic investigation and cellular phone records point to fabrication not interception of e-mails. These artefacts associated him with them and demonstrated that he had once handled the fabricated e-mail and chat room conversations. These findings, read together with NIA records (which indicated that the agent was a primary source acting with sub-sources) therefore demonstrate that he is also the source (or one of the sources) of the fabricated e-mails.

The nature of information in his possession and which relate to the individuals and subjects of the e-mails, cellular phone records and personal notes together with common/systematic errors perpetrated by both him and the supposed participants in the e-mail conversations provide a significant degree of evidence that it was in fact him (with or without others) who also fabricated the e-mails (source and act of fabrication).

5. The allegedly intercepted e-mails were fabricated and could not have been transmitted via the World-Wide-Web

In the final analysis, our own evidence supported by independent expert opinion would suggest that the allegedly intercepted e-mails could not have been communicated or sent by the alleged participants. They were fabricated to resemble the electronic communications of carefully selected targets and to convey a contrived set of conspiracy projections - they are patently fraudulent.

PART 4

**ANNEXURE A
to
ANNEXURE E**

ANNEXURE A: ERRORS IN E-MAIL AND CHAT ROOM SESSION CONTENT

In the Final Assault - Death Knell packet [dated Wednesday the 20th of April 2005 at 19:41 and 20:24](#) between Macozoma and Netshitendze, Macozoma uses the subject heading: 'Final Assault' whilst Netshitendze replies under a different subject heading: "the Death Knell". While it is possible for a person to reply under a different subject heading, it would require the deletion and replacement of the heading prompted by the original under reply. This is rather unusual. It adds an element of scepticism to the 'interception' status of the packet and may indicate that the change in heading was motivated by a typographical choice of headings - and thus a fabricated and printed and not an electronically transmitted, intercepted and printed product.

Alleged e-mail packet 'The Zulu boy' - 1 between Macozoma and Mlambo-Ngcuka was identified as having a date irregularity where the original message is dated the [26th of April 2005](#) although the reply to the alleged original message is dated the [20th of April 2005](#). The time and minute intervals between the allegedly intercepted e-mails are normal and reasonable however, indicating that a typographical error may have been made with the dates. The date irregularity in this allegedly intercepted packet provides a further reason to believe that the allegedly intercepted packet was manufactured as opposed to being intercepted.

On the [12th of September 2005](#) under the allegedly intercepted e-mail packet bearing the heading "Motlantle question", Macozoma allegedly sent an original message at [11:18](#) to Mlambo-Ngcuka. Mlambo-Ngcuka's reply to the message is also at [11:18](#). This is indicative of the possibility of another typographical and human error in the course of the manufacturing of the allegedly intercepted e-mail.

The allegedly intercepted e-mail participants or targets may be stratified according to groups where each individual within a group is related by virtue of having communicated by allegedly intercepted e-mail or participating in allegedly intercepted chat-room discourse with at least one other individual in that group. Only one allegedly intercepted cross conversation or chat-room discussion was found between or across the groups, that being an alleged chat dated the [19th of October 2005](#) between G Nel, J Du Plooy (who belonged to the second group of so-called conspirators) and L MCarthy (who belonged to the first one), all of whom are employed at the DSO.

It is clear that the groups functioned independently of each other and comprised of many individuals. This notwithstanding, they seemed to continuously make the same mistakes in the manner in which they spelt the names of the main participants. The Director-General of the NIA, Mr B Masetlha is referred to as Masetla; the Secretary-General of the ANC, Mr Khalema Motlanthe is referred to as Motlantle and the Head of the Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS), Mr J Netshitenzhe is referred to as J Netshetendze. The Khampepe Commission is also referred to as Kamphepe Commission and McCarthy as MCarthy by both groups of 'conspirators'.

The prevalence of these unique errors in the text of each of these names in the online communications of a number of different individuals in both of the groups is no coincidence.

They provide a strong indication that the errors were made by a single person, in the process of fabricating text as part of faked intercepted e-mails and chat rooms, and were typographical in nature.

The alleged chat mail titled 'NIA and the Interception Act' dated the 4th of September 2005 between Tony Leon, Izak du Plooy and Gerrie Nel denotes a time stamp error in the header of the e-mail. The e-mail communication is recorded as starting at 14h50 and ending at 15h430. The end-time of the communication includes an additional digit. An error of this nature cannot be computer generated and is attributable to the human factor in the form of a typographical error and strongly implies that the chat mail was manufactured.

A chat room between Saki Macozoma, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and Vusi Pilkoli is dated and reflected as commencing Sunday the 19th of September 2005 at 19:45 and terminating at 20:15. The termination date of the chat is Sunday the 18th of September 2005 - the previous day. The 19th of September 2005 is actually a Monday and the 18th of September 2005 a Sunday. The chat appears to represent a chat of Sunday the 18th of September 2005.

Once again, an error of this nature cannot be computer generated and is attributable to the human factor in the form of a typographical error and implies that the affected chat room was handcrafted.

In a chat room dated the 2nd of October 2005 between Gen Roos, I du Plooy, J du Plooy and Gerrie Nel, two contradictory start times appear on the face of the mail. The conversation start time appears to be 10:01 and is immediately followed by another start time of 08:01. This repetition can only be attributed to a typographical error when the mail was fabricated.

An alleged chat room discussion took place between Tony Leon, Gen Roos, A and J du Plooy, Antony Harber, Matthew Bucland and Gerrie Nel on the subject of 'The Future of Scorpions' and commenced Tuesday the 11th of October 2004 at 19:40 and terminated on the same day at 20:10. A typographic error is evident in the date where 2004 is reflected as the year of the e-mail when in actual fact 2005 ought to have been reflected.

An error of this nature cannot be computer generated and is attributable to the human factor in the form of a typographical error and implies that the affected chat room was manufactured.

An e-mail packet of 4 mail exchanges between Trevor Manuel and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka dated Saturday the 15th of October 2005 at 06:09, 06:14, 06:09 and 06:14 (in sequence) reflects a time irregularity which can only be attributed to a typographic error occasioned by the human factor in the course of manufacturing the e-mails.

ANNEXURE B: E-MAILS, ANGLE BRACKET INCONSISTENCIES

E-mail	Inconsistency
6-1	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket.
6-2	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket.
6-3	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket
7-1	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket
7-2	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket
7-3	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket
7-4	joelN - Single opening bracket. Double closing bracket
8-1	Saki - No e-mail address displayed
pp10 - 29	No e-mail addresses displayed
p30	Angled brackets present. E-mail addresses blanked out.
pp37-38	Multiple angled brackets. Bad domain.
pp53-59	No e-mail addresses displayed

ANNEXURE C: E-MAILS, TIMESTAMP INCONSISTENCIES

E-mail	Sender/Recipient	Inconsistency/Incorrectness
1-1	Macozoma/Ngcuka	Too many commas. Time in 24 hour format but PM indicator is present.
1-2	Ngcuka/Macozoma	Too many commas. Time in 24 hour format but PM indicator is present.
1-3	Macozoma/Ngcuka	Too many commas. Time in 24 hour format but PM indicator is present.
2-1	Ngcuka/Macozoma	No space between Time and PM indicator. Time in 24 hour format but PM indicator is present.
4-1	Mlambo-Ngcuka/Macozoma	Time in 24 hour format
4-2	Macozoma/Mlambo-Ngcuka	Time in 12 hour format. Date out of sync. Formatting is different from 4-1
4-3	Mlambo-Ngcuka/Macozoma	Same as 4-1
5-1	Macozoma/Mlambo-Ngcuka	Same issue as 4-2
6-1	Macozoma/Netshitendze	Correct 24 hour time format. No space between comma and year
6-2	Netshitendze/Macozoma	Same as 6-1
6-3	Macozoma/ Netshitendze	Same as 6-1
p7	Macozoma ← → Netshitendze	Same as p6
8-1	Ngcuka/Macozoma	New format. Commas shifted around. 24 hour format but PM present
8-2	Macozoma/Ngcuka	Similar to 8-1 but lacking a comma
p9	Macozoma ← → Mlambo-Ngcuka	Dates out of sync
10-1	Leon/Harber	New format. No year displayed. 12 hour format. Short form for day of week
10-2	Harber/Leon	Same as 10-1 but day of week in long form
10-3	Leon/Harber	Same as 10-2
11-1	Buckland/Leon	Same as 10-2
11-2	Leon/Buckland	Same as 11-1 but AM indicator is in small caps
13-1	Leon/Buckland	No year displayed. 12 hour time format
14-1	Pikoli/Chikane	No year displayed.
14-2	Chikane/Pikoli	Same as 14-1, but no white space between

		time an PM.
14-3	Pikoli/Chikane	Same as 14-2
14-4	Chikane/Pikoli	Same as 14-1
19-1	Nel/Roos	No year displayed. 24 hour format with PM indicator
19-2	Roos/Nel	Same as 19-1
19-3	Nel/Roos	Same as 19-2 but lacking white space between time and PM
22-1	Macozoma/Pikoli	No year displayed. 24 hour format with PM indicator.
22-2	Pikoli/Macozoma	Same as 22-1 but with white space between time and PM
22-3	Macozoma/Pikoli	Same as 22-2
22-4	Pikoli/Macozoma	Same as 22-2
p24	Vundla ← → Macozoma	All the same. No year displayed. Time in correct 12 hour format.
pp26 - 29	Pikoli ← → Macozoma	All the same. No year displayed. Time in correct 12 hour format.
p30	Macozoma ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	All the same. No year displayed. Time in correct 12 hour format.
37-1	Nel/Roos	No year displayed. 24 hour format with PM indicator.
37-2	Roos/Nel	Same as 37-1
37-3	Nel/Roos	Same as 37-1
37-4	Roos/Nel	Same as 37-1
37-5	Nel/Roos	Same as 37-1 but with a white space between time and PM indicator
38-1	Roos/Nel	Same as 37-5
pp51-52	Macozoma ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	All the same. Correct 12 hour time format
p53	Macozoma ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	All the same. No year displayed. Correct 12 hour time format.
54-1	Pikoli/Macozoma	Same as p53 but with white space between time and PM indicator
pp60-61	Macozoma ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	Same as pp51-52
p62	Manuel ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	All the same. 12 hour time format, no white space between time and AM indicator.
pp64-65	Kasrils ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	Same as p62.
p74	Macozoma ← → Mlambo- Ngcuka	All the same. 12 hour time format.

ANNEXURE D: E-MAILS, SPURIOUS DATA

E-mail	Sender/Receiver	Spurious Data
p10	Leon ← → Harber	Garbage ahead of e-mail 10-1.
p14	Chikane ← → Pikoli	Garbage ahead of each e-mail. 14-2 implies decryption
18-1	Roos/Nel	Garbage ahead of e-mail header. Spurious data in e-mail body
19-2	Roos/Nel	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
19-3	Nel/Roos	Garbage ahead of e-mail header. Spurious data in e-mail body
26-2	Macozoma/Pikoli	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
26-3	Pikoli/Macozoma	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
27-1	Macozoma/Pikoli	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
28-2	Macozoma/Pikoli	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
28-3	Pikoli/Macozoma	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
29-3	Macozoma/Pikoli	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
37-3	Nel/Roos	Spurious data in e-mail body.
37-5	Nel/Roos	Garbage in header. Spurious data in e-mail body
38-1	Roos/Nel	Garbage in header. Spurious data in e-mail body
53-2	Pikoli/Macozoma	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
53-3	Macozoma/Pikoli	Garbage ahead of e-mail header
54-1	Pikoli/Macozoma	Garbage ahead of e-mail header

ANNEXURE E: CHAT SESSION INCONSISTENCIES

Page Number	Participants/Group [Initiator]	OS	Timestamp Issue	Spurious Data
12	Leon/du Plooy et al [Leon]	Microsoft	Non matching start and end timestamps	No
15	Leon/du Plooy et al [Leon]	Microsoft	Non matching start and end timestamps	No
16	Leon/Nel et al [Leon]	Microsoft	Matching start and end timestamps. No year provided	Yes
20	Leon/Nel et al [Leon]	Microsoft	Start timestamp has year info.	Yes
31	Macozoma/Mlambo-Ngcuka et al [Macozoma]	Unknown	Non matching start and end timestamps	Yes
34	Macozoma/Mlambo-Ngcuka et al [Macozoma]	Unknown yAHOO mentioned	Non matching timestamps. End timestamp is all uppercase.	Yes. End session data in middle of chat
39	Nel/du Plooy et al [Nel]	Microsoft	Non matching timestamps. Missing comma in end timestamp.	Yes
40	Macozoma/Mlambo-Ngcuka et al [Macozoma]	Unknown yAHOO mentioned	Matching timestamps. Well formatted	Yes
44	Mlambo-Ngcuka/Macozoma [Mlambo-Mgcuka]	Unknown yAHOO mentioned	Non matching timestamps. End timestamp is all uppercase.	No
45	Nel/du Plooy et al [Nel]	Microsoft	Matching timestamps	Yes
47	Nel/ Roos et al [Nel]	Microsoft	Matching timestamps. Different fonts.	No
49	Nel/du Plooy [Nel]	Microsoft	Matching timestamps. Different from p47.	Yes
55	Leon/ Roos et al [Leon]	Linux	Matching timestamps. Dates are incorrect.	Yes
66	Mcarthy/Kasrils [Mcarthy]	Linux	Non matching timestamps	Yes
68	Mcarthy/Nel et al [Mcarthy]	Linux	Matching timestamps	Yes

70	Kasrils/Mcarthy et al [Kasrils]	Linux	Matching timestamps.	Yes
72	Mcarthy/Kasrils et al [Mcarthy]	Linux	Matching timestamps, similar to p70.	Yes