FOREWORD BY THE MINISTER

Foreword:

(L.N. SISULU)
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY VETERANS
FOREWORD BY THE CHAIRPERSON

Foreword:

(R. MEYER)
CHAIRPERSON OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE
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**LEVEL OF DEFENCE EFFORT**

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**Partners Further Afield**
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11 CROSS-CUTTING DEFENCE SUPPORT INTERVENTIONS

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<td>PFMA</td>
<td>Public Finance Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI</td>
<td>Population Health Improvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJeVOC</td>
<td>Provincial Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMC</td>
<td>Reserve Management Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSTEDFILT(B)</td>
<td>Personnel, Organisation, Sustainment, Training, Equipment, Doctrine, Facilities, Information, Leadership, Technology and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organisations</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Brigade</td>
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<td>SAMATT</td>
<td>South African Military Advisory and Training Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<td>SASAR</td>
<td>South African Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAMP</td>
<td>Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPA</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Public Accounts</td>
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<td>SCOSCA</td>
<td>Select Committee on Constitutional and Security Affairs</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Special Defence Account</td>
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<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea</td>
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<td>Shared Situational Awareness</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Air Vehicle</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>UN Convention on the Law of the Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS TO BE ADDED
1. On 04 May 2010, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans delivered her budget speech in Parliament. During this speech she gave specific direction concerning the development of a future defence policy framework:

“Major changes, both dramatic and evolutionary, have taken place in the defence environment over the past 15 years. The policy review and strategy would of necessity take this into consideration and will be informed by a clear-eyed assessment of what we want our foreign policy to achieve, the potential threats facing us, and socio-economic interests in what is a very uncertain era of growing competition among new major powers. The new environment requires new thinking and new approaches. To this end, we remain committed to creating a dependable, agile and flexible Human Capital base in the defence force.

We had a Defence Workshop from 19 to 21 March 2010 to review the work done in this respect and are of the view that we need to give this added impetus. It will enable long term planning in terms of force levels, force structure and equipment needs.

For the SANDF and particular the SA Army to remain successful, it will have to take into account the complexities of African politics. The size of the continent, its geographic and climate complexity, as well as the lack of transport infrastructure, problems engendered by economic under-development and the diverse military challenges it may encounter, will necessitate the SANDF to be well and appropriately equipped and trained for both its external and internal roles as prescribed by the Constitution.”

2. In response to the above requirement, work continued towards the development of a new policy and strategy for Defence, and in her budget speech of 13 April 2011, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans stated:

“We promised to deal with a number of issues of policy review and we have done that. The long overdue Defence Review is here. We have a (departmental discussion document) draft that we would like to present to the Parliamentary Committees at their earliest opportunity. Thereafter we would like to embark on a public consultative process before we submit the final Defence Review to Parliament.”

3. Consequently, the Minister constituted a Defence Review Committee whose mandate it was to both prepare a consultative document and engage in a comprehensive public consultation process with key stakeholders, interested parties and civil society. The Defence Review Committee met for the first time at the Castle of Good Hope on 14 July 2011 at which the Minister provided the Committee with its Mandate and Terms of Reference. The Minister of Defence stated that the compiled Defence Review is required to provide:
CONSULTATIVE DRAFT

4. The Minister of Defence further required the Defence Review to address the following key considerations:
   a. The primary objective of the National Defence Force arising from Constitutional imperatives and the defence statutory framework.
   b. Government priorities, including the Medium Term Strategic Framework and the developmental agenda.
   c. The strategic security environment, trends and predictions, and emerging sources of insecurity.
   d. The defence contribution to national security and an expression of South Africa’s national interests.
   e. The defence contribution to South Africa’s international relations policy, international relations strategy and international obligations.
   f. Recent international experiences in defence policy making and the lessons that can be extracted from these.
   g. Defence expenditure within the context of South Africa’s fiscal policy and framework.
   h. The nature and scope of the South African defence industry, its products and its strategic domestic and international partners.
   i. The manufacture, marketing, sale, export and transit of South African armament and related goods and services.

5. The Minister of Defence tasked the Defence Review Committee to reflect on the following critical questions in its deliberations:
   a. What place does South Africa occupy in the world, on the African continent and in the Southern African region?
   b. What does the Southern African region and the African continent expect of South Africa?
   c. What is the nature of the Defence Force that South Africans want?
   d. What should Government’s defence commitment be?
   e. What should South Africa’s future defence posture be?
f. What state of readiness, and what capabilities and force levels, are required to meet present and future defence commitments?

g. What should be the high-level defence doctrine and on what should it be based?

h. What is the ideal relative size of Regulars and Reserves in the Defence Force?

i. What is the required Defence Force culture?

j. What is the nature of the Defence Industry required to support the future Defence Force?

WHY A NEW DEFENCE REVIEW?

6. The 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review were seminal documents negotiated with the wider South African public, including three consultative conferences held within the august confines of Parliament. The key focus thereof was, however, the political transition from Apartheid to a democratic South Africa and the concomitant integration of diverse statutory and non-statutory armed forces into a single Defence Force.

GROWING REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

7. After almost a decade and a half there are new challenges and new opportunities. South Africa’s political and economic integration into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) has led to greater involvement on the continent, not least of which has been a vibrant engagement of the newly established regional and continental security architecture, including the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

8. South Africa’s strategic environment in some reasonably fluid. However, some regional and continental challenges have become evident. Internationally, non-traditional security threats, non-state actors and non-conventional manifestations of insecurity and instability characterise the contemporary environment, with greater propensity for international intervention in conflict areas. Africa has not been immune to these dynamics which are apparent in the so called “new scramble for Africa”.

9. The United Nations (UN) has become more assertive in African peacekeeping. There has also been the conviction that regional and sub-regional organisations must take more responsibility for managing the conflict in their neighbourhoods. This implies a greater role for the AU and SADC in managing regional conflict, in which South Africa is expected to play a significant role.

10. Threats to global peace and security are often expressed according to the perceptions and assessments of the powerful nations. Given the space occupied by the powerful in determining the central and principal threats faced by humanity, acts of terror and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are currently considered to be the primary sources of global insecurity. South Africa acknowledges such threats to global security. However, factors of insecurity such as underdevelopment, poverty, access to vital resources, the spread of diseases and environmental security, are more crucial for Southern Africa and the developing world.
11. There has been the concurrent commitment of South African forces to peace missions across the continent, commencing in 1998 with over 1,000 troops bilaterally deployed to assist with post conflict reform in Burundi. This has grown to the extent that South Africa became the 10th largest troop contributor to United Nations peace missions – a far cry from the deployment of a mere one battalion that was envisaged in 1998. Africa, together with key international partners, is definitely taking responsibility for its own security.

12. Figure 1, reflecting the size of the African continent in relation to other states, illustrates the physical magnitude of African regional and sub-regional responsibilities.

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1 Open source diagram from Creative Commons. No rights reserved.
13. Whereas Figure 1 demonstrates complexity due to the relative size of Africa when compared to other countries, Figure 2 illustrates the fragmentation that arose from the former colonisation of Africa.

![Colonisation of Africa as at 1930](image)

*Figure 2: Colonisation of Africa as at 1930*

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GROWING DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY

14. The internal role of the Defence Force has also progressively changed since 1998. Cabinet initially withdrew the Defence Force from supporting the Police Service in border safeguarding and routine safety and security operations. Consequently, the Army Territorial Reserve Units (Commandos) were progressively phased out and disbanded and the light infantry units were withdrawn from the borders and transited into the motorised infantry role.

15. During 2010, Cabinet directed the return of the Defence Force to border duties and to take primary responsibility for border safeguarding - land, air and maritime borders. This has significant implications for defence due to the extent of these borders:

   a. South Africa’s land area of 1,219,090 km\(^2\) has 4,471 km of land border, requires the sustained deployment of significant numbers of Army units, light aircraft and helicopters.

   b. South Africa’s 1,219,090 km\(^2\) land area has an air border of 7,660 km requiring surveillance and control by electronic sensors and air and land reaction forces to counter illegal intrusion.

   c. South Africa’s coastline of about 3,924 km at the high water line and an economic exclusive zone of 1,553,000 km\(^2\), of which both Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474,400 km\(^2\), require sustained air and maritime patrols.

16. Domestically, the priorities of Government are keenly focussed on addressing the needs of our people, especially the rolling back of poverty and the creation of conditions conducive to economic growth and social development. From the early days of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in the early 1990s to the current Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) there has been consistent policy intent concerning the role of the State in meeting the development needs of our people. Consequently, the role of the Defence Force in a developmental state also needs to be expressed in policy alongside the traditional functions of defence. This should not detract the Defence Force from its mandated functions, but should express both how the execution of its mandated functions and other specific initiatives will contribute to the development of our people. Great care must be taken to ensure sound civil-military control.

17. It can be concluded that:

   a. The global shift in focus of threats and sources of insecurity has necessitated a review of defence and security policies worldwide. South Africa is not immune to this and must clearly contextualise the defence contribution to national security, with particular emphasis on achieving national goals and defending vital interests.

   b. Regional and continental socio-economic integration is the foundation for Africa’s socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for South Africa’s own prosperity and security.

   c. South Africa’s national security strategy, foreign policy and defence policy cannot be viewed in isolation. There is a clear relational linkage between them. South Africa’s domestic security is inextricably linked to that of regional security, and vice versa. The struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with the pursuit of a better Africa in a better world.
d. South Africa's destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region.

e. Africa is at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa must therefore continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa. Peace, stability and security are essential preconditions for development. South Africa must consequently continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction.

f. South Africa’s growing peacekeeping commitment on the African continent has compelled the need to re-examine and reprioritise defence roles and functions accordingly in pursuit of the “African Agenda”.

g. The significant responsibility to properly safeguard South Africa’s vast land, air and maritime borders requires a fresh look at the methods of doing so and the defence capabilities required.

h. Defence will be called upon, both through its collateral capabilities and also through dedicated initiatives, to deepen its contribution to the developmental agenda of the State.

18. The above requires a sober-eyed assessment of what the role of Defence is in national security, regional security and the regional and continental role South Africa wishes to play. The examination of what is required of Defence also requires an assessment of what defence capabilities are required to achieve this.

19. It is clear that the current defence capabilities are not adequate. The assumptions against which the 1998 Defence Review Force Design was constructed quickly became invalid. The selected force design was never attained and remained out of reach within a dwindling defence budget.

WHAT IS THE DEFENCE REVIEW?

20. Chuter\textsuperscript{3} indicates that "national security policy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s strategic goals". Chuter concomitantly indicates that "defence policy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the defence sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s security policy goals".

21. Chuter identifies the inseparable linkage between national security policy, foreign policy and defence policy by stating that: "Defence Forces exist primarily to underpin the domestic and foreign policies of a state" and correctly positions defence policy as: "a national-level policy which fits into a policy hierarchy, converting government security policy objectives into orientations and tasks for defence, projecting a policy with a coherent set of aims and objectives and supported by the appropriate human and material resources to put them into practice". This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.

\textsuperscript{3} Presentation by Dr David Chuter, an independent security analyst, on 24 November 2011 at the Minister's inaugural "Defence Review Public Engagement Seminar".
22. Defence policy is thus understood as that body of public policy that a government pronounces as its guidelines for the defence objectives and functions of its armed forces. To this end, defence policy defines the defence or military scope of national security, the strategic posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances, and security institutions or mechanisms (both national and international) that govern the utilisation of a country’s defence force. The national defence policy also clearly identifies the possible threats to a country’s national security, its society, economy, territory and environment, and provides options to government on how the defence force should deal with such threats.

23. In essence, national defence policy defines the strategic intent of government regarding Defence, including the utilisation of the defence force. Therefore, a country’s defence policy, given these characteristic features, must be subjected to periodic review and update so as to reflect on factors that have constituted a change to Government’s guidelines to the defence function.

24. The Defence Review is not a prediction of the future. The Defence Review recognises that the future remains uncertain and unpredictable and thus defence capabilities must be sufficiently robust to respond to a number of plausible deviations from the expected defence trajectory. Faced with persistent troubled peace and an uncertain future, an analysis of possible contingencies can only be based on an assessment of the key characteristics and trends of the security environment and the trajectories along which the security environment could develop. There is, however, no guarantee that the future will develop along that trajectory and thus defence planning should be robust enough to allow for some deviation from the baseline, but cannot be completely unconstrained.
25. The Defence Review posits the defence ways and means to deliver on national security priorities. It indicates where effort must be directed and where resources must be focussed. It expresses itself on what further policies and strategies are required, and sets a clear target for the defence capabilities that are to be established over the next 30 years and charts a course for getting there. As illustrated in Figure 4, thus the Defence Review seeks to:

a. Firstly, set a long term policy and strategy agenda for Defence that will set the stage for the next thirty years of defence effort. This does not mean that the Defence Review will not be reviewed and augmented in the next decade, but that it provides a stable base against which long term plans can be set and budgets aligned with its intent.

b. Secondly, be reasonably comprehensive and detailed by engaging defence matters at a strategic level without digressing into the operational and tactical level of debate.

c. Thirdly, pronounce sufficiently on the continuum of policy, strategy, structure and force design needed to set a stable long term defence planning agenda.

d. Fourthly, express high level defence doctrine.

e. Fifthly, requires the Defence Force to unpack the Defence Review into concrete long-term plans and programmes.

Figure 4: Focal Points of the Defence Review

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4 The 1998 Defence Review, due mainly to its limited focus on the matters of integration and transformation, did not deal with the full spectrum of policy, strategy and design.
26. All governments face similar questions when attempting to identify their national defence needs, force requirements and resources. These questions (Figure 5) are summarised as:

a. What are the nature and characteristics of security and defence environment?

b. What position does the country aspire to and what is the consequent defence role?

c. What must Defence be able to do at a stretch and what should Defence not do?

d. What are the resources that are available to Defence?

e. How is balance achieved between standing commitments and contingent commitments, especially the funding thereof?

f. How should Defence be structured, organised and equipped to best fulfil requirements within resource constraints?

Figure 5: Factors to be considered in the Policy Review
27. In determining the future South African Defence Policy Framework, a number of factors have been studied (Figure 6), namely: the national security objectives, foreign policy objectives, national interests and the geo-strategic trends in the strategic environment. While the future is inevitably shrouded in uncertainty, it is impossible to plan defence capabilities without constructing some idea of how the future might develop.

![Figure 6: Key Questions for the Defence Review](image)

28. The oft-stated ideal of defence planning is to develop and maintain an appropriate, affordable and adequately balanced defence force. However, these terms require qualification.

a. Balance is a multi-dimensional concept, comprising external and internal factors within and between defence capabilities, both current and future.

b. Affordability, likewise, can only be measured relative to both a specified affordability baseline (the known defence allocation) and the level of defence ambition. The highest level expression of balance is thus the balance between South Africa’s national interests and ambitions, the defence capabilities required to support these and consequent alignment of the defence allocation.

c. If the strategic environment should change radically, national ambitions, defence planning and the defence allocation would have to be revised or, if the disruption is severe enough, completely re-planned.
DEVELOPING THE FUTURE DEFENCE POLICY

29. The Defence Review takes its lead from the national security construct, national posture and national interests. This is augmented by South Africa’s foreign policy obligations and aspirations. The Defence Review unpacks the Constitution and other Statutes, establishes fundamental principles and tenets and cascades these to a future-orientated, concept driven, effects-based defence policy and strategy.

30. This effects-based approach examines what defence and other national capabilities must be applied to realise strategic outcomes in peace, conflict and war. The effects-based approach posits the clear and unambiguous future mission, goals and tasks for Defence.

31. The Defence Review adopts a very straightforward internal logic (Figure 7). This is comprised of:

   a. An understanding of the South African State, its people, its systems and geography and posits the unique challenges facing South Africa as a Developmental State.

   b. An understanding of the global, continental, regional and domestic security environments and some of the implications thereof for South Africa. The future spectrum of conflict is posited, expressing a range of contingencies which may arise.

   c. Contemporary defence expenditure is unpacked at the global, continent and regional levels.

   d. The emergent national security strategy is expressed as a construct and the national interests and vital interests of South Africa are posited. This culminates in five strategic national security effects which must be pursued by all forms of national power in South Africa.

   e. The Defence Mandate emanating from the Constitution and other Statutes is unpacked into a Defence Mission, Strategic Goals and Key Defence Tasks. Each task is expressed in terms of its defence effect.

   f. Force design guidelines are given, concomitant supporting defence concepts posited and high-order defence capabilities expressed.

   g. The Defence Mandate, Mission, Strategic Goals and Tasks are systematically unpacked to determine the scale of defence effort required for each and the concomitant defence capability requirements. This scale of effort will remain the fundamental basis for the development of the force design. Many countries would describe the scale of defence effort as the “level of defence ambition”.

   h. The future defence organisation is posited, ranging from the key tenets for the Ministry of Defence and the repositioning of the Defence Secretariat to that of the command and staff arrangements for the Defence Force.

   i. Lastly, the fundamentals of the future defence and procurement strategies are provided, the focus areas and strategic and niche areas identified and the future positioning of the defence industry is discussed.
32. The Defence Review is predicated on the following principles:

a. The Defence Force will strive to be seen as a representative and trusted non-partisan national asset. The Defence Force will be respected by the people of South Africa and the international community for the standard of military professionalism it cultivates and maintains.
b. The Defence Force will adhere to sound civil control and robust legislative oversight. The Defence Force will be fully compliant with national and international law, and specifically International Humanitarian Law, statute, national policy and regulatory frameworks. Due cognisance will be given to the unique nature of the Defence Force relative to the public service.

c. Strategically the Defence Force will adopt a defensive posture but will maintain offensive operational capabilities. The defence mandate, mission, goals and tasks will be focussed on the attainment of national strategic effects. The resource allocation to Defence will therefore be quantified to ensure that the appropriate combat readiness, mission levels and contingencies are sustained.

d. The Defence Force will be maintained as a balanced modern, flexible, technologically advanced force supported by a singular overarching information technology infrastructure. The Defence Force will be appropriately equipped to execute successful operations across the spectrum of conflict. The Defence Force will be multi-role trained with all capabilities embedded with firepower, protection, manoeuvre, sustainment and intelligence.

e. Leadership and professionalism will be the cornerstone of strategic, operational and tactical success. Defence Force members will be skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined professionals imbued with a high level of morale and sense of duty. Similarly, they will be led by exemplary, competent, ethical and dynamic leaders. Mission Command will be the leadership philosophy.

f. The Defence Force will be organised into combat formations and there will be clear distinction between command and staff functions. Command lines will be clear and unambiguous. Commanders will have the required delegations and be held accountable and responsible for and have commensurate authority over all resources allocated for the execution of their assigned mandates.

g. As an important pillar of the South African state, the Defence Force will contribute to national development primarily by creating the security conditions necessary for development to take place, and secondly through specific interventions as may be required from time-to-time to meet national priorities. The Defence Force is further the provider of last resort during times of national disaster, national emergency or civil turbulence.
INTRODUCTION

1. South Africa is a very diverse country in many respects. Geographically it is positioned at the southern tip of Africa between the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Indian Ocean to the east. Topographically it has an extensive coastline with mountain ranges separating the southern and eastern coastal plains from the interior plateau. It contains large areas of arid semi-desert to savannah in the north-west to sub-tropical vegetation and tropical vegetation in the south-east and north-east of the country.

2. Demographically South Africa comprises four major race groupings that speak one or more of the eleven official languages. Over the last 15 years the English language has become the most common language for correspondence by the government, the public and business communities alike.

3. South Africa has by far the largest and most sophisticated economy on the African continent. South Africa has the 28th largest gross domestic product in the world and has been ranked as the 22nd largest importer and 26th largest exporter. More than 50% of the economy is trade related with mining, manufacturing, services and to a lesser degree agriculture as the mainstays of the economy. For the most part, all nine provinces have economies that are larger than most African States with the Gauteng province lying in third place to Egypt and Algeria. The bulk of exports and imports are transported via sea lines of communication with the Port of Durban as one of the busiest in the Southern Hemisphere.

FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL SYSTEM

FORM OF GOVERNMENT

4. South Africa is a constitutional democracy comprising a parliamentary republic. Unlike most parliamentary republics, the positions of head of state and head of government are merged in a parliament-dependent President. The President is thus the Head of State, Head of the Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.

5. South Africa has a bicameral Parliament consisting of:

   a. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which has 90 seats with 10 members elected by each of the nine provincial legislatures for five-year terms. The NCOP has special powers to protect regional interests and safeguard cultural and linguistic traditions.
b. The National Assembly, which has 400 seats with members elected by popular vote under a system of proportional representation to serve five-year terms. This is achieved through a system of party-list proportional representation.

6. After each parliamentary election, the National Assembly elects one of its members as President; hence the President serves a term of office the same as that of the Assembly, normally five years. No President may serve more than two terms in office. The President appoints a Deputy President and Ministers, who form the Cabinet. The President and the Cabinet may be removed by the National Assembly by a motion of no confidence.

7. South Africa has three capital cities: Cape Town is the seat of Parliament and legislative capital; Pretoria is the seat of the President and Cabinet and administrative capital; and Bloemfontein is the seat of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the judicial capital.

LEGAL SYSTEM

8. South Africa has a mixed legal system of Roman-Dutch common law, English commercial law, and customary law. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is the supreme law of the Republic and provides the foundation for the rule of law. The Constitution entrenches a comprehensive set of inalienable rights. These rights include inter alia the right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law; to be treated with dignity and respect; to freedom and security of the person; to freedom of religion, belief and opinion; to freedom of expression; freedom of association; and to peacefully demonstrate.

9. South Africa has an independent judiciary and enjoys the rule of law. Chapter 8 of the Constitution defines the structure of the South African judicial system. This chapter also guarantees the independence of the courts and requires other organs of the state to assist and protect the courts in order to ensure their "independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness". In addition, Chapter 2 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to have a dispute or trial heard by a fair, impartial and independent court. Courts comprise the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, High Courts, Magistrates Courts, and other courts established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament. The Magistrates' Courts, hear lesser criminal cases and smaller civil cases; the High Courts are courts of general jurisdiction for specific areas; the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court in all but constitutional matters; the Constitutional Court hears only constitutional matters.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

10. South Africa has adopted a multi-party constitutional democracy system of government. A combination of proportional and constituency representation is used. The National and Provincial electoral systems are based on proportional representation, whilst local elections combine both a proportional representation with a ward representation.

11. Politically South Africa has been a constitutional democracy since 1994.
12. South Africa is classified as a middle-income, emerging economy, affluent in natural resources with well-developed legal, communications, financial, and energy and transport sectors. Agriculture contributes 9% to the gross domestic product, with industry and services contributing 26% and 65% respectively. South Africa has the 18th largest stock exchange in the world. Compared to the rest of the world, however, South Africa is ranked 128th in its economic growth.

13. The Rand is the most actively traded emerging market currency in the world and belongs to a distinguished group of 15 currencies that form the continuous linked settlement system, where foreign currency transactions are settled immediately, lowering the risk of transacting over time zones.

14. South Africa holds a prominent strategic position in the world economy with the 28th highest gross domestic product. The growth in the economy in recent times has been dramatically reduced on the back of the economic challenges faced by South Africa’s main trading partners. The economy is, however, expected to have a medium term growth trajectory of 4% and a long term 40 year growth average of 5%. South Africa has a relatively small domestic customer base and economic growth is largely reliant on a growth in the exportation of goods and services.

15. On the downside, unemployment continues to remain at unacceptably high levels in excess of 25% and despite government initiatives, is barely decreasing. Domestically 33% of the labour force is employed in the informal economy which traditionally is the sector that evades taxation and circumvents labour legislation. This informal sector has grown in excess of 7% in recent times. Analysis suggests that the formal labour market is threatened by the high levels of illegal immigrants from neighbouring African countries.

16. South Africa’s economic infrastructure includes ten international airports and eight international seaports. These ports provide excellent connections for international travel and trade. The number of containers moving via land, sea and air continues to grow year on year.

17. South Africa’s global economic strategy remains focussed on Africa and a strong developmental agenda. The value of trade in the SADC region has increased substantially over the last decade and constitutes the bulk of trade in the African continent. Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia are South Africa’s largest trade partners in Africa.

18. South Africa has recently joined the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) economic alliance, positioning itself for new trade growth and market access into the future. The trade, development and cooperation agreement with the European Union is pivotal to economic development as well as contributing to South Africa’s reconstruction and development agenda.

19. Germany, USA, Japan, UK, Italy, China, and Switzerland are amongst the top ten export destinations. In South America, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Peru are the major trading partners.

20. Trade with members of the South East Asian Nations has provided South Africa with a potential market of 520 million people and a 39% growth in exports to the region.

21. It is expected that Government will continue with financial repair and reform to ensure sound economic fundamentals to support sustained growth.
22. South Africa is a medium sized coastal state and has a land surface of 1 219 090 km², situated on the southern tip of Africa. Only 11% of this area is classified as arable. The coastline as measured at the high water line is 3 924 km and the air border is 7 660 km in extent. South Africa shares land borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho totalling 4 471 km. Marion Island and Prince Edward Island are 298 km² and 47 km² in extent with coast lines of 134 km and 32 km respectively.

23. South Africa has an economic exclusive zone of 1 553 000 km² of which the areas around Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474 400 km². The Atlantic Ocean borders the west coast, the Indian Ocean borders the east and south coast and the Southern Ocean surrounds Marion and Prince Edward Islands. South Africa has tabled its claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the extension of the continental shelf for the purpose of securing additional resources. This implies that South Africa will have to exercise control and enforce state authority over 4 340 000 km² of maritime territory.

24. Like much of the eastern part of the African continent, South Africa’s landscape is dominated by a high plateau in the interior, surrounded by a narrow strip of coastal lowlands. Unlike most of Africa, however, the perimeter of South Africa’s inland plateau rises abruptly to form a series of mountain ranges before dropping to sea level. These mountains, known as the Great Escarpment, vary between 2,000 meters and 3,300 meters in elevation. The coastline is fairly regular and has few natural harbours. Each of the dominant land features, the inland plateau, the encircling mountain ranges, and the coastal lowlands, exhibits a wide range of variation in topography and in natural resources (vegetation?).

25. South Africa’s climatic conditions generally range from Mediterranean in the south-western corner of South Africa to temperate in the interior plateau, and subtropical in the north-east. A small area in the north-west has a desert climate. Most of the country has warm, sunny days and cool nights. Rainfall generally occurs during summer (November through March), although in the south-west, around Cape Town, rainfall occurs in winter (June to August). Temperatures are influenced by variations in elevation, terrain, and ocean currents more than latitude.

26. The approximately 49 million population of South Africa consists of about 80% black (African) and 10% white (European), with about 9% people of mixed white and black descent (formerly called “Coloured”), and a small minority of South and East Asian background. Ten to fifteen percent of the population may be illegal immigrants.

27. South Africa has 11 official languages, nine of which are indigenous - Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele, Pedi, and Tsonga. Many African people also speak Afrikaans (the first language of about 60% of the whites and the majority of those of mixed race) or English (the first language of most of the rest of the non-Africans). About 80% of the population is Christian; major groups include the Zionist, Pentecostal, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Dutch Reformed, and Anglican churches. There are small minorities of Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and followers of traditional African religions.
28. Demographically, South Africa is a 'young country' with a disproportionate youth bulge - two-thirds of the population is under the age of 35 and one-third is under the age of 15. However, South Africa is expected to experience some significant changes over the next 20 years due to a slowing of the population growth rate with declining fertility rates and the impact of HIV/AIDS. A negative population growth rate is forecast from 2040 onwards. Increasing sex ratios of male to female and higher female mortality due to AIDS is expected. Increasing proportions of black Africans relative to other race groups and an ageing of the population as life expectancy increases and the impact of HIV/AIDS declines, is expected\(^5\). Increased urbanisation with the migration from rural to urban areas is expected to continue.

### SOUTH AFRICA AS A ‘DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE’

29. The commitment to constructing a ‘democratic developmental state’ is a recurrent theme in government policy documents. Government has determined in its policy analysis of developmental challenges facing the country that a ‘democratic developmental state’ that is able to intervene in order to meet national challenges, including economic growth, unemployment, inequality, unemployment and poverty, must be pursued. In this model, the State is interventionist, an agent of development and takes up the mandate to accomplish national development. This ‘democratic developmental state’ is characterised by state-led macro-economic planning and strong state-led intervention that focuses on addressing social and economic challenges in society.

30. In seeking to establish South Africa as a democratic developmental state, Government wishes to influence the direction and pace of economic and social development and to prioritise and promote national development issues. This is characterised by Government leading a strong, concerted drive for economic growth and ensuring mobilisation of national resources towards developmental goals. Good governance and adherence to developmental values are crucial to this notion.

31. Furthermore, South Africa faces a pressing need to "prioritise the priorities", such priorities being deeply rooted in the vital national interests of the country, so that the developmental agenda has a clear, finite set of identifiable objectives that are supported by the concomitant effort of all stakeholders. This requires institutional and organisational attributes that enable the achievement of growth and development objectives, productive investment, exports, growth and human welfare. As such, South Africa has developed innovative strategies to promote social cohesion on:

   a. A comprehensive, integrated and participatory anti-poverty strategy, which promotes national unity, shared value systems and citizen identity.

   b. Sustainable solutions for the prioritised quality delivery of basic services particularly to marginalised and vulnerable groups.

32. The developmental agenda translated to the lives of all South Africans seeks to manifests in:

   a. Reduced levels of poverty.

   b. Meaningful and sustainable jobs.

   c. Living within safe & secure borders.

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\(^5\) City of Cape Town, Demographics Discussion Paper, 2010.
d. Benefit from good service delivery.

e. Benefit from global peace, stability, security & prosperity, especially on the African Continent.

33. South Africa and the Region continue to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment, inadequate health services and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. These human security and developmental problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, namely:

   a. Endemic cycle between poverty and violence.
   b. Marginalisation of vulnerable groups of society.
   c. The spread of diseases.
   d. The flow of refugees.
   e. The illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, goods, small arms and light weapons.
   f. Environmental destruction.

34. As such, “security is a prerequisite for development, and there can be no development without commensurate security – one of the primary contributions of Defence is, together with other security departments, creating the security conditions for development to take place”. South Africa has conceptualised a ‘Human Security’ approach which identifies the need for a shift in focus from solely securing the state by military means, to the provision of security for its people by addressing critical political, socio-economic and environmental problems.

**POVERTY**

35. Poverty has many dimensions that shape people’s lives. Poverty in South Africa is most evident in the lack of opportunities for economically active citizens to earn a wage. Income poverty affects individuals and households in ways that are often degrading and lead to precarious lifestyles. However, the linkages between income poverty and deprivations in health care, education and social infrastructure are direct, with devastating consequences for individuals and society. Deprivations in health and education are also linked to a lack of access to other assets such as housing, land, social infrastructure (such as clinics, schools, libraries and cultural resources) and services such as credit facilities. Without access to quality health and education and income-earning opportunities, the lives of the vast majority of the poor wage a daily struggle to simply survive.

36. South Africa does not have a single official poverty line. Government uses US$2 a day or R524 a month per person (in 2008 prices, updated to 2010) as a rough guide. Using this indicator, the proportion of people living below the poverty line was about 53 percent in 1995; the figure subsequently varied, reaching 58 percent in 2001 and declining to 48 percent in 2008. By international standards, this is a very high level of poverty. Poverty among women-headed households is higher than the average and women continue to earn less than men, even though differences in years of education have largely been narrowed. About 61 percent of women live in

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6 Presentation by Dr David Chuter, an independent security analyst, on 24 November 2011 at the Minister’s inaugural “Defence Review Public Engagement Seminar”.

7 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011.
poverty, and 31 percent live in destitution, compared with 39 percent and 18 percent of men respectively. The decline in poverty since 1995 has been relatively small given rising per capita income, a growing economy and significant social policy interventions.

**INCOME INEQUALITY**

37. There is good reason to be concerned about rising income inequality. Research shows that unequal societies tend to do worse on a range of socioeconomic indicators, including life expectancy, mental illness, obesity, educational performance, teenage births, homicides, imprisonment rates, levels of trust and social mobility. Other research shows strong relationships between levels of inequality and violence and crime, as well as the propensity for conflict and civil war. Inequality in South Africa is reflected in the following ways:

a. In 1995, the poorest 20 percent of people earned an average of R1 010 a year (in 2008 prices) and the richest 20 percent earned an average of R44 336 a year. In 2008, the poorest 20 percent of people earned R1 486 a year and the richest 20 percent earned an average of R64 565 a year.

b. In 1995, the poorest 20 percent of the population earned just 2.3 percent of national income, while the richest 20 percent earned 72 percent. By 2008, these figures had barely changed, with the poorest earning 2.2 percent of income and the richest earning 70 percent.

c. In 1995, median per capita expenditure among Africans was R333 a month compared to whites at R3 443 a month. In 2008, median expenditure per capita for Africans was R454 a month, and for whites R5 668 a month.

38. Within South Africa, extremely high unemployment and underemployment have a particularly severe impact on those under the age of 35. Millions of working-age adults are structurally unemployed and live in households with no income. As a result, a great many South Africans depend on a relatively small number of wage earners, so that most working people live in poverty. The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues to take a tremendous toll. These factors, in combination with internal migration from rural areas to urban centres, and increasing regional labour migration, place pressure on limited social infrastructure and state capabilities to provide essential services.

**UNEMPLOYMENT**

39. Employment is one of the most effective ways of fighting poverty, tackling inequalities and enabling people to improve their quality of life. The lack of jobs is a major cause of poverty and inequality.

40. Despite the improvement in job creation between 1997 and 2008, unemployment remains very high. Employment increased from 11.1 million in 2001 to 13.6 million in 2008, and declined thereafter as a consequence of the global recession (The Presidency 2009). One of the biggest challenges facing South Africa today is that there is a very small number of working people (41 percent) in the adult population. In addition, earnings from work are low relative to the cost of living. High unemployment results in high dependency ratios, with many people relying on few wage earners. This results in a situation where the majority of working families live near or below the poverty line.

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8 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011
9 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011
41. At 25 percent, South Africa’s official rate of unemployment is exceptionally high. The situation is even worse for young people. Unemployed youth feel excluded and unable to contribute positively to society. The lack of faster employment growth in general, and in particular the inability of young people to break into the labour market, undermines the country’s ability to unite people around a common vision. Generally the economy has been unable to absorb new job entrants. "In the first 15 years of democratic rule the economy generated approximately 3.2 million jobs. Over the same period though, some 4.7 million individuals entered the labour market, in search of jobs. The consequence of the latter was an increase in the number of narrowly defined unemployed by 1.5 million".

42. The inability of the economy to create jobs for young people directly threatens the delicate balance between the constitutional imperative for redistribution, the need to escape the shadow of the past, and the need to build inclusivity for all – both black and white. Many young whites perceive the Employment Equity Act as exclusionary legislation. This is in spite of the fact that statistics show that black workers take longer to be absorbed into the workforce, and are generally the first to be retrenched during a downturn. Black people generally experience higher levels of unemployment and the participation of white males is more or less unaffected by business cycle fluctuations.

43. Unemployment rates are higher for black youth than they are for whites, especially at younger ages. Similarly, despite the positive increase of women actively seeking employment, high unemployment rates among women adds to social exclusion and entrenches the poverty trap, especially when considering the fact that many of the poorest households are headed by women.

**EDUCATION**

44. Education is a key factor in development. Good education provides access to the top end of the labour market and facilitates social mobility, while poor education perpetuates the skills shortage at the top end, causing a wage premium. The large number of low-skilled workers depresses wages at the bottom end. This combination contributes to the exceptionally high level of income inequality in South Africa. Investment in education is also important in developing responsive and active citizens who can play a role in local governance, community development and other local initiatives.

45. Education is one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and features prominently in South Africa’s Constitution. South Africa has implemented a number of progressive policies to ensure a realisation of the MDGs. South Africa has done well in extending access to education and has met MDG targets in this regard. Education receives the single largest share of total government expenditure. As a proportion of GDP, South Africa’s expenditure on education in 2010/11 will be 5.8 percent (R165 billion) up from 5.1 percent (R105 billion) in 2007/08.

46. About 1 million young people exit the schooling system annually, of whom 65 percent exit without achieving a Grade 12 certificate (JET 2011a). Half of those who exit the schooling system do so after Grade 11, either because they do not enrol in Grade 12 or they fail Grade 12. However, only a small number of those who leave the schooling system enrol in FET colleges or have access to any post-school training. The net effect of this is that access to post-school education and training is limited for school leavers.
CRIMINALITY

47. Crime levels are high in South Africa. Violent crime, contact crime and property crime are so common that many South Africans live in fear. When people feel unsafe it makes it harder for them to pursue their personal goals, and to take part in social and economic activity. Feeling unsafe can result from having been a victim of crime, knowing people who have been victims of crime, or hearing crime reported in the community or the media.

48. A 2010 study by the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) shows that, although violent crimes take place in all settings, it is predominant in metropolitan areas. Major forms of violent crimes identified include: assaults linked to arguments, anger and domestic violence; rape and sexual assault; and robbery and other violent property crime. According to the crime statistics for the period April 2009 to March 2010, the largest number (31.9 percent) of all 2.1 million crimes were contact crimes, followed by property crimes (26.1 percent) and other serious crimes (25.5 percent). Although there has been a decline in murders, the high proportion of contact crimes is bound to raise fears among citizens.

49. In discussing crime, there is always the danger of focusing too much on policing as a solution. There is no doubt that more visible policing gives citizens a sense of protection, but reducing crime will require a combination of interventions, including those originating from outside the criminal justice system. The speed with which the police investigate and arrest perpetrators, and how effectively the prosecution is carried out by the criminal justice system, are critical to how safe citizens feel.

50. The National Prosecution Authority has reported an increase in the percentage of convictions, from 80 percent in 1999/00 to 85.9 percent in 2007/08, and a reduction in the number of cases withdrawn from 414 211 in 2002/03 to 225 407 in 2007/08. However, the high number of cases that are withdrawn affects citizens’ confidence in the criminal justice system.

51. The CSVR study identifies the following factors as sustaining the culture of crime: (1) inequality, poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and marginalisation; (2) perceptions and values relating to violence and crime; (3) the vulnerability of youth, linked to inadequate child rearing and inappropriate socialisation; and (4) weaknesses in the criminal justice system.

52. The six pillars of violence prevention (WHO 2002, cited in Matzopolous 2011) are: investing in early interventions, increasing positive adult involvement, strengthening communities, challenging social norms that entrench violence, reducing income inequality, and improving criminal justice and social welfare. An effective, integrated strategy is needed to address the pervasive problem of violence.
a. Serve a valuable social role, particularly in a diverse society;
b. Provide an economic boost to targeted areas of the country; and
c. Leverage the establishment and development of some sectors of industry.

54. In addition to its inherent potential, the Defence Force can, again without detriment to its primary functions, carry out directed actions to support national development if additional funding is provided for this purpose.

55. A Defence Force can, thus, be an important agent of national development, which has been and continues to be demonstrated in several countries, outstanding examples being Brazil and Pakistan.

INHERENT POTENTIAL

56. The inherent potential of the Defence Force to support national development can be realized almost automatically as a direct result of its normal peacetime activities, although some minor steering can enhance this effect without detriment to its primary functions.

57. The Social Role – Developing the Person. Military service, even quite brief periods, can play an important and valuable role in:
   a. Maturing and socializing young adults;
   b. Providing a stable environment in which to enhance the education of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds;
   c. Developing in young people from different communities and social sectors a national consciousness and cohesion; and
   d. Enhancing and deepening the integration of minority groups in the wider community.

58. The Defence Force’s potential in this respect can be realized without detriment to its primary functions and with, at most, minimal additional resources or funding.

59. Given appropriate additional funding the Defence Force can extend this effect on a wider cross-section of the community by means of youth service or cadet systems.

60. The Socio-Economic Role – Supporting Local Communities. There is considerable potential for the Defence Force to support socio-economic development in, particularly, rural communities and towns. This arises from the fact that any military unit:
   a. Will inject resources into the surrounding community, through:
      i. Its personnel spending some of their salaries locally;
      ii. Local purchases (e.g. food, fuel, cleaning materials, stationary);
      iii. Procuring certain services locally (e.g. glazier, plumber);
      iv. Hiring locally to fill certain civilian posts within the unit; and
      v. Recruiting from among the local population.
b. Can provide assistance in emergencies – medical, fire-fighting, support to police, repair of critical machinery (e.g. emergency vehicles, generators, pumps)

c. Can, with some additional funding support, enhance or provide certain community services, for instance:

i. Supporting the local emergency and welfare services;

ii. Expanding the base hospital to treat civilians in need;

iii. Expanding the base school to accommodate the children of poor families;

iv. Using the base school or training facilities to provide adult education and life skills training.

61. Economic Role. The Defence Force has an inherent ability to support economic activity within the country, arising from its need:

a. To procure normal consumables, both locally and at the national level (for its reserve stocks), which can be procured from the business community;

b. For uniforms and general field equipment, which can be manufactured by the business community;

c. To purchase some commercial-standard equipment and vehicles that can be supplied and supported by the business community;

d. To procure certain commercially available services (construction, civil engineering) that can be cost-effectively contracted to the business community.

62. Industrial Role. Finally the Defence Force has an inherent ability to support development of the industrial sector, arising from its requirement for:

a. The maintenance, repair, overhaul, modernization and upgrading of military equipment, which will not always justify in-house capability, thus creating commercial opportunity;

b. The manufacture of equipment required in numbers that justify local manufacture, as well as the manufacture of munitions and spares;

c. The development of optimized equipment.

63. The Defence Force’s requirements can also stimulate research and development in a range of technical fields, which will:

a. Spin-off into other sectors of industry, thereby broadening the country’s industrial base; and

b. Attract young people to engineering and science, thereby expanding and deepening the country’s skills base.
POTENTIAL FOR DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

64. Given appropriate additional funding, the Defence Force also has the potential to, without detriment to its primary function, carry out a range of directed activities in support of national development.

65. **Service Systems.** One opportunity in this regard exists in structuring short and medium service systems to incorporate further education or training that prepares the member for a career outside the military. This approach can assist young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to obtain an education or training they could otherwise obtain, while providing the Defence Force with its junior personnel:
   a. Bursaries for degrees or training to be followed by a period of contracted service during which the member will gain experience in the chosen field;
   b. Post-service bursaries for university or technical courses;
   c. In-service training additionally focused on preparing members for a later civilian career in a related field; and
   d. Pre-discharge vocational training.

66. Such education and training programmes can range from flight training, with pilots committed to a specific period of service and then free to join an airline, through medical and engineering education and training to artisan training in most fields.

67. **Defence Force Skills.** The Defence Force has a wide range of skills that can, in some situations, be applied to national development projects, among them medical and technical skills and skills in the area of education and training. Individual members of the Defence Force and/or teams can be deployed for specific tasks that will, in most cases, also serve to improve those skills for the benefit of the Defence Force itself, for instance:
   a. Medical teams can be deployed to rural areas on a regular basis;
   b. Technical teams can be deployed to maintain or repair equipment (generators, pumps) and vehicles in outlying areas;
   c. Instructors can be deployed to provide adult education or basic technical training for people in outlying areas.

68. **Defence Force Capabilities and Equipment.** The Defence Force has a range of capabilities and equipment that can, in some situations, be employed in support of national development. For instance:
   a. Army engineers can maintain (even construct) roads and bridges in inaccessible area or in insecure areas, where it is not commercially viable to do so;
   b. Air Force transport aircraft and helicopters can move equipment to areas that are not accessible to commercial aircraft or where commercial air transport is not viable;
   c. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft can carry out mapping work for projects in outlying areas in cases where this would not be commercially viable.
69. **Defence Force Facilities**. The Defence Force also has facilities that can in some circumstances, be used to support the national development agenda. Among them are:

a. Military hospitals at various levels;

b. Training units and training facilities in other units;

c. Workshops;

d. Depots.
INTRODUCTION

1. The South African Government's strategic intent for the defence function is a guided response to a security environment that is dynamic and increasingly complex due to human actions, technological advancements and natural phenomena or processes. An assessment of this environment within four levels of analysis, namely the international, the continental, the regional and the domestic, provides an outlook to the possible threats and sources of insecurity that have an impact on South Africa and its people.

2. This assessment is cognisant of the outcomes-based approach of Government, namely to mobilise resources of the state for the development of our people; to ensure the stability of the Republic and the constitutional order; grow and develop the South African economy; promote the integration and growth of the Southern African region; sponsor the African agenda at the United Nations (UN) and elsewhere; and work towards a more just and equitable international order.

3. The present sources of insecurity affecting the country and its people are largely of a developmental and human security challenge, the strategic intent for defence must therefore address a multitude of political, socio-economic, environmental and military threats, with different levels of priority at different times.

GLOBAL SECURITY TRENDS

4. South Africa and its people are part of an international system of states that has become highly interconnected and is rapidly evolving. This world is, at the same time, defined by persistent inequalities in the political, economic, social, environmental and military dimensions of international relations, the balance of power and global security.

5. The current international strategic environment is characterised by a range of traditional and non-traditional threats to security as is evident in competition between powerful states for strategic resources; persistent regional and local conflicts; violent political, ethnic and religious extremism; acts of terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the involvement of non-state actors in conflict; and high levels of international crime. These international dynamics have been exacerbated by the global economic downturn, vast demographic changes and the long-term impact of climate change.

11 The mandate of the Department of Defence includes support to the developmental state and to contribute to the socio-economic needs of the country (Opening Remarks by the Hon. Min. of Defence and Military Veterans, Ms L.N. Sisulu in the Defence Strategic Business Plan, 2010).

12 WMD are generally grouped into nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological capabilities.
6. Over the past decade a number of general security trends and prominent characteristics of the international strategic environment have become clearly visible. The following are considered to have an impact on the defence function.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE BALANCE OF POWER AND DIPLOMACY

7. Globalisation – increasingly global relations of culture and economic activity - will be the overarching megatrend that will in future substantially shape all other major trends by deepening interdependence and empowering certain actors whilst alienating and marginalising others. The gap between the richest and poorest countries is widening and this economic disparity will be a source of tension and potential conflict. Globalisation has thus not brought geopolitical, religious, ethnic or ideological struggles to an end. These challenges will be particularly acute in Africa in countries that are not well integrated into the world economy and have weak or inflexible governance and that are being pressured by the influence of globalisation.

8. Within the current international system, changes in global power relations are discernible in the continuing diffusion of economic power and competition for resources. The international community is moving towards a more distributed power structure with business and non-governmental organisations gaining influence at the expense of the state. However, the USA remains the dominant global power because of its extensive political, economic and military capabilities. The partnership between Europe and the USA will be central to the world’s security and prosperity, having the potential to positively or negatively influence global security.

9. It is foreseen that in the next decade there will be increasing numbers of important actors that challenge the current world order. Examples include:

   a. The economic growth of emerging powers with increase leverage, tempered by the demands of their growing populations.

   b. Growing regional collaboration, such as European and South American alliances.

   c. Emerging multilateral alliances, characterised by the emerging significance of the BRICS.

10. Within this context, securing access to energy, food, water and strategic minerals will remain a global priority and states as well as international corporations will continue to compete for access to vital and strategic resources. As such, non-state actors, including international companies, NGOs, private military corporations, extremists, mercenaries and criminal groups, will play increasingly prominent roles in international affairs. It is foreseen that civil society and the media in particular, will increase pressure on governments to act to protect the environment, alleviate poverty and ensure human rights.

11. Although the political and economic integration such as that witnessed in Western Europe has made progress in recent years, states have retained their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will continue to secure and protect these through the maintenance of militaries and defence forces. Therefore, bi- and multi-lateral relations remain the primary mechanism for the pursuit of peaceful international relations.

INTER-STATE CONFLICT AND WAR

12. The current international security environment constrains large-scale inter-state conflict and conventional war owing to the interdependency of economies and international security cooperation and conflict resolution. Notwithstanding this, military power continues to be exercised...
alongside economic and political power at the global strategic level. The reconfiguration of military power after the Cold War has produced a world in which major powers and regional groupings bestride the globe with military capabilities that are unlikely to be contested in the near future.

13. Although the growing interdependency among states dissuades inter-state conflict, an unfettered requirement by the developed and developing nations for access to raw materials and strategic resources, as well as their quest for power, dominance and influence, increases the propensity for intensified competition. This could trigger inter-state disputes and regional conflicts. These trends will continue to undermine international institutions established to regulate world order and peace.

14. In the present international security environment the traditional boundaries between fighting a war and stabilisation operations have become blurred. In conducting operations, it is probable that defence forces will have to execute a mixture of conventional and unconventional operations while adopting symmetric and asymmetric approaches – indicating that the future security environment will be characterised by complex war fighting.

15. The post-Cold War era has much different requirements to previous mass conscript armies. European militaries, for example, are undergoing a fundamental shift from Cold War-era mass armies toward rapidly deployable expeditionary forces. Current missions require different equipment, sophisticated logistical expertise and more qualitative training for the troops. Forces will become smaller and more agile and the role of private security companies will increase. In the South African context, however, the relatively small SA Army will probably have to increase its capacity to meet expanding defence expectations both domestically and internationally.

16. In the future, battlefield success in:

   a. Major combat operations will be determined by the ability to orchestrate surgical strikes with precision munitions. The major powers have acquired capabilities for war that are characterised by precision weaponry, near real time intelligence support to C^2 and electronic warfare (EW). All three abilities, having been integrated into combat systems, have fundamentally changed the nature of warfare and can inflict destruction of an unprecedented scale. Some of these advanced weapon systems have already been integrated and in the next decade, many African defence forces will augment “traditional” forces with these selected high-end capabilities, including missiles, advanced C^4I systems, precision strike systems and advanced air defence systems.

   b. Operations other than War will be mainly determined by the ability to provide the security and stability essential to economic and social development.

17. It is imperative that short-term contingencies and other non-conventional operations do not dictate the long-term and ultimate force design of the Defence Force. As such, the likelihood of an external conventional threat to South Africa must be constantly reviewed and assessed in relation to the more pertinent threats to our country and its citizenry, which are of a non-conventional and human security nature^{13}.

^{13} Human Security refers to the broadened conceptualisation of security that encompasses political, social, economic and environmental dimensions of threats and sources of insecurity.
INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

18. The vast majority of armed conflicts occur within states, rather than between them. Although occurring within states, intra-state conflicts have a negative effect on inter-state relations. The consequences of such conflicts in terms of refugee flows, the trafficking of small arms and the disruption of trade will have profound spill-over effects on neighbouring states. At the same time neighbouring states can and often do become involved in an intra-state conflict, giving rise to regional disputes.

19. Although it is foreseen that intra-state conflicts will continue to feature prominently within the international security landscape, such conflicts would primarily take place within the underdeveloped and developing worlds. Reasons for this include political intolerance, competition for resources, ineffective governance, corruption, extreme poverty and underdevelopment that create the potential for conflict and extremism. Territory that lacks proper governance and infrastructure provides safe-havens for criminals, terrorist groupings, armed guerrillas and armed insurgents to base themselves and organise their operations.

20. Various international flashpoints remain unresolved and continue to generate instability in their respective regions. Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sahel region, the Great Lakes, Somalia and Sudan continue to experience intra-state conflict. The United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the African Union (AU) are extensively involved in certain intra-state conflicts. The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine remains unresolved and protracted, as do tensions around Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

21. Since the end of 2010 several “People's Revolutions” or so-called “Jasmine Revolutions” have taken place in the Maghreb region, including Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Jordan. The division between Sunni and Shiite tribal clans may prove to be one of the most crucial components of the uprisings in the Arab world. An analysis of the various manifestations of the uprisings indicates that there are certain commonalities involved. These include:

   a. The reasons for the uprisings.
   b. The role of the populist media.
   c. The role of the youth and generational issues.
   d. The swaying of the loyalties of the armies.

22. The new transparency brought about by the youth and their use of social media to get international exposure and sanction for their cause, has been a powerful new driving force. This transparency cuts through all aspects of corrupt governance and undemocratic practices and sends a clear message that the general population is unwilling to tolerate malpractices that serve a narrow minority.

GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES

23. The current international environment is significantly influenced by the competition for access to strategic resources, in particular energy products such as food and water, oil and gas, and strategic minerals that are essential for the technology industries.
24. Rapid population growth in some developing economies and growing consumption in the developed world will increase competition for energy, water, minerals and land. As a result, pressure on the world’s natural resources will increase drastically. Energy markets will be exposed to short-term fluctuations in supply and delivery. Import-dependent countries with weak economies will be vulnerable. Tensions and even conflict could possibly arise between states that are pursuing control over dwindling supplies.

25. The global demand for energy is expected to increase by more than 50% by 2035 and fossil fuels would have to meet more than 80% of this increased demand if alternate energy sources cannot be obtained\(^\text{14}\). As a result, oil production on the African continent has increased in recent years, thereby providing the impetus in the competition for this strategic resource between countries that have exorbitant and ever increasing demands for energy.

26. Africa will in the medium to long term remain a major source of raw materials and strategic minerals for foreign countries. Competition for these resources will have both a positive and negative effect on continental stability in the medium to long term. The requirement for strategic minerals will continue to influence external diplomatic, economic and even military involvement in African states that are endowed with deposits of such resources. Foreign involvement in sourcing the continent’s raw materials could lead to investment, job creation, economic growth and prosperity. Of particular concern, however, is the exchange of arms for strategic minerals and the risk of military intervention to secure access to resources.

**ACTS OF TERROR**

27. Events within the global strategic environment have compelled recognition that terror groups pose a serious security threat. Indeed, acts of terror have become less territorially defined and more global in reach. No country can be considered immune from international acts of terror that are difficult to counter owing to the international networks involved and may be perpetrated by individuals not affiliated to a specific country or group, but to an ideological cause.

28. Countering acts of terror will remain a prime focus of major powers’ security policies for the foreseeable future. This threat will grow on the basis of perceived racial, ethnic or religious grievances. Extremism is likely to last decades and will require a consistent focus by states with an interest in the preservation of the established international system. Continued strife in the Middle East and Africa will continue to exacerbate the conditions that cause instability and acts of terror.

29. On the African continent acts of terror by militant extremist groups remain a threat in mainly North and East Africa. These include acts of terror by diverse extremist groups, including Al Qa’eda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab in Somalia and to a lesser extent the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Terror incidents will tend to occur in urban centres, often capitals. Increased security at military and diplomatic facilities will drive extremists to attack “softer” targets such as private citizens and commercial interests. The characteristics of effective terror organisations make them difficult intelligence targets.

30. Although the probability of a domestic terror attack on South Africa is deemed unlikely, the risk thereof cannot be overlooked. Of more immediate concern is the possibility of terror groups exploiting South African territory to mount an attack in a third state, using the country as a transit point, or to attack a foreign target on domestic soil. Of equal concern is the possibility of a terror attack on South African nationals and property abroad.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND OTHER LETHAL WEAPONS

31. The threat posed by WMD, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN), is of perennial concern. Major role players, regard the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems as a priority threat. Proliferation of WMD is evident in certain states that have not signed or do not adhere to international control treaties.

32. Nuclear conflict between two evenly matched powers is unlikely in the near future. However, it would be imprudent to completely rule out the possibility of state-on-state warfare. Miscalculation in a regional crises or desperation of a rogue state may spark conflict that could plunge several military powers into war. In addition, the use of a radiological device, or so-called “dirty bomb”, is probably the most serious WMD threat posed by non-state groups. International efforts continue to control WMD, delivery systems, supplies of fissionable material, chemical precursors and biological agents. The focus is on preventing newcomers (state and non-state) to attain WMD. Much less success is attained with doing away with present WMD stocks. Attention will focus on possible nuclear transgressors.

33. The possibility of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, acquiring WMD is undeniably a reality as this material and technology becomes more readily available. Chemical and biological weapons are generally easier to develop, hide and deploy than nuclear weapons and will be readily available to those with the will to acquire them. Chemical and biological weapons could well be used in a regional conflict or a terror attack.

34. In future, the proliferation and threat will manifest in the distinct possibility of the acquisition, transportation and distribution of CBRN material, and conventional weapons and ammunition, by non-state actors. Efforts to regulate the proliferation of WMD such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have slowed down the spread of such weapons but not stopped their production.

35. The general availability and employment of destructive armament is increased through technological development, the international arms trade and arms smuggling. The globalisation of technology is leading to a more competitive global armament industry and the diffusion of military technology. Advantages will accrue to states with the adaptability to link civilian technologies successfully to defence programmes, and the foresight to anticipate future warfare requirements accurately. Free trade in weapons and easy global migration of skilled military and scientific personnel also result in countries acquiring defence equipment and expertise, giving them a strategic defence capacity within a short period.

36. Technological development, furthermore, increases the potential of cyber and space-based warfare. At the same time, technological development and highly-competitive arms markets are likely to result in weapons that are less expensive, more portable, destructive, widely available and easier for non-state actors to use.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

37. The consequences of climate change pose some of the most serious threats to humanity at present. High rates of fossil fuel usage and associated emissions of greenhouse gases have resulted in the disruption of global climatic conditions and weather patterns, with an increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, cyclones and wildfires. The effects of such environmental conditions are most felt by the poorest and least developed nations. For example, prolonged droughts and rising desertification as a result of climate change, has crippled food production and in turn exacerbated the levels of famine. Climate change will over time also
result in rising sea levels, posing a risk to low-lying areas and certain island states.

38. These threats warrant the intensification of collective action in the implementation of the principles of sustainable development, as agreed upon at the UN Conference on Environment and Development. Equally critical is the implementation of reduction targets of greenhouse gases as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol. As weather patterns become more erratic and natural disasters more frequent, Defence would be expected to maintain a capacity to play a significantly supportive role in addressing the consequences and aftermath of such events.

39. Tectonic events, including volcanic eruptions and earthquakes that could result in tsunamis are ever-present environmental risks that could result in major humanitarian disasters. While southern Africa is geologically stable, other parts of Africa such as the Rift Valley and North Africa are more exposed to such events.

CONTINENTAL SECURITY TRENDS

40. In terms of the broad continental snapshot, Africa’s vulnerability to socio-economic deprivation, armed conflict and political instability renders the continent chronically tenuous and works against its potential of becoming a more powerful influence in global power dynamics. Africa features only wrt two determinants, i.e. Africa possesses vital resources (see Figures 8 and 9 below), namely strategic minerals and oil and gas; and because of its geo-strategic nature - there are three major sea-routes adjacent to the continent, i.e. the Cape sea-route, Gulf of Aden and Straits of Gibraltar.

Figure 8: Africa’s Geo-Strategic Importance
41. Armed conflicts, violence and the use of force have continued to affect the security of our continent and its people. A constant high level of instability exists in various parts of Africa, which often leads to predominantly intra-state conflicts, violent crime and a critical lack of human security. While Africa has experienced relatively few inter-state conflicts in recent years, various intra-state conflicts continue to have a wide-ranging impact on inter-state relations, mainly because of refugees, cross-border crime and support to insurgent groups from neighbouring countries. Some of these conflicts are based on longstanding disputes, while others have recent origins and are exacerbated by ineffective leadership and governance.

AFRICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES

42. Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa emanate from, among other factors: lack of political rights; weak and dysfunctional states; inadequate political and economic governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; the marginalisation of groups within a state; the involvement of the military in inappropriate political and economic roles; and unconstitutional changes of governments.

43. For the foreseeable future, extensive peace-support operations (PSOs), including security sector reform and reconstruction, will be required to address peace and security in Africa. Future PSOs will be challenged by the availability of armament on the continent, as well as asymmetric warfare. In general, security management in Africa will have varying success because of the intractability of security issues and lack of capacity and commitment among stakeholders. The following general security trends within the continental context have significant implications for Defence.

Figure 9: Distribution of African Natural Resources
ARMS COMPETITION OVER SCARCE AND STRATEGIC RESOURCES

44. War and conflict on the African continent could in the future be caused by a multitude of factors. However, one of the primary causes will be the struggle and armed competition for vital and scarce resources. The continent is the target of a new scramble by foreign powers and corporations focusing on access to natural resources. Foreign powers trade with Africa; they invest in industries and infrastructure and provide extensive development assistance to Africa. Part of the motivation is that Africa is a growing and future market and has assets, including as arable land, which can be developed. Some countries have altruistic motives and try to alleviate poverty and suffering on the continent. But the main objective of foreign powers and international companies in Africa is to gain/safeguard access to the continent’s resources, particularly oil and other minerals. Fifty percent of Africa’s oil is produced in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa, with the rest mainly in North Africa and some in the east. The main West African producers are Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea (Figure 10). SADC is regarded as the main mineral depository of the world. Rare and valuable minerals such as coltan (75% of world stock in the DRC) and platinum in South Africa and Zimbabwe and uranium in South Africa, Namibia and the DRC, are found in the region.

Figure 10: African Oil Production (2009)
45. The population growth of the continent, the uneven distribution of available resources and the concomitant rise in consumption levels will also result in a greater demand and competition for essential natural resources, especially water, food and land. The population of the Horn of Africa, for example, has increased almost 5-fold since 1960, placing severe pressure on available resources.

46. With regard to the availability of water, it is expected that the continent will continue to face growing water scarcity and stress, thereby increasing the propensity for conflicts over this vital resource for human survival (Figure 11). The UN estimates that by 2020, agricultural yields from some rain-fed crops will be reduced by 50%. More than 75 million Africans are expected to be affected by such trends. Indeed, the most seriously affected would be the small-scale and subsistence farmers as a result of water scarcity, desertification and soil erosion.

![Figure 11: Key Water Basins in Africa](image-url)
MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE MILITARY/SECURITY COMPANIES

47. A clear distinction must be made between mercenaries, being individuals availing their military skills, and private security companies who provide collective military services. Both categories may provide their services to either governments or non state actors.

   a. The activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed conflicts have often been controversial, especially when they provide military services in violation of domestic and international law (in some instances they are used to sustain undemocratic states).

   b. A further complicating factor is the increasingly blurred relationship between the military and non-military aspects of conflict resolution. As more comprehensive approaches to conflict resolution are adopted, it is expected that private security companies will in future undertake a wider range of activities, some of which were until recently carried out by armed forces and military personnel. These include, for example, civilian contractors providing services such as logistical support, weapons maintenance, sanitation, and laundry services to missions and deployed military personnel.

   c. Attempts to address this issue were complicated by the difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as opposed to activities of private security companies. Notwithstanding this, mercenarism is understood to be a manifestation of unregulated foreign military assistance and has the potential to undermine legitimate constitutional democracies, as experienced in Africa.

48. Several South African private security companies continue to be contracted by foreign countries to operate in conflict zones, usually protecting prominent individuals, critical infrastructure, property and strategic resources. It is very probable that the global involvement of South African private security companies or South African citizens, particularly in defence transformation, peacekeeping and peace building in conflict and post-conflict areas will continue into the foreseeable future.

POVERTY, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND POOR HUMAN SECURITY

49. Of the 39 countries worldwide that are currently facing food emergencies, 23 are in Africa. Population growth and increases in consumption on the continent will continue to strain the ability of poorer nations to alleviate conditions of poverty and underdevelopment. It is estimated that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will exceed 1.3 billion by 2035 and that 45% of the continent’s population will live in urban areas by 2015, increasing to 54% by 2025. The implication is increasing overpopulation and substantial growth in unplanned and random informal settlements within and around urban areas.

50. Such overpopulation and human settlement trends will have significant implications for defence forces that are mandated to operate within them. The increasing number of armed and unarmed non-combatants in a combat zone would add significantly to the complexity of undertaking successful military operations. It is also likely that unregulated urbanisation will result in future adversaries having urban survival and combat skills. Consequently, they might choose to pursue their objectives and conduct operations in sprawling towns and cities which will already have

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51. Human security in a number of African countries remains precarious. Unfavourable climatic conditions, poverty, ineffective governance, ongoing conflict and instability, as well as the world economic downturn continue to exacerbate the social and economic vulnerability of many communities. The humanitarian situation will not improve significantly in the short to medium term and will continue to undermine security and stability, as is evident from the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and food riots in some African countries. Displaced populations will remain an important trigger for migration to other regions and countries, including South Africa.

CONFLICT, LARGE SCALE POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND MIGRATION

52. Conflict in Africa is generally of low intensity, but is extensive and destructive in nature. This is especially evident from the large number of refugees and IDPs, of which Africa has 20 and 40 percent respectively of the world total, while only 15 percent of the world’s population reside in Africa17. Conflicts in the Maghreb, Chad, Eastern DRC, Somalia and Sudan, as well as an increase in political violence and unconstitutional changes of power in some countries are important causes of this phenomenon.

HEALTH

53. Pandemics and outbreaks of communicable diseases will continue to have a significant impact on population development and without effective control measures, may spread globally in very short time periods, with long-term socio-economic and political effects. Some diseases may re-emerge and/or intensify as environmental changes occur and the patterns of human activity become more diverse and complex. Some of these diseases will also reduce the effectiveness and morale of armed forces of those nations worse affected and will continue to affect the ability of some nations to deploy significant military capabilities. The social, economic and human costs of pandemics and communicable diseases will remain high and are likely to impact negatively on economic growth and on diplomatic and international relations.

TRANS-NATIONAL CRIME

54. International organised crime will grow in volume, structure, organisation and profitability, while criminals exploit new markets in areas of accelerating economic growth and opportunity, particularly in Asia and in other developing trans-national markets. Areas to be targeted will include the smuggling of people, contraband, drugs and small arms. Sea routes and harbours will be exploited in the execution of transnational crime. Criminals will aggressively exploit the weaknesses in security systems and control measures of emerging markets to promote illicit trade and encourage corruption. This will present major challenges to governance, fiduciary arrangements and international financial regulation18.

55. In recent years, the African continent has seen the emergence of two new syndicated illegal phenomena, namely illegal mining and illegal bunkering of crude oil. Examples include illegal gold mining in South Africa and illegal crude oil bunkering in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea.

17 The number of IDPs in Africa remains stable at 11.6 million. Sudan has the largest number of IDPs of about 4.9 million. Other countries with large numbers of IDPs are the DRC and Somalia, with 1.9 million and 1.5 million respectively. Refugees in Africa total 2.1 million, a decline from 3.4 million in 2000. Kenya has the largest refugee population of 360 000, followed by Chad with 314 000.
56. A further concern is the possibility that the continent can be used as a base for international terrorist groups as well as being a target for their activities. In addition, trafficking in small arms, light weapons, drugs and humans undermine Africa’s peace, security and development.

**MARITIME SECURITY**

57. The substantial increase in acts of piracy along Africa’s coastline is of grave concern as it threatens the peace, security and stability of the continent. Although the current piracy hot-spots are off the east and west coasts of Africa, i.e. the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea, pirates have extended their activities to over 1 100 km offshore and have moved into Seychelles and Tanzanian waters, even reaching the Indian coast. Somali pirates have operated as far south as the Mozambique Channel and as far east as 72° East towards the Maldives. As a direct consequence of the piracy along the east coast of Africa, a growing number of shipping companies have had to route their ships via the Cape Sea Route instead of using the Suez Canal. Such dynamics, together with requests from foreign governments and multilateral organisations, have compelled South Africa to provide a response to such security threats. As such, Defence will play a key role to help combat piracy, especially since recent incidents have occurred along the SADC coastline.

**NON-STATE ACTORS**

58. Most conflicts on the African continent over the last 10 years have involved rebel and armed groups with no institutional right to exist, opposing perceived illegitimate governments by means of guerrilla warfare. This has been characterised at times by state-sponsored support to non-state actors.

59. These rebel groups, that may consist of warlords, militias, paramilitary groups, armed guerrillas, terrorist organisations and insurgents, rely mainly on small arms and light weapons already available on the continent or on private companies and individuals who supply them with first and second-generation light weapons from Eastern Europe or the Persian Gulf.

60. Their modus operandi is to establish safe base areas in remote parts of the country or in a neighbouring country, where the government has no effective administrative or security presence. From there they expand the territory under their control and establish their own administration to enable them to obtain revenue through taxes and the exploitation of natural resources in the area. Logistic supply systems are rudimentary and consist mainly of pillaging from the local population and living off the land.

61. Their military focus areas, apart from territorial expansion, are the disruption of inter alia road and rail communication lines, economic ventures that supply the government with revenue, urban centres and ultimately the national capital. Control over airfields that can be used for logistic supply and the export of exploited natural resources, is an important prerequisite for success.

**REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC SECURITY TRENDS**

62. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the Southern African region as a whole has undergone substantial change, with considerable progress being made towards the resolution of long-standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices. However, post-conflict reconstruction has posed many challenges, particularly in regard to socio-economic development, the integration of former combatants and the consolidation of democracy. Of notable
The region has a distinct lack of civil capacity to manage disasters and will continue to rely on defence capabilities for disaster management. Regional militaries and defence forces have traditionally cooperated in this field and will be obliged to continue to do so in the future.

64. The region also faces the challenge of ensuring maritime security. Regional states with coastline borders generally lack the capacity to monitor maritime traffic. Consequently, piracy and the smuggling of weapons, contraband, people and goods take place. Of particular importance is the protection of maritime trade and the region’s maritime resources including fisheries, seabed minerals and energy resources. South Africa has in essence an ‘Island Economy’ which is almost totally dependent on maritime transport. The bulk of the country’s GDP is generated through trade, the majority of which is conducted with the use of sea transport or merchant shipping. As such South Africa has an “obligation to co-operate with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to protect its national interests”\(^{19}\). The same holds true for all other dimensions of security.

65. In addition much of the region continues to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment, inadequate health services and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. These human security and developmental problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, namely, the spread of diseases; the flow of refugees; the illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, goods, small arms and light weapons; and environmental destruction\(^{20}\). This feeds the endemic cycle between poverty and violence.

66. Despite the inequalities of wealth, poverty and the legacies of apartheid, South Africa’s own domestic security environment has improved significantly since the inception of a democratic government. The security sector has been transformed to display values of democratic governance that enshrine the principles of transparency, accountability and demographic representivity. However, South Africa’s domestic stability is characterised by high levels of crime and some incidents of civil unrest. These include cross-border crime, illegal fishing, poaching, labour action (including violent action), aggression towards foreign citizens, service delivery unrest and disruption of services.

**ENDEMIC DISEASE**

67. The quadruple burden of disease\(^{21}\) includes four simultaneous epidemics impacting on the social wellbeing of the South African community, including on the military community. These are the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, the increasing injury patterns of both accidental and non-accidental injuries, outbreaks of communicable diseases including re-emerging diseases (such as tuberculosis, diarrhoea and pneumonia, which interact in vicious negative feedback loops with malnutrition and HIV) and the growing incidence of lifestyle diseases related to affluence.

68. Like many middle-income countries, South Africa has to grapple simultaneously with the diseases of poverty and affluence, but the inequalities in access to health care means that relatively more is spent on the diseases of affluence than those of poverty. The disease patterns and increasing high burden of disease have a negative impact on the health status of the general population.

\(^{19}\) Mandela, N. International Fleet Review, Cape Town, 5 April 1997.
\(^{21}\) National Planning Commission 10 June 2011: Human Condition Diagnostic, Pg 15
population and therefore on the social stability of the community. The supportive measures to enhance health, such as clean safe drinking water, effective sewage processing plants and control over vector diseases also remain a cause for concern\(^{22}\).

69. This places an increasing burden on mainly the public, but also on the military health infrastructure in the country. The monitoring of health tripwires indicates a negative trend in key indicators, such as disability-adjusted life year measures\(^{23}\). The regression in such critical indicators such as infant mortality rate and life expectancy are evidence of a health system in distress.

70. Health is a key driver in social stability and social welfare (poverty alleviation) perception by society. The deterioration in the health status or the perceived health status can influence social stability and stimulate social upheaval. Although present indicators do not reflect such social trends yet, the sporadic social discord on service delivery also reflects a perception that health services are not meeting the expectations of the community. This is reflected by the statement of an ailing public health system\(^{24}\).

71. The decreased life expectancy, increased birth rate and increased interpersonal violence\(^{25}\) all contribute to the creation of a youth bulge society, with a young radical component having a sense of fatalism, resulting in social upheaval, the child soldier phenomenon and the creation of a breeding ground for radicalism. This disease profile and health environment impacts directly of Defence's role in maintaining stability and support to the population.

**MIGRATION AND POROUS BORDERS**

72. Globalisation and improved means of transportation and communication exacerbate migration\(^{26}\). South Africa remains a destination of choice for foreign migrants because of perceived opportunities and stability in contrast to instability and deprivation in some areas of the continent and Asia.

73. The pull factors that attract foreign nationals to South Africa persist, among them perceived and real economic opportunities and better living conditions and services. Similarly, the push factors that drive foreign nationals to the Republic also persist. The risk of illegal migration and of illegal activities among migrants is therefore likely to increase.

74. High levels of illegal migration into Southern Africa continue to pose a serious threat to our national security and stability. Vulnerabilities in the border environment continue to be exploited by those with negative intent and manifest in illegal migration and cross-border crime, particularly arms proliferation; drug trafficking; vehicle smuggling; the smuggling of precious stones, metals, ivory and endangered species; and the illegal importation of cigarettes, clothing, alcoholic beverages and other goods. Recent events as indicated in Figure 12 elucidate this point.

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\(^{22}\) National Planning Commission 10 June 2011: Human Condition Diagnostic, Pg 15
\(^{23}\) National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011
\(^{24}\) National Development Plan dd 11 November 2011, Pg 3
\(^{25}\) National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011
\(^{26}\) Large-scale migration and urbanisation to attain a better life is an international phenomenon. It could probably be managed, but not stopped or turned around. The challenge is rather to apprehend the criminal element that operates over international borders under the guise of migration.
75. The control and management of the country’s borders therefore remains one of South Africa’s biggest security challenges. Deficiencies in border management, the challenge posed by illegal migration, and a lack of understanding of the émigré footprint in our country creates persistent threats to the integrity of borders. Deficiencies in both Border Line Control and Border Post Management at ports of entry (land, sea and air borders) continue to pose a significant challenge for borderline security. Insufficient human and logistical resources have hampered adequate Border Line Control. Consequently, security vulnerabilities at ports of entry and on the borderline have been and will continue to be exploited by trans-national crime syndicates and possibly by terror groups.

76. The management of migratory flows will remain an acute challenge for the relevant departments and agencies charged with borderline security. The phased return of the Defence Force to the borderline is a positive step and measures will have to be put in place to ensure that it is suitably guided and capacitated in terms of managing particularly illegal crossing of the borderline.

CRIME, SYNDICATED CRIMINALITY AND ILLICIT ECONOMY

77. The persistent high levels of crime, especially violent crimes have affected all sectors of society in South Africa. Violent crime, contact crime and property crime are so common that many South Africans live in fear. When people feel unsafe it makes it harder for them to pursue their personal goals and to take part in social and economic activity. Feeling unsafe can result from having been a
victim of crime, knowing people who have been victims of crime, or hearing crime reported in the community or the media.

78. A 2010 study by the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) shows that although violent crimes take place in all settings, it is predominant in metropolitan areas. Major forms of violent crimes identified include assaults linked to arguments, anger and domestic violence; rape and sexual assault; and robbery and other violent property crime\(^\text{27}\).

79. Although violent crime constitutes a relatively small percentage of total criminal activity in South Africa, it has undeniably affected the morale of the population and productivity of the economy. Indications are that the trio of serious violent crimes (residential and business robberies and vehicle hijacking) and organised crime will continue to be a security challenge, as criminal syndicates continuously adapt to law enforcement action by shifting their focus to other forms of criminal activity.

80. The insecurity produced by violent crime continues to be exacerbated by the availability of illicit arms in the hands of criminal syndicates. Illegal firearms have been central in the activities of organised violent crime and are instrumental in armed robberies. Of particular concern is the use of weapons that have been sourced from security departments, in particular Defence and the Police, including the illicit use of service weapons.

81. Drug-trafficking continues to be the most visible form of serious organised crime and takes place on a large scale. South Africa has been identified as a regional hub and transit zone for illicit drugs in Southern Africa and there has been a marked increase in the flow of drugs into South Africa in recent years, with international syndicates playing a prominent role in this regard. Drug consumption among the youth is increasing dramatically. Rehabilitation centres confirm a change in the profile of those undergoing treatment, with the number of African youth attending these centres more than doubling in recent years. Substance abuse, particularly drug use, is a factor driving youth-based crime in South Africa.

82. There is a high level of illicit international economic activity and the state is facing a major challenge from the illicit economy, which has the potential to seriously compromise Government’s New Development Plan and concomitantly its ability to deliver the required services to the people. It is estimated that South Africa’s economy is losing 10% of its GDP to illicit trade in areas like mining, tobacco and textiles\(^\text{28}\).

83. Illicit economic activity in South Africa imitates legitimate business practices to conceal the illicit activities. Economic crime in South Africa is widespread in all aspects of economic activity, particularly in finance, manufacturing, mining, the retail sector, trade, and government procurement and tenders. A broad typology of economic crime currently taking place in the country includes trade in arms, drug and human trafficking; counterfeiting; smuggling; corruption; trade in contraband; fraud; money laundering and tax evasion.

84. The regional dimension of the illicit economy is also a cause for concern. Factors that have allowed for the illicit economy to thrive in the region are mainly illegal migration, inadequate border controls, a lack of capacity to enforce existing legislation, corruption amongst border officials, criminal networks operating across South Africa’s borders to facilitate illicit economic activity, and a misalignment of regulatory frameworks. Progress has been made in developing relations and joint strategies to combat illicit mining with neighbouring states most affected by this crime, especially

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\(^{27}\) National Planning Commission: Human Condition Diagnostic, Pg 22

\(^{28}\) Budget Vote Speech, State Security Minister Cwele, June 2011
Zimbabwe and Mozambique. There has also been progress with developing an international strategy to address the trans-national trafficking of precious metals.

**SOCIAL UNREST**

85. Social protest and disruptive industrial action have been on the increase, accompanied by an increase in levels of violence. Incidents of social instability are mostly localised and in many instances characterised by intra-political party contestation and the absence of effective local leadership. The country’s youth play a prominent role in both protest action and in attacks against foreign nationals. The epicentres of protest are areas where inequality is highest, with high population pressure and higher than average levels of unemployment. Capacity problems, mismanagement of resources, corruption in local government and economic stresses from the recession and its consequent job losses increase socio-economic pressures in communities.

86. In general the underlying causes of protest action around services remain unchanged. Assessments reflect that the socio-economic factors which shape the environment within which government provides basic services to people, have not been addressed and hence protest action is expected to persist. These factors include widening income inequality, unemployment and poverty, and they continue to generate tensions and frustrations that find expression in protest action. Youth unemployment especially has proven to be a catalyst for violent protests. This trend is likely to continue, with protests around services expected to increase prior to elections due to opportunistic campaigning by some individuals and political parties.

87. Protest action has often turned violent and violent protest marches and strike action have threatened the stability of parts of the country. This has warranted closer monitoring of such situations when they arise. Growing dissatisfaction associated with service delivery at the local government level and attempts to coordinate protests nationally will continue to cause major disruptions to the stability of the country and consequently jeopardise the provision of essential services. This trend of domestic instability is compounded by economic crises and its consequent impact on food and energy prices for South Africans, in particular the poor and needy of the population.

88. Intolerance and violence against foreign nationals remains a cause for concern but cannot be linked to any single causal factor. It is rather the result of a combination of factors, several of which can be linked to competition over scarce resources and the accompanying dynamics of human behaviour. It must be noted that concerns around the provision of services are not the sole cause of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa. Other factors that contribute include entrenched negative perceptions and stereotypes about foreigners, business rivalry, criminality and pressure on scarce resources that local communities experience, particularly where perceptions of relative deprivation are sharpened by high unemployment and strong migratory pressure.

89. The probability of a re-emergence of attacks on foreign nationals is high, given that the circumstances which preceded the previous spate of attacks persist. In the meantime, émigré groups are positioning themselves to respond to possible future attacks. This raises the possibility of retaliatory attacks against South Africans as some émigré communities have threatened to acquire weapons to defend themselves.

90. Particularly significant within the domestic context is the spiralling violence within communities, in particular gender-based violence accentuated by the growing levels of poverty, disease and the marginalisation of vulnerable groups of society. It is highly likely that such incidents of domestic instability will continue and could even increase. Some incidents will require Defence
Force assistance to the South African Police Service and other State Departments to counter their impact. This has important implications for the operations of the Defence Force in the creation of an enabling environment for development.

EXTREMISM AND THE PROPENSITY FOR TERROR

91. Acts of terror have also affected the domestic security environment. There is a continued threat to the national security and stability of South Africa by both foreign and domestic extremist and terrorist groups. Although it is in many cases indirect in nature, it continues to require vigilance and the attention of the intelligence and security agencies. The threat posed to domestic stability and security by terrorism is strongly influenced by developments outside South Africa’s borders. The SADC region is an area of increasing openness and interdependence, allowing for the free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources.

92. The possible use of South African soil by terrorist groups is also a concern. South Africa’s advanced communications, financial and transport infrastructure creates both an environment and opportunities for individuals linked to terrorist groups to exploit South African soil for logistical and support purposes, including the transfer of funds, money laundering, recruitment and the distributing of propaganda. South Africa could also be used as a conduit or transit zone for the movement of terrorists.

CYBER-SECURITY

93. Cyber-security is an ever-present concern for all spheres of South African society. Reports on violations of information systems and infrastructure litter the information landscape, with commerce, banking, government and private information having fallen victim to the perpetrators of cyber-crime. The threat exists in an environment that is rapidly evolving and changing, specifically with significant amounts of personal information being freely available on social networking sites. It involves three discrete manifestations:

a. Cyber-espionage involving *inter alia* the silent gathering of information.

b. Cyber-crime involving *inter alia* malware, viruses, identity theft and attacks on financial institutions.

c. Cyber-warfare involving *inter alia* offensive information operations.

94. The threat is particularly malicious as the perpetrators misuse freely available tools and commercial infrastructure, remain largely anonymous and are exposed to very little personal risk. Cyber-crime thus remains difficult to prove and is consequently difficult to prosecute.

95. South Africa has established a National Cyber-Security Policy Framework whose purpose it is to create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment that facilitates the protection of critical information infrastructure whilst strengthening shared human values and understanding of cyber-security in support of national security imperatives and the economy.

CONCLUSION

96. The end of the cold war and apartheid has had a significant impact on the security environment of South and Southern Africa. In the perceived absence of an immediate conventional threat to South Africa and its people, non-military factors of insecurity that emanate at the global, continental and regional levels, are the main concern. Of these, poverty, underdevelopment,
deteriorating health status and inadequate/weak governance constitute the central factors contributing to insecurity in Africa.

97. National security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition, which includes the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature. Since many of these sources of insecurity transcend state borders, collective action must be undertaken within multilateral organisations to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions. Accordingly, security can no longer be viewed within its traditional and narrow interpretation as militarily securing the state. Security must entail, as its objectives, not only the absence of war, but also the eradication of poverty and the pursuit of sustainable economic development, social justice and democratic governance. Furthermore, the interrelatedness and transnational nature of many contemporary security threats dictate that solutions are often beyond the control or capability of any single state and would, therefore, require collaborative action within multilateral organisations and collective security mechanisms at the international, continental and regional levels.

98. South Africa has a strong commitment to regional and continental peace, stability and development. This manifests in government’s commitment to NEPAD, the AU and SADC and their structures and mechanisms. Government’s commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels consequently imply a long term Defence involvement in collective defence and security including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence co-operation. Prioritisation is thus increasingly being placed on peace missions, with particular focus on reconstruction, especially in the areas of security sector reform and the successful integration of the armed forces.

99. South Africa’s national security intent and priorities thus have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of the Defence Force. Addressing concerns of environmental security dictates that the planning and execution of military activities takes into account the impact it will have on the environment.

100. Summing up, both the international and the continental strategic environments are extremely fluid and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. This is a factor of both national actors and non-state groups - ideological, political and criminal - playing varying roles that have the potential to impact on stability and security.

101. The result is an ever-evolving palette of potential challenges, risks and threats that can affect Africa and, more specifically, Southern Africa, directly and indirectly. The terrorist attacks in parts of Africa and the escalation and spread of maritime criminality in African waters are merely two examples of this.

102. South Africa is in every way an integral part of the international community and, particularly, of the African continent and Southern African, and is not immune to this challenge. In fact, it is clearly in South Africa’s interests to work towards peace, security and stability in its wider environment. This will at times require the deployment of elements of the Defence Force for a wide range of missions in addition to its core mission of deterrence and defence and that of safeguarding South Africa and its interests.

103. That requires a balanced Defence Force with the requisite strength and the appropriate spread of capabilities and depth of personnel and material resources to handle a diverse and evolving set of challenges.
1. Defence expenditure data is important for four reasons:
   a. Firstly, it promotes democratic discussion of the role and tasks of the military.
   b. Secondly, it facilitates discussion of resource allocation within a national budget between the military and the civil sectors.
   c. Thirdly, its disclosure should form part of early-warning systems and confidence-building measures to prevent military tension, arms races and armed conflict. Increased defence spending can be a prominent indicator of a military build-up prior to armed conflict, as war requires the diversion of resources for the purchase of arms, munitions and other logistics.
   d. Fourthly, it can be used as a tool to discuss common security needs between states, as well as burden-sharing within alliances and coalitions.

2. Below is a broad overview of the main defence expenditure and arms transfer trends on the international, continental and regional levels.

GLOBAL TRENDS IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

3. Towards the end of the Cold War, international defence expenditure declined and remained stable up until 1998 (Figure 13 below). By 1999, international defence expenditure started to increase significantly and rose even more rapidly with the commencement of the War on Terror in September 2001. By 2009, international defence expenditure reached defence spending levels associated with the Cold War-era.

4. The sub-regions with the largest growth in defence expenditure since 2000 were:
   a. North Africa (107%),
   b. Eastern Europe (88%).

c. North America (75%).

d. East Asia (71%).

e. South Asia (57%).

Figure 13: World Military Expenditure Trends: 1988 - 2009

5. Algeria is the biggest military spender in North Africa and the African continent. The strong growth in Eastern Europe is accounted for by the Russian Federation, whose armed forces are going through a significant modernisation programme up to 2020.

6. The strong defence expenditure trend in North America is attributed to the United States, whose defence budget increased from 3.1% to 4.9% of GDP and by approximately 75% in real terms, remaining the highest international spender on defence. The United States spent 43% of the world's defence spending in 2009, followed by China (6.6%), France (4.2%), the United Kingdom (3.8%) and Russia (3.5%). In contrast, during the Cold War (1986), the US spent only 28% of the world total on defence.

7. Western and Central Europe were the two sub-regions that had the lowest growth in defence spending over the same period. The decrease in Western European defence spending is an indication of how many countries in this region reverted to an emphasis on "soft power" rather than military power.

8. Figure 14 below is a comparative graph of selected countries that demonstrates their 2009 defence expenditure is constant US$ across the three planes of actual budget, percentage of gross domestic product and percentage of government expenditure.

9. Another trend over the last decade is a rapid increase in defence expenditure by countries in many different regions through revenues from natural resources and particularly oil and gas. The rapid increase in defence expenditure was enabled by high commodity prices, new discoveries and exploitation. Algeria is the biggest military spender in North Africa and the African continent. Countries with the highest growth in military spending include: Chad (663%), Azerbaijan (471%), Kazakhstan (360%) and Ecuador (241%).

African Defence Spending

10. In the New Millennium, Africa enjoyed unprecedented economic growth of between 5% and 6% p.a. in terms of real GDP until 2008. The continent was, however, hard hit by the global financial crisis as commodity prices decreased and economic growth declined to 3.1% in 2009 but is expected to steadily recover into the next decade. Africa’s defence expenditure mirrored economic growth, increasing by 51% over the period 1998 to 2007 (see Figure 15 below), largely driven by Algeria’s 97% increase in defence spending. In the rest of Africa, defence spending is relatively low by international standards.

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11. Although Africa’s defence spending increased in real terms, sub-Saharan Africa’s defence spending declined from an average of 1.75% of GDP in 2004 to 1.24% in 2008 (Figure 16).

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12. Figures 17 and 18 below demonstrates East and Southern Africa’s defence expenditure from 1999 to 2008 indicating that South Africa and Angola spend most on defence in Southern Africa, while Kenya and Ethiopia spend most in East Africa. Nigeria spends the most on defence in the West Africa.

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Note 1: nk = not known
Note 2: 1990 figures in italics are for 1991; no 1990 figures available
Note 3: 1990 figures underlined are for 1992; no 1990 figures available
Note 4: 2010 figures in italics are for 2009; no 2010 figures available.
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 17: Defence Expenditure in East and Southern Africa (1999 to 2008)
13. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a steady decline in global arms transfers which reached a low-point in 2002. Since 2002 there has been a steady increase in arms transfers up until 2007, with a decrease in 2008 (Figure 19 below) which has not reversed the overall upward trend.
14. Between 1980 and 1984, the top five biggest arms suppliers were the Soviet Union, the US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. This list changed very little in the following decades and the post-Cold War era. The top suppliers and recipients are indicated in Figure 20 below.

a. Between 2004 and 2008, the largest arms suppliers were the US, Russia, Germany, France and the UK and they accounted for 78% of all arms exports.

b. The top five recipients of conventional weapons between 2004 and 2008 were China, India, the UAE, South Korea and Greece.

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*Figure 19: The Trend in Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons (1999-2008)*

The bar graph shows annual totals and the line graph shows the five-year moving average. Five-year averages are plotted at the last year of each five-year period.

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38 Between 2005 and 2009, combat aircraft accounted for 27% of all arms transfers.
Figure 20: The Suppliers and Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons (2004-2008)\(^{39}\)

\(^{39}\) SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
15. African states accounted for 7% of international imports of major conventional weapons over the period 2004 to 2008\textsuperscript{40}. Over this period, Algeria and South Africa were the largest arms importers in Africa and accounted for 35% and 27% of imports respectively. Sudan was the third largest recipient of conventional weapons with 8% of imports. The arms imports of Chad (Sudan’s neighbour) increased five times over the period 2004 to 2008 than from 1999 to 2003.

16. Countries with increased revenues from natural resources such as oil and gas are generally spending more on defence. African oil-producing countries such as Algeria, Chad, Angola and Sudan can therefore be expected to significantly increase their military inventories over the short, medium and long-term.

**SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE SPENDING**

**BUDGET TRENDS**

17. South Africa’s defence spending has fluctuated considerably over the past century. After the spikes of the First World War and the Second World War, when spending reached a high of more than 17% of GDP, spending declined sharply to around 1% of GDP until the 1990s, when it increased to between 2% and 3% of GDP, rising sharply to almost 12% in the late-1990s (Figure 21). The defence budget grew almost tenfold in nominal terms between 1975 and 1989, from R1 billion to R9.4 billion. In constant dollar value, however, the increase was modest—from US$3 billion per year in the early 1980s to US$3.43 billion per year in the last half of that decade, based on 1988 prices. Defence spending averaged 16.4% of government spending in the 1980s; it ranged from a high of 22.7% in 1982 to a low of 13.7% in 1987, but rose again to 15.7% of government spending in 1989\textsuperscript{41}.

![Figure 21: Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP](image-url)
18. In 1989, South Africa ranked 13th in total world-wide military expenditure, 44th in world military spending as a percentage of gross national product and 63rd in world military spending as a percentage of total government spending. South Africa also ranked 49th in the size of its armed forces, but only 103rd in terms of the size of armed forces in relation to population.

19. By the mid-1990s, South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% of gross domestic product and less than 10% of total government spending. Military salaries by that time consumed more than half of defence spending. Spending on armaments and equipment declined from 44% of defence spending in the 1980s to 28% in 1994.

20. Between 1995 and the approval of the Defence Review in 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1% (Rb1,444) in nominal terms, with the concurrent mismatch arising between policy intent and execution. The defence budget further decreased from 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and has levelled out in recent years at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP. The 1998 Defence Review force design was consequently neither affordable nor sustainable, especially following the defence budget cuts in the late 1990s. South Africa at present spends less than 1.2% of GDP on defence (Figure 22), translating to less than 5 cents out of every rand of total budget being expended on defence. The SANDF is effectively nearly 24 percent underfunded.

![Figure 22: Recent Defence Allocations](image)

**IMPACT ON DEFENCE CAPABILITIES**

21. While South Africa is not perceived to be a global military force, it can be considered a regional military power in the context of Southern Africa. It furthermore has major international commitments to Africa in the form of peace support operations, most notably in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and has also recently begun military operations to support Mozambique in fighting piracy off its coast. In addition to the enduring deployments in support of the UN and AU,
various deployments of a shorter duration are also being executed. Internally, the Defence Force has redeployed back to country’s borders, further increasing the Defence Force’s operational tempo. Domestic and international commitments are thus currently at a level far beyond the policy predictions of the late 1990s.

22. In addition, the decrease in the defence allocation reflects directly in the level of prime equipment the defence force can acquire and operate. Figure 23 indicates the relative force levels over a fifty year period from 1961 to 2011. The line-graph uses a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis in order to be able to reflect the number of combat vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels on one chart. The horizontal axis shows defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, with the year on year percentage being reflected in the bar-graph. The graphs show that:

- In 1961, the Defence Force had around 680 combat vehicles, peaking at around 6,470 vehicles at the end of the 1990s and beginning to plateau around 1,680 vehicles in 2011.
- In 1961, the Defence Force had around 91 combat aircraft in service, peaking at around 335 in the mid-1980s and 48 in 2006. This has risen to 65 with the introduction of the SAAB Gripen light fighter.
- In 1961, the Defence Force had 23 warships (frigates, destroyers and submarines) and this has decreased to 11 warships in 2011.

23. The integration of the Strategic Defence Packages has proven to be far more costly than was planned. The introduction of recently acquired modern defence equipment has resulted in an unpredicted increase in their operating cost. In most instances:
a. In order to reduce initial cost, life-cycle logistic support was not fully provided for during acquisition and it was envisaged that this would be covered in the operating budget of the combat services.

b. The current operating budget has proven insufficient to cover higher than planned fuel costs, in-service training, maintenance, repair and support to modern defence systems.

c. The introduction of new defence systems required that they were extensively operated to prove doctrine, resulting in unanticipated costs.

24. Defence prime mission equipment is thus unsustainable within the current budget allocation and standards of proficiency are ever decreasing, due partly to both limited funds for force preparation and the poor serviceability of certain major prime mission equipment.

25. The major defence programmes (landward defence, air defence, maritime defence, military health support and command and control systems) therefore have definable risks and shortcomings, exacerbated by the ongoing escalation in fuel and medical prices, increased maintenance costs and the high tempo of operations which have to be supported along extended logistic lines.

26. The South African military is consequently too poorly equipped and funded to execute the widening spectrum of tasks to the desired level\textsuperscript{47}. The increase in defence commitments from 1999 onwards, the introduction of new weapon systems and the lack of any significant adjustment to the defence allocation has rendered the Defence Force unsustainable and only partially compliant with the constitutional imperative to defend and protect South Africa and its people. It is severely stretched and many of its core military capacities require an intervention to make them sustainable.

IMPACT ON READINESS

27. The Minister, the Military Command and the Defence Secretariat have consequently raised their concerns on the persistent defence underfunding and have consistently articulated the consequences, as set out below.

Landward Defence

28. The SA Army faces block obsolescence of its prime mission equipment and much of its support capabilities. This is directly attributable to the SA Army not having benefitted from a Strategic Defence Package capital renewal programme as had the SA Air Force and the SA Navy.

29. The lack of an adequate operating budget has further resulted in the serviceability of equipment remaining in service to steadily decline as major repair and maintenance programmes have been pushed to the right in order to reallocate the majority of its operating budget to personnel related expenditures.

30. As a result of the above constraints the SA Army is no longer in a position to conduct major combat operations, nor fully rollout the forces needed to safeguard South Africa’s borders within the required timeframes.

Air Defence

31. The SA Air Force remains critically underfunded. This has a direct impact upon its ability to maintain combat readiness across the full spectrum of operational tasks expected of it.

32. The air combat and air combat support capability is severely constrained due to an inadequate flying hour’s budget. This has resulted in insufficient pilots being trained to fly the newly acquired fighter aircraft and combat support helicopters and in those that have been trained not being afforded the opportunity to fly the requisite hours for maintaining combat proficiency. From a combat readiness perspective these capabilities, therefore, remain largely grounded. Such aircraft as can be mounted for an operation will also be restricted in their combat radius due to the loss of the in-flight refuelling capability.

33. The medium and light fixed wing transport aircraft are all reaching the end of their operational life. Increased upgrade, repair and maintenance cycles have resulted in a reduction of their operational availability. Currently the fleet is unable to meet the lift requirements for supporting the external operations and any surge in this requirement will result in an even greater reliance on contracted airlift services.

34. The absence of airborne early air warning sensors have resulted in a situation where only limited aerial domain awareness exists over large parts of South Africa’s airspace today. The conduct of intelligence driven operations aimed at safeguarding South Africa’s territorial integrity and protecting its borderlines are thus severely restricted.

Maritime Defence

35. The SA Navy experiences severe pressure on its operating budget. This has primarily been brought about by increased sustainment costs resulting from the increased operational tempo of its Frigates as well as the need to keep the obsolete Offshore Patrol Vessels operating until their eventual replacement. The situation is further exacerbated by increased personnel spending necessitating the reallocation of critical maintenance and repair funds. This has resulted in a situation where the SA Navy’s vessels can no longer be made combat ready to execute the full range of missions they were designed for. In particular it is the primary war-fighting capabilities that have been severely affected.

36. The absence of dedicated static and airborne maritime sensors has resulted in a situation where virtually no maritime domain awareness exists around South Africa’s coasts today. The conduct of intelligence driven operations aimed at safeguarding South Africa’s territorial integrity and protecting resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone is thus severely restricted.

Military Health

37. The rising cost of medical care in South Africa is mirrored in the SA Military Health Service. The cost of medicine, medical equipment and contractual obligations places enormous strain on the SAMHS budget, exacerbated by increased personnel spending. The military health budget now faces ever growing pressure due to the provision of free medical care to dependants and military veterans. The quality of medical care delivered to serving members of the Defence Force is consequently less than acceptable.
38. Shortfalls in professional medical expertise severely limit operational medical support. Medical support can currently only be sustained at less than a conventional brigade through the deployment of a medical battalion group minus. Similarly, chemical and biological defence capabilities have become aged and obsolete and the professional medical institutes are struggling to provide specialised medical and research services.

39. Level 4 and Level 3 hospitals providing support to the Defence Force are being upgraded through a repair and maintenance programme (RAMP) intervention which will partially address these facilities. However, these hospitals must be recapitalised, new Military Base Hospitals built, pharmaceutical stocks replenished and a specialised Medical Base Depot established to store pharmaceuticals, including those required for national reserve stock.

**Strategic Stock Reserves**

40. The required ammunition stock level for the national reserve is currently unspecified, but it is believed that to comply with the constitutional imperative, an Army Mechanised Brigade must be supported for ninety days in a mixture of high, medium and low intensity operations, with requisite combat support and combat service support being rendered by combat services and staff divisions.

41. Current ammunition levels can by no means support this level of effort. The Defence Force's ammunition stocks have been depleted over time and ammunition must be procured for training, deployments and national reserve replenishment. The Defence Force needs to urgently invest in new ammunition as well as the scheduled disposal of aged ammunition in order to allow for the following:

   a. Building up of ammunition reserves.
   b. Training and formally exercising forces.
   c. Replacing old and unstable ammunition.
   d. Providing controlled throughput of ammunition.
   e. Sustaining strategic capabilities in the defence industry.

42. Depot spares and equipment are generally depleted and equipment in stock requires repair and/or replacement. Fragmented management information systems inhibit integrated and systemic decision making.

**Defence Facilities**

43. The condition of defence facilities is significantly impacting on readiness and sustainability due to a facility maintenance backlog. This impact is increasing in leaps and bounds.

44. The National Department of Public Works' budget for maintenance, municipal rates and services and leases has been devolved to the Defence Force, requiring alternative approaches to facility maintenance being investigated, including the establishment of a Defence Works Formation. Defence must budget in future for its total facility cost.

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48 1 Mil Hospital is one of the contracted Level 4 (Out of Mission) UN Hospitals in Africa.
45. Key force preparation facilities and weapons ranges are under threat.
   a. Operational infrastructure (runways, taxiways, approach lights, approach aids, control towers, fire fighting services, etc) require interventions to remain functional.
   b. Facilities and infra-structure in general require major upgrades, renovation and maintenance.
   c. Training infrastructure (simulators, classrooms, etc) is in need of maintenance, repair, replacement and/or upgrading.
   d. Support contracting for 2nd, 3rd and 4th line maintenance is severely constrained.

46. There is severe pressure to release DOD land for alternate uses. Several strategic Defence Force depots and training and testing ranges are already threatened by encroachment, reducing their effectiveness and posing potential risk to the safety of encroaching communities.

THE IMPACT ON PERSONNEL, OPERATING AND CAPITAL

47. The allocation of the current defence budget is also a matter of concern. In FY 2010/11 the compensation of employees rose to 55% of the allocation, despite these employees "being, at entry level, the lowest paid of South Africa’s public servants"\(^{49}\). This leaves little for training and exercises or for operations such as peacekeeping or the maintenance of public order\(^{50}\).

48. The 1998 Defence Review pegged the defence personnel budget at 40% of the total budget with 30% to be spent on operating costs and the remaining 30% to be spent on capital costs (40:30:30 ratio). As can be seen in Figures 24 and Figure 25, the 40% benchmark was maintained until FY 2009/10, where after personnel spending, as a percentage of the defence budget climbed remarkably beyond the envisaged 40% of allocation to 55%.


### Figure 24: Personnel, Operating and Capital Expenditure in Recent Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>% Personnel Exp</th>
<th>% Operating Exp</th>
<th>% Capital Exp</th>
<th>Total Exp (Rb)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23 829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27 801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30 442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 25: Personnel, Operating and Capital as Portions of the Defence Budget
49. This upward trend can be attributed to six main causes:

   a. Increased level of tasks, such as regional peace-keeping and border safeguarding commitments have brought about a higher personnel requirement.

   b. The general phenomenon of growing labour costs in South Africa.

   c. Government’s employment imperative required all vacant posts in the public service to be filled, creating upward pressure on the defence personnel budget.

   d. Defence retains people who no longer fit their post-profile or who cannot be economically employed.

   e. Recent service-improvements for defence personnel were introduced without commensurate budget augmentation from the National Treasury.

   f. The defence budget was augmented each year accordingly for the Strategic Defence Packages. The tapering off of these additional capital funds means that in recent years the ratio of personnel, operating and capital has normalised the defence budget.

50. The expanding defence personnel budget impacts negatively on the defence operating budget, resulting in an under-investment in the levels of maintenance and repair, training and force preparation required to meet South Africa’s defence commitments. However, this apparently inflated personnel budget is not necessarily an indication of inflated staffing, but of an insufficient operating and capital budget to support the activities of the Defence Force.

51. Similarly, capital spending has declined to close on 10% of the allocation, impacting negatively on the consequential renewal of prime mission equipment, constant reprioritising of the capital budget and delayed decision making on defence acquisitions.

52. The acquisition of new armament has been sub-optimal due to a number of interrelated factors impacting upon the process.

53. In the first place the absence of an approved Force Design giving rise to a fully funded long term Joint Armaments Plan has resulted in a fragmented approach to acquiring new armaments where Services and Divisions largely act in silos and base their current armaments planning on their current financial allocations as reflected in the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP) within the MTEF timeframe. This “silo” approach has resulted in sub-optimal acquisition solutions being sought that have not fully supported the tenets of jointness and the enhanced defence effect that could have been achieved. It has further resulted in acquisition priorities being shifted frequently and in critical needs being only part satisfied.

54. In the second place the acquisition process itself is very slow due to the number of regulatory checks and balances that have been built into it. This inter alia results in equipment only becoming available long after the requirement was registered, by which time the requirement has invariably changed, giving rise to a new requirement or a modification(s) to the requirement being initiated. Exacerbating this situation is requirement creep during the acquisition process which results in both time and cost overruns.

55. In the third place, given the complexity of the process, the capacity to support the process is often lacking. This has been evident within the Defence Force, ARMSCOR and even within industry.
There is thus a need to both streamline the process and to capacitate it fully by personnel specifically educated in capital acquisition.

56. Figure 26 below demonstrates the decline in uniformed defence personnel (Regulars and Reserves) consequential to the decline in the defence allocation. The left hand Y-axis indicates the numbers of actual personnel and the right hand Y-axis indicates defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The bar graph indicates the actual defence allocation per year as a percentage of GDP.

![Figure 26: Defence Personnel Over Time](image)

57. Figure 26 clearly demonstrates the rapid decline of the Reserve Component between 1991 and 1996, the years following the end of military conscription. This trend has slowed in recent years, indicating that stability is being achieved in the Reserve Component. Transformation has been slow due to a lack of investment in the Reserves. The requirement for relatively small Regular Component backed by a sufficiently large Reserve Component has not been complied with and consequently the strategic imperative of being able to rapidly and cost effectively expand through a Reserve Component is limited. The effect of voluntary severance incentives late 1980s and post 1996 is clearly evident in the trends for the Regular Component. Nonetheless, the Regular Component has remained relatively constant, with some growth in recent years.

58. Notwithstanding this immense decline in the Reserve Component, there has, in recent years, been a consistent upward Reserve utilisation trend in the pursuit of defence obligations. In particular there has been a significant year-on-year increase in the number of Reserves called to active duty. This indicates a healthy core of Reserves which are the basis for the future growth and rejuvenation of the Reserve Component. The Reserve Component, being the surge capability to meet ordered commitments, requires significant investment. The current capacity of the Reserves needs to be enhanced through a concerted effort to equip and train members of the Reserve Component.
59. Defence members with scarce and professional skills are leaving the Defence Force at concerning rates. It is clear that the Occupational Specific Dispensations have some effect in stemming these losses, but conditions of service continue to contribute to these losses.

60. The Defence Force is experiencing an alarming loss of skilled personnel, specifically engineers, technicians, aircrew and legal officers, amongst others, requiring specific occupational dispensations to prevent the further loss of scarce skills. The retention of large numbers of persons who can no longer be gainfully employed further exacerbates this situation.

61. Linked thereto is a serious shortage of technical personnel throughout the Defence Force. This is due to a mixture of the inadequacy of employment incentives and structures, limited intakes, limited training, reduced status of technical personnel, economic growth (external demand) and industry practice. Organic forward maintenance support (1st and 2nd line) to the increasingly modern and complex weapon systems of the Defence Force is seriously affected, and may lead to dependence on contractor support in operational areas. There is an urgency to improve employment incentives for technical personnel, improve technical structures, and increase intakes and training numbers.

CONCLUSION

62. The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, government expectations and the resource allocation have eroded defence capabilities to the point where the Defence Force is unable to fully deliver its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people, and, further, cannot even support the current modest level of ambition. Even with an immediate intervention, it will take at least five years to stabilise the decline and another five years to develop a limited and sustainable defence capability. The longer the current state of affairs is perpetuated, the greater the effort and cost will be to arrest the decline and restore the capabilities required to safeguard South Africa's borders, protect its maritime trade routes, conduct Peace Missions and humanitarian interventions and to defend and protect the country against aggression.

63. Defence expenditure is often expressed in terms of a percentage of the GDP that is allocated to defence. It is in this context that international donor agencies have used the figure of 2% of GDP as being a reasonable amount for a developing country to spend on defence when it is at peace, is not faced with instability in its immediate region or with any direct threat. The real significance of this measure of defence spending is that it is an indicator of national will. It is a clear indication of how seriously a country takes its security, of how seriously it takes commitments it has undertaken in respect of regional defence or security arrangements, and how willing it is to face up to unexpected threats to itself or its region.

64. Consequently, if it is to be effective, the Defence Force must be funded adequately and appropriately:

   a. The defence budget must meet the financial requirements that arise from the roles and mission sets assigned by government to the Defence Force.

   b. The defence budget must provide steady funding over time, not on a boom or bust cycle, to allow the Defence Force to equip and train effectively

65. This requirement can be best met by handling defence funding as four complementary sub-budgets:

   a. Defence Force Operating Budget;
b. Defence Force Contingency Budget;

c. Defence Force Capital Budget; and

d. Defence Force Operational Employment Budget.

66. **Defence Force Operating Budget.** The operating budget must provide the funding to enable the Defence Force to sustain itself at the strength and readiness levels that are required to meet standing tasks and identified contingencies as developed from Defence Policy, as well as the additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks. The operating budget must, therefore, provide steady funding to cover:

   a. Personnel costs (salaries and allowances; accommodation or allowances; health support; etc);

   b. Personnel development costs (education, training, development; relevant training centres and schools);

   c. Unit, formation, joint and multi-national field training exercises;

   d. Maintenance, repair and overhaul costs in respect of equipment and systems;

   e. Modernisation of equipment and systems;

   f. Maintenance, repair and refurbishment costs in respect of facilities; and

   g. The additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks.

67. **Defence Force Contingency Budget.** The contingency budget must hold sufficient funds to meet the immediate financial requirements that would arise in the event of certain identified contingencies arising.

   a. Such contingencies can include deployment in support of the Police or for disaster aid, emergency relief or search and rescue operations, the financial impact of which can to a reasonable extent be estimated and planned for.

   b. This budget must also, however, provide for such contingencies as external disaster aid or emergency relief operations or an emergency evacuation of South African citizens from another country. Such contingencies must be identified as early as possible on the basis of continuous evaluation of intelligence, so that funds can be transferred into this account in good time from government contingency funds.

68. **Defence Force Capital Budget.** The capital budget must provide the planned funding to enable the Defence Force to equip itself to meet the operational demands arising from the standing tasks and identified contingencies as developed from Defence Policy. The capital budget must, therefore, provide planned, phased funding to cover:

   a. Upgrading equipment and systems to meet the demands of evolving operational and tactical requirements;

   b. Planned and phased (perhaps on a half-generation change-over basis) replacement of obsolete or obsolescent equipment and systems;
c. Acquisition of equipment and systems required for a force expansion necessitated by a change in:
   i. Defence Policy; or
   ii. The strategic situation.

d. Acquisition of equipment and systems required to develop new force capabilities necessitated by:
   i. A change in Defence Policy;
   ii. A change in the strategic situation; or
   iii. Technological developments.

69. **Defence Force Operational Employment Budget.** The employment budget must provide prompt, steady and sustained funding to cover additional costs arising from operational employment of the Defence Force or elements thereof. Operational employment results from political decisions and must be funded over and above the sustainment and capital budgets. The only exceptions are:

   a. Standing tasks assigned the Defence Force and for which a properly calculated contingency amount is provided included in the sustainment budget; and
   
   b. Short-term contingency deployments the costs of which are met from contingency budget funds.

70. The operational employment budget must, therefore, provide prompt, adequate, steady and sustained funding to cover the additional:

   a. Personnel costs (deployment allowances; family support; accommodation; health support; etc);
   
   b. Deployment costs (air and sea transport of personnel, equipment and supplies);
   
   c. Sustainment costs (provision of additional spares to cover higher utilisation rates; maintenance and repair of deployed equipment; rotation of equipment);
   
   d. Operational costs (the actual cost of operations – munitions, fuel, batteries, field rations, replacement of equipment damaged or lost in operations);

71. The operational employment budget must, in addition to the above, provide prompt and adequate funding to cover:

   a. Accelerated overhaul or replacement of equipment and systems resulting from the higher utilisation rates arising from operational employment; and
   
   b. Acquisition of equipment, systems, munitions or stores required to allow effective operations in a particular situation or theatre of operations.
1. Following the political transition in 1994, South Africa faced a new set of situational imperatives. These included the complete and fundamental remaking and restructuring of its social and political dispensations and the economy. South Africa had to create a democratic society, develop its constitutional imperatives, remove economic inefficiencies and under-development, and turn an inward-looking focus outward. South Africa had to harness its economic resources and liquidity to ensure the competitiveness of the economy and reintegration into the global economy. Restructuring of the corporate sector was also a strategic imperative. As a country, South Africa had to change the terms of its incorporation into the global system, and reintegrate itself into the political economy of the region and the continent with the aim of reducing the tenuousness of the African political and economic environment, and hence its own vulnerability. South Africa in essence needed to rehabilitate itself in the family of nations.

2. This massive process of rebuilding and reshaping society was informed and animated by the liberating vision of striving to overcome the legacy of apartheid and colonialism and instead building a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. On the international front, the building of just, equitable and cooperative relations with the rest of the world arose as a necessary condition for the realisation of South Africa's national policy goals.

3. Post 1994, one of the government's policy priorities was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was seen as the long-term means of promoting the well-being and security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country. The RDP focused on addressing the basic needs of the people, developing human resources, building the economy and democratising the state and society, and is thus viewed as part of the broader national security agenda. While the RDP has been overtaken by later policy initiatives, the fundamental principles of the RDP endure and are embedded in our understanding of national security.

4. Constitutional provisions clearly prescribe a fundamental break from the tradition of military involvement in politics that characterised South Africa pre-1994. Traditionally, Cold-War national security had a narrow military and security focus that emphasised the physical protection of the state against external military threats. The security concept has now shifted from an inheritance of authoritarian law and order responses, to a broader concept of the safety and security for all citizens.

5. This broad perspective on safety and security, which emphasis on the wellbeing of the citizens, extends by implication to matters of political, economic, social and environmental security domains. The personal security of the individual extends to matters such as health, forced migration and absence of human rights, freedom from violations based on gender, rights of political and cultural communities, political, economic and democratic development.
6. This understanding of security does not replace the security of the state with the security of the people. It sees these aspects as mutually dependent. The state retains the obligation to facilitate, if not create, the necessary conditions and environment for the fulfilment of human security. Within this conceptualisation of security, Defence is but one of the element of power of the State that promotes and ensures national security. Although Defence contributes to the conditions of human security, this should not detract the Defence Force from its mandated functions. It should rather express both how the execution of its mandated functions and other specific initiatives will contribute to the development of our people.

Figure 27: The Security Paradigm
SOVEREIGNTY

7. South Africa is one sovereign and democratic state comprising a parliamentary republic. The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. National security has at its crux the protection and continuance of the sovereignty of South Africa, its political and economic independence, the protection of its institutions, values and freedoms, including the preservation of freedom from external interference.

8. South Africa's external and internal sovereignty is, inter alia, characterised as follows:

a. The Constitution is the supreme authority.

b. Ultimate political authority is vested in the people of South Africa. The public plays an active role in shaping and deciding policy through the expression of a general public will and an aggregate civil interest of citizens.

c. The people are democratically represented by a Head of State and a parliamentary representation system established at various levels.

d. The Rule of Law is applicable, obeyed and enforced and the legal system is free from interference.

e. South Africa possesses and exercises full authority and jurisdiction over its territory, claimed areas and resources, as well as the conferred rights in exclusive zones.

f. South Africa is free from outside influence, intimidation or coercion upon its basic prerogatives and is free to pursue relations with other states.

g. South African citizens are protected and are entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

h. The democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom are affirmed and are protected, promoted and fulfilled by the State.

i. Order and peace is maintained and sanction for the violation of laws enforced.

j. Government manages the internal affairs of the State and pursues the interests and welfare of its citizens.

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51 Constitution 1996: Section 1.
52 Constitution, 1996: Section 2.
54 Constitution 1996: Section 3(2)(a).
55 Constitution 1996: Section 3(2)(b).
56 Constitution 1996: Section 7(1).
57 Constitution 1996: Section 7(2).
9. The above characteristics of South Africa's sovereignty must be considered in relation to the mandate of the Defence Force as expressed in Section 200(2) of the 1996 Constitution which expresses the primary object of the defence force being to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

NATIONAL PURPOSE

10. South Africa is consequently a sovereign and peaceful country with no aggressive intentions towards any other State. It seeks to live in peace with its neighbours and actively pursues the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of other nation-states, preventing and deterring conflict, the defence of peace and security, the peaceful resolution of conflict and its vibrant participation in the systems of democracy and global governance. South Africa further recognises the interdependence of States and will seek to promote cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation.

11. South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial nation. It is further a developing nation whose domestic and foreign policies are driven by the developmental needs of its people. The cornerstone of South Africa’s future prosperity is sustainable economic growth and development, both domestically and in the Region. South Africa thus recognises that its prosperity and sustainability are inextricably entwined with those of the Region, and the converse thereof is true. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity, and prosperity.

12. Similarly, the security of South Africa and the security of the Region are inextricably entwined. A secure South Africa contributes to a secure Region and a secure Region contributes to a secure South Africa. Consequently, the concept of national security cannot exist independently from the concept of regional security and, concomitantly, South Africa’s national defence policy must take due cognisance of the role that the Defence Force must play in the promotion of regional security.

13. Africa is at the centre of South African policy. South Africa has significant economic and military capabilities that position it to make a unique contribution for many pressing African issues. South Africa, as a regional power, recognises its responsibility to contribute significantly to the advancement of the Continent. To this end, South Africa’s leadership in collaboration with other significant and able partners will provide momentum to African issues. South Africa specifically strives to:

a. Eradicate poverty, inequality and opportunity deprivation as the sources of instability.

b. Resolve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation, rather than through war.

c. Promote and consolidate freedom, the hard-won rights that have been gained, and the strengthening of the institutions that have been created.

d. Globalise these rights, freedoms and institutions wherever and whenever possible.

e. Promote the belief that the future of the world is based on the shared destiny of all peoples.
14. South Africa actively supports regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises. South Africa’s evolving international work recognises two canons, namely Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. This importantly means that our National Security is rooted in:


   b. South-South solidarity informing international relations and a firm opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms.

15. South Africa envisages that, as a major power in Africa, it will play a leadership role in conflict prevention, peace support operations, peace-building, and reconstruction. In its engagement with the Region, Continent and the international community, South Africa seeks to build an environment in which it can realise its political, security and economic interests. South Africa will seek to champion collaboration, cooperation and the building of partnerships in Africa.

**NATIONAL SECURITY**

16. Section 198 of the 1996 Constitution requires that:

   a. National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life;

   b. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation;

   c. National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law;

   d. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.

17. National security is pursued by all means of state-power, namely: political power, diplomatic power, information power, economic power, social power and lastly military power. South Africa pursues three main objectives (Triple-P’s):

   a. Promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of the people so as to free them from fear and want.

   b. Protecting the planet and managing climate change to ensure the sustainability for future generations of resources of energy, water and food.

   c. Ensuring the prosperity of the country, the Region and Continent, through sustainable economic growth and development.

18. These objectives cannot be achieved in isolation from one another. Promoting the well-being of the people to the exclusion of all else would lead to the planet not being sustainable and prosperity being unachievable. Striving for prosperity alone would lead to a society characterised by greed and exploitation, and a damaged planet. Only protecting the planet would lead to a too narrow ecological focus, poverty and the exclusion of the poor. An integrated approach is therefore required that incorporates and balances people, planet and prosperity.
19. Domestically the objectives of national security encompass the:
   a. Consolidation of democracy.
   b. The protection of constitutional order.
   c. The achievement of social justice.
   d. Economic development.
   e. A safe environment.
   f. Substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability.

CIVIL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL INTEREST

CIVIL INTERESTS

20. Civil society is often believed to express and represent the collective public interest. The public interest is at times convergent and other times divergent, often due to the diverse spectrum of interest groups present in civil society. The collective public interest is, however, understood to represent the aggregate collective interest of civil society.

21. Allied at times, but divergent at other times, to the public interest is the collective interest of the business sector. Bearing in mind that a vibrant economy is a fundamental pillar for the establishment and maintenance of a developmental state, the activities of the business sector is key to national growth and development. At other times self-serving actions and profiteering undermine the public interest.

22. Government interest is mostly expressed politically through the policies of the government of the day and is executed through government departments, agencies and public entities. That there is often a perceived dichotomy between public interest and government interest does not mean that the two are contradictory, let alone antagonistic. The expression of public interest is a fundamental characteristic of a democracy. In a consistently democratic dispensation, government exists not for its own sake, but to serve society. The Preamble to the 1996 Constitution makes this point clear when it states "We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic". Legitimate governments derive their mandate from the people, and elected representatives have the right and the responsibility to exercise leadership. Similarly, the governed have a right to contribute on how they should be governed.

23. Critical though is that public, business and government interests should not be subsumed under the fleeting passions of sectoral mood swings or the immediate self-interest of the elite.

NATIONAL INTEREST

24. South Africa’s national interest and its expression are evolving and maturing with its emergent nationhood, requiring cohesion and unity to be forged around consensus. National interest by definition is not static, but by its very nature is subject to periodic change and may also be subject to differing interpretations by sectors of society.
25. National interest is a collective concept that defines the aggregate of things that ensure national sovereignty and that guarantee the survival and flourishing of a nation. National interests are therefore, in the South African context, defined as:

“those cardinal interests that, if threatened or removed, would compromise the sovereignty, independence, survival, continuance or liberty of the Republic and therefore are considered vital for the functioning of the state, the security of the people and the preservation of the South African way of life”.

26. States define their National Interest at strategic moments in their development when the structural conditions that give rise to the national interest change in a fundamental way. It is not every day that the national interest is re-defined because the conditions that give rise to it are normally not volatile, but of longer duration.

27. National Interest has been described as a broad “sixth-sense” that evolves with a nation’s history, national experience and strategic context and is most often asserted by the formal authority, the State. National interest is about giving effect to the issues that shape the consciousness as a people and from which South Africans derive national identity. South Africa’s national interest reflects long-term goals, values and aspirations, provides the ongoing purpose to be served, provides strategic direction to policy makers, and provides consistency to policy.

28. National interest is collectively informed by the interests of all sectors of society: political; economic; social; security; etc. South Africa’s national interest is its collective endeavour, using its national assets to advance the well-being and contentment of the people, inclusive of ensuring its people’s survival and the safety of their institutions.

29. The well-being and development of the South African people forms the cornerstone of the national interest. South Africa sees the interests of its people at the core of its Constitution, and a people-centred approach therefore informs the work of the state. South Africa emphasises human development and human security within and beyond its borders. Therefore the national interest is informed by a people-driven perspective that prioritises protecting and promoting the human rights of its citizens; enabling them to live free from fear and want; eradicating poverty; and building a society in which every citizen has access to adequate shelter, health care, education, security, work and opportunities to generate an income.

30. National interests are therefore essential and indispensable and it is this realm that Defence has a significant role to play in the sovereignty of the State. It must be noted that national interests may, in some instances, be counter-posed to the interests of other states, thus informing the development of South Africa’s foreign policy.

31. Pursuit of the national interest will always give rise to differences of opinion and approaches. Overall, there will be those who do not accept the national interest. Furthermore, national interest and broad public interest should not be confused with the immediate self-interest of individuals or organisations.

32. National interest, due to its broad and shifting nature, cannot be decreed in statutes. It is posited that the framework for a national interest definition exists in a triad of such definition.

a. The 1996 Constitution remains the point of departure. This can be described as the ENDS of National Interest.
i. The preamble indicates that the Constitution exists to:

1. To heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.
2. To lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which governance is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law.
3. To improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person.
4. To build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.

ii. Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution defines the common values, namely:

1. Human dignity,
2. The achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms;
3. Non-racialism and non-sexism;
4. Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law;
5. Universal adult suffrage,
6. A national common voter’s roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of governance to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

b. The next point of the triad refers to how objectives are realised. This can be described as the WAYS of national interest. This would mean, among other things, contribution to the upliftment of the disadvantaged, economic growth, poverty-eradication and elimination of crime.

i. The ways are often expressed in the priority programmes of Government as found in the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF). At present the MTSF identifies ten priorities:

1. Speeding up economic growth and transforming economy to create decent work and sustainable livelihoods.
2. A programme to build economic and social infrastructure.
3. Comprehensive rural development strategy linked to land and agrarian reform and food security.
4. Strengthen our skills and human resource base.
5. Improve the health profile of the nation.
(6) Intensify the fight against crime and corruption.
(7) Build cohesive, caring and sustainable communities.
(8) Pursuing African advancement and enhanced international co-operation.
(9) Sustainable resource management and use.
(10) Building a development state including improvement of public services and strengthening democratic institutions.

c. The last point of the triad is that of the critical matter of detail. This may be referred to as the **MEANS** of national interest. The means are the detailed programmes, plans, budget and resources to realise the objectives set through the power bases of the State, including the military power base.

**National Interest in the Domestic Context**

33. In the domestic context, and bearing in mind national sovereignty, the South African national interest focuses on the interrelated priorities of the upliftment of the South African people, the promotion of constitutional order and the development of the economy. These interests and their sub-objectives are pursued by all power bases of the State, including the military power base. These are outlined below58:

a. **Ensure the Sovereignty of the Republic, its Constitutional Order and its Institutions.**
   i. Ensuring the protection and continuance of the sovereignty of the South African State; its national territory, islands, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf responsibilities.
   ii. Ensuring the state’s independence of decision making on its core prerogatives and international relations.
   iii. Ensuring the freedom of South Africa to trade, including the free use of land, air and sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs.
   iv. Ensuring the security, domestically and externally, of fundamental resources, minerals, energy and water required, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof.
   v. Ensuring the safety and security of domestic and external strategic installations.
   vi. Ensuring the safety and security of the South African people, both within national territory and abroad.
   vii. Ensuring the integrity and functioning of the core systems of the state and the capacity and resilience of state institutions, so as to ensure good governance and provide a better life for all.

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58 Not an exhaustive list.
viii. Ensuring that all tiers of government function in pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, transparency and accountability.

b. The Protection and Promotion of the Human Rights of all South Africans, including their Development and Upliftment.

i. Protecting and promoting the human rights of all South Africans.

ii. The development of the South African people.

iii. Strengthening the fight against poverty and inequality to ensure basic human dignity and opportunities for a life free from fear and want.

iv. Strengthening of democracy and public participation to achieve an inclusive society that belongs to all.

v. Building human capital and capabilities to improve the country's human resource and skills base.

vi. Improving public services to address the legacy of the past, meet basic needs, develop human resources and build the economy.

vii. Strengthening efforts to combat crime and corruption to ensure the safety of the South African people.

c. Ensure the Sustainable Growth and Development of the South African Economy.

i. Creating sustainable jobs and livelihoods by speeding up growth and transforming the economy.

ii. Building economic and social infrastructure to ensure investment growth, sustainable human settlements and economic development.

iii. Implementing a comprehensive rural development strategy to promote food security, and land and agrarian reform.

iv. Protecting, growing and harnessing our natural resource base, technology and national economic infrastructure.

v. Ensuring the development of renewable and sustainable sources of water and energy.

National Interest in the Regional Context

34. In the regional context, the South African national interest focuses on the interrelated priorities of the growth and development of the Southern African Region, continental peace and stability and the creation of a just and equitable world order. These interests and their sub-objectives are outlined below:
a. **Promote the Sustainable Growth and Development of the Southern African Region.**
   
i. Ensuring that South Africa is an integral part of the Southern African region.

   ii. Strengthening and consolidating institutions of security, democracy and governance in the region, with particular emphasis on strengthening and capacitating SADC and its structures.

   iii. Strengthening regional integration with particular emphasis on political and economic integration, and the building of efficient and responsive economic infrastructure.

   iv. Consolidating free trade and enhancing investment in the region.

   v. Strengthening partnerships with states in the region to increase cooperation across the political, economic, social and security sectors.

   vi. Contributing to conflict prevention, peace-making, peace keeping and post-conflict reconstruction in the Southern African Region.

b. **Promoting a Stable African Continent Enabling Peace and Development.**
   
i. Promoting human development and human security for all Africans.

   ii. Promoting peace, stability and good governance on the African continent.

   iii. Creating an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and development on the African continent.

   iv. Strengthening and capacitating the AU and its structures and promoting implementation of NEPAD.

   v. Supporting conflict prevention, peace-making, peace keeping and post-conflict reconstruction on the continent.

c. **Promote the Creation of a Just and Equitable World Order.**
   
i. Participating fully in fundamentally transforming multilateral structures and shaping a new equitable world order.

   ii. Promoting sustainable development and a rules-based international system.

   iii. Strengthening South-South relations, particularly with new emerging powers.

   iv. Engaging with strategic formations of the North to advance the African agenda.

   v. Taking and maintaining independent positions in our international relations work.
NATIONAL SECURITY POSTURE

35. South Africa believes that addressing the causes and consequences of conflict establishes a conducive environment for human security. South Africa thus pursues a people-centred approach to national security that places a legitimate, credible and cohesive developmental state at the centre for driving the overarching agenda of building a better South Africa, a better and safer Africa and a better world for all peoples.

36. National security will therefore be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social, environmental, cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain continental and regional stability.

37. South Africa, as a responsible government amongst the community of nations, reserves the right of self defence against aggressors and will equally protect the state and its people from threats to the sovereignty, independence and interests of South Africa. This will be done within the constraints of the Constitution, domestic law and the principles of international law (including customary international law).

38. Consequently, the objective of South Africa’s national policy and strategy is to firstly prevent and deter armed conflict and secondly succeed against the threat should all other measures fail. South Africa’s approach to national security and commitment to the African Agenda supports its regional, continental and global responsibilities and cascades towards a posture that emphasises peace, security and defence cooperation on the Continent.

39. South Africa has consequently adopted a defensive posture that firstly promotes security through political, economic and military cooperation with other states, and seeks to prevent, manage and resolve conflict through non-violent means. Government’s thus preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war, and to only resort to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed. South Africa has and will continue to employ the following principal strategies to this end:

   a. **Political, economic and military co-operation with other states.** In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and the pursuit of confidence and security building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important.

   b. **The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through nonviolent means.** Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.

   c. **The deployment of the Defence Force.** The use of force or the threat of the use of force, against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.

40. In order to achieve the principle strategies indicated above, South Africa will harness all forms of state power to achieve the following national security effects.
NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS

41. A security effect is a desired physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military and other state power intervention. A security effect thus involves the application of military and other national capabilities to achieve strategic outcomes in times of peace, conflict and war - not just military challenges, but also broader security challenges - and provides government with the ability to develop and consider a number of alternative options. An understanding of strategic effects allows defence to plan flexible capabilities.

42. The following security effects are pursued (Figure 28) in fulfilment of the South Africa’s national security:

   a. Anticipation.
   b. Deterrence.
   c. Prevention.
   d. Intervention.
   e. Stabilisation.

Figure 28: National Security Effects
ANTICIPATION

43. Priority is given to the ability to anticipate future threats in order to develop contingencies and responses to any increased instability in the strategic environment. The anticipation effect results in an appropriate strategic intelligence comprehension and a constant monitoring of risks to South Africa’s national interests. This intelligence comprehension provides South Africa with adequate early warning for the development of appropriate capabilities required for response.

44. The anticipation effect thus culminates in strategic intelligence comprehension, which in turn facilitates prediction, responsiveness, contingency and capability development and the preparation of appropriate and flexible responses. The collective effort of South Africa’s intelligence services constitutes the national anticipation capability. South Africa’s national security cannot be viewed in isolation from Regional and Continental Security, thus requiring that a premium be placed on the Regional and Continental Early Warning Systems.

45. Defence contributes in various ways to the national anticipation of foreseen and unforeseen developments and events that may impact on South Africa’s national interests. This inter alia includes scenario analysis and guidance to:

   a. Ensure a sufficient degree of flexibility, adaptability and resilience in the Defence organisation.

   b. The preparation of a sufficiently capable and flexible Defence Force.

46. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of intelligence is essential to support operations in which South Africa is or may be taking part. Defence must structure itself optimally for the anticipation effect.

DETERRENCE

47. Deterrence is the cornerstone of South Africa’s National Security and Defence Policies; its purpose being to dissuade a potential adversary from adopting a course of action that threatens South Africa’s national and vital interests. Deterrence may be described as a potential adversary’s perception of South Africa’s national will, resolve and ability to deny strategic objectives and to impose severe and unacceptable consequences against any threat posed. Deterrence is thus an over-arching national concept that links the military and other instruments of national power, other external measures such as alliances and treaties, to deter and counter specific threats to national security, support and advance national interests and to mitigate the continuum of possible conflict contingencies. Deterrence demands a focused, prompt, rapid and flexible national response to disparate threats, with the Defence Force being a key component of South Africa’s overall deterrent capability and posture.

48. Deterrence is only likely to succeed if the envisaged combination of threats and incentives is credible and deliverable, and its potential is communicated unequivocally to those in a position to assess it. Effective deterrence also depends upon a demonstrable contingent capability and overt preparedness, such that potential adversaries conclude, from their own evaluations, that the benefit to be gained from pursuing a particular course of action is not worth the risk associated with the possible or probable consequences. South Africa’s defence contribution to deterrence is based upon credible forces; rapid force generation capability in the form of trained Reserves; operational record; demonstrated ability in field training; technological and doctrinal competence; and, the visible morale of personnel.
49. A credible deterrent posture requires manifest political intent and may take a variety of different forms. It may be general or focused on achieving particular or immediate objectives, be broadly preventative, or intended to address specific threats.

**PREVENTION**

50. Emphasis is placed on prevention of conflict through peaceful means by enhancing cooperation and collaboration on developmental and security issues that could potentially lead to threats to South Africa’s National Interest. Prevention requires a national ability to peacefully reduce, defuse or resolve potential conflict and disputes through political and diplomatic means. The spectrum of preventative efforts may extend from that of cooperation and collaboration between parties or States to that of negotiation or arbitration.

51. South Africa’s prevention effect is vested in the political, legal, diplomatic and intelligence dimensions of State authority. Defence contributes to the prevention effect through both its defence cooperation and intelligence actions. The importance of international defence cooperation structures that are entered into must be assessed within the framework of this strategic effect. As South Africa’s national security depends on good international relations and well functioning security institutions, it is therefore important to continue to invest in them. This is specifically relevant for the strengthening and capacitating of the Regional and Continental security architecture.

52. The Defence contribution includes *inter alia* the following:

   a. Defence relations and cooperation contacts with countries that have political and strategic importance for South Africa, including the deployment of defence attachés and cooperative endeavours.

   b. Assistance with the development of defence capabilities in friendly states through advising, training and educating security personnel and organisation, so as to prevent new conflicts or the re-emergence of old conflicts.

   c. Encourage compliance with international statute and customary international law; arms control regimes and International Humanitarian Law.

53. In the domestic context Defence can, in support of civil authority, contribute to the prevention of social disruption by increasing the resilience of the population through various programmes and initiatives.

**PROTECTION**

54. South Africa’s protection effect is concerned with the security of South Africa, its people, sovereignty, territory and national interests. This national effect is the cumulative capacity of all elements of state power harnessed around the maintenance, preservation, safeguarding and defence of the South African people and state. Notwithstanding the vast contribution made by all other organs of state, the Defence Force plays a pivotal role in this regard with most defence capabilities organised towards the maintenance of this effect. The Defence contribution to the protection effect will, *inter alia*, extend to aspects such as:

   a. Defending the Republic against external aggression or internal threats to the constitutional order.
b. The execution of national tasks, such as border safeguarding, maritime security, cybersecurity and airspace defence.

c. The safeguarding of South Africa’s vital infrastructure and national key points.

d. The collaborative or unilateral protection of South Africa’s vital interests, either within its national territory or further abroad.

e. Carrying out operations to protect South African territory abroad and either protect or evacuate South African diplomats and citizens abroad.

f. Assisting civil authority with the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of public order and security.

g. Assistance in disaster relief and in the event of large-scale incidents.

h. Fulfilling South Africa’s international treaty obligations.

i. Contributing to the social upliftment of the South African people within the context of a developmental state.

INTERVENTION

55. South Africa’s intervention effect is the comprehensive coercive capacity of the State, within the rule of law, to influence, interrupt, intrude or force change in the outcome of events, developments or contingencies that demonstrably threaten South African interests. An intervention may also extend to a collaborative effort with other allies or multilateral organisations against other states, groups or individuals. Such intervention may thus extend to:

a. Collaborative protection of threatened interests beyond South Africa’s borders with the host nation state.

b. Deliberate protection of threatened interests beyond South Africa’s borders if there is a lack of capacity or will to intervene by the host nation state.

c. An intervention in the wider interest, such as an intervention in the case of grave circumstances or human rights violations, establish or re-establish the international rule of law, or to separate belligerent parties in a conflict.

STABILISATION AND NORMALISATION

56. The stabilisation and normalisation effect relates to the immediate and extended intent to improve circumstances, restore equilibrium and create the condition for the promotion of stability, security and the rule of law in a former area of conflict or instability. This is a collective effort, in which government departments, business, labour, multilateral organisations and the spectrum of non-governmental organisations have a role to play in assisting stabilisation efforts and promoting of stable political, economic and social development and the rule of law. These create the conditions for the creation or continuation of political, social and economic development.

57. Defence organisations are repeatedly called on to contribute defence assets to post-conflict reconstruction or emergency relief in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. Although the responsibility for those activities lies in the civilian domain, the circumstances sometimes require the
use of defence assets. Such stabilisation operations often require years and sometimes decades of military commitment, placing a high demand on those assisting.

58. The defence contribution to the stabilisation effect is diverse in nature, but would focus primarily on the reconstruction of the security sector through the demobilisation of belligerent parties and the establishment and training of the statutory defence force. Defence expertise is often required to advise and train security organisation in post-conflict areas. With respect to this strategic function, the armed forces can make the following contributions:

a. International peace support operations.

b. International humanitarian assistance and intervention in support of civil authority.

c. Reconstruction in a former conflict area.

d. Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former belligerents.

e. Demobilisation and repatriation of child soldiers and those not wishing to take up arms in a statutory force.

f. Advising, training and educating security personnel and organisations.

CONCLUSION

59. The above confirms the need to establish a coordinated national security system, inclusive of a National Security Council.
1. The 1996 Constitution mandates the Defence Force, as the only lawful military force in the Republic, for the protection and defence of the Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force. Schedule 6, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution legislates the following constitutional functions for which the Defence Force may be employed:

   a. for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
   b. for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
   c. for service in the preservation of life, health or property;
   d. for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
   e. for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
   f. for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.

2. Furthermore, the Defence Act, 2002 [Sec 18(1)(d)] provides that Defence Force may be employed to effect national border control.

3. The Public Service Act 1993 requires that:

   a. Each department shall have a head.
   b. The head of department shall be responsible for the efficient management and administration of his or her department, including the effective utilisation and training of staff, the maintenance of discipline, the promotion of sound labour relations and the proper use and care of State property, and he or she shall perform the functions that may be prescribed.

4. The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 requires that:

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a. Every department and every constitutional institution must have an accounting officer\(^{62}\).

b. The head of department is the accounting officer\(^{63}\).

c. The duties of the accounting officer are prescribed in Section 38(1) of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999).

5. The Defence Mandate logic is unpacked as per Figure 29 below.

![Figure 29: Defence Mandate Unpacked](image)

6. In alignment with National Posture, South Africa’s Defence Posture will be premised on a ‘layered’ approach to defence and security by acting in partnership with others whenever that is practicable in order to:

   a. Defuse contentious issues or situations before they give rise to serious dispute or potential for conflict;

   b. Resolve disputes and conflicts that do arise by means of diplomacy, mediation or negotiation; and

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c. Develop and entrench regional and continental collaborative systems and means, including alliances and pacts, to reduce the potential for tension and conflict and to increase the potential for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts that do arise.

7. Understanding that there will be threats that cannot be defused or countered by peaceful means, South Africa will, nevertheless:
   a. Maintain adequate and appropriate armed forces matched to the requirements of a continually evolving strategic situation, and
   b. Regularly review and update defence policy and strategy to ensure complete alignment with strategic reality.

8. In the spirit of the peaceful resolution of security challenges on the Continent, South Africa will follow an incremental approach to the protection of national interests external to the Republic. The concept of collaborative protection\(^{64}\) will be implemented first, and if necessary, followed by the concept of deliberate protection\(^{65}\).

9. While South Africa will focus on the prevention of conflict and views the use of force as the means of last resort, the mandate of Defence requires the maintenance of comprehensive defence capabilities. In the absence of any foreseen or readily foreseeable military or para-military external or internal threat against South Africa, many capabilities need not be maintained at a high level, nor is the full spectrum of potentially required capabilities affordable or sustainable at full readiness. Capabilities will therefore, wherever possible, be maintained to ensure expansion to the required levels as and when needed.

10. Should the need for the deliberate self defence of South Africa arise, the principle of “forward defence\(^{66}\)” will be applied. Should peaceful means and deterrence fail or the level of aggression preclude a peaceful resolution, South Africa will use appropriate and focused force, in partnership or autonomously to:
   a. Defend itself against aggression;
   b. Protect its people;
   c. Protect its sovereignty;
   d. Protect its territorial integrity; and
   e. Protect its national interests and critical infrastructure.

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\(^{64}\) Collaborative protection, in the external context, means the protection of national interests in collaboration with the host state where the interest may lie.

\(^{65}\) Deliberate protection, in the external context, means the unilateral protection of an interest in a host state where the host state is unable or unwilling to collaboratively protect the interest.

\(^{66}\) Concept of defending a line as far forward as possible in order to deny an attacker early territorial gains (SANDF Military Dictionary Pg 151).
11. The defence strategic direction takes its lead from the national security construct, national posture and national strategic effects and cascades to a future-orientated, concept driven, effects-based defence strategy.

12. The adoption of an effects-based defence strategy approach allows for a threat independent determination of capabilities required, based on government’s level of ambition. The effects-based defence strategy is defined as the application of defence and other capabilities to realise strategic outcomes in peace, conflict and war. The effects-based approach requires a clear and unambiguous understanding of South Africa’s defence mission (Figure 30) and five defence goals, and informs the development of fifteen strategic defence tasks (Figure 31).

13. The strategic defence tasks provide an effects-based framework for detailed defence planning on the size, shape and capabilities of the Defence Force. The strategic defence tasks provide a future-focused framework for developing force structure requirements.

Figure 30: The Defence Mission
14. The defence mandate, as derived from the Constitution, provides a legal statement of purpose, covering the full spectrum of possible defence employment. The functions listed in the Constitution stipulate the purposes for which the defence force may be employed. The employment of the Defence Force will be considered against environmental circumstances, national security policy, government priorities and the availability of resources.

**GOAL 1**

**DEFEND AND PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA**

**INTRODUCTION**

15. Defence carries the Constitutional obligation to protect and defend the Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and people against direct threats. The structure of Defence will reflect all the capabilities required to achieve this, vested *inter alia* in skilled and appropriately equipped personnel. The spectrum of potential inter-state violence is as per Figure 32 below:
a. The defence of South Africa involves the following tasks: deter and prevent conflict; defend National Interests and defend South Africa.

**KEY TENETS**

16. South Africa must be able to defend itself autonomously without having to rely on another country. The Defence Force will be maintained as a formidable fighting force that can decisively and successfully defend South Africa’s land, air, sea and cyber spaces, vital interests and strategic lines of communication.

17. A balance of comprehensive defence capabilities will be maintained. The design of these capabilities will be shaped to achieve the national strategic effects. Some will be maintained at a lower level and expanded as early warning predictions may indicate.

18. The Defence Force will be a well-trained, well-equipped and professional fighting force operating within the boundaries set by domestic and international law and ethical standards.

19. Recognising the immense cost and destruction inherent in armed conflict, South Africa will endeavour to:

   a. Act proactively, in partnership or autonomously, to defend itself by neutralising a dangerous threat before it can develop into open, physical aggression that visits death and destruction on South Africa or the region.

   b. Pursue the principle of forward defence as far as possible.
c. Employ operations to defeat the opposing forces while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum.

d. Bring any conflict to an early close, employing forces and strategies appropriate to achieving that end.

e. Undertake or support immediate post-conflict reconstruction of areas affected by military operations, to minimise the impact on the civilian population.

**TASK 1**
**DETER AND PREVENT CONFLICT**

**DEFENCE EFFECT**

20. The defence policy principle of preventing armed conflict is achieved by taking all political, diplomatic and military measures to deter potential aggressors. South Africa’s international stature and balanced defence capabilities contribute to overall deterrent capability and posture. This is augmented by credible combat forces, operational prowess, and rapid force generation through trained Reserves, the demonstrated ability in field training, the technological and doctrinal competence and the visible morale of personnel. (Figure 33).

![Figure 33: Task 1 - Deter and Prevent Conflict](image-url)
THE DETERRENT TRIAD

21. The most cost-effective means for South Africa's credible deterrence, is to maintain what can be termed a 'deterrent triad', comprising:

   a. A 'Threshold Deterrent' capability, in the form of a joint landward force of sufficient strength and capability to demand the commitment of substantial forces for aggression to succeed, thereby raising political and logistical risk for a potential adversary.

   b. A 'Denial of Entry' capability, in the form of a capable joint maritime force that makes maritime entry highly risky for a potential adversary.

   c. A 'Denial of Manoeuvre' capability, in the form of a joint air defence force of sufficient strength and capability to make it impossible for a potential adversary to conduct manoeuvre operations.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND DETERRENCE IN PARTNERSHIP

22. The SADC Mutual Defence Pact enjoins the parties to:

   a. Develop “individual and collective self-defence capability” (Article 4); and to

   b. Meet an armed attack against a state party with "immediate collective action" (Article 6).

23. Deterring aggression is preferable to defending against aggression. Extended deterrence is essentially the extension of a protective ‘deterrent umbrella’ to include neighbours or allies. Deterrence in Partnership will require closer strategic and military cooperation within SADC with complementary rather than supplementary military capabilities and interoperability ensured at the operational and tactical level. This requires operational and strategic mobility, by air, by sea and overland by road and rail throughout the region.

TASK 2
PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS

DEFENCE EFFECT

24. South Africa’s national security is ensured through the protection of its national interest inside and outside its territory. Threats to national interests are countered through an incremental approach to their protection with the use force as a means of last resort. Protection of external national interests are firstly pursued in concert with the host countries and followed, if necessary, by deliberate protection with expeditionary forces able to deploy to distant theatres for protracted periods of time, capable of conducting operations in complex environments during independent and semi-autonomous deployments. Expeditionary force projection is promoted via air, sea, road and rail capabilities. (Figure 34).
25. The primary responsibility to guarantee the safety and security of external national interests will rest with the state in whose territory such interests are located. If such interests are threatened beyond the capability of the host state, South Africa will follow a cooperative and incremental approach to aid the host state in protecting such interests. Cooperation will be conducted within the context of bilateral agreements and under the auspices of the regional, continental and international security structures, as applicable.

26. Forces will be tailored for the specific operation. Light, early-entry forces may be required to provide a rapid response, but such operations will usually be executed by medium forces. Heavy forces may in some cases be required to counter a particular threat. The focus will be on protection, using offensive tactics as required. Maximum use of intelligence, local reconnaissance and surveillance and organic firepower, particularly indirect, precision firepower, will be required. Operations will normally involve protracted support over long distances and forward positioning of logistics in the host country. Air supply will be the primary method of support, augmented by sea, rail or road support. Support via internal waterways may also be required.

27. If national interests are threatened beyond the capability of a host state, a joint intervention force will protect such interests. Such operations will require the rapid deployment of forces capable of operating over the spectrum of conflict. This will usually involve medium forces, but a rapid initial deployment of light, early-entry forces may be required to stabilise the situation. Heavy forces may
be required to support the main protection force. Force projection will mainly take place via air, sea and road, augmented by rail and possibly rivers. Forces will be capable of projecting and sustaining combat power in hostile territories.

TASK 3
DEFEND SOUTH AFRICA

DEFENCE EFFECT

28. South Africa's 1 219 090 km² land surface area is defended in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force through _inter alia_: a broad and expanding strategy of forward defence informed by the defence posture; an operational concept of fluid, high-mobility and high-tempo manoeuvre; predominantly offensive operations at the tactical level; maximum use of superior command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems and information operations; and flexible and responsive sustainment. Defence may extend to preventive self-defence if South Africa must take the initiative to prevent an attack or to deliberate defend when an aggressor exercises the initiative. (Figure 35).

Figure 35: Task 3 - Defend South Africa

PREVENTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST IMMINENT THREATS

29. International law recognises the right of states to act in self-defence, provided that a threat is imminent and that the actions taken are proportional to the threat, thus avoiding the use of excessive force. South Africa will exercise this right as a last resort:
a. after all other practicable means of preventing aggression have failed; or,

b. when the initiative lying with the aggressor imposes too great a risk of strategic failure.

30. The aim of such preventive operations will be to prevent or destroy the threat before it can fully manifest itself. Operations will be focused and of limited duration using small, balanced, modular force packages of special operations forces employing focused tactics, high strategic, operational and tactical mobility and maintaining a high operational tempo. Such operations would typically comprise raids and strikes by highly trained light forces, but particular circumstances may require a shift to medium and heavy forces.

31. Operations against, inter alia, terrorism, insurgency and organised crime will generally rely heavily on special forces\textsuperscript{67}, augmented and supported by special operations forces\textsuperscript{68} as required. Interdepartmental cooperation between government departments, specifically the security forces, will be vital. Such operations will be conducted only on the basis of confirmed and verified intelligence.

**DELIBERATE SELF-DEFENCE**

32. Deliberate self-defence will be conducted when aggression cannot be deterred or discouraged by political, diplomatic or other means, when preventive self-defence has failed and South Africa enters a state of National Defence. Forces must be able to deploy simultaneously throughout the theatre in day/night and all weather situations to create operational shock and to shatter the aggressor’s cohesion. South Africa will seek to dominate the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum and superior situational awareness.

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**GOAL 2**

**SAFEGUARD SOUTH AFRICA**

**DEFENCE EFFECT**

33. Constitutional imperatives to “defend and protect”\textsuperscript{69} extend beyond engagement in combat operations to that of safeguarding South Africa and its people in times of both conflict and peace. South Africa’s borders, strategic installations and air, maritime and cyber space are safeguarded\textsuperscript{70} and other responsibilities ordered by government executed.

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\textsuperscript{67} Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialised military skills, organised into small multi-purpose detachments to conduct guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare operations (SANDF Military Dictionary, Pg 337).

\textsuperscript{68} Uncommon, exceptional operation with a limited and specific tactical or strategic objective or goal (SANDF Military Dictionary, Pg 337).

\textsuperscript{69} Constitution, 1996: Section 200(2).

\textsuperscript{70} Safeguard South Africa includes its people, territory, islands, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, extended continental shelf, vital interests, resources and critical infrastructure.
34. **Requirement for Legislation.** Extant legislation needs to be reviewed to ensure that the rights and duties of defence members serving in the internal role, as called for in the tasks set out below, are adequately provided for and that sufficient protection is given in law for such members.

**TASK 4**
**SAFEGUARD BORDERS**

35. Defence will assume full responsibility for land, air and maritime border safeguarding. This will be pursued with Defence leading all collaborative efforts concerning border safeguarding on the border-line and immediate areas. The control of ports of entry remains the responsibility of other departments and agencies, with Defence playing a supportive role through formalised liaison mechanisms. (Figure 36).

![Figure 36: Task 4 - Safeguard South Africa](image)

**LAND BORDER**

36. South Africa’s land area has 4,471 km of land borders(Figure 37), partly demarcated by rivers that are largely seasonal in their ability to hamper illicit crossing, and partly running through areas of thick bush or mountainous terrain that are difficult to monitor or patrol.

37. These borders have proved vulnerable to a range of illegal activities, including rustling of livestock and the smuggling of narcotics and stolen and untaxed goods, and also to illegal immigration. They are equally vulnerable to the future movement of illicit weapons or explosives by terror groups who may be intent on attacking international targets in South Africa. There is, thus, a clear need to secure the land borders.
38. South Africa’s land area has an air border of 7,660 km (Figure 38), although it is primarily the air space over the land border and part of the north-western and north-eastern coastlines that are particularly vulnerable to illegal intrusion. Air transportation is growing rapidly with a consequent responsibility to ensure sound airspace awareness, control and protection.

39. There is evidence of smuggling by air - known to be a major problem in other parts of Africa and elsewhere in the world - particularly regarding narcotics smuggling. There is also the danger of terrorist groups moving explosives or weapons by air. There is thus a clear need to protect South Africa’s airspace against such intrusions and against possible terror actions such as have been seen in other parts of the world, particularly during major events such as the 2010 World Cup.
40. The maritime interests of South Africa are derived from its geographic location, geo-economic structure and geo-political aspirations and obligations as a regional maritime power. South Africa has one of the longest coastlines in Africa stretching for about 3,924 km at the high water line, from the desert border with Namibia on the Atlantic coast, southwards around the tip of Africa and then north to the border with subtropical Mozambique border on the Indian Ocean.

41. South Africa has an exclusive economic zone of 1,553,000 km² of which the areas around Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474,400 km². The Atlantic Ocean borders the west coast, the Indian Ocean borders the east and south coast and the Southern Ocean surrounds Marion and Prince Edward Islands. South Africa has tabled its claim to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the extension of the continental shelf. This implies that South Africa will have to exercise control and enforce state authority over 4,340,000 km² of maritime territory (Figure 39). This must also be seen in the context of South Africa being in effect an island economy:

a. Directly dependent on seaborne trade for 50% of its GDP; and substantially more if one considers that 75% of the oil on which economic activity depends, comes by sea from the Middle East.
b. With an important fishing industry; and,

c. With potential for a growing offshore hydrocarbon sector.

Figure 39: South Africa’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf Claim

MARITIME TRADE AND PIRACY

42. South Africa lies along a strategic major international sea trade route, is located far from its key trade partners whom it reaches largely by sea, has international obligations for providing safety of navigation and ships, ensuring freedom of the seas and security of shipping, as well as the protection of the marine environment. South Africa’s national maritime interests include effective cooperation arrangements with neighbouring states and territories within and beyond our region and continent for the management of our maritime domain and interests, our oceans management and good order at sea.

43. Maritime piracy, once thought to be a scourge of a bygone age, has re-emerged in recent years as a serious threat to both crews and property on the high seas. It is rapidly becoming one of the most threatening challenges of the 21st century. The threat levels and costs of maritime security calls for a comprehensive approach to this global challenge, entailing short and long term initiatives, both onshore and offshore, involving all relevant public and private sector stakeholders.
44. The security of South Africa’s maritime trade routes, and our consequent ability as a nation to trade, is a fundamental matter of national security. As a trading nation, with over 95% of our trade being reliant on maritime trade routes, the security of South Africa and its people is crucially dependant on the ability to trade, grow the economy, reduce poverty and provide meaningful work for South Africa’s people. Maritime security is also linked to commercial fishing and tourism. Consequently, the freedom of the seas, the right of innocent passage and the protection of the trade routes for merchant shipping is of vital national interest to the nation. SADC countries, including land-locked countries, are dependent on maritime trade for economic prosperity. Piracy and maritime crime are impacting negatively on the economies of many African states.

45. The security of South Africa’s maritime trade routes and ocean areas is thus fundamentally a matter of National Security. The inter-relationship of South Africa’s security and that of the continent furthermore implies that the security of all African maritime trade routes and sea areas, is also important to its security. The maritime security role of Defence may thus extend beyond its area of direct responsibility.

**TASK 5**

**SAFEGUARD CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

46. In terms of the National Key Points Act, 1980\(^1\), National Key Points are those state, parastatal or private installations or infrastructure whose security is declared to be vital to the functioning of the South African state, its economy and the wellbeing of its people. Current examples range from the Houses of Parliament to selected airports, sea ports, power stations, refineries, arms industry factories, chemical and pharmaceutical plants. These installations can become vulnerable to attack and must be protected accordingly.

47. In terms of the National Key Points Act, 1980, Defence is responsible for the administration of the Act\(^2\). The protection of National Key Points has, however, been delegated to the South African Police Service.

48. Given that the security paradigm has radically changed since the introduction of National Key Points Act, specific attention will be given to the re-proclamation of National Key Points prior to Defence’s resumption of this task. The approach therefore will be completely overhauled and legislation amended if necessary. Specific attention will be given to the definition of a National Key Point as well as the necessary powers to proclaim critical infrastructure as National Key Points.

49. The outcome of this process may impact on the design and structure and increased size of the Defence Force.

\(^1\) National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act No. 102 of 1980).

\(^2\) National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act No. 102 of 1980).
DEFENCE EFFECT

50. The Constitution mandates that the Defence Force may be employed for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own.

51. South Africa and its people are and feel safe through the augmentation of state authority by the Defence Force should the Police Service be unable to maintain law and order on its own or in cooperation with the Police Service in specific circumstances requiring additional security capacity. (Figure 40).

52. The authorisation of the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the South African Police Service requires that the (national) Minister of Police formally requests the Minister of Defence for such employment, or that the President instructs the Defence Force to employ in cooperation with the SAPS. Such employment must be authorised by the President as head of the national executive and can only be undertaken within the borders of South Africa. The Police Service is and will remain the lead department.

53. The practice of obtaining a Presidential Minute for the rendering of assistance to the Police Service will be dealt with in a new streamlined approval process to facilitate the provision of urgent support required to achieve operational objectives.

MAJOR EVENTS

54. From time to time the SA Police Service may require security support during the hosting of major public events. The Defence Force will provide forces to be co-located with SA Police Service elements and/or other departments within allocated areas of responsibility. Forces employed for this purpose will be tailored to the mission.

COOPERATION WITH SPECIALIST POLICE TASK FORCES

55. From time to time the Defence Force is required to work with the various Police Specialist Task Forces, both standing task forces and temporary tasks forces which are mission specific, such as to counter rhino poaching. This cooperation with the SAPS may extend to reciprocal training initiatives related to task force activities.

THREATS TO CIVIL ORDER

56. Domestically, the security environment is currently characterised by normal political and economic competition found in a peaceful State. The Defence Force may be constitutionally employed for service when the Police Service is no longer able to uphold law and order. The spectrum of domestic threat that may be encountered by the Defence Force in such unlikely circumstance could extend as per Figure 41.

57. The Defence Force will primarily support the Police Service from collateral capability and will not generally structure for this task. However, given the Defence Force’s role in Fighting-In-Built-Up-Areas (FIBUA) some specialised additional equipment will be procured.
58. South Africa’s treaty obligations falling within the jurisdiction of the Defence Force are honoured and professionally executed. (Figure 42). This extends *inter alia* to:

- a. International Hydrographic Obligations.
- b. International Maritime and Aviation Search and Rescue Obligations.
- c. International Humanitarian Law Obligations.
- d. Arms Control Obligations.
59. International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) promulgated the SOLAS. The SOLAS is regularly revised as the need arises. The SOLAS Convention (in its successive forms) is generally regarded as the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of shipping. Through its accession to the SOLAS and its revisions, South Africa is bound to the obligations thereof.

   a. SOLAS Chapter V requires governments to ensure that all vessels are sufficiently and efficiently manned from a safety point of view. It places requirements on all vessels regarding voyage and passage planning, expecting a careful assessment of any proposed voyages by all who put to sea. Every mariner must take account of all potential dangers to navigation, weather forecasts, tidal predictions, the competence of the crew, and all other relevant factors. It also adds an obligation for all vessels' masters to offer assistance to those in distress and controls the use of lifesaving signals with specific requirements regarding danger and distress messages.

   b. SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 4 prescribes South Africa’s responsibilities with respect to the promulgation of navigational warnings. In accordance with this regulation, South Africa will take all steps necessary to ensure that, when intelligence of any dangers is received from whatever reliable source, it will be promptly brought to the knowledge of those concerned and communicated to other interested Governments. The South African Navy (Hydrographic Office) consequently assumes responsibility, on behalf of the State, to provide:
Various hydrographic products, such as the consolidation of navigational, hazard or maritime warning data into regular formal navigational safety publications or promulgation as Navigational Warnings or Notices to Mariners.

A national tidal network of tide gauges where data sets are received in near real time from instruments and used to monitor sea level and refine tidal predictions for publishing as Tide Tables for South African and Namibian harbours.

The revised SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 9 clearly specifies South Africa’s obligation in terms of hydrographic services to be provided. This entails the collection and compilation of hydrographic data and the publication, dissemination and keeping up to date of all nautical information necessary for safe navigation. The South African Navy (Hydrographic Office) consequently assumes responsibility, on behalf of the State, to carrying out the following nautical and hydrographic services, in the manner most suitable for the purpose of aiding navigation to:

- Ensure that hydrographic surveying is carried out, as far as possible, adequate to the requirements of safe navigation.
- Prepare and issue official nautical charts, sailing directions, lists of lights, tide tables and other official nautical publications, where applicable, satisfying the needs of safe navigation.
- Promulgate notices to mariners in order to keep official nautical charts and publications, as far as possible, up to date.
- Provide data management arrangements to support these services.
- Ensure the greatest possible uniformity in charts and nautical publications and to take into account, whenever possible, the relevant international resolutions and recommendations.
- Co-ordinate their activities to the greatest possible degree in order to ensure that hydrographic and nautical information is made available on a world-wide scale as timely, reliably and unambiguously as possible.

60. International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO).

a. South Africa has been an IHO Member State since 1951. An agreement was consequently set up between the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Transport in 1954 wherein the South African Navy assumed responsibility for the hydrographic obligations of the Republic. This function is currently performed by the South African Navy Hydrographer, yet this arrangement has never been formalised in legislation.

b. The IHO has allocated responsibility for IHO charting of Region H to South Africa, as well as a contributing member responsibilities for IHO Charting Region M (Antarctica) and the co-ordination of Navigation Area VII within the World-Wide Navigational Warning System (Maritime Safety Information). These three obligations are graphically described in Figure 43 below.

c. South Africa will, within the confines of the IHO, engage on the reapportionment of IHO charting responsibilities in the Southern African Region.
61. Requirement for National Legislation. South Africa's international hydrographic and nautical charting obligations, responsibilities and liabilities must be brought into national law. Such national legislation must provide for:

a. South Africa's compliance with its international hydrographic surveying and nautical cartography obligations arising from its membership of the International Hydrographic Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation.

b. The appointment of the South African Navy Hydrographer as the National Hydrographer of the Republic.

c. The role and functions of the National Hydrographer.

d. The hydrographic services to be provided.

e. The setting of hydrographic standards and competence.

f. Protection of survey marks and other hydrographic measures.

g. The extension or limitation of civil liability.

h. Funding of the capability.

i. Secondment of hydrographers to other countries and international hydrographic institutions.
MARITIME AND AERONAUTICAL SEARCH AND RESCUE OBLIGATIONS

62. South African Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Act, 2002 provides that the Minister of Transport must by notice in the Gazette, as well as in relevant maritime and aeronautical publications, publish the search and rescue regions within which search and rescue services will be provided in terms of the responsibility of the Republic as laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation (Figure 44).

Figure 44: South Africa’s Search and Rescue Areas of Responsibility

63. The South African Search and Rescue Organisation (SASAR) ensures a co-ordinated and effective maritime and aeronautical search and rescue service within the South African search and rescue regions. SASAR may, for purposes of any aeronautical or maritime search and rescue operation, request the assistance of any military aircraft or vessel to assist in any operation. Furthermore, diverse ad hoc search and rescue services are provided, where the situation merits, to entities such as emergency and rescue service.

64. South Africa will engage with the Republic of Brazil concerning bilateral cooperation in the western areas of South Africa’s responsibility.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) OBLIGATIONS

The Defence Force is required to be a disciplined, professional, well-trained and well-equipped fighting force operating within the boundaries set by domestic and international law and ethical

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standards. South Africa will comply with its obligations under international law and treaties. IHL is contained chiefly in the Geneva Conventions and other similar IHL instruments, which seek to regulate the conduct of armed conflict and the rights and duties of belligerent parties with reference to humanitarian concerns.

65. A major part of IHL is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Nearly every State in the world has agreed to be bound by them. The Conventions have been developed and supplemented by two further agreements: the Additional Protocols of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. South Africa has ratified the Geneva Conventions which are briefly discussed here below:

a. **First Geneva Convention.** This Convention provides for the protection of the wounded and sick combatants on the field. In essence it provides for the protection of this category of persons irrespective of their nationality. The wounded and the sick of a belligerent who fall into the enemy hands are recognised as prisoners of war.

b. **Second Geneva Convention.** This Convention, closely follows the provisions of the first Geneva Convention in structure and content, but contains provisions specifically applicable to war at sea (e.g. hospital ships). This Maritime Convention, is an extension of the first Convention (Wounded and Sick), the terms of which it applies to maritime warfare. In addition to the protection of the wounded and sick, this Convention protects combatants and other personnel who are at sea and who are shipwrecked.

c. **Third Geneva Convention.** This Convention protects persons entitled to prisoner of war status. A prisoner of war is an enemy force member no longer able to bear arms. The Third Convention provides that prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated, and precisely defines requirements for conditions and places of captivity, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and judicial proceedings instituted against them. It provides that any unlawful act or omission by the detaining power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited and will be regarded as a grave breach of this Convention. Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their person and their honour.

d. **Fourth Geneva Convention.** This Convention protects civilians during wartime. Treaties which had been adopted before 1949 were concerned with combatants only, not with civilians. The events of World War II demonstrated the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for the protection of civilians in wartime. The Fourth Geneva Convention contains a short section concerning the general protection of populations against certain consequences of war.

e. **Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions.**

i. Protocol I extends the applicability of the Geneva Conventions during international armed conflict.

ii. Protocol II extends the applicability of the Geneva Conventions during internal conflict between armed forces and dissident armed forces in the same country.

66. Other agreements prohibit the use of certain weapons and military tactics and protect certain categories of people and goods. These agreements include: the 1954 Convention for the Protection

67. Defence will be bound by IHL and all other Conventions and Treaties pertaining to armed conflict and to which South Africa is a party.

NATIONAL ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS

68. As a responsible arms trading nation, South Africa has instituted rigorous legislation and regulations regarding conventional arms transfer, including export of conventional arms, under the auspices of the National Arms Control Committee (NCACC) which is competent to regulate the transfer of conventional arms. Defence must assume the following responsibilities in this regards:

a. To adhere to arms control regulations within its own field of endeavour.

b. To assist the NCACC with the provision of an Arms Control Secretariat and a capability to conduct compliance and verification services.

c. To assist the NCACC in the departmental review of all related permit applications or extensions.

69. Defence has a further responsibility to be represented on the Non-Proliferation Council (NPC) housed at the Department of Trade and Industry, and to assist the NPC in its tasks related to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related dual use items.

TASK 8
ENSURE INFORMATION SECURITY

DEFENCE EFFECT

70. South Africa’s information and communication systems, technology and infrastructure are protected.

71. Information and communication systems and technology are tools enabling command and control to be exerted in warfare. They provide the infrastructure for weapon systems and sensors to exchange relevant data and allow decision makers to use data, information and ultimately intelligence to visualise the battlefield and make successful military decisions (Figure 45). This is applicable in both weapon and administration systems.
72. Although the terms cyber-warfare, cyber-defence or cyber-attack are often used in everyday speak, the broad military concept used in this goal is Information Warfare, a term which covers a broad range of operations to be carried out within the Information Sphere (commonly also known as the InfoSphere). Military forces strive to achieve necessary information superiority so as to ensure own freedom of action and to ensure strategic dominance and success.

73. Information security is ensured by dominating the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), the network information systems spectrums (also known as the Cyberspace) as well as influencing human beliefs and behaviour in the physical, information and the cognitive (psychological) domains. The following is achieved:

   a. Potential information onslaughts against defence are deterred.
   b. Defence information and communication assets and processes are defended and protected and information superiority achieved.
   c. Information and communication assets and processes of an opposing force are disrupted, destroyed, denied and exploited and own information superiority is enhanced.

74. Defence, furthermore, plays a supportive role with other security agencies in the protection of government information and promotion of broader information security in the South African society. This supportive role is defined in the National Cyber-Security Policy Framework, which seeks to enable the development of an information society which takes into account the fundamental rights of every South African citizen to privacy, security, dignity, access to information, the right to
communication and freedom of expression. The framework seeks to ensure that Government, business and civil society are able to enjoy the full benefits of a safe and secure cyberspace through working together to understand and address the risks, reduce the benefits to criminals and seize opportunities in cyberspace to enhance South Africa’s overall security and safety including its economic well-being.

GOAL 3
PROMOTE REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

75. The interdependent and uncertain 21st century world faces challenges which are complex and global in nature, threatening collective wellbeing and placing increased pressure on the global system of governance. These challenges encompass human security issues such as environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, development, political and economic crises, human rights, disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral cooperation is more relevant than ever in seeking equitable multilateral solutions to global problems.

76. As part of its commitment to ensuring peace and stability, South Africa encourages multilateral options in seeking global solutions. South Africa also remains committed to the major international instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights through equal emphasis on civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights.

77. South Africa’s foreign policy, shaped by its own domestic priorities, seeks a “better Africa in a better world”. Economic integration, development, peace and security are cornerstones of this policy. South Africa will thus continue to support regional and continental conflict resolution, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable development.

78. South Africa’s engagement with other states will be one of peaceful relations, adherence to international law on armed conflict and international treaties to which it is party and the recognition that development and stability are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, hence the commitment to the promotion of regional security. The following will be pursued:

a. The promotion of peace, security and confidence-building through constructive dialogue aimed at nurturing sound diplomatic relations and pursuing South Africa’s foreign policy principles and objectives.

b. The peaceful resolution of conflicts though recognised international instruments and mechanisms.

c. Support to government diplomatic initiatives through participation in multilateral institutions such as the SADC, AU and UN.
79. To this end Defence will continue to play a significant role in the advancement of the African Agenda, support South Africa’s multilateral engagements and foster sound relations with key strategic partners.

### KEY TENETS

80. In an era of globalisation and interdependency, many threats to peace and stability, such as global poverty, climatic change or terrorism, cannot be effectively addressed unilaterally or by individual states. States must collaborate in the pursuit and promotion of common security ideals and in defence against threats to security. A shared concept of security and threat perception, and an agreed upon set of principles and/or rules, enables the collective resolution of conflict and threats to security. Such collective action requires internationally mandated initiatives that are legitimate, effective and sustainable and share the cost and resource burdens amongst states.

81. Since the security of South Africa is inextricably linked to that of the African continent and the developing world, South Africa must:

   a. Promote peace and security through the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

   b. Help shape the security and developmental agenda through effective participation in security mechanisms.

   c. Remain committed to the resolution of conflict in terms of the UN Charter and international and customary international law and, as far as possible, employ military force within a multinational framework.

   d. Demonstrate particular diligence in furthering the objectives of International Humanitarian Law which defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare; ensuring that the civilian population and other non-combatants are protected and that unnecessary suffering is reduced.

   e. Seek UN Security Council or AU Peace and Security Council mandates for peace missions and concomitant security sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD).

82. Defence diplomacy forms an important instrument in South Africa's conflict prevention repertoire by promoting collective peace and security and preventing and deterring conflict. A defence diplomacy strategy will therefore be developed to address defence bilateral and multilateral priorities.

### TASK 9

**PROMOTE STRATEGIC INFLUENCE**

**DEFENCE EFFECT**

83. South Africa enhances its strategic influence through a strengthened defence diplomacy strategy which strengthens South Africa’s ability to shape the multilateral security agenda, pursue critical multilateral security objectives, capacitate multilateral institutions, develop regional and continental partnerships and direct participation in selected bilateral mechanisms. (Figure 46).
SHAPE THE MULTILATERAL SECURITY AGENDA

84. The United Nations (UN). The UN system, through its universal membership and broad mandate, occupies the central and indispensable role within the global system of governance. The UN constitutes the most prominent global organisation dedicated to the principles of collective security. In pursuit of enhanced continental and global security South Africa will consequently remain a significant and responsible troop contributor to United Nations missions and will give consideration to participation in the UN Standby Arrangement System.

85. The African Union (AU). South Africa will continue to champion the role of the AU as the primary organisation for coordinating continental positions with development partners. The AU will be the primary mechanism for South Africa’s continental engagement. South Africa will intensify its engagements in the AU and its structures towards building African unity and the social and economic development of the continent. Security is promoted by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) through timely and effective response to conflicts and crises in Africa. The work of the AU PSC is promoted through its mechanisms: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Peace Fund. Enhanced South African engagement of these mechanisms will remain a priority.

86. The Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa is committed to establishing SADC as the firm base for the engagement of the Continent. The consolidation of the security structures and institutions of SADC is thus of paramount importance. Stability in SADC will be promoted through: the conclusion of treaties such as the SADC Mutual Defence Pact; the

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79 Signed by the SADC Heads of State in August 2003.
conclusion of individual bilateral agreements; and participation in SADC Standby Force activities. South Africa will pursue initiatives to create a firm SADC defence and security sector foundation. South Africa will continue its current contribution to the SADC Standby Force and will put significant effort into establishing the SADC Standby Force as a standing multi-national force in terms of South Africa’s pledges. South Africa will specifically advocate for the migration of the current planning elements to a functional brigade headquarters capable of conducting regular force preparation, mobilisation of forces when required and executing command and control over deployed forces.

CONTRIBUTE CAPACITY TO MULTILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURES

87. South Africa further recognises the need to enhance its international contribution through candidatures and the secondment of South Africans into strategic positions in regional, continental and global governance institutions. Defence, in pursuit of the African Agenda, will prioritise enhanced representation at the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the AU Peace and Security Commission and the SADC Organ.

FORGE REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PARTNERSHIPS

88. South Africa will continue to advance common African positions through its structured bilateral activities in the belief that regional defence partnership initiatives will further peace, stability and the broad security objectives and diplomatic initiatives of Government.

89. Defence cooperation with other states in SADC, Africa and beyond, is viewed as a foundation for the achievement of peace and security. The signing and implementation of international defence agreements is thus a critical policy action and is an important component of regional confidence building.

EXECUTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBM)s

90. South Africa will play a supportive role to regional and continental partners. Defence will pursue cooperation in the fields of logistics, training and education, intelligence, combined exercises, secondment of personnel, the development of common doctrines and operational procedures. Defence will thus pursue the implementation of CSBM s to provide for greater transparency and cooperation on regional and continental military matters, and thereby promoting collective confidence and stability.

PURSUE DEFENCE INDUSTRY COOPERATION

91. The pursuit of joint procurement programmes in the SADC region will be an important initiative, with the emphasis on the acquisition of inter-operable equipment within the region as a stepping stone to regional interoperability and a functional SADC Standby Force.

92. Rigorous, focussed, co-ordinated and visible government involvement and political support and commitment are necessary for the successful marketing of South African armaments and related equipment and services. Government has an obligation to exercise control over the defence industry as well as actively assist it in obtaining access to key markets. Government will thus assist the defence industry by facilitating those initiatives that support political, economic and military objectives such as the maintenance of strategic defence technologies and capabilities.
DEVELOP RELATIONSHIPS FURTHER AFIELD

93. South Africa will seek to establish and maintain defence cooperation with key nations further afield as identified in the context of foreign policy. This will be a balance of existing strategic partners and the emergent powers of the South. In addition to national foreign policy objectives, these initiatives will also be driven by the military requirement for life-cycle support to prime mission equipment, force preparation and force employment cooperation in terms of security objectives, defence education and training requirements and cooperation with partners on various military general assistance missions.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

94. Defence diplomacy is increasingly undertaken to achieve and maintain security co-operation among regional blocs and with equal momentum in furthering bi-lateral defence relations to acquire and procure defence capabilities, implement joint operations and training programmes, and share critical resources in addressing common tasks.

95. A defence diplomacy strategy will be developed and will address defence bilateral and multilateral priorities. These will include:

a. Pursuing the priorities of government as expressed in its Medium Term Strategic Framework.

b. Pursuing the priorities of the Executive Authority responsible for defence.

c. Deployment of defence personnel into strategic multilateral security institutions.

d. The pursuit of critical multilateral security objectives.

e. Concluding instruments on the duties, rights, responsibilities, protection and remuneration of our forces deployed to multilateral organisations.

f. Identification of bilateral military assistance to other countries.

g. Prioritisation of Military Attaché deployments.

h. Multinational military force preparation and force employment in pursuit of common security objectives, such as maritime security, border safe-guarding and piracy.

i. Support and cooperation requirements that may be required from key partners to deployed Defence Force forces.

j. The requirements of the four combat services and other divisions in terms of force preparation, education, training and force support.

k. General defence cooperation measures, exchanges of intelligence and protection of defence intellectual property.

l. National responsibilities assigned to defence, for example: vital interests, hydrography and search and rescue

m. Strategic support to defence industry requirements.
n. Focus defence international engagements with key strategic partners.

**TASK 10**  
**CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY**

**DEFENCE EFFECT**

96. South Africa’s resolve to promote peace, security and development on the continent is demonstrated through unambiguous policy statements, the maintenance and employment of a credible crisis response capability, the prepositioning of forces and the contribution of South African forces to various forms of peace missions. South Africa, in appropriate circumstances, makes elements of its Defence Force available to peace support operations of the United Nations and African Union, employs armed force to assist other countries faced with aggression and conducts internationally agreed upon constabulary operations. (Figure 47).

![Figure 47: Task 10 - Contribute to Peace and Stability](image)

**INTERVENTION UNDER GRAVE CIRCUMSTANCES**

97. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict are enshrined in the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Military interventions in other states may, however, be justified in extreme circumstances where all attempts at the peaceful resolution of conflict have failed.
98. Unilateral action can only be justified in exceptional circumstances as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Circumstances that could legally justify such action include serious threats to international peace, severe intra-state violence and gross violations of human rights.

   a. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter accordingly provides for regional enforcement actions, which may include the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace and security where pacific measures have failed or are deemed inadequate.

   b. The AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact, in pursuance of the Constitutive Act of the African Union80 and the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC81, promotes cooperation among the Member States in the areas of non-aggression and common defence, the promotion of peaceful co-existence in Africa, the prevention of conflicts of inter-State or intra-State nature, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and the definition of a framework under which the Union may intervene or authorise intervention, in preventing or addressing situations of aggression82.

   c. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation83 and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact84 likewise provide for enforcement action as a means of last resort where peaceful means of resolving significant inter- or intra-state conflict, as defined in the Protocol, have failed.

   d. South Africa will seek UN Security Council endorsement of any collaborative or unilateral intervention that may be necessary. The timing of such endorsement may depend on the gravity and urgency of the intervention, and does not preclude urgent intervention in grave circumstances prior to multilateral endorsement.

99. While a single country might in some cases be the major contributor, with the military as major participant, such operations will almost invariably be JFM in nature. In some cases South Africa may thus wish to exercise the option of assuming command responsibility as a framework nation and plan to provide defence combat capabilities across the entire task spectrum, into which contributions of other nations can be integrated in a flexible and synergetic manner.

100. Forces employed for a deliberate intervention should be tailored to the mission.

   a. Deployment to and build-up in theatre should be rapid to ensure a preponderance of power to deter the belligerents and provide the ability to operate simultaneously throughout the theatre.

   b. Intervention forces should be highly skilled and trained, with a capacity for network-enabled operations.

   c. While light forces can be used as early-entry forces, they should be augmented by heavier forces as the situation requires.

   d. Superior command and control, protection, firepower (including non-lethal and precision capabilities), mobility and manoeuvre, information and intelligence, as well as

80 AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact: Article 4(h).
81 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC: Article 7(e).
82 AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact: Article 2(a)&(b).
84 SADC MDP Article 7(1)&(2).
sustainment are critical.

e. Deployed forces should be capable of semi-autonomous and protracted independent operations. Air, sea and land force projection capabilities will be required to deploy and support such operations and such capabilities should be able to execute defence operations singularly or jointly.

PEACE MISSIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION

101. Peace missions include a wide spectrum of operations from the provision of observers, to peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, to peace enforcement in a hostile environment under Chapter 7 of the Charter. A purely military approach to peace support operations, which ignores the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peace building, will not effectively achieve lasting stability and conditions of human security. A multidimensional developmental approach will be pursued with military and civilian bodies cooperating to accelerate capacity-building and socio-economic development.

102. Defence will pursue reconstruction and create conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peace keeping objectives. The process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations will enable and reinforce the process of development and reconstruction. Developmental peacekeeping will inevitably be executed in a joint, inter-departmental, inter-agency and multi-national (JI2M) context.

103. Defence will continue supporting the UN and the AU through:

a. Contributing headquarters staff, formed units and specialised elements to mandated and assessed missions.

b. Providing technical and specialist support and facilitating industrial support to UN and AU forces.

104. Defence can contribute greatly to socio-economic development by employing its diverse capabilities, such as its planning capability, in parallel with peace-operation forces. This would usually deploy as part of the South African contingent forces but may in exceptional cases deploy on its own as part of the South African contribution to a multinational HQ. Its activities will in most cases be influenced by the civil component of an integrated multinational HQ.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

105. South Africa believes that security is underpinned by the inter-related factors of peace and stability, development, democracy and good governance. South Africa undertakes Security Sector Reform (SSR) within the Policy Framework for Reconstruction and Development of the AU and SSR guidelines of other relevant multilateral organisations, in particular, the UN.

106. In countries emerging from conflict the security sector is often seriously deficient. South Africa accordingly views SSR as an indispensable aspect of conflict resolution and the creation of sustainable security. The security sector of a country, comprising the armed forces, police, intelligence services, judiciary and prisons services, plays a key role in maintaining peace, stability and the rule of law. The functionality of the security sector is thus of vital importance and the ultimate objective of SSR is thus to create a secure and stable environment that is conducive to:
a. human-centred and infrastructural development;
b. poverty alleviation; economic growth; and
c. the institutionalisation of representative, accountable and transparent governance that is based on the rule of law and democratic principles.

107. The aim of SSR is to reposition the security sector to provide security to the state and society in an effective and efficient manner, within the framework of democratic civilian control.

108. Defence, together with the post-conflict country, its government, security organs and other contributing countries, will contribute to the reconstruction of the security sector through:

   a. disarmament,
   b. the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants,
   c. curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and
   d. training constituted forces to function as a professional military force within a democratic system.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF IN THE REGION

109. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief interventions may take place throughout and beyond the African continent. Operations will preferably be launched through regional, continental and international security structures, although specific operational requirements and the degree, extent and urgency of the humanitarian crisis may necessitate independent action.

110. Humanitarian assistance operations cover a wide range of actions which may include the deployment of troops to prevent the spread of diseases affecting humans and livestock, the transportation and distribution of food or water during droughts, fighting major bush fires, search and rescue operations during floods and relief operations after earthquakes or floods, to name but a few. Humanitarian assistance operations may be necessary when people are facing a severe threat or deprivation and civilian assistance is hampered or prevented. These operations combine the demands of humanitarian assistance operations with stability operations to protect the population, relief teams and their stores, and to ensure free movement and the free distribution of supplies.

111. Defence, as authorised by Government, will use its collateral capabilities to provide rapidly deployable and initially light early-entry forces to stabilise such situations prior to the deployment of follow-on forces and the humanitarian agencies required to enable and execute relief operations.

GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

112. South Africa may consider the deployment of General Military Assistance Missions on a bilateral level where training teams are deployed for specific tasks and specific periods. Training could range from bridging training, to basic training and to sophisticated training at all levels.
PRESIDENTIAL TASKS

113. Defence provides the President with specific personal support in the execution of presidential duties, primarily in the areas of air transport, close protection and medical services. This includes the Deputy President, Minister of Defence and other approved VVIPs. (Figure 48).

114. The President, as Commander in Chief and as the Head of the National Executive, may from time to time order the Defence Force into service for identified tasks.
In times of crisis or great need South Africa and its people are secured through the Defence Force’s assistance to civil authority in the maintenance of essential services, the protection of life, health and property and the execution any other services that may be ordered by Government. (Figure 49).

Defence may be called upon to assist civil authority with a range of tasks when capacity has become strained, when a situation or an emergency is beyond the latter’s capabilities or in the event of an imminent crisis. Typical tasks may include the augmentation of vital services during strikes, consequence management and relief after man-made and natural disasters, support to special events, and the protection of life and state property. Defence may thus render assistance with the prevention of the spread of diseases affecting humans and livestock, the transportation and distribution of food or water during droughts, fighting major bush fires, search and rescue operations during floods and relief operations after earthquakes or floods, to name but a few examples. Humanitarian assistance operations may be necessary when people are suffering severe threat or deprivation and normal civilian assistance is hampered or prevented.
117. Other government departments will act as lead departments, with Defence in support of their activities. Task-organised elements may be detached to other departments as required. This may include mobile forces to quickly deal with the particular situation, using centralised air-mobile forces or decentralised forces moving by road. Defence will have a permanent pool of equipment (cargo carriers, tents, water bunkers and strategic medicines) available on standby to support the three levels of government.

ANTI-POACHING MEASURES

118. The collateral capability of the Defence Force will be utilised to support civil authority including the Department of Environmental Affairs, SAN Parks and relevant provincial wildlife authorities in combating the illegal poaching of South Africa’s flora and fauna, with specific attention to be given in the short-term to the protection of the rhinoceros and abalone populations. Other flora or fauna may require anti-poaching protection in times to come. Specific short-term operations will be conducted on the basis of a Memorandum of Agreement between the Defence Force and the relevant authority. This support will have the three-fold objective of disrupting, preventing and deterring poaching.

OTHER ORDERED DEFENCE OPERATIONS

119. Defence will execute any other services that may from time to time be ordered by Government within the constraints of domestic and international law.

TASK 13
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA

DEFENCE EFFECT

120. Development is enhanced by the collaborative and incremental defence contribution to the developmental agenda.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA

121. Government has set the following objectives as the broad path for growth and development that will accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty and include the marginalised in the mainstream economy:

a. The growth of the economy as the central and main intervention.

b. Decisive State intervention to promote involvement of the marginalised in economic activity.

c. Targeted intervention in the second economy to ensure socio-economic inclusion and increase social cohesion.

122. Challenges. The challenges faced by government to meet these objectives include:

a. Intensification of the work of government to meet these objectives.
b. The massive infrastructure outlay required to reduce the cost of doing business.

c. The requirement to develop capital goods and supplier industries.

d. An industrial programme to meet significant domestic demand, increase exports & create jobs.

e. Development programmes to meet skills requirements in the economy and increase domestic employment.

DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

123. The defence contribution to development, and thus to national security, is provided by creating the conditions whereby growth and development may take place. This it achieves by addressing the military dimensions of conflict and insecurity and maintaining peace and stability. As a major national asset, the Defence Force may also be tasked to contribute to national developmental ends in collaboration with all other departments and agencies, through the use of its collateral utility without detriment to its primary role or resource allocation (Figure 50).

![Figure 50: Task 13 - Contribute to the Developmental Agenda](image)

124. Examples of the potential Defence Contribution to national development may include.
a. **Youth Development.** Significant numbers of young South Africans in the age bracket 15 to 25 years lack employment, skills, discipline and educational opportunities. This provides Government with a huge developmental challenge. The collateral utility of the Defence Force can be used to improve the employability of South African youth by means of skills development and community service through targeted interventions. These interventions will not constitute military training and will therefore not contribute to the militarisation of the youth. The focus of these interventions will be citizenship, discipline, teamwork and self-actualisation with the national youth development programme and any other tailored youth programmes.

b. **Spatial Dispersion of Defence Infrastructure.** Military bases in outlying areas provide employment and improve the economic profile of rural communities. Defence will seek to enhance its rural dispersion and will promote employment from the local communities. Defence Force bases in rural areas will also prioritise procurement from local business and industry.

c. **Reserve Utilisation.** The utilisation of Reserves from rural communities augments the income streams of poorer households. Reserves with specialised skills and experience can also be utilised to assist in development projects. The expansion of the reserve system in rural areas will consequently be prioritised.

d. **Employment.** Defence is committed to the continuous 100% filling of all funded vacant posts and an increased utilisation of its Reserve Component. Entry level recruitment to the Defence Force will be done through advertisements in the local and national media, contact sessions at schools and tertiary education institutions followed by country-wide selection boards.

e. **Community Services.** The Defence Force can be tasked to render specific community services in areas where other authorities are unable to render the required support. Defence Force facilities may be utilised for the education, training and development of local communities. Such initiatives will be executed in collaboration with the relevant authorities and stakeholders.

f. **Critical Infrastructure Interventions.** As a principle Defence will not generally compete with the private sector in the provision of infrastructure. However, the collateral capability of Defence may be tasked to enhance critical infrastructure in rural and inaccessible areas. These actions will allow for the sourcing of labour from remote communities and will assist in skills development and upliftment within such communities.
125. Sound civil control over Defence is enhanced through Ministerial Control, Parliamentary Oversight, comprehensive defence policy and the performance monitoring and evaluation of the Defence function\footnote{This is described more fully later in the Chapter on the Future Defence Organisation, specifically under the key tenets of the Ministry of Defence.} (Figure 51).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure51.png}
\caption{Figure 51: Task 14 - Enhanced Civil Control}
\end{figure}
MINISTERIAL OVERSIGHT

126. The Constitution requires that a member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defence. The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Defence (hereafter referred to as the Minister) consequently exercises control over Defence and is accountable to Cabinet and Parliament for all defence activities.

127. The Secretary for Defence must perform such functions as may be entrusted by the Minister, in particular those necessary or expedient to enhance civil control by:

   a. The Minister over Defence.
   b. Parliament, and its parliamentary committees having oversight over Defence.

PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

128. The Constitution provides for the establishment of multi-party Parliamentary Committees to have oversight over all security services. Such committees must exercise oversight as determined by legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament and are accordingly empowered to inter alia maintain oversight within their portfolio and summon any individual or legal person to give evidence on matters regarding the portfolio.

129. The parliamentary committees directly tasked with oversight on Defence are the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), the Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD), the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), as well as the Select Committee on Constitutional and Security Affairs (SCOSCA) in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Committees with other portfolios may from time to time have an interest in Defence matters.

130. The JSCD was established with broad powers of oversight to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, the functioning of Defence, acquisition and procurement policy, and the state of readiness of Defence from an operational perspective. It may perform other functions relating to Parliamentary supervision of the armed forces as prescribed by law.

131. The PCD is responsible for monitoring Defence by scrutinising and investigating defence business. It makes recommendations on the functions, budgetary allocations, rationalisation and restructuring of the Defence organisational structure, policy formulation and any other relevant matters from an administrative perspective. It is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in Parliament.

132. The SCOSCA in the NCOP has an oversight role on all Defence-related legislation and policy. This oversight role largely focuses on the implications for the nine provinces of South Africa.

133. SCOPA exercises oversight over all executive structures and constitutional institutions of the State on behalf of the Legislature to ensure accountability for resources and financial management in accordance with the requirements of the PFMA, 1999, as amended.

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86 Constitution, 1996: Section 201(1).
DEFENCE EFFECT

134. Defence resources are efficiently and effectively applied and managed through robust policy
prescripts, rigorous planning, programming and budgeting, comprehensive internal controls and
comprehensive accounting and reporting. (Figure 52).

DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION

135. The administrative framework for Defence is prescribed by national legislation and
regulations, principally:


136. Consequently, the efficient and effective management of resources and required internal
control systems, audit and accounting responsibility rest heavily on the shoulders of the Head of
Department and the Accounting Officer.

137. Defence Activities. High-level activities to achieve the Defence Mission will broadly include:

   a. Contributing to the formulation of Government policy and the setting of defence policy.
   b. Developing defence strategies, plans, programmes and budgets.
   c. Planning, generating and delivering military capabilities, supporting infrastructure and
services.
   e. Planning, conducting and controlling military operations.
   f. Exercising governance, risk and compliance in defence resources to account for
resources voted by Parliament.

138. Every defence member should be contributing to one of the above high-level activities in
order for the Defence Force to attain its mandate.

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89 The oversight of Performance, Monitoring and Control will reside with the Ministry of Defence. The execution of this
Task will reside across all command and staff functions as described in the Chapter on Defence Organisation.
Figure 52: Task 15 - Effect Management of Resources
1. The current security environment has been described as a “persistent troubled peace”, reflecting greater uncertainty in a post-bipolar world. In this security environment future conflicts are expected to often simultaneously involve conventional and non-conventional styles of warfare in the same theatre.

2. This implies that many of the conflicts that arise will thus demonstrate features usually associated with criminality, terrorism and armed insurgencies that have been fuelled by nominal or actual grievances. The challenge, therefore, is to strike an effective and sustainable balance between capabilities required for meeting both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats.

3. As regards South Africa, a pure conventional military threat remains highly unlikely in the medium term. In the meantime factors of insecurity to South Africa and its people will arise out of developmental challenges, pervasive crime, and illegal migration, amongst others. Regarding internal security, the threat of illegal crossing of the South African borderline (land, air and maritime) is likely to increase. The land, air and maritime borders of South Africa are likely to remain highly vulnerable to illegal crossing because of the lack of capacity to effectively institute safeguarding measures. When undertaking borderline protection the Defence Force will have to deal with large numbers of legal and illegal, mainly socio-economic, migrants as well as criminals. In order to manage this situation, the Defence Force will require extensive resources as well as undertake cross-border cooperation with defence forces of the neighbouring SADC states.

4. In all probability, the nature and pattern of conflict in Africa will remain constant. Conflict will remain mainly as intra-state conflict and political strife; insurgency, civil war, proxy warfare and limited military intervention by neighbouring countries will prevail in conflict areas. Defence Forces will operate amongst civilian populations. Security measures taken in Africa will remain tied to assistance with security management as and when required. Central and East Africa and parts of North Africa are the most likely areas for PSOs, as tension and conflict will probably persist.

5. It remains possible that the Defence Force may be deployed where peace has not yet been attained or in defence of vulnerable populations. In such instances, the Defence Force may have to counter heavy conventional weapons in the possession of either state or non-state actors. Current peace processes in which the Defence Force is involved are expected to progress slowly, particularly in the DRC and Sudan, and will require continued SADC and Defence Force deployment. It remains possible that South Africa (and thus the Defence Force) could be called upon to meet its responsibilities in terms of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

6. Maritime insecurity resulting from piracy will probably increase off the East and West African coasts and will lead to increased foreign involvement to combat this threat. The threat of maritime insecurity could migrate to the SADC maritime area and necessitate increased involvement (both in
intelligence and operations) to counter.

7. Future conflicts will be characterised by uncertainty, complexity and an increase in asymmetry. Physical and human complexity will remain an important characteristic of the future operating environment. The physical terrain may include urban areas, dense bush, forests, and mountains, areas dominated by river systems, swamps and deserts. Ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and religious diversity, and operations in the face of ethnic, tribal and religious tensions and conflicts, will produce considerable human complexity. Forces will therefore be required to have knowledge of culture, customs and language as well as being masters of sophisticated weapons and systems. Operations in complex post-conflict environments may be as dangerous as combat missions.

8. The future security environment will be characterised by threats and sources of insecurity that will emanate from a wide variety of possibilities across the spectrum of conflict. In addition, a clear distinction between the different modes of war will continue to be increasingly blurred. Both regular and irregular modes of warfare will be frequently, and almost routinely, integrated. Military operations will span the spectrum from peacetime operations such as participation in disaster relief and support to government departments, to combat operations such as counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency operations and conventional war. Certain types of operations can rapidly escalate from traditional peacetime interventions to combat operations.

9. Forces will thus operate in complex, highly fluid and lethal environments which in turn dictate the need for highly integrated levels of command and control, protection, mobility, firepower, sustainment and situational awareness. The complex, non-linear and rapidly changing security environment will pose a challenge to armed forces, demanding new doctrine and tactics, specialised equipment, heightened levels of awareness and appropriate decision-making and leadership. The analytical and planning capabilities within Defence will therefore be the critical factor in determining the appropriate preparation for and responses to emerging security trends.

10. In an increasingly complex and inter-related world, national security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition that will include the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature. Emphasis will increasingly be placed on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Defence must consequently be organised and structured as a military force to be able to perform its operations to the levels qualified. In most instances, inherent war-fighting capabilities will be utilised to meet obligations.

11. Defence forces and military personnel will also find themselves increasingly employed in essentially non-military roles owing to their readiness profile, training and capacity for organised action, often as a first response to natural disasters and other serious civil contingencies. They will accordingly require specialised training tailored to their expanded role, supported by current, validated and authoritative doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures, and an increased awareness of the legal implications of their actions.

12. Particular focus will be placed on the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and establishing a firm foundation for sustainable development, especially in the areas of security sector reform and the successful integration of armed forces. In addition to their traditional war fighting role modern militaries will be required to play a constructive role in post-war reconstruction efforts in collaboration with other government departments and other agencies.

13. Since many of the sources of insecurity transcend state borders, collective action must be undertaken within multilateral organisations to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions.
Government's commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels require a long-term Defence involvement in collective defence and security mechanisms, including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence cooperation. These include the PSC, ASF, Continental and Regional Early Warning, and the SADC Standby Force.

14. South Africa's national security policy and priorities therefore require a Joint, Inter-Service/Division, Interdepartmental, Inter-agency and Multinational (JI²M) approach which will have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of Defence.

15. The exponential growth in information and communication technologies will create the potential for the leakage and diffusion of sensitive and potentially dangerous information. Information security will thus be a vital area of concern. The media, in all its forms, will continue to shape perceptions, expectations and opinions. State and non-state actors, in pursuit of their own interests, will continuously exploit this powerful capability. This motivates a requirement for a coherent and flexible communication strategy and Information Warfare Defensive (Information system security) strategy.

16. Addressing concerns of environmental security dictates that the planning and execution of military activities will need to take into account the impact it will have on the environment and facilities.

17. The spectrum of military operations will therefore include non-combat operations where the use of force will be absent or restricted to self-defence, to those where there is an implicit or explicit threat of military force, to overt combat operations that cannot be conducted without the use of potentially extreme force. Some military operations will be conducted largely in support of other state departments or agencies, where those departments or agencies have the overall executive responsibility for the operation. Such operations will generally not entail the use of military force. Conventional combat operations in defence against an overt military threat, on the other hand, will largely be a direct Defence responsibility, although cooperation with and the involvement of other departments and agencies will always be present. In addition to the inter-departmental, inter-agency nature of operations, operations can also be conducted in a multi-national context, especially where security issues transcend national borders, as will often be the case. Figure 53 illustrates this relationship.
Military Role relative to Other Departments and Agencies

Figure 53: Spectrum of Military Operations in Relation to Other Departments and Agencies

18. Military operations will thus span a complex spectrum in terms of the potential or actual use of force, the risk of escalation, the nature and capability of opposing forces, scale, intensity, duration, and environmental variables such as location, demographics, climate and terrain, cooperation with other government departments and agencies, and requirements for international cooperation. The variety and complexity of requirements is arguably greater than at any previous time in history. At the same time the demands of non-defence needs have escalated considerably and the resources allocated to defence are severely limited.

19. Being expected to satisfy all requirements concurrently with extremely restricted resources presents a challenge that has frustrated defence planners across the world for at least the past decade. A common understanding of the extent and complexity of defence requirements is the first step in resolving that dilemma.

FUTURE CONFLICT GEOGRAPHIES

20. Since many of the threats and sources of insecurity transcend state borders, collective action through multilateral organisations is required to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions. In responding to a changing security environment, states have to consider the elements of their military power base in relation to their foreign policy objectives. Defence has to consider the national approach to security, the future conflict spectrum, the different geographies of warfare, the increasing need to prioritise environmental security, the imperative of collective security and the role of defence diplomacy. (Figure 54)
21. In responding to a changing strategic environment, Defence takes cognisance that the future threat environment will be characterised by five interdependent geographies, namely the land, sea, air, space\(^90\) and information spheres\(^91\). It is essential that strategies and doctrines are developed for these five future interdependent warfare geographies, especially for the relatively new warfare geographies of space and the information sphere.

22. These geographies must be analysed across political, social, economic and technology spectrums. Therefore, Defence has to consider the national approach to security, the future conflict spectrum, the different geographies of warfare, the increasing need to prioritise environmental security, the imperative of collective security and the role of defence diplomacy.

23. It can therefore be deduced that the obvious geographic challenge is the extent of the theatre of operations compounded by the complexity of the terrain, climate, health threats, population, navigation, poor transport infrastructure and flimsy structures all of which present enormous tactical difficulties.

**LANDWARD SPHERE**

24. Land forces retain the unique capacity to capture, occupy and hold terrain and to maintain a continuous presence for as long as required for the specific mission objective. Future war will compete for and take place in the human domain. In future warfare, land power, primarily referring to deployed troops, will thus continue to be decisive. Air, sea, space power and information

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\(^90\) Space is defined by the FAI as the region more than 100 kilometres above the surface of the earth. The South African National Space Agency Bill of 2007 defines space as the region above the measurable atmosphere

\(^91\) This is the domain where information exists and flows.
superiority will, however, be critical enablers for the achievement of landward objectives.

25. Effectiveness and survivability will require unprecedented integration and interoperability across the combat services and down to the lowest echelons in future vast battle spaces. Some future operations will be conducted in distant, extremely large theatres with poor transport infrastructure. Sustainment footprint and personnel efficiency drive suitability as a deciding factor for what capability will be required for an asymmetric, hybrid and/or symmetric battle space.

26. In addition to the full complement of combat capabilities required by complex and hybrid warfare, military health services will be particularly important. Future military operations in Africa will be conducted in an austere health environment and such services will play an important role both in ensuring the wellness of deployed forces and in humanitarian support.

27. In the future battlefield successes will be determined by the ability to orchestrate precision operations (kinetic\textsuperscript{92} and non-kinetic\textsuperscript{93}) with precision manoeuvrability. The major powers have acquired ability for war that is characterised by precision weaponry, near real time intelligence support to Command and Control (C\textsuperscript{3}) and Electronic Warfare (EW). All three capabilities having been integrated into a combat system have fundamentally changed the nature of warfare to inflict destruction of an unprecedented scale. Some of these advanced weapon systems have been integrated and in the next decade, many African defence forces will augment “traditional” forces with selected high-end capabilities, including missiles, advanced Command and Control, Communication, Computer and (military) Intelligence and Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems, precision strike systems and advanced air defence systems.

28. The austere health environment is a threat to human wellness, creating a human battle space to operate in. Environmental, humanitarian and demographic issues and disease threaten the wellness of the local population and risk the health of deployed soldiers. Limited and deteriorating health capability on the continent limits the health support capabilities and the continuing need for external health support intervention to sustain wellness. Health service projection, force health protection, sustainment and evacuation are influenced by the nature of the human battle space, environment control measures and strategic reach. Restoring wellness and health contribute to maintain stability.

MARITIME SPHERE

29. Maritime security presents a severe challenge for peace and security on the African continent. Piracy, the smuggling of weapons, contraband and people, and the illegal exploitation of maritime resources have become increasingly prominent issues in recent times. However, littoral states in the region generally lack the capacity to monitor, police and enforce maritime law. South Africa, in particular, is a maritime nation with an island economy and thus requires naval capabilities to ensure the security of its waters, marine resources and trade routes.

30. In addition South Africa has submitted claim to an additional 0.8 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under Article 46 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Figure 55 below). This claim vastly increases South Africa’s area of responsibility.

\textsuperscript{92} Kinetic means by means of force or technology.
\textsuperscript{93} Non-kinetic means initiatives such as information warfare.
31. The substantial increase in acts of piracy along Africa’s coastline is of grave concern as it threatens the peace, security and stability of the continent. Although the current piracy hot spots are the east (Gulf of Aden) and west (Gulf of Guinea) coasts of Africa, pirates have extended their activities to over 1,100 km offshore and have moved into Seychelles, Tanzanian and Mozambican waters. As a direct consequence of the piracy along the east coast of Africa, a growing number of shipping companies have had to route their ships via the Cape Sea Route, instead of using the Suez Canal. Such dynamics, together with requests from foreign governments and multilateral organisations, have compelled South Africa to provide a response to such security threats. As such, Defence will play a key role to help combat future occurrences of maritime crime, especially along the east and west coasts of SADC.

AERONAUTICAL SPHERE

32. Developments in technology have greatly enhanced the effectiveness and lethality of air power and it will play a vital role in future warfare. While especially prominent in regular warfare, it will also be essential during irregular warfare. In the first place, the establishment and maintenance of a favourable air situation will remain crucial to the success of combat operations. Air power will also play a decisive role in reconnaissance, in shaping the battle space through the precise delivery of ordnance, in the rapid projection of force and forces, and in the sustainment and recovery of such forces.

33. In several recent African conflicts smuggling by air of precious commodities, people and weapons has also played a significant, if not crucial, role in financing and sustaining conflict. Control of the air can thus be an important factor in peace missions. In addition, smuggling by air for purely criminal purposes such as the drug trade can undermine state authority. Peacetime control of the air is also therefore an important factor in promoting security.
SPACE

34. Space represents the ultimate vantage point. Satellites thus provide global surveillance cover and unobstructed global communications. A modern defence force therefore requires assured access to space-based remote sensing, communications and navigation. Such access will be a vital contributor to comprehensive intelligence collection, situational awareness, mapping of remote areas and information superiority.

35. In view of the importance of space-based assets, the space warfare is almost inevitable. This could involve attacks against ground stations, electronic measures to jam satellite links or anti-satellite weapons to disable or destroy satellites. A measure of systems redundancy and hardening will therefore be required.

INFORMATION SPHERE

36. Military forces are becoming increasingly dependent on information and communication technology. The convergence of information and communication technology in the digital domain implies that cyber-power will bring enhanced communication, intelligence, positioning, imagery and weather forecast capabilities to the future battle space.

37. This fifth dimension has gained prominence in that strategic power can be projected in the Information Sphere (also commonly known as the InfoSphere). The InfoSphere is the environment where information exists and flows in both structured and/or random ways and where facts or knowledge reside and are represented or conveyed by a particular sequence of symbols, impulses or characterisations. It is also a key domain in the execution of command and control. The exploitation and protection of capabilities functioning in the electromagnetic spectrum, network/cyber information systems and cognitive domains thus require concerted attention for the attainment of information superiority.

38. The spectra and domains where effort must be concentrated are described below and depicted in Figure 56:

a. Electromagnetic Spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum is a continuum of radiant energies that span from gamma and x-rays, through ultraviolet, the optical or visible wave band, infrared waves, microwaves, radio waves and up to extremely low frequency radio waves.

b. Network Spectrum /Cyber Spectrum. The network/cyber spectrum is made up of various technologies that enable the transportation (movement) of data packages in the form of bits and bytes resulting in the creation of information systems and networks that enable electronic interaction to take place.

c. Human Domain. The human domain relates to knowledge and wisdom acquired through thoughts, experience and senses, resulting in a perception, sensation or intuition. It is also the place where understanding, beliefs, norms and values reside, and where decisions are made. This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience. The significance of the human domain lies in its ability to influence the perceptions, cognitions, attitudes and behaviour of specific individuals and groups.
39. Future conflict trends will further blur security boundaries, requiring armed forces to break out of their current information paradigms, cross silo-barriers and break into new ground through the creation of a new security partnership between government, business, academia and private citizens. This will require interaction with strategic partners and multilateral organisations in order to develop working principles for cyberspace interactions.

FUTURE CONFLICT

40. This process of adversary adaptation to the complexity of future battle space is already well underway, and will require an effective and affordable response. Adversaries will avoid engagements that play to government strengths; for instance, they will seek to deny the Defence organisation access to theatre, using all the political and military levers that can be deployed. They will also seek to disperse into an increasingly complex battle space, including amongst the people and below ground, where armed forces will struggle to dominate. The human terrain, and its associated linguistic, ideological, tribal, sectarian and ethnic features, will remain highly complex.

41. These differences will require armed forces to think in a new way about the current Defence Capabilities; things that have been regarded as supporting or enabling functions such as deep cultural understanding (which includes fluency in languages), Human Intelligence or Civil-Military Cooperation will, in this environment, be battle-defining. It will be increasingly difficult to distinguish groups of adversaries from one another, either by their appearance or through the equipment and tactics that they use. Potential adversaries may have expeditionary capabilities which will require an appropriate response.
42. In future conflict the armed forces may be forced, through strategic imperative or operational necessity, to engage the adversaries in areas that reduce the effectiveness of their capabilities and confer an advantage to indigenous combatants. Each of the environments maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace) and electromagnetic will be affected differently, and will be inter-linked and porous, with activities in one having effect in others. The current construct of sea, land and air fails to capture the emerging environments, such as the deep ocean, space, underground and cyberspace, and it fails to expose the environmental seams along which the adversaries will attack.

43. Difficult terrain will become the contested battle space, with adversaries seeking to hold or exploit ground for political, social and military purposes. In the maritime environment the need to operate in the littoral where there will be a proliferation of mines, anti-ship missile systems, fast-attack craft and submarine capabilities. In the air, the ability to operate, especially in the lower airspace and around air bases, will be contested. Similarly, anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the ability to disrupt satellites on which the operation relies, will have matured. The adversaries will seek to limit the access to theatres of operation; they may do this directly, for example through the use of barrages of missile attacks, swarm attacks by UAVs, or by mining the approaches to our directly or indirectly be influencing public will and the political opinion.

44. Access to the theatre, whether physical or virtual, and which is likely to be via a node, cannot be taken for granted. In the virtual environments, both friendly and adversary forces will use the same nodes, which will be difficult to identify, protect or attack. Protection of the Defence virtual networks against exploitation and attack will be (and should already be) non-discretionary. Physical access, on which the concept of expeditionary operations is predicated, will be increasingly contested, and this constraint can only be mitigated by substantial and protracted engagement with a wider range of potential partners.

45. In the complex battle space of the future, international and regional legal and societal norms will place continued constraints on the conduct of operations. The increasing difficulty of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants is likely to require more extensive targeting preparation, and the legal and moral requirement to take all feasible precautions in avoiding, or at least minimising, collateral damage will lead to the greater use of precision weapons. However, the use of such weapons will still carry risk.

46. Furthermore, concerns about the proportionality of the use of non-precision weapons are in future likely to lead to attempts to further minimise their use. The use of non-precision weapons, or the failure of precision weapons to avoid all collateral damage, while legally permissible, may generate adverse perceptions that undermine the legitimacy of operations. In particular, the view that the use of air power is a ‘cruel overmatch or a blunt instrument’ is likely to be encouraged by adversaries who recognise the reach, precision and utility that such technology represents.

47. Furthermore, legal challenges may be raised against the use of novel weapons and systems, such as Unmanned Aerial Systems, Distant Early Warning (DEW), non-lethal weapons and Computer Network Operations (CNO). Ethical concerns are likely to result in policy constraints on the use of such technologies, and may lead to new international treaties and constraints. The application of domestic law and international human rights obligations to an armed conflict situation will continue to be debated and reviewed, and may result in unanticipated restrictions. Any legal, moral or ethical constraints, which uphold the legitimacy and legality of regional and continental military operations, are unlikely to restrict the actions of, or be reciprocated by, potential adversaries.
48. Moreover, it can be deduced that the Defence will be required to operate internationally in circumstances of political or societal breakdown, and this challenge will frequently result in the potential for escalating violence. There will be a proliferation of smaller conflicts and events that may require a range of concurrent military responses, from prevention through containment to intervention. In order to provide Government with options, there will be a requirement for increased situational understanding, and judgment of the nation, as well as improved cross-government, multi-agency and regional cooperation. Experience shows the likelihood of new challenges which will warrant urgent and non-discretionary military responses. These responses may include: conducting humanitarian relief operations; non-combatant evacuations; dealing with imminent terrorist attacks or threats to national interests; or focused coercive actions (such raids by special or specialised forces).

49. There will, however, be an increasing requirement to become involved in prevention activity, on a far wider geographic scale, as the incidence of potential conflict hotspots increases. While such activities remain important, their low visibility within wider government circles make them vulnerable to cost cutting. However, as part of the joint operation approach, the effectiveness and political utility of these forms of military missions may become more apparent. Prevention, including deterrence, containment or coercion, will be far more effective if it is backed up by credible military force well equipped to conduct such operations. Furthermore, there may be a requirement to adapt the capability-based approach to embrace wider threats. Dealing with diverse and adaptive threats may demand more investment in high-calibre people, educated and trained to a new benchmark.

**DEFENCE CONTINGENCIES**

50. The design of a defence force is dependent on an understanding of and consensus on the type of contingencies that might require a defence response.

51. The analysis of defence contingencies is intended to create a planning baseline by considering plausible futures based on features and trends of the strategic environment, considering contingencies involving both conflict between states and conflict within states at various levels of severity, from peacetime interaction and competition, to contingencies involving high levels of violence. This allows deliberation on the full spectrum of defence activity, from standing peacetime tasks, to defence of South Africa, to peace missions in Africa and beyond.

52. The defence of South Africa against any direct threat will remain the defence priority. Military operations will be executed and managed according to priorities dictated by circumstance. Defence will not be expected to become involved in every possible contingency. Involvement in many contingencies will be discretionary, based on: likelihood, resource constraints, government priorities or other considerations.

**INTER-STATE CONTINGENCIES**

53. The inter-state contingencies span a range of threat levels, from political and economic competition that characterises peace-time interaction between states, to general or total war. The description of each threat level includes a number of threat manifestations. A contingency at a particular threat level can comprise any sub-set of manifestations. The spectrum is as follows:
a. **Political and Economic Conflict**: Alliances, propaganda, economic and political co-operation/sanctions, military co-operation and/or assistance. Conflict management through negotiation, mediation, arbitration.

b. **Sub-National Conflict**: Boycotts, seizures, violations of territorial integrity, assassination, acts of terror, sabotage, hostage taking, state-sponsored plundering of resources, training, advice and military assistance.

c. **Overt Armed Conflict**: Sporadic armed clashes, skirmishes, raids and temporary incursions by conventional forces. Limited ends rather than major change in status quo.

d. **Limited War**: Protracted, sustained operations by conventional forces, partial/temporary invasion, intent to affect significant change in status quo such as regime change or annexation of territory.

e. **General/Total War**: Full mobilisation, war in all dimensions, intent to invade, occupy and conquer, complete change in international order.

54. The above contingencies may contain threats directed at:

a. South Africa;

b. South Africa’s external interests;

c. SADC countries; and,

d. non-SADC countries.

55. The source of such threats may be continental or external to the continent. The reason for this distinction is that the projection of an inter-continental defence capability and the consequent logistic sustainment thereof is considerable, implying major power involvement or the collaboration of major powers.

**INTRA-STATE CONTINGENCIES**

56. The structure of the intra-state framework is conceptually identical to that of the inter-state framework. The threat spectrum is as follows:

a. **Threats to General Human Security**: Natural and human disasters, crime, breakdown of essential services, plundering of resources, mass migrations, large numbers of illegal aliens, refugees, protests, civil disobedience/unrest.

b. **Civil Threats to Constitutional Order**: Violent protests, sporadic communal violence, mass civil disorder, uncontrolled organised crime, breakdown of law and order.

c. **Sub-state Threats to Constitutional Order**: Systematic low-key violence by non-state groupings including terrorism, assassination, transnational crime, hostage taking, seizures, sabotage, piracy.

d. **General Civil Conflict**: Widespread communal inter-group violence and civil disorder.

e. **Insurgency**: Armed rebellion, revolt or insurrection to weaken or gain control of the
State.

f. **Civil War**: Armed intra-state conflict between civilian groups or between the State and a group motivated by identity issues, a desire for secession or for control of state.

57. Threats may involve South Africa, SADC and non-SADC states, South African interests in such states, and non-African states.

**RISK AND IMPACT OF CONTINGENCIES**

58. A further consideration is the level of risk posed to South Africa, risk being defined as a function of the probability of a contingency and the extent of its impact. While the future is inherently uncertain, all planning implies an expectation about the future. This implies judgment within the context of the security environment. Potential impact is assessed by considering the following factors:

b. Impact on the economy of the region.
c. Human impact in South Africa in terms of disease, death and displacement.
d. Human impact in the region in terms of disease, death and displacement.
e. Impact on South Africa's territorial integrity.
f. Impact on South Africa's international standing.
g. Impact on morale in South Africa.

**STRATEGIC DEFENCE CONCEPTS**

**COMPLEX WAR-FIGHTING**

59. The African Battle-Space poses many challenges. Diverse participants may include terror groups, bandits, religious fanatics, mercenaries, insurgents, unarmed protesters, environmental groups, formal militaries and non-state actors. Characteristics may include:

a. Future conflicts will be characterised by uncertainty, complexity and an increase in asymmetry, and will not be contained by national borders.
b. The physical terrain may include urban areas, dense bush, forests, mountains, riverine areas, swamps and desert.
c. Physical and human complexity will be an important characteristic of the future operating environment.
d. Ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and religious diversity, and operations in the face of ethnic, tribal and religious tensions and conflicts, will produce considerable human complexity.
e. Complex health threats to deployed forces from diseases and environmental conditions.

60. Post-conflict missions can suddenly become as lethal as pure war-fighting missions, requiring agility to simultaneously execute a wide range of complex missions among foreign populations, as well as in unfamiliar and difficult terrain. These complex, highly fluid and lethal environments demand enhanced command and control, protection, mobility, firepower, sustainment and situational awareness.

INTEROPERABILITY

61. Interoperability is principally concerned with the ability of personnel and systems of different nations and agencies to work efficiently and effectively together. Future defence operations will probably be conducted in combination with other defence forces, requiring the ability to operate effectively alongside forces with differing military capabilities, doctrine, and cultural backgrounds.

62. Priority must be given to promoting interoperability on command and control capabilities (processes, policies and procedures) with regional partners, as well as meeting the needs of regional coalition requirements. Capability coherence must be created through experimentation and exercises.

INTEGRATED COMMAND AND CONTROL

63. Effective, efficient and affordable defence command and control and defence administration is driven by the concept of Integrated Command and Control, allowing for the integration of all defence capabilities required for effective command and control and administration, and further allows deployed defence capabilities to integrate with co-located multi-national forces, other government departments and civil authorities in executing such functions as peace missions, humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

INTELLIGENCE DRIVEN

64. Effective intelligence aims to build up a strategic picture of the environment and provide early warning of potential developments and events which may affect the national interest. This is achieved by means of the timely collection, processing and dissemination of effective information in order to be able to anticipate and where necessary respond to any potential situation in which security may be compromised.

RAPID REACTION

65. Security crises can arise overnight both in times of peace and conflict. These may include imminent danger, grave human rights violations, threats of a human origin and natural disasters. A prompt, quickly executed military response will prevent such crises from escalating and will limit and alleviate the human security consequences thereof. The ability to respond rapidly to such contingencies and sustain such response is a critical component of the defence concept.

EXPEDITIONARY

66. South Africa requires the ability to contribute to and conduct military operations remotely. Such operations may be mounted at short notice in distant and extremely austere theatres. Expeditionary operations may have to be sustained for protracted periods. Strategic air, land and sea mobility are crucial to South Africa’s contribution to regional and continental security.
CONCURRENCY OF OPERATIONS OF A “CAMPAIGN QUALITY”

67. Subject to government direction, Defence will have to execute several concurrent operations, varying across the spectrum of conflict. This calls for sufficient capacity and a dynamic and flexible planning process and capability sets that are responsive to the fluidity of our strategic environment. At the operational level, multiple operations must be sustainable over protracted periods of time – thus implying multiple operations of a “campaign quality”.

JOINT, INTER-AGENCY/DEPARTMENTAL AND MULTI-NATIONAL OPERATIONS (JI²M)

68. Future Defence operations will be based on a JI²M approach. Emphasis will be placed on increased collaboration with and between the Defence, government departments, international organisations, multinational partners, non-government organisations and volunteer organisations and to address both internal and external matters of security. This will not exclude the coalition of the willing conducting intervention operations under grave circumstances prior to a multilateral mandate emerging.

a. Joint operations integrate and synchronise the capabilities to exploit combined potential to generate joint combat power. Joint forces must have the intelligence, command and control, firepower, protection, mobility and sustainment to engage any threat found across the spectrum of conflict. The command and control for JI²M operations will include both the methods and the means that a designated commander may employ in the exercise of authority over assigned forces to accomplish the mission.

b. Inter-agency and interdepartmental operations, on the other hand, forge a vital link between Defence and other organs of state, as well as between the various non-governmental organisations (NGO), private voluntary organisations (PVO) and international organisations (IO). The objectives are improved civil-military relations and integration and unity of effort.

c. Both the joint operations and the inter-agency aspects could extend to an international and multinational context.

69. JI²M operations will therefore integrate military and non-military operations, leveraging each participant’s strength into unified actions to address multidimensional security challenges. Such actions will remain the preferred defence choice.

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY CAPABILITY

70. Defence diplomacy is undertaken increasingly to achieve and maintain security co-operation among regional blocs and with equal momentum in furthering bi-lateral defence relations to acquire and procure defence capabilities, implement joint operations and training programmes, and share critical resources in addressing common threats.

71. The Minister of Defence is responsible for setting the international defence diplomacy policy and strategy, extending to international security issues, bilateral relationships and multi-lateral relationships with international defence and security institutions. The Chief of the Defence Force is
responsible for the execution of Defence Diplomacy and assisting the Minister with foreign ministerial commitments.

72. South Africa is unambiguously committed to the promotion of peace and stability and to the resolution of conflict by peaceful means. Active participation in multilateral institutions and collective security mechanisms are an expression of this commitment. South Africa has also entered into a number of international agreements that entail reciprocal obligations and undertakings to engage in cooperation in various sectors, including defence.

73. In the post-conflict reconstruction role, there is a vital linkage to be established between foreign policy, defence policy and that of trade policy. Whilst Defence is primarily concerned with the arena of security sector reform, other sectors of Government must become seized with important concurrent trade and investment initiatives to:

a. Initiate economic development in the country emerging from conflict, thus linking the axiom of security and development.

b. Unlock economic benefit for South Africa that could arise from achieved peace and stability on the continent.

74. The signing and implementation of international defence agreements is thus a critical policy action and will continue to play an important role in advancing defence diplomacy, participation in peace missions, cooperation in the defence and related industries, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD.

75. South Africa also pursues defence diplomacy initiatives to promote defence cooperation with other states in SADC, Africa and beyond. Defence will thus engage in cooperative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, multinational exercises, and procurement of military equipment. The deployment of military attachés is in support of this capability.

76. South Africa’s future Defence Attachés will be stringently selected for their military knowledge and combat service experience and their ability to champion South Africa and further foreign policy, defence diplomacy and international objectives.

COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY

77. A joint command and control capability is essential to ensure jointness of action with respect to land, air, sea and space as well as sustainment to support JI²M operations in a manner that sustains coherence between defence concepts and doctrine. Military command and control must integrate with inter-departmental and inter-agency command and control to ensure synergised effects.

78. The command and control capability needs to be understood as a collective of the following key enabling elements:

a. Situational awareness that presents the Commander and Staffs with relevant information for decision support and decision making functions.

b. Integrated information acquired through sensors as a technical platform for both intelligence and situational awareness. In some instances this is provided through automated command and control processes.
c. The successful conduct of Ji³M operations requires that this joint command and control capability will be conducted in a manner that:

i. Is coherent across all levels of command.

ii. Provides effective command and control support to commanders and their staffs irrespective of the type of mission, battle space conditions, and the force elements comprising the operational force.

iii. Heightens interoperability across all the participants in the Ji³M operation, enabling each force element to collaborate in synergy with other force elements and achieved maximum defence effect.

iv. Exploits computer, sensor and communications technologies to the greatest extent possible, so as improve situational awareness, clearly and rapidly communicate intent and monitor and control the execution of military missions and tasks.

v. Takes advantage of network enabled defence capabilities, thus enabling force elements to more adaptable, flexible, responsive and agile in the conduct of operations.

79. A single unified chain of command will be pursued that ensures the effective and efficient conduct of all activities. Decisions regarding implementation will be taken at as low a level as possible with maximum delegations to and the empowerment of lower level commanders. Commanders are to receive the necessary delegations so as to have control over all their designated resources.

INFORMATION WARFARE CAPABILITY

80. The Defence Information Warfare Capability focuses on six areas, namely: Network Warfare; Electronic Warfare; Psychological Operations; Information Based Warfare; Information Infrastructure Warfare; and Command and Control Warfare (Figure 57).
81. The focus areas are defined as follows:

   a. **Network Warfare**: To exploit or use the Information Systems (offensive) of an adversary and to protect all Defence Information Systems (defensive) to ensure use for own forces.

   b. **Electronic Warfare**: To exploit or use electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum while retaining its friendly use.

   c. **Psychological Operations**: To conduct planned psychological activities in peace, conflict and war directed at adversarial and neutral audiences, in order to create attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives. These operations include psychological action and warfare and encompass those political, military and economic ideological and intelligence activities designed to achieve the desired psychological effect.

   d. **Information-Based Warfare**: To enhance situational awareness at the operational and tactical levels to enhances own sensor to shooter effectiveness and timeliness, as well as to degrade that of an adversary.

   e. **Information Infrastructure Warfare**: To protect own information infrastructure and the attack or exploitation of an adversaries information infrastructure.
f. Command and Control Warfare: To conduct Information Warfare on the battlefield and by causing a disjunction between an adversaries command structure and its commanded forces.

STANDING AND SURGE MILITARY CAPABILITY

82. The national security effects, defence mission, defence goals and strategic tasks require a standing military force and a surge military capacity. This standing and surge capability is based on the following principles:

a. The first principle is that the standing military force will contain the necessary capabilities and capacity to execute standing defence commitments. The standing military force also provides the platform for a surge in force levels as required for dealing with contingent defence commitments. The standing force will comprise both Regulars and Reserves at differing readiness levels.

b. The second principle is that the expanded military capability as necessitated by surge requirements will also comprise of both Regulars and Reserves, with the Reserves being the predominant provider of the surge capacity.

c. The third principle is that a “One Force” approach will consequently be pursued, in which the Regulars (full-time uniform) and the Reserves (part-time uniform) will constitute an integrated Defence Force. These components are integrally reliant on each other for a cohesive combat capability. The Reserves provide an affordable additional surge capacity as and when required. The Reserves are represented at all levels in Defence and are maintained at a sufficiently large scale to provide capacity on a day-to-day level and for force level surges when required.

d. The fourth principle is that such surge capability is supported by the defence industry and the national stock reserve.

83. The standing and surge capacity must consist of supported balanced land, air, maritime, special force and military medical capabilities able to meet various contingencies at short notice. The following military attributes will be vested in such capabilities:

a. Command and Control.

b. Situational Awareness.

c. Manoeuvre, lift and deploy.

d. Firepower and lethality.

e. Protection, survivability and military security.

f. Support (including combat service support) and health support.
84. The balance between Regulars and Reserves may change from time to time. Whereas in the standing military force the number of Regulars may be greater, however, the number of Reserves will be greater in the surge capability\textsuperscript{94}.

85. Combat command and control, administration and support structures must be able to expand from peacetime to wartime capacity, in accordance with early warning predictions, through the Reserves. This expansion capacity will be seen as an integral facet of the defence structure. All defence structures that must be able to expand more rapidly than normal recruiting will allow, will have an appropriate Reserve component. The dynamics of the Reserves differ from those of the Regulars and, as a result, the management approaches to these two components will differ.

**INTERVENTION CAPABILITY**

86. Intervention requires a balanced rapid response capability of forces that can meet the demands of the particular situation, and that can be deployed and supported by air or sea. The success of such operations will hinge on the ability to exploit manoeuvre, surprise, night-fighting capability and superior command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

87. This capability will consist of light, rapidly deployable joint-response forces able to meet contingencies during times of peace and conflict. The capability will comprise a airborne and seaborne elements with an air-droppable, air-landed (fixed and rotary wing) and sea-landed abilities with the required medical and logistic support. The success of these operations will hinge on the availability of intelligence before and during the operation.

88. The strategic projection of the response capability may occur from own soil and/or from forward-positioned land or sea bases. It will have limited tactical mobility and therefore be vulnerable until link-up forces arrive. In-theatre air transport will provide tactical and operational mobility and will enable the dispersion and concentration of forces as required. Combat support helicopters will greatly enhance tactical and operational firepower and limit force vulnerability.

**LANDWARD DEFENCE CAPABILITY**

89. Landward defence is a joint defence responsibility comprising land, air, maritime, health support and other vital capabilities. To enable landward forces to participate successfully in all combat operations the following capabilities have to be available within the manoeuvre approach:

a. A mechanised capability tailored for combat operations.

b. A larger motorised capability responsible for rear-area defence operations in order to create a firm base from which major operations can be executed and supported. This capability will also be actively involved in African peace missions.

c. A joint rapid response capability to address contingencies and to inter alia disrupt and destroy high value targets behind the front line in support of national defence, assist with the withdrawal of South African citizens from countries experiencing internal turmoil, as well as take part in multinational operations such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

\textsuperscript{94} The ratio between Regulars and Reserves is discussed more substantially in the Chapter on Defence Resource Principles.
90. These capabilities will be optimised to function effectively on the continent’s diverse and complex environment and will be able to address the full spectrum of conflict.

**AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY**

91. Air defence is similarly a joint defence responsibility with air, landward, maritime, health support and other vital capabilities. Key considerations are:

a. An integrated air defence system is required, particularly during the deployment of forces to remote areas. Where the need exists, ground and naval forces require tailored organic air defence capabilities.

b. Air superiority, or at least the maintenance of a favourable air situation, allowing the relatively unconstrained use of the air by own aircraft while denying such use to opposing forces, is critical both to enable air support to own surface forces and to safeguard such forces from attack.

c. Effective air defence is critically dependent on the ability to detect, identify, track, intercept and destroy any potential air threat. This requires well-integrated airspace surveillance as well as command and control systems. While static systems will provide a large part of this capability, the protection of deployed South African forces will also rely on mobile, organic air, land and sea systems.

d. The spectrum of airborne assets provides key air defence capabilities against air threats, fire-support to own forces and the ability to protect infrastructure through interdiction and close air support. These may also be deployed during peace missions or in combined security operations if required.

e. Air transport for ordered and diplomatic commitments, including evacuation and rapid deployment, continues to be an important capability. Strategic lift, air supply and airborne operations are indispensable to the support of operations.

f. Air support to civil authority and South Africa’s international obligations, inclusive of search and rescue, support to other security services, diplomatic interventions, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are also indispensable.

**MARITIME DEFENCE CAPABILITY**

92. As with land and air defence, maritime defence is also a joint defence responsibility involving the deployment of surface and air capabilities. It focuses mainly on dominating and controlling the littoral zone but includes the defence of South Africa’s territorial waters and EEZ and participation in collective defence. Key considerations are:

a. In view of South Africa’s extensive maritime interests, the maritime capability will consist of a balanced blue-water force.

b. The ability to protect and defend South Africa’s coastline and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) will necessitate the maintenance of a surface, sub-surface combat and maritime patrol capability. In addition a mine countermeasures capability will ensure open harbours.
c. The monitoring and surveillance of vast sea areas is vitally important for effective maritime defence, but cannot be done by surface vessels alone. Aerial surveillance by satellite and aircraft is therefore critical. Technology will further enable long-range maritime surveillance by means of land-based systems. However, no single system will satisfy all requirements for maritime domain awareness and a suitable combination of systems is required.

d. Maritime support to deployed forces is provided through strategic lift and sustainment, naval gunfire support, providing a platform for rotary-wing close air support and support to Special Force and special operating forces.

e. Other capabilities include operational boats (capable of riverine and shallow water operations) and operational diving.

f. A national hydrographical survey and maritime cartography service in fulfilment of South Africa's international obligations.

g. Naval coordination and guidance of shipping to route shipping.

93. South Africa’s maritime assets must provide essential support to civil authority and South Africa’s international obligations, inclusive of search and rescue, support to other security services, diplomatic interventions, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

MILITARY HEALTH CAPABILITY

94. The achievement of the defence mission is inter alia dependent on the health of defence members. A comprehensive health care service supports defence members and other approved clients. The health care system requires a comprehensive continuum of health care with an inherent rehabilitation capability comprising the following:

a. A system for all serving members, military veterans, their dependants and other approved patients.

b. The ability to provide the health care needs for all operationally deployed forces by means of mobile capabilities including the deployment and sustainment of mobile health care elements.

c. Services related to military specific health care fields including aviation, maritime and military medicine, forensic services, military psychology, veterinary, a biological, chemical and radiological defence element as well as epidemiology and military health research.

d. Capability to treat communicable diseases and to isolate infected patients for transportation to primary facilities.

95. The military health support capability is an asset to Government to relieve human suffering and provide support to the people in humanitarian operations, disasters, augmenting the capacity of civil authority and meeting international obligations.
SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITY

96. A permanently ready Special Forces operations capability is required with the ability to conduct either joint or autonomous defence operations and able to contend with a range of contingencies.

SUPPORT\textsuperscript{95} CAPABILITY

97. The support capability supports military operations through the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required until the accomplishment of the mission or objective. It is centrally directed but is executed in a decentralised manner. Landward, sea and air operations will be supported during peace, conflict and war by an integrated, robust, responsive and flexible support system, based on approved doctrine, and tailored to effectively and efficiently support operations across the spectrum of conflict.

98. Operations will be supported along internal and external lines of communication (LOC) as the case may be.

a. The support capability must support operations for protracted periods, over extended distances, in underdeveloped theatres and along multiple LOC in complex operating environments.

b. Support in South Africa will be based on static installations evenly distributed throughout the country to support day-to-day activities and operations. Unique support requirements within joint operations will be provided by the system owner.

c. External operations can be supported via sea, air, road and rail transport. Heavy sea and air lift capabilities are indispensable. A specific intervention is required to re-establish the rail transport capability, including engagement with TRANSNET and regional railway systems.

d. Appropriate war-time, peace-time and contingency reserve stock levels\textsuperscript{96} will be established in the defence supply-chain. The support of expeditionary and JI\textsuperscript{2}M operations may involve land and sea-basing, forward support (sea and land), host nation support and the utilisation of the defence industry in-theatre.

i. Support in high intensity operations may require additional stock levels and in-theatre stockpiling. For high intensity operations of an expected duration of at least three months, support will be pre-positioned as close as possible to the front lines and predominantly be mobile in nature.

ii. For low intensity operations of indefinite duration, support will be forwarded from the closest static support units.

e. The management of and execution of support functions at ports of embarkation and ports of disembarkation must receive high priority. The lack of in-theatre security and vulnerable supply lines will place a premium on the physical security of support installations and LOC.

\textsuperscript{95} Support means the management of defence capabilities throughout their total life-cycle.

\textsuperscript{96} Ensuring the availability of resources (equipment and personnel) of appropriate quality and quantity as per reserve stock policy.
99. Defence planning is both a science and an art. It requires decisions that will affect the defence of the country for decades, and that involve considerable investment of human, industrial and financial capital; and those decisions must be taken without any degree of certainty regarding the evolving strategic situation, or what threats might arise.

100. There is thus always a real risk that the most carefully considered assessment could be entirely overturned within a short time by unforeseeable events, such as intervention by an external major power. The 2011 events in North Africa are a salutary example. It is neither possible nor affordable to prepare for every eventuality. The only practical approach to defence planning is to maintain balanced capabilities that:

a. Enable the country to meet existing challenges effectively;

b. Enable the country to deal effectively with foreseeable contingencies;

c. Are elastic and can meet developing challenges or threats; and that

d. Provide the foundation on which to build stronger forces when required, within a timeframe that is realistic relative to the strategic situation.

101. The balanced set of capabilities must be continuously evaluated against the evolving strategic situation, and refocused, adapted or expanded as the situation dictates. There are ten key areas in which balance must be maintained:

a. Among the combat services and the supporting services and staff divisions. There is a clear need to have the right balance among ground, naval and air force elements, and to have optimal balance between ‘teeth’ and ‘tail’. There is often pressure to improve the ratio of ‘teeth’ to ‘tail’, which is logical but which also holds risk of developing forces that cannot sustain operations.

b. Between Regulars and Reserves. A defence force comprising only Regulars (i.e. full-time) personnel will be too small or too expensive: The military and the economy need the same people, leaders and those with technical aptitudes. A balance of Regulars and Reserves makes effective defence affordable; the Regulars to provide the basis and deal with crises, and the Reserves augment and expand the force when necessary.

c. Between forces for local and expeditionary operations. Any country must in the first instance look to its own defence, but some countries must also, in their own interests, look to regional security and stability. South Africa is such country and must be able to undertake expeditionary operations, be they constabulary or peace support in nature.

d. Between ‘high tech’ and ‘low tech’. ‘High tech’ is tempting, can give a very real edge over opponents and can be the most cost-effective option. But ‘high tech’ can also be costly to achieve and maintain. ‘Low tech’ is tempting because it is in most cases cheaper, but can prove to a false economy if the opposing forces are better equipped. The choice must be taken judiciously on a case-by-case basis.
e. Between local and foreign equipment. Local development is costly, but will give strategic independence, provide equipment optimised for the theatre and for the Defence Force's operational style, and can have valuable spin-offs for the wider economy. Local manufacture under license can also be an option. Key items that will be manufactured locally include munitions, batteries and spares, secure command and control communications and information warfare equipment and other equipment required in large numbers. Complex equipment that is needed in small numbers is generally optimally acquired military-off-the-shelf.

f. Between current equipment and future technology. The Defence Force must be given the equipment it needs to conduct current operations and to meet potential short-notice challenges. But equipment acquisition will be phased to avoid the potentially fatal problem of block obsolescence facing the Defence Force at a critical time. Under-equipping and over-equipping can be equally dangerous. While sufficient consideration must be given to research and development, care must be taken to not over-specify requirement in a chase of technology, and as such detracting from the general principle of acquiring equipment military-off-the-shelf.

g. Between preparation for a 'short' war or a 'long' war. South Africa will ensure adequate reserves of equipment and support for more protracted operations by ensuring the availability of strategic stocks.

h. Between preparation for 'high intensity' and 'low intensity' operations. Armies are often accused of planning for 'the last war' and not for 'the war to come'. South Africa will address this challenge of the unpredictability of the nature of that 'war to come', by being prepared for a balance of high intensity and low intensity operations.

i. In preparation for probable, possible and 'impossible' threats. Assuming a particular threat to be 'impossible' is irresponsibly dangerous. All contingencies will be identified and then prioritised by assessing the risk thereof; being a function of the probability of occurrence and the level of impact will that occurrence occur.

j. Between defence expenditure and other government expenditure. Under-funded defence forces are disjointed and unable to provide national security effects thus opening the risk of foreign sub-version and aggression. South Africa will have to find the balance between spending on development and social programmes and national security imperatives.
CHAPTER 8
LEVEL OF DEFENCE EFFORT

INTRODUCTION

1. The world finds itself in an uncertain and unstable era, with several new powers on the horizon which are set to compete with each other, older powers influencing events and many nations struggling to shrug off the effects of the Cold War. There is also a growing trend of non-state actors, having diffuse political, ideological and criminal purposes, becoming increasingly dangerous. Africa has not escaped this uncertainty and instability. The Continent not only faces the same overall challenges as the rest of the world, but some unique to it: disputed borders, underdevelopment and poverty, ineffectual governments and the desire by major powers to gain favourable access to, if not control over, the Continent’s natural resources. The future thus holds many challenges and threats for the Continent. Some are non-military, some paramilitary and some military.

2. To political, economic and strategic implications of uncertainty and instability, must be added the destabilising effects of developments in warfare: some examples being, maritime security and piracy, the shift to truly international terrorism, the emergence of war "amongst the people" and developments in technology creating increased opportunity for cyber attacks. Conflict and insecurity on the African Continent has impacted on stability and development, giving rise to poverty, displaced persons and increased migration southwards.

3. South Africa’s security is inextricably entwined with that of the African continent. South Africa is directly and dramatically affected by the drivers of instability in Africa in as much as this places pressure on already limited resources. Increased competition for scarce resources, illegal migration, syndicated crime, poverty, income inequality, underdevelopment, and poor standards of education and health both contribute to and are exacerbated by instability in the region.

4. South Africa, due to its geo-strategic position, international standing and extensive capabilities, is expected to promote economic growth and development and the advancement of democracy and good governance on the continent. South Africa will therefore seek to play a prominent role in promoting peace and security through the standard of its representation at international security institutions and the shaping of the international security agenda, augmented by a significant contribution to peace missions, post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform initiatives. This approach is consistent with South Africa’s espoused intent to play a significant role in the reform of the multilateral institutions of governance and the taking up of a seat in the United Nations Security Council in particular.

5. The accomplishment of the Defence Mission must consequently contribute significantly to regional peace and security; the safeguarding, defence and protection of the nation; and developmental imperatives. It is against these parameters that the national level of ambition defines the quality and scope of required defence capabilities and structures. This is achieved through an analysis of how the Strategic Defence Goals will be pursued, the concomitant military effort required and the priorities attached thereto.
6. Consequently, the Defence Force must be configured and equipped to reflect and give expression to:

   a. South Africa’s national security and foreign policies by protecting national interests, contributing to collective defence and security, participating in peace missions and rendering military assistance to other nations,

   b. South Africa’s contribution to the efforts of multilateral organisations, creating an environment in which South Africans are and feel secure,

   c. The provision of a stable base for the sustainable growth and development of the South African Economy, and

   d. The pursuit of the constitutional imperative to “improve the quality of life of all citizens” by deploying its resources, together with the capabilities of the other organs of State, in the achievement of government’s national security and development objectives.

7. The defence goals and tasks are reiterated below in Figure 58 and Figure 59.
Figure 59: Determining the Level of Defence Effort

GOAL 1: DEFEND AND PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA

STRATEGIC INTENT

8. The defence of South Africa and its vital interests is the cornerstone of the defence mandate. Provision must be made for contingencies, however unlikely, that could develop relatively quickly and for those that would take longer to develop, particularly high impact contingencies. The level of defence must therefore be expressed for both a “force-in-being” (short-term force requirement) and a “future-force” (long-term force requirement) which maintains core defence capability because of the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such capability cannot be created from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The fundamental characteristics will be:

a. a balanced and sustainable nucleus;

b. an effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises;

c. the ability to deal with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature;
d. the balance to deal with a range of contingencies; and

e. the continuous enhancement of leadership, people, doctrine and equipment in the Defence Force.

**TASK 1: DETER AND PREVENT CONFLICT**

9. The Defence contribution to deterrence and the prevention of conflict is primarily created through the generation of credible combat forces, operational prowess, rapid force generation through trained Reserves, proven ability in field training, technological and doctrinal competence and the visible morale of personnel.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

10. The prevention of conflict will be dealt with progressively, using all means of the State. In defence terms, there would be a concurrent escalation in the application of defence capabilities; from the use of defence diplomacy to a "show of force" through to more robust interventions.

**TASK 2: PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS**

11. Threats to South Africa’s external national interests could arise within a conflict between South Africa and another state or as a consequence of conflict between other states in the region or as a result of domestic conflict within a state. This could include threat manifestations to the level of limited war or civil war. An intra-state conflict external to South Africa may imply a collaborative initiative or a unilateral South African initiative to protect national interests threatened by such conflict.

12. Threats to external national interest are both plausible and possible. South Africa would seek to resolve such threats politically and diplomatically, and if the use of force should be necessary, would prefer to do so collaboratively or within a multilateral context. However, unilateral action must be possible as a last resort to rapidly respond to direct and indirect threats to South Africa’s national interests in the region. The response would be tailored to the level of the assessed threat. South Africa must therefore be in a position to exercise appropriate military force projection and intervene unilaterally should it be necessary to protect national interests. These interests and the maximum level of unilateral action would be defined on a case by case basis.

13. The rescue, evacuation and hostage rescue of South African nationals abroad will also require joint capabilities earmarked permanently within the South African crisis management framework.

14. The defence of national interests is a standing Defence Force commitment.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

15. Defence capabilities must be maintained in accordance with the guidelines provided hereunder.

16. **Operational Level Headquarters.** Sustained provision of:

a. Operational level control over assigned forces.

b. Joint tactical command and control in the area of operations.
17. **South African Army.** Sustained provision of:
   
a. A rapidly air and sea deployable formation headquarters and combat group (motorised/mechanised), inclusive of combat support and combat service support required for the mission for deliberate and collaborative deployment.
   
b. A sufficiently robust combat group (motorised/mechanised) size follow-on force for deliberate and collaborative deployment.
   
c. Contingency forces.
   
d. Other specialist elements as may be additionally required.
   
e. Combat search and rescue capability.

18. **South African Air Force.** Sustained provision of:
   
a. Combat fighter capability.
   
b. Medium/strategic inter-theatre and intra-theatre airlift for to deploy and support forces.
   
c. Forward and airborne command posts.
   
d. Medium helicopters.
   
e. Combat support helicopters.
   
f. Combat search and rescue capability.
   
g. Deployable tactical airfield capability.

19. **South African Navy.** Sustained provision of:
   
a. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre sealift to deploy and support forces.
   
b. Seaborne command posts.
   
c. Composite company of the maritime reaction squadron, compiled as an operational diving team, inland water operational boat team and a maritime reaction platoon.
   
d. Appropriate surface combat vessel force.
   
e. Appropriate submarine force.
   
f. Maritime combat support capability.
   
g. Deployable base capability.
   
h. Combat search and rescue capability.
20. **South African Military Health Service**. Sustained provision of:

   a. Medical Battalion Groups, as required to support the required force levels of the combat services.

   b. Base level hospital services.

   c. Other specialised operational services.

   d. Combat search and rescue capability.

21. **Special Forces**.

   a. Air-borne, sea-borne, urban and anti-terror Special Force Groups for specific operations as required.

   b. Combat search and rescue capability.

**TASK 3: DEFEND SOUTH AFRICA**

**Concept of Operations**

22. The Deliberate Defence of South Africa will take predominance over all other tasks and is a standing Defence Force commitment. The level of defence required is aligned to circumstance found in overt armed conflict and limited war.

23. Should the spectre of a military threat manifest against South Africa, South Africa would seek to either take the initiative to prevent an attack or deliberate self-defence when an aggressor is able to exercise the initiative. In either case the conduct of operations will be characterised by a strategy of forward defence, an operational concept of fluid, high-mobility and high-tempo manoeuvre, predominantly offensive operations at the tactical level, maximum use of superior command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems and information operations, and flexible, responsive logistic support.

24. Major landward combat forces, comprising tactical brigades, will primarily be deployed by means of road and rail to and from forward positions. Land forces will be supported by relevant air and maritime combat support capabilities.

25. **Operations in the Extended Deep**.

   a. Deep operations will be executed with predominantly light forces ranging from Special Forces to special operations forces projected covertly by air and sea. This may be extended to include motorised and mechanised forces with the required combat support\(^7\), joint firepower, intelligence, mobility and sustainment that contribute to deep attack capabilities.

   b. Maximum emphasis will be placed on stand-off and long-range precision attack.

   c. Air, land, sea and special force capabilities will provide specialised combat capabilities from dispersed locations, using situational awareness and communications to seize the

\(^7\) Combat Support Elements, such as artillery, air defence artillery, signals and military engineers, provide combat support to the combat forces as a part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.
initiative, maintain the momentum and exploit success.

d. Appropriately protected combat service support\(^9\) will be agile and versatile and able to support operations along multiple lines amid rapidly changing support requirements.

26. **Close Operations.**

a. The close battle will be fought mainly by heavy forces with the required combat support, while command and control will be exercised by joint tactical headquarters.

b. All available forces will be used to find, fix and destroy the aggressor swiftly and decisively. This will be done by engaging the enemy in the battle area and in his depth while protecting rear areas, employing manoeuvre to concentrate force at the key place and time and conducting high-intensity and high-tempo operations.

c. Air, land, sea and special force capabilities will operate from dispersed locations, using space and air assets for situational awareness and communications to seize the initiative, maintain momentum and exploit success.

d. Maximum emphasis will be placed on stand-off and long-range precision attack and rapidly executed long-range strikes.

e. Combat forces will be sustained from prepositioned and reserve stocks. The support system will need to be agile and versatile, and able to support operations along multiple lines amid rapidly changing support requirements.

27. **Rear Operations.**

a. Rear area operations will be conducted to defend areas behind the front line of own forces operating externally and/or behind the lines of own forces operating within South Africa’s borders. This could include elements from all combat services. Joint mission-trained task forces executing these operations will rely heavily on inherent and task-organised intelligence capabilities.

b. Rear areas and land, sea and air lines of communication (LOC) in South Africa will be protected by tailored joint forces. Land LOC will be protected by mobile and static forces.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

28. **Command and Control.** Command and control will be provided by the operation level headquarters through established joint tactical headquarters and air and sea-borne command posts.

29. **South African Army.**

a. A rapidly deployable light brigade.

b. A mechanised division for operations in the close area.

c. A motorised division to protect lines of communication and operate in the rear area.

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\(^9\) Combat Service Support Elements, such as logistic support, technical services and military medical support, provide service support to combat forces as part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.
d. Protection of South Africa’s critical infrastructure scaled-up to a standing commitment using some motorised capacity multi-rolled as light infantry.

e. Combat search and rescue capability.


a. One squadron of multi-role fighters capable of stand-off defence, supported by a squadron of light fighters\textsuperscript{99}, able to conduct airspace protection, interception\textsuperscript{100}, the interdiction of enemy forces\textsuperscript{101} and close air support – able to upscale to a second squadron of multi-role fighters.

b. One squadron of Combat Support Helicopters to augment mechanised forces, provide close air support and operate in the deep – able to upscale to a second squadron.

c. Four helicopter squadrons comprising heavy, medium and light transport helicopters for command and control, air assault operations, battlefield mobility and logistic support and casualty evacuation – able to upscale by an additional medium helicopter squadrons.

d. Two air transport squadrons, comprising medium/strategic and utility fixed-wing, aircraft for inter-theatre and intra-theatre personnel and cargo air-lift for motorised and mechanised forces, able to multi-role for airborne command and control, in-flight refuelling and MEDIVAC – able to upscale by an additional medium transport squadron and an additional utility transport squadron.

e. Combat search and rescue capability.


a. A maritime task force comprising:

i. Three surface frigate-size combat vessels – able to upscale to six frigate-size combat vessels.

ii. Two conventional submarines – able to upscale by an additional submarine.

iii. Two Combat Support Vessels – able to upscale to an additional Combat Support Vessel.

b. One strategic force projection vessel for inter-theatre and intra-theatre personnel and cargo sea-lift for motorised and mechanised forces, able to multi-role for seaborne command and control, combat service support and hospital services – able to upscale by an additional strategic force projection vessel.

c. Mine laying and clearance capability.

d. Combat search and rescue capability.

\textsuperscript{99} Light fighter may also provide lead-in fighter training capability.

\textsuperscript{100} Aircraft utilised for the identification or engagement of airborne objects.

\textsuperscript{101} Planned operations aimed at destroying or neutralising an enemy’s military potential and disrupting the movement of its forces into, out of and within the battle area.
32. **South African Military Health Service.**
   a. Three Medical Brigades to support the force levels of the combat services.
   b. One field hospital – able to upscale to two field hospitals.
   c. Two surgical hospitals (Level III) – able to upscale to an additional surgical hospital.
   d. One military hospital (Level IV) – able to upscale to an additional surgical hospital.
   e. Combat search and rescue capability.

33. **Special Forces.**
   a. Special Forces air-borne, sea-borne and urban Regiments.
   b. Combat search and rescue capability.

## GOAL 2: SAFEGUARD SOUTH AFRICA

### STRATEGIC INTENT

34. South Africa’s borders and strategic installations will be safeguarded by the Defence Force in conjunction with other Departments. This extends to:
   a. Border Safeguarding.
   b. Safeguarding of Critical Infrastructure.

35. State authority may also be augmented by the Defence Force during major events or when the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own and additional security capacity is required.

36. South Africa’s treaty obligations that fall under the jurisdiction of the Defence Force will be honoured and professional executed. The following obligations may be augmented as needed:
   a. Hydrographic Obligations
   b. Maritime and aviation search and rescue.
   c. International Humanitarian Law.
   d. Arms Control responsibilities.

### TASK 4: SAFEGUARD BORDERS

37. Border safeguarding will entail the control of and the enforcement of state authority with respect to South Africa’s land, air and maritime borders. Operations will not only be conducted on the land borderline, but will include rear area operations to enhance operational manoeuvrability. Border safeguarding to enforce state authority will include the deployment of air assets to control the airspace and maritime assets for the control of South Africa’s maritime space. The critical
safeguarding component of the defence mandate extends to the following:

a. Control of South Africa’s 4,471 km land border line and the immediate rear area
b. Control of South Africa’s 7,660 km air border and airspace over its 1,219,090 km² land surface area
c. Control of South Africa’s 3,924 km coastline (at the high water line), economic exclusive zone of 1,553,000 km² (102) and 4,340,000 km² of maritime territory.

38. Border safeguarding, in cooperation with contiguous states and other government departments and agencies, will require self-supported and sustained joint mobile forces. Situational awareness, effective command and control and the sustainment of operations along extensive borders will be vital capability requirements. South Africa will further seek to declare a permanent “Air Border Identification Zone” (ADIZ).

39. Participation in border safeguarding will be a standing Defence Force commitment.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

40. The Defence Force must be prepared to routinely conduct border safeguarding at the levels hereunder.

41. **Operational Level Headquarters.**

   a. Provincial level tactical headquarters.

42. **South African Army.** Land border safeguarding will be operationalised through the permanent employment of landward light mobile units in identified mission areas that will be subdivided into operational areas conducting day and night high mobility operations. Forces must be able to function in joint or composite structures operating from permanent operational bases. Required are:

   a. Sector-specific tactical headquarters.

   b. Sustain a maximum of 8 Battalions configured in the light-mobile or special infantry roles on the land-border on a 1:4 cycle ratio.

   c. As required for embedding in the combat formations:

      i. Engineer squadrons.

      ii. Composite tactical intelligence squadrons.

      iii. Signal squadrons.

      iv. Maintenance companies.

      v. Field workshops.

      vi. CIMIC sub unit.

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102 Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474 400 km².
d. Air delivered rapid reaction sub-sub units for land, air and maritime border control as may be required for specific operations.

e. Ad hoc deployment of Special Force Teams for specific operations and as required for the enhancement of detection.

43. South African Air Force. The air border will constitute the air space directly above South African territory as demarcated by its land and maritime borders up to a height where an aircraft is no longer able to derive support from the atmosphere (+30,000 meters).

a. **Air Border.** The Air Force will provide:

   i. Detection beyond South Africa's landward borders through static and mobile radars and other sensors to facilitate early warning and the employment of reaction capabilities.

   ii. Airborne intercept of transgressors through the forward tactical deployment of appropriate aircraft able to intercept aircraft of slow, medium and high speed.

b. **Land Border.** The Air Force is required to provide rotary and fixed wing assets to support landward operations for command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance and reaction operations.

   i. Mobile Air Operations Teams at operational bases.

   ii. Sustained provision of one flight of medium and one flight of light helicopters.

   iii. Sustained provision of medium and light fixed-wing transport aircraft.

   iv. Sustained provision of unmanned air vehicles.

c. **Maritime Border.**

   i. Mobile Air Operation Teams at maritime command posts.

   ii. Sustained provision of two maritime patrol aircraft.

   iii. Sustained provision of two maritime helicopters organic to off-shore patrol vessels.

   iv. The ad hoc deployment of air assets into adjacent waters during approved multinational operations to extend deterrence and enhance situational awareness and response.

44. South African Navy. The South African Navy is required to:

a. Provide comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness through static and mobile radars and other sensors to facilitate early warning and the employment of reaction capabilities.

b. Sustained provision of two maritime off-shore patrol vessels.
c. Sustained provision of six maritime in-shore patrol vessels aligned with major ports.

d. Sustained provision of one composite maritime reaction squadron to conduct interdiction and interception operations.

e. The ad hoc deployment of maritime assets into adjacent waters during approved multinational operations to extend deterrence and enhance situational awareness and response.

f. Deployable base capability.

g. Support with the maintenance of harbour security at major ports.

45. South African Military Health Service.

a. Static Area Military Health Services in the operational sectors.

b. Deployable Medical Task Teams from Medical Battalion Groups as required supporting the required force levels of the combat services.

c. Ad hoc support in the:
   i. Management of hazardous substances.
   ii. Management of health or veterinary threats in the border areas.

46. Special Forces. Special Forces are to provide ad hoc deployment of Special Force elements as may be required for specific operations.

TASK 5: SAFEGUARD STRATEGIC INSTALLATIONS

47. The safeguarding of critical infrastructure will entail the administration, protection oversight and at times the physical protection of National Key Points. Physical protection, depending upon the National Key Point and the prevailing security situation, will be either a contingent or a standing commitment and may be either land or sea based.

48. Protection plans will be prepared for all proclaimed National Key Points and forces earmarked for their contingent and/or standing protection. Required forces and readiness levels are to be determined through collaboration with other security agencies and private companies on a case by case basis. Defence must, however, be capable of taking over the full responsibility where the facility owner fails to comply, is no longer able to do so, or where the threat situation suggests an attack is probable, or where the Minister of Defence deems that a specific National Key Point must be permanently safeguarded by Defence.

Scale of Defence Effort

49. The Defence Force must be prepared to safeguard critical infrastructure as a contingent commitment, but with due consideration that selected National Key Points could become a standing commitment at the levels hereunder.

50. Chief Staff Operations. Chief Staff Operations (CS3) is to:
a. Administer execution of the Act on behalf of Defence. In this regard Chief Staff Operations is specifically required to maintain a comprehensive database of all extant National Key Points and develop and maintain tailored protection plans for these in collaboration with other legislated role players.

b. Specify the forces required for both contingent and standing commitments, inclusive of reaction forces required for emergency response, and to specify that these forces are regularly exercised.

c. Institute an oversight mechanism to ensure compliance by all National Key Points owners.

51. **Operational Level Headquarters.** The Operational Level Headquarters is to implement contingency plans when required.

52. **South African Army.**

   a. This task may result in both contingent and standing commitments. Safeguarding critical infrastructure will be operationalised through additional forces that will have to be established for this purpose.

   b. Such forces will predominantly operate from permanent bases whilst having the ability to also operate from temporary bases for short durations. The forces must be able to function in inter-departmental or inter-agency structures and complementary to private security personnel.

53. **South African Air Force.** The Air Force is required to provide rotary and fixed-wing assets to support the movement of rapid reaction forces to a specific National Key Point in the event of an imminent threat or in the event of a safety related incident having occurred. The following capabilities are to be provided:


   b. Sustained provision of one flight of medium and one flight of light helicopters.

   c. Sustained provision of medium and light fixed-wing transport aircraft.

54. **South African Navy.** The South African Navy is required to:

   a. Sustain provision of two maritime off-shore patrol vessels.

   b. Sustain provision of six maritime in-shore patrol vessels aligned with major ports.

   c. Sustain provision of a Rapid Reaction Company.

   d. Sustain provision of two Operational Diving Teams.

55. **South African Military Health Service.** The Military Health Service is required to:

   a. Sustain static Area Military Health Services in the operational sectors.

   b. Sustain deployable Medical Task Teams from Medical Battalion Groups appropriate to
support the required force levels of the combat services.

c. Sustain *ad hoc* support to the management of hazardous substances.

56. **Special Forces.** Special Forces are to provide *ad hoc* deployment of Special Force elements as may be required for specific operations.

**TASK 6: SUPPORT THE POLICE SERVICE**

57. Support to the Police Service is a standing Defence Force commitment. Defence accordingly has a responsibility to support the Police Service and the other Security Services for major events and in the restoration of law and order when incidents of crime, violence and domestic unrest extend beyond the control of such Services.

58. The spectrum of potential domestic threat may be described as follows:

a. **Threats to General Human Security.** Natural and human disasters, crime, breakdown of essential services, plundering of resources, mass migrations, large numbers of illegal aliens, refugees, protests, civil disobedience/unrest.

b. **Civil Threats to Constitutional Order.** Violent protests, sporadic communal violence, mass civil disorder, uncontrolled organised crime, breakdown of law and order (South Africa 2008 & 2009-2010, France 2010, UK 2011).


e. **Insurgency.** Armed rebellion, revolt or insurrection to weaken or gain control of the State. (Examples: Uganda-LRA 1987-, Tuareg Rebellion 2007-2009).


59. Defence support to the Police Service will focus primarily on major events and dealing with civil and sub-state threats to the constitutional order. Task tailored forces may be formed to rapidly respond to situations, using centralised air or land mobile forces or forces co-located with the Police Service within allocated areas of responsibility.

60. Although the possibilities of general civil conflict and insurgency are remote, their occurrence would have high impact, requiring a significant and rapid response by the Defence Force to restore and maintain law and order.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

61. The Defence Force must be prepared to routinely support the Police Service in terms of sustaining the provision of a rapidly deployable light-mobile combat group, expandable with follow-on forces should it be required.
62. Operational Level Headquarters.
   a. Joint inter-departmental, national level Headquarters.

63. South African Army. Sustained provision, as required, of -
   a. A rapidly deployable combat group inclusive of combat support and combat services support required for the mission.
   b. Other specialist elements as may be additionally required.

64. South African Air Force. The Air Force is required to sustain the provision of rotary and fixed wing assets to support the Police Service for command and control, surveillance, reconnaissance and reaction operations.
   b. Sustained provision of one flight of medium and one flight of light helicopters.
   c. Sustained provision of medium and light fixed-wing transport aircraft.
   d. Sustained provision of at least one unmanned air vehicle system.

65. South African Navy. The South African Navy is required to provide:
   a. Sustained provision of six maritime in-shore patrol vessels aligned with major ports.
   b. Sustained provision of one composite maritime reaction squadron to support harbour security at major ports.

   a. Static Area Military Health Services in the operational sectors.
   b. Deployable Medical Task Teams as required to support the required force levels of the combat services.
   c. Management of hazardous substances.

67. Special Forces. Special Forces are to provide:
   a. Deployment of Special Force elements as may be required for specific operations.
   b. Special Force support to VIP protection, counter-drug operations, combating of terrorism and syndicated crime, etc.

**TASK 7: EXECUTE TREATY OBLIGATIONS**

**International Hydrographic and Nautical Charting Obligations**

68. The following functions will be carried out by the South African Navy (Hydrographic Office) on behalf of the Republic as a standing Defence Force commitment.
a. Surveying.
b. Charting.
c. Hydrographic books and publications.
d. Issuing of Navigation Warnings and Notices to Mariners.

Scale of Defence Effort

69. **South African Navy.** The South African Navy will provide:
   a. A hydrographic survey vessel.
   b. A system of deployable land hydrographic platforms.
   c. A National Hydrographic Office.

70. **South African Air Force.** The South African Air Force will provide light helicopters as required to execute national hydrographic responsibilities.

71. **South African Military Health Service.** Medical Task Teams organic to deployed elements.

**Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Treaty Obligations**

72. South African Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Act, 2002\(^{103}\) provides that the Minister of Transport must by notice in the Gazette, as well as in relevant maritime and aeronautical publications, publish the search and rescue regions within which search and rescue services will be provided in terms of the responsibility of the Republic as laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation.

73. The South African Search and Rescue Organisation (SASAR)\(^{104}\) ensures a co-ordinated and effective maritime and aeronautical search and rescue service within the South African search and rescue regions\(^{105}\). SASAR may, for purposes of any aeronautical or maritime search and rescue operation, request the assistance of any military aircraft or vessel to assist in any operation\(^{106}\). Furthermore, diverse ad hoc search and rescue services are provided, where the situation merits, to entities such as emergency and rescue service.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

74. Land, aeronautical, maritime and ad other hoc search and rescue support is a standing Defence Force commitment. The Defence Force must therefore provide land, aviation and maritime search and rescue capabilities when required. Such capabilities will generally be provided through its collateral capability.

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International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

75. Defence will continue to support the fulfilment of South Africa’s IHL and arms control obligations. Acknowledging that within the constraints of IHL, the choice of weapons and the methods of warfare are not unlimited, Defence will consequently:

   a. Ensure defence compliance with IHL obligations.
   
   b. Demonstrate particular diligence in furthering the objectives of IHL which defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare.
   
   c. Have due regard for the civilian population, non combatants, neutral parties, protected persons and emblems.
   
   d. Ensure that unnecessary suffering is reduced.
   
   e. Not use restricted weapons outside of agreed parameters.
   
   f. Not employ weapons that are prohibited.
   
   g. Protect all cultural property during armed conflict.
   
   h. Be compliant with reporting obligations arising in terms of binding instruments.
   
   i. Pursue a specific relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the South African Red Cross Society for the integration of IHL in defence programmes.

Scale of Defence Effort

76. The Defence response to IHL obligations will focus on interventions across all levels of command and staff functions. These are described below.

77. Policy and Strategy. At the level of policy and strategy, Defence will assess and determine South Africa’s IHL obligations impacting on the Defence Force. This will be pursued through:

   a. Involvement in the negotiation of new IHL instruments and formal policy debates with other State Parties to IHL matters impacting on the armed forces.
   
   b. Determining the requirement for domestic enabling legislation for IHL instruments and appropriate sanction (if required) in domestic law and in the Military Disciplinary Code.
   
   c. Participation in an Inter-Departmental/Inter-Agency Committee to manage defence IHL obligations.
   
   d. Establishing a defence IHL centre of excellence and an internal committee responsible for overseeing IHL obligations in the Defence Force.

78. Doctrine and Procedures. At the level of doctrine and procedure, the Chief of Staff Operations (CS3) is responsible for the integration of South Africa’s IHL obligations in:

b. Joint Warfare Publications.

c. Defence Operational Procedures.

79. **Training.** At the level of training:

a. Chief Staff Training (CS7) has the obligation to ensure that IHL courses and curricula are developed and implemented at all levels of developmental training.

b. The Joint Training Command has the obligation to ensure that the IHL courses and curricula are taught on all warfare courses.

80. **Staff Responsibilities.** Defence Staff’s (CS1 – CS9) have the responsibility to implement IHL obligations in their functional areas. A non-exhaustive set of examples is provided below:

a. **Chief Staff Personnel (CS1).**
   i. Military Identification Cards.
   ii. POW Identification Cards.
   iii. POW Administration.

b. **Chief Staff Intelligence (CS2).**
   i. IHL considerations in geo-spatial information.
   ii. IHL Factors in intelligence assessments.

c. **Chief Staff Logistics (CS4).**
   i. Movement of POWs.
   ii. POW Camps.

d. **Chief Specialist Staff (CS9).**
   i. Policy on Military Police responsibilities in terms of POW.

81. **Planning and Executing Operations.** The Defence Force (CS3 and Operational Level Headquarters) will endeavour to pursue IHL compliant military operations to the greatest extent possible. This will be a main consideration in:

a. Operational Directives.

b. Operational Plans.


d. Commanders Brief for the execution of the operation.

e. Command responsibilities that extend to IHL matters.
82. Sanction for Contraventions.
   a. Contraventions of IHL will, as a general principle, be dealt with within the military disciplinary system.
   b. The sanction for IHL contravention will be determined and pursued in domestic legislation and the Military Disciplinary Code.

83. Mandatory Reports on International Humanitarian Law. In addition to other reporting requirements, and before the end of each financial year, the Chief of the Defence Force will provide the Minister with an assessment of the implementation of International Humanitarian Law in the Defence Force and the degree of compliance with International Humanitarian Law obligations.

Arms Control Obligations

National Requirement

84. South Africa adheres to its obligations arising from treaty obligations regarding the manufacture, possession, trade or transfer of weapons, components or substances controlled or prohibited by treaty obligations. This will extend to reporting obligations arising from such treaties. Defence will cooperate with other departments, agencies and national committees to contribute to South Africa’s arms control obligations arising from, inter alia:

   a. UN Register for Conventional Arms. This Register is a confidence-building mechanism in terms of which member states are required to reveal imports and exports of some seven categories of major weapons systems.
   b. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Regime controls missile related technologies and equipment that could be used in the development and manufacture of unmanned delivery systems (ballistic or cruise missiles) for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
   c. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, retention, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons and dual-use items, as well as applying a strict international control mechanism on scheduled toxins, chemicals and chemical precursors.
   d. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC). The BTWC prohibits biological weapons.
   e. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT establishes an international framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
   f. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organisation established in 1957, with the mandate “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”.
   g. African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ). The “Pelindaba Treaty” pursues Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone.
h. **Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).** The Treaty establishes a sophisticated network of monitoring stations to verify compliance. Zangger Committee. The Zangger Committee defines and monitors trade in goods and equipment specifically designed for nuclear use.

i. **Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).** The Nuclear Suppliers Group endeavour to control nuclear related dual-use equipment, material and technology, as well as dual-use goods.

j. **Wassenaar Arrangement.** The Wassenaar Arrangement contributes to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and military dual-use goods and technologies.

85. **Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Dual-Use Items.** The Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Act 87 of 1993) covers the transfer of technology, materials, components and dual-use capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction and also provides for the establishment of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (NPC) which is controlled by the Department of Trade and Industry.

   a. The South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction acts as South Africa’s national authority for the control over all dual-use capabilities.

      i. Dual-use capabilities are defined as those capabilities relating to technology, expertise, services, materiel, equipment and facilities which can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but which could also be used for other purposes, including conventional military or commercial use.

      ii. Dual-use items and technologies are controlled in terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Part 2 of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group of which South Africa is a member.

   b. The Council is tasked to exercise control over the transfer of technology, materiel and equipment which could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction.

86. **Conventional Arms Control.**

   a. The National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002 (No. 41 of 2002) (as amended) provides *inter alia* establishes the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) consisting of Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers appointed by the President. The Act further seeks to ensure compliance with the policy of the Government in respect of arms control and to ensure the implementation of a legitimate, effective and transparent control process which fosters national and international confidence in the control procedures.

   b. The NCACC is vested with the political authority to regulate the transfer of conventional arms in South Africa. The National Conventional Arms Control Committee is empowered to implement Government policies on arms transfers and to protect and promote national economic and security interests related to trade in conventional arms.
Scale of Defence Effort

87. Defence has the obligation to establish an arms control compliance administration system for controlling its armament as required by applicable international law, the National Conventional Arms Control Act 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002), and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993).

88. Identified defence members, on the basis of their expertise, may from time to time be appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry as members of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to protect the interests, carry out responsibilities and fulfil the obligations of South Africa in accordance with national non-proliferation policy and the provisions of the Act.

89. Defence has the obligation to establish an arms control and compliance system for the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to administer the National Conventional Arms Control Act 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002), the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006 (Act 27 of 2006), any further statute that may be promulgated in this regard and the international obligations of the Republic with regard to conventional arms control.

TASK 8: ENSURE INFORMATION SECURITY

State Requirement

90. The risk of South Africa’s communications and electronic data being subject to a cyber-attack remains a reality. The Protection of Information Bill refers to state information which requires protection against unlawful alteration, destruction or loss of valuable information. It is of critical importance that the concept of Information Operations be established on national level to coordinate State activities in the InfoSphere (Figure 60). Information Operations can thus be applied as the coordinating body to ensure that the security cluster and civil society will collaboratively define national information security goals to protect information as a strategic resource.

107 Government Gazette 32999 dated 05 March 2010: Section 5(1).
91. The protection of state information against a cyber-threat is the primary responsibility of the State Security Agency through Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC Pty Ltd). COMSEC was established in 2002 as a private company with the primary purpose of ensuring that critical electronic communications of the State are secure and protected. The functions of COMSEC are:\textsuperscript{108}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Protect and secure critical electronic communications against unauthorised access or technical, electronic or any other related threats.
  
  \item[b.] Provide, with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Agency, verification services for electronic communications security systems, products and services used by organs of state.
  
  \item[c.] Provide and co-ordinate research and development with regard to electronic communications security systems, products, services and any other related services.
  
  \item[d.] Perform functions necessary for the effective functioning of COMSEC.
  
  \item[e.] For purposes of these functions, COMSEC must:
\end{itemize}

i. Develop, design, procure, invent, install or maintain secure electronic communications systems or products and do research in this regard.

ii. Provide secure electronic communications services, systems and products.

iii. Provide cryptographic services.

iv. Train and support users of the electronic communications systems, products related services.

v. Provide consultancy services on the security and protection of electronic communications services, systems and products.

92. The State Security Agency, the Department of Communications, the SAPS, Defence and the Department of Science and Technology must collaboratively seek to define and coordinate a multi-agency and inter-departmental initiative to provide the State’s information security.

a. The Department of Communication is the leading agency for coordinating policy and legislation on cyber-related matters.

b. The State Security Agency is the leading entity to implement the concept of Information Operations on national level. The State Security Agency has the overall responsibility and accountability for coordination, development and implementation of cyber-security measures in the Republic.

c. The SAPS is the leading agency for Cyber-Crime.

d. The Department of Science and Technology is the leading agency for the development co-ordination and implementation of national capacity development programme on cyber-security research.

e. Defence is the leading agency for information warfare.

93. The National Cyber-Security Policy Framework seeks to create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment that facilitates the protection of critical information infrastructure whilst strengthening shared human values and understanding of cyber-security in support of national security imperatives and the economy. This will enable the development of an information society which takes into account the fundamental rights of every South African citizen to privacy, security, dignity, access to information, the right to communication and freedom of expression.

94. The National Cyber-Security Policy Framework seeks to ensure that Government, business and civil society are able to enjoy the full benefits of a safe and secure cyberspace through working together to understand and address the risks, reduce the benefits to criminals and seize opportunities in cyberspace to enhance South Africa's overall security and safety including its economic well-being.

95. In terms of the national cyber-security effort, Defence will contribute to the national Cyber-Security Response Committee and Cyber-Security Centre. These structures will effectively coordinate departmental resources in the achievement of common cyber-security safety and security objectives.
96. This will require expert service providers, such as ARMSCOR and other public sector agencies, to play a significant role in the research, development and maintenance of specific strategic technologies and capabilities.

**Defence Requirement**

97. Critical defence networks become cyber targets as these networks run the command & control, administration, personnel, logistics and finance information systems. Consequently, appropriate information warfare capabilities are required to protect defence information systems, including the coordination of technology development not available in the open market. Information Warfare is a specialist environment, necessitating the selection, training and career management of specialist personnel, the development and maintenance of complex systems and constant research and development to counter potential threats.

98. Joint Information Warfare will be conducted to dominate the InfoSphere focusing on the electromagnetic spectrum, network information systems spectrums and the human domain to contribute towards information superiority. The following objectives will be pursued:

   a. To deter any potential information onslaught against Defence.
   b. To defend and protect Defence information and communication assets and processes to enhance its information superiority.
   c. To disrupt, destroy, deny and exploit the information and communication assets and processes of the Opposing Force to enhance own information superiority.
   d. To support other activities primarily for the accomplishment of information superiority.

99. Not having dedicated defence-owned communication infrastructure and network, the national infrastructure is used to transport data to various defence users. In certain under-development areas Defence has its own information infrastructure but which is also connected to the national infrastructure. Consequently, Defence must protect its data by applying end to end encryption on all network links (Figure 61).
100. Appropriate defence information warfare capabilities must be developed to enhance the protection of modern systems, including the coordination of technology development not available in the open market. The focus will be on the establishment of a centre of excellence with a core capability to satisfy information warfare requirements for the operational environment, inter alia:

a. Information warfare modelling and simulation technology for decision support.

b. Information warfare application and enabling domains research and development for operationalisation.

101. Joint Information Warfare will be structured to support the landward, air defence and maritime defence capabilities. Combat services and staff divisions have a distinct responsibility to develop or contribute to the development of Joint Information Warfare systems. In addition, Joint Information Warfare will be directed at influencing the beliefs and behaviour of humans in the physical, information and cognitive (psychological) domains.

102. Joint Information Warfare will be integrated within all levels of war and throughout the spectrum of conflict. Suitably trained and equipped information warfare forces and their means of deployment, sustainment and recovery will be provided by various combat services and staff divisions to meet defence strategic objectives.

103. Defence must provide and maintain the capability to counter cyber threats and other own unique military requirement for cyber-security. Notwithstanding, Defence will retain the capability to provide and maintain its own secure communications with respect to unique military requirements incorporating all aspects of electronic warfare into the discipline and doctrine of Joint Information Warfare. A unique approach to recruitment, training and leadership development is required to ensure that scarce skills are effectively managed through specific service conditions.
this regard, the following specific capabilities will be retained as a strategic requirement:

a. **South Africa Communications Security Agency (SACSA)**. SACSA resides within the Defence Force and will continue to provide Defence with both cryptographic services and the acquisition and maintenance of cryptographic equipment. It is important to note that before the establishment of COMSEC, SACSA was the sole provider of cryptographic services to government.

b. **ECLIPSE.** Eclipse will be retained as a specialist cryptologist service funded by the Defence Force and housed within ARMSCOR (PTY) LTD, providing Defence with mathematic algorithms for cryptography.

**Level of Defence Effort**

104. Information warfare remains a standing defence task. In order to address the global influences and to structure operations in the information age across the physical, information and cognitive domains, a number of information warfare objectives must be pursued:

a. **Command and Control.** Ability to defend own command and control systems and to attack the Opposing Force’s ability to generate command and communications with its deployed forces.

b. **Critical Defence and National Information Infrastructure and Architecture.** Ability to defend against attacks on information infrastructure such as computers, networks and communication systems, and extending to other infrastructure such as energy and utility supplies, rail, road and water access, and other infrastructure dependant on information systems for their continued operation.

c. **Optimal Flow Data, Information and Intelligence, in Real-Time.** The ability to own and attack the integration of sensors, emitters, processors, information and data flow to prevent the Opposing Force’s battlefield visualisation. The above is done by the protection of information based processing to allow uninterrupted data fusion and information processing to take place, allowing the commander to make sound decisions based on accurate and in-time information.

d. **Controlling the Electromagnetic Spectrum.** The ability to take measures to ensure the full use of the electromagnetic spectrum by own forces, whilst denying or exploiting opposing forces’ use thereof.

e. **Affecting thoughts, feelings and behaviour.** The ability to affect the perception, intentions, and orientation of decision-makers, commanders and soldiers of the Opposing Force and its population.

f. **Controlling the Network/Information Systems Spectrum.** The ability to use information systems and techniques to destroy, degrade, exploit, or compromise information systems.

105. Based on intelligence assessments concerning the Information Warfare threat, central direction will be given to guide research and development of Information Warfare recourses and capabilities to support the planning and successful execution of defence operations. Consequently, Information Warfare capabilities across combat services and staff divisions will be coordinated to enhance and protect modern defence systems through the development of operational capabilities and appropriate technologies to meet future requirements.
106. An Information Warfare centre of excellence will be established to rapidly respond to the spectrum of information warfare threats and support to joint landward, air defence and maritime defence capabilities.

107. The South Africa Communications Security Agency and Eclipse capabilities will be significantly expanded to support cyber-defence requirements in collaboration with other security agencies.

GOAL 3: PROMOTE REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

STRATEGIC INTENT

108. South Africa will seek to enhance its strategic influence through shaping the multilateral security agenda, pursuing critical multilateral security objectives, developing regional and continental partnerships and directed participation in selected bilateral mechanisms. The aspects wherein South Africa will seek to enhance its strategic influence, and in which a Defence Diplomacy Strategy will direct the defence effort, include:

a. Shaping the multilateral security agenda, specifically within the context of the:
   i. United Nations (UN),
   ii. African Union (AU),
   iii. Southern African Development Community (SADC),

b. Contributing capacity to multilateral security structures.

c. Forging regional and continental partnerships.

d. Executing confidence and security building measures (CSBM)s.

e. Pursuing defence industry cooperation.

f. Developing relationships further afield.

109. South Africa’s resolve to promote peace, security and development on the continent will be demonstrated through unambiguous policy statements, the maintenance and employment of a credible crisis response capability, the prepositioning of forces and the contribution of South African forces to various forms of peace missions.

110. International conflict prevention and crisis management requires the provision of joint forces with escalation, enforcement and sustainment capabilities for operations in different operational theatres at the same time. External support will be relied on if necessary.

111. UN peacekeeping within the voluntary UN Standby Arrangements System requires South Africa to identify capacity that can be earmarked for the creation of joint multi-national forces under a UN mandate.
112. South Africa, in appropriate circumstances, will make elements of its Defence Force available to the peace support operations of the United Nations and African Union; employ armed force to assist other countries faced with aggression and conduct internationally agreed upon constabulary operations. South Africa may thus consider contributing to:

   a. Interventions under grave circumstances.
   b. Peace missions and post conflict development.
   c. Reconstruction of the security sector.
   d. Regional and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
   e. General military assistance missions.
   f. Anti-piracy operations

**TASK 9: PROMOTE STRATEGIC INFLUENCE**

113. Participation in defence diplomacy, bilateral assistance and other cooperative interaction will be standing Defence Force commitments in support of South Africa’s regional, continental and global role.

**Scale of Defence Effort**

**Bilateral Partnerships**

114. **Contiguous States.**

   a. Defence will pursue specific security arrangements with countries with whom common borders are shared and with whom coordinated cooperation on matters such as defence, state security, immigration, civilian policing, customs and ports of entry will be sought.

   b. Specific cooperative operations may take place to counter imminent threats or wider criminality such as poaching, stock-theft, illegal movement and smuggling of people and goods, as well as maritime security and piracy.

115. **Wider SADC.** Defence will similarly prioritise bilateral relations within the SADC Region through the vigorous and robust pursuit of bilaterally agreed upon cooperation plans.

116. **Partnerships beyond SADC.**

   a. Defence partnerships will also be pursued with like-minded states beyond SADC that are committed to the common values of democracy, human rights, peace and stability, and civil control of the armed forces.

   b. Defence will specifically seek strategic partnerships with countries which have the means to play a leadership role in their Region or on the Continent, who demonstrate the political will to be a force for good in the pursuit of these ideals, who promote peace, security and development and whose leadership role has international consequences or influence.
c. Senior defence personnel will be deployed as Attaché’s to such countries.

117. **Partners Further Afield.**

   a. It will be critical for South Africa to enhance its defence relations with key partners on
      the continent as well as with both the established developed partners and the
      emergent partners of the developing world.

   b. In terms of established partners, characterised mostly by traditional relationships and
      on a perceived common outlook on global issues, these well-established ties of
      friendship and mutual understanding will be strengthened through continued
      cooperation in bilateral and multilateral areas, with the emphasis being placed on
      interactions as equal partners.

   c. In terms of the emergent partners, mostly characterised by sustained high economic
      growth in recent years and continued high economic growth prospects in the future,
      the strategic focus will be aimed both at bilateral defence relations and at the
      deepening of trade and investment linkages in the defence industry sector, where there
      is potential for future growth and where synergies and complementarities in product
      and technologies exist.

118. **Bilateral Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).** A range of defence CSBMs can
     be pursued with partner nations, including the following:

     a. Security and defence agreements and mechanisms.

     b. Intelligence exchanges and cooperation, a (regional) communications network and a
        “crisis hotline” and established procedures for dealing with unusual or unscheduled
        military incidents.

     c. Annual consultations and exchanges of information, within structured engagement, on
        threat perceptions, defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, general
        defence cooperation, high level visits and troop deployments.

     d. Military assistance, exchanges and education and training cooperation.

     e. Combined military exercises and/or on site observation of military exercises and
        specified activities.

     f. Disaster and humanitarian assistance.

     g. Common procurement of defence systems and common technology programmes.

**Multilateral Priorities**

119. **United Nations.** South Africa will:

     a. Continue the trend of being a significant and responsible troop contributor to United
        Nations mandated and assessed missions, within the framework of government
        objectives and interests.
b. Seek to significantly enhance its representation at the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

120. **African Union.**

a. South Africa will continue to support the AU PSC and its mechanisms, playing a specific role in the MSC, CEWS and the ASF.

b. Defence will:

i. Work with SADC and its member states to maintain the readiness of the SADC Standby Force (SADC SF).

ii. Contribute to the capacity of the CEWS.

121. **Southern African Development Community.** Defence has an important role to play in the strengthening of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security through:

a. Enhancing security coordination within the context of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, including the Defence Sub Committee and its sub-sub committees and working groups, including the exchange and training of personnel.

b. Availing South African facilities for the planning and hosting of regional military exercises in pursuit of the SADC SF and other security objectives.

c. Establishing a strategic relationship between the South African Peace Mission Training Centre in Thaba Tshwane and the SADC Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre in Harare, including the exchange of Directing Staff.

d. Significantly contributing to the establishment of the SADC Logistic Base.

e. Developing mutually compatible doctrine and drills,

f. Cooperating with regional defence industries to promote inter-operability.

g. Meeting South Africa’s pledge of forces to the SADC Standby Force, noting that such forces will also consequently be available for the ASF. Current pledges are listed in Figure 62 below. In addition thereto, South Africa will offer to permanently supply the Brigade Tactical Headquarters to the SADC Standby Force.
122. It must be noted that such pledges:

a. **Firstly**, are part of the set of forces South Africa makes available for the operations of the United Nations, African Union and the SADC Standby Force. This implies that, if already utilised, these forces are no longer available to meet other commitments.

b. **Secondly**, are always subject to the exigencies of South Africa's national interests.

c. **Thirdly**, may be amended from time-to-time as the strategic situation requires.

123. In terms of all multilateral security structures, Defence may further consider attaching or seconding subject matter experts as may be required for periods of shorter duration, examples of potential subjects being doctrine development, maritime security, nuclear and biological threats, military health, amongst others.

**Defence Industry**

124. Government will actively assist the domestic defence industry with the international marketing of armaments and actively support specific marketing initiatives by the defence industry. Domestic user participation, co-ordination and government export support measures will require collaborative government involvement.
Defence Attachés

125. South Africa’s future Defence Attachés will be stringently selected for their military knowledge and combat service experience and their ability to champion South Africa and further foreign policy, defence diplomacy and international objectives.

TASK 10: CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY

126. The promotion of peace and stability in the region and on the continent is a key component of South Africa’s foreign policy. Ideally the risk of inter-state conflict on the Continent will be managed collectively, preferably by diplomatic means, but if all else fails intervention in the form of a peace mission may be required.

127. It is important to note that inter-state armed conflict in individual states within the wider SADC remains unlikely. However, general civil conflict in SADC is considered a higher risk contingency. Furthermore, Defence must be able to contribute to multinational peace missions to the level of peace enforcement in conflict involving African states outside of SADC in the Sub-Sahara region.

128. In general, threats to security closer to South Africa will enjoy priority. Defence deployments beyond Africa will be exceptional, of limited scale and duration, and subject to other priorities.

129. Where the use of force is required to maintain peace or to separate belligerent parties, South Africa may consider doing so in terms of a multi-lateral mandate, a specific Defence Pact or as part of a coalition of the willing established under a UN or AU mandate in terms of Chapter 6, 7 or 8 of the UN Charter. Involvement is discretionary and will be determined in the light of the specific situation and concurrent commitments. It may also include unilateral intervention should pressing circumstances so dictate. However, the commitment cannot be open-ended. Criteria for involvement in specific missions and a pre-determined maximum level of involvement will be set by Government.

130. Defence must be able to provide forces for a range of conflict that may occur on the continent. South Africa’s contribution may range from headquarters staff at various levels, observers, specialist military elements to robust and protected fighting forces with inherent support capabilities. South Africa will plan to assume command of multinational forces at the brigade level, where possible. In some instances where South Africa has specialist capabilities that are not readily available elsewhere, such as military engineering and military health, these force structure elements may be maintained at a higher level of capacity than normally would be required in the Defence Force.

131. In this context, regional and continental defence cooperation and the participation in collective defence measures and peace missions will enjoy significant priority as a standing Defence Force commitment.

Scale of Defence Effort

132. For the promotion of Continental and Regional Peace and Security and for Intervention under Grave Circumstances –
a. **Sustained Effort.** Defence must be prepared to participate in two (2) medium-scale continuous international deployments. Defence must additionally prepare for the deployment of a rapid reaction force with medium-scale follow-on forces for a limited duration (not exceeding 6 months). As a general principle, the sustained capability must be provided on a 1:4 rotation cycle.

i. **South African Army.** Per deployment prepare:

   1. Fully funded and formed, sufficiently robust combat group size force, equipped as per establishment tables, inclusive of combat support and combat service support required for the mission, and also capable of being deployed under the more robust requirements of a UN Chapter VII Mandate.

   2. Configured forces according to the doctrine and wet-lease requirements of the mandating authority and troop contribution caveats.

   3. To contribute to Combat Search and Rescue.

ii. **South African Air Force.** Per deployment prepare:

   1. Combat fighters.


   3. A mix of medium and light helicopters.

   4. Combat support helicopters.

   5. Appropriate medium fixed wing transport.

   6. Medium/strategic Inter-theatre and intra-theatre air-lift for deliberate and collaborative combat group deployments and sustainment.

   7. Maritime surveillance if required for operations of a littoral nature.

iii. **South African Navy.**

   1. Composite company of the maritime reaction squadron, compiled as an operational diving team, in-land water operational boat team and a maritime reaction platoon.

   2. A Surface combat vessel on continuous deployment.

   3. Two off-shore patrol vessels on continuous deployment.

   4. A maritime combat support vessel for non-continuous sustainment.

   5. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre sea-lift for deliberate and collaborative combat group deployments.
iv. **South African Military Health Service.**

   (1) Medical Task Teams as required to support the required force levels of the combat services.

   (2) Level II field hospital\(^{109}\).

   (3) Level IV hospital\(^ {110}\).

v. **Special Forces.** Special Forces are to provide:

   (1) Special Force elements for specific operations as required, either in a deliberate role or on request of the mandating authority.

   (2) Contribute to combat search and rescue.

vi. **Specialist Staff.** The above may extend to the deployment of specialist staff to multilateral missions, such as engineer squadrons, provost companies, military observers, military liaison officers and headquarters staffs.

b. **Additional Effort.** In addition, Defence is required to prepare forces for concurrent participation in up to three (3) shorter-term small-scale operations, including:

   i. Assistance during bi-lateral and multi-lateral initiatives and elections in the Region and Continent. During elections a medium scale deployment may also be deployed for a very limited period.

   ii. South African Military Advisory and Training Team (SAMATT) Missions, where training teams are deployed for specific tasks and specific periods. Training could range from bridging training, to basic training and to sophisticated training at all levels.

   iii. Military advisers and multinational (Inter-departmental) technical teams to provide military advice.

   iv. Support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, independently or as part of a regional and/or international effort.

c. **Future Effort.**

   i. The Defence Force will be able to respond to a significant and dire threat to the stability of the SADC region by extending its continuous effort of two medium-scale continuous international deployments to that of a rapid reaction force which can be followed on by the deployment of a large-scale deployment.

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\(^{109}\) UN terminology definition: A Level II hospital is one of four levels of facility in a UN peacekeeping operation: it aims to provide second-line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilization, life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next medical level.

\(^ {110}\) UN terminology definition: A Level IV Hospital provides advanced and multi-specialty hospital facility under one roof; comprising of Medical Centres, Departments and Units that provide emergency medical services, outpatient specialist services, in-patient ward facility including intensive care unit, diagnostic and treatment facilities.
ii. The large-scale deployment would be based on a sustained, sufficiently robust Joint Combat Brigade configured as required for the mission and able to conduct the more robust tasks of a UN Chapter VII Mandate.

iii. This will require an expansion to the envisaged force design and force structure.

GOAL 4: ORDERED TASKS

STRATEGIC INTENT

133. Threats to the security of South Africa and its people arise primarily out of human security and developmental challenges. The promotion of domestic peace, stability, growth and development thus encompasses a variety of tasks falling within the mandate of the defence force. These include assistance to Government Departments as may be required for emergency relief, the maintenance of essential services and a variety of contingent peace-time tasks.

134. Defence will support civil authority, on the basis of a written request between the respective Ministers, when a situation or an emergency is beyond the latter Department’s capabilities. Other government departments will act as lead departments with Defence in support of their activities. Typical tasks in support of civil authorities are the augmentation of vital services during strikes, consequence management and relief after man-made and natural disasters, support to special events, and the protection of life and property. Such support will be time-bound and subject to executive and legislative oversight.

TASK 11: ORDERED PRESIDENTIAL TASKS

Scale of Defence Effort

135. Under a standing Presidential employment authority, the Defence Force will provide the following for Presidential and VVIP tasks:

   a. Command and control arrangements.
   b. Protection.
   c. Air transport and associated medical and security support for domestic, continental and inter-continental travel.
   d. Search and rescue and combat search and rescue missions.
   e. Rapid reaction support.

136. Presidential and VVIP tasks will be a standing commitment.
**TASK 12: ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITY AS ORDERED**

**Scale of Defence Effort**

137. **Support to Civil Authority.**

a. **Disaster and Humanitarian Support.** Defence will depot a permanent pool of equipment (logistics vehicles, tents, water bunkers, riot control equipment and strategic medicines) for rapid reaction to support the three tiers of government. This will be standing defence equipment located mostly within the capability of the rapid reaction component of the Defence Force.

b. **Maintenance of Vital and Essential Services.** The Defence Force must be prepared to provide land, aviation and maritime capabilities to maintain vital and essential services.

c. **Assistance to Civil Authority** will be a contingent defence commitment provided from its collateral capability.

**Anti-Poaching Measures.**

d. **Tailored anti-poaching task teams**\(^{111}\) may be formed to rapidly respond to situations, using centralised air or land mobile forces or forces co-located with the Police Service and relevant wild-life civil authorities within allocated areas of responsibility.

e. **This requires:**

i. Cooperative bilateral arrangements with contiguous countries and concomitant cooperative intelligence, tactical operations and hot pursuit within pre-determined buffer-zones.

ii. A clear mandate, including the capacity to gather intelligence and pre-empt the poaching value chain.

iii. Enablement of this task in law, including constabulary powers for the Defence Force.

iv. Clear operational doctrine and tactics predicated on manoeuvre and firepower across all combat services and combat support services. This further indicates the need to revitalise the Defence Force’s counter-insurgency capability.

v. Clear rules of engagement.

vi. Dedicated and adequate budget.

vii. Specialised organic defence combat and combat support capabilities to operate day/night in all weather conditions, including the use of state-owned and civilian-owned electromagnetic capacities.

viii. Dedicate support from the defence industry.

\(^{111}\) Inclusive of all service support to execute constabulary operations.
a. Anti-poaching operations in support of civil authority will be a standing defence commitment as per authorised Memoranda of Agreement.

b. In addition, the Defence Force will seek to cooperate with the relevant wildlife authorities to conduct bush-warfare training in such areas to maintain presence and visibility.

**TASK 13: CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA**

**Scale of Defence Effort**

138. Defence will not structure for its contribution to the Developmental Agenda but will use its inherent collateral utility to support the agenda. Within rural areas Defence will identify spare capacity in its facilities in order that these can be utilised by communities for education and training purposes.

139. Defence can avail itself of infrastructure upgrade opportunities, such as the construction of bridges or repair of roads, which exist in remote and inaccessible areas in order to conduct Force Preparation. The inherent skills and experience that can be found in Defence can be used to manage developmental projects.

140. The contribution to national development will result in in-direct contingent commitments where defence capabilities are provided to other Departments against compensation, and direct defence commitments requiring structuring and budgeting provision within Defence.

141. **National Youth Service.**

a. The National Youth Service (NYS) will be established as an auxiliary service of the Department of Defence\(^\text{112}\). The annual NYS intake will be determined by the Minister and the resources provided for this purpose. NYS members will serve according to the term determined by the Minister\(^\text{114}\).

b. The NYS will comprise the recruitment, selection, induction, formative training, community service training, work-integrated or service learning, as well as continuation training, including accredited hard\(^\text{115}\) and soft skills\(^\text{116}\), social and business entrepreneurship training and community service delivery. All training will be formally accredited and assessed.

c. The DOD will cooperate with other Government Departments and role-players regarding NYS and will plan and budget for this task in its annual strategic plan.

\(^{112}\) Act 42 of 2002: Section 16(1).
\(^{113}\) Act 42 of 2002: Section 5(a).
\(^{114}\) Act 42 of 2002: Section 16(2).
\(^{115}\) Artisanship, computer literacy, etc
\(^{116}\) Discipline, work-related etiquette, presentation, organisation, etc.
READERS NOTE

DIAGRAMS HEREAFTER ARE ILLUSTRATIONS OF FUNCTIONALITY AND NOT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
1. It is necessary to clarify the following concepts.

   a. **Force Design.** The force design are those components of the Defence Force, within the wider defence force structure, which can and may be mobilized for operational deployment or which directly support defence operations.

      i. This includes combat, combat support, combat service support as well as command and control units that may be deployed to execute operations.

      ii. Non deployable units in the force design may include structures that directly support deployed forces, such as a military hospital.

   b. **Force Structure.** The force structure is the complete structure of the entire defence organisation, inclusive of the force design, and ranges from the Ministry of Defence at the highest level (Level 0) to the diverse units at Level 4 in the organisation.

   c. **Force Structure Element.** A Force Structure Element (FSE) is any self standing organisation on the defence force structure across all levels of the organisation. Each headquarter, combat formation, school, depot and unit is an individual Force Structure Element.

   d. **Blueprint Force Structure.** The Blueprint Force Structure is the complete master-plan for the full force structure requirement, including all present and future capabilities required for the execution of the Defence Mandate, reflecting differing states of readiness, differing levels of equipment sets and indications for the opening and closing of these units. The blueprint force design is the master-plan, the defence allocation on the other hand will determine the extent to which the blueprint will be implemented in the future.

2. The force design and force structure of the Defence Force is informed by the defence mandate, mission, goals and tasks coupled to defence doctrine as expanded upon in this Defence Review.
3. As earlier evidenced in this Defence Review, new global and regional stresses have emerged and Africa continues to be troubled by multiple stress factors including the effects of global climate change, the rise of international terrorism and crime, and the potential effects of a new scramble for Africa’s resources. Therefore defence against military aggression remains a key imperative for the Defence Force.

4. This implies that Defence must have the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of operations under complex conditions. This spectrum may range from benign to hostile missions, including the support of other government departments, humanitarian support, the participation in peace missions and the defence of South Africa. All of which must be factored in determining the Defence Force’s design and structure. The Defence Force will:

a. Be required to deploy and sustain forces over extended strategic distances;

b. Be required to conduct operations within operational theatres having extended tactical distances;

c. Be required to contend with diverse threats, some in quick succession, some concurrently;

d. Have to conduct operations in complex political, social and geographic arenas; and

e. Have to integrate with other, often very different, forces for the conduct of operations.

5. Given these challenges, developing the appropriate force design for the Defence Force is a complex task. While this Defence Review sets out the goals, the Capability Sets required for achieving those goals and the level of effort expected of the Defence Force, it remains a fact that there can be no certainty about the evolving strategic situation, and it is neither possible nor affordable to prepare for every eventuality. Further, the force design that is to be developed will affect the defence and security of South Africa for decades, and will involve considerable investment in human, industrial and financial capital. Given these realities, the only practical approach is to define a long term Force Design that provides the balanced capabilities that will:

a. Enable the country to meet existing challenges effectively;

b. Enable the country to deal effectively with foreseeable contingencies;

c. Be refocused or adapted to meet developing challenges or threats; and

d. Provide the baseline for a more robust force when required, within a timeframe that is realistic relative to the strategic situation.
6. The uncertain and continuously evolving strategic situation requires a Defence Force that is:

   a. **Intellectually agile**, able to understand the evolving strategic situation and derive from it the key implications for South Africa;

   b. **Continuously evolving** its concepts, doctrines, organization and training to keep ahead of developments;

   c. Able to **adapt** promptly and quickly to sudden, unforeseen challenges and threats; and

   d. **Resilient**, able to recover quickly and without loss of cohesion from mishaps and setbacks.

7. The Defence Force must, further, be appropriate, adequate and affordable.

   a. Appropriate to the strategic situation in structure, organisation, composition, doctrine, equipment, training and education, with specific focus on the built-in flexibility to adapt quickly to changes in the strategic situation.

   b. Adequate to meet the demands likely to be made on it, in terms of its standing and surge strength, logistic and technical support capacity, reserves of fuel, munitions and stores to sustain extended operations, and the funding to train and maintain forces.

   c. Affordable in terms of financial and opportunity cost. While there can be ‘military luxuries’, unnecessary duplications and wasteful procedures, it is not always simple to define what is ‘affordable’, and decisions in this regard are fraught with risk and must be considered in the light of practical experience and the experience of other defence forces.

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8. The required capability sets and levels of effort defined in this Defence Review contain certain overlaps in terms of Force Structure Elements. In determining a Force Design this has to be taken into consideration to avoid unnecessary and costly aggregation while still providing for potential concurrency of the missions and tasks falling to the Defence Force.

9. Developing an effective military capability is a long-term process, both because equipment takes time to acquire and bring into service and, more importantly, because it takes time to develop and grow officers and non-commissioned officers. The realistic planning horizon for full implementation of the Force Design will be thirty years hence. This implies certain unavoidable short term vulnerabilities. In order to mitigate these, the Defence Force must:

   a. Exploit technology to increase the effectiveness and lethality of its forces in order to deter conflict conditions from developing; and
b. Develop doctrines and the capabilities of its force structure elements to maximise their operational and tactical utility.

10. The Force Design therefore provides the framework for acquiring the right military capabilities needed for the short, medium, long and extended long term based upon the evolving strategic situation. In the short to medium term the requirements of Goals II to IV together with those specified for Goal I in the Short Term Force Employment Guidelines are to be addressed, with the full capabilities required for Goal I to be addressed in the long to extended long term.

11. In addressing the above, acquisition must be so phased as to provide for a consistent multi-year funding commitment that will ensure the long term viability of the South African Defence Industry and will avoid block obsolescence of prime mission equipment in future.

### SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

12. In operationalising the Force Design indicated in the figures below, cognisance is to be taken of the service specific requirements laid down. It is, therefore, the preserve of the Defence Force to operationalise the Force Design through a detailed force design and implementation planning process.

**SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY**

13. Figure 63 below provides the end state SA Army Land Command.

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**Figure 63: SA Army Land Command**
14. The Army’s operational forces are to be grouped under a Land Command, with the combat elements organized into brigades grouped into three divisions, each of which has a specific operational focus. In addition, some specialized elements will be under direct command of the GOC Land Command. The three divisions are:

a. **A Mechanised Division**, which will be the primary Army component of the overall deterrent capability, and which will provide medium and heavy force elements for peace enforcement and similar operations. This division is to have three brigades - armoured (tanks and mechanised infantry), mechanised (mechanised infantry and armoured cars) and motorised (infantry and armoured cars) - and divisional troops such as reconnaissance, medium artillery, air defence and engineers.

b. **A Motorised Division**, which will provide border and rear area protection elements and the main force elements for peace support and similar operations. This division is to have six motorised infantry brigades, some of the infantry battalions of these brigades must also be trained for complex environments, such as mountain and forest operations. The divisional troops include some light armour and artillery.

c. **A Contingency Brigade**, which will provide rapidly deployable capability as well as the highly mobile elements to support the other formations. The Contingency Brigade’s airborne, air-landed and sea-landed battalion groups and brigade troops will be structured and equipped to support deep operations, rapid deployment and early entry operations.

15. As the future Force Design will only be achievable over the long term, the initial focus is to be on the motorised division, contingency brigade and armoured brigade. Current capabilities are to be developed into multi-mission units with more lethal asymmetric capabilities that can execute a range of missions across the conflict spectrum and serve as interim counters to larger conventional forces.

16. These multi-mission capable forces will be established at battalion and combat group level, and will be suitably armed and equipped to give the required multi-role capability, with particular emphasis on light, medium and specialist infantry capabilities. These units will be structured to allow rapid aggregation in various proportions for customised, mission-oriented application. They will also be capable of full integration with the military capabilities of the SADC Standby Force.

17. In the medium and long term the focus will shift to the re-establishment of Brigade and Division structures and the renewal of the mechanised capability.

18. The specialised elements under the direct command of the GOC Land Command, include:

   a. **A Civil-Military Co-operation capability**, responsible for cooperating with civilian communities and authorities in operational areas to minimise disruption of life during operations and to facilitate a swift commencement of post-conflict reconstruction.

   b. **A Psychological Warfare capability**, responsible for psychological operations against hostile forces and for establishing broad communication with the local communities.

19. Assumption of National Key Point responsibilities will require additional forces.
SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE

20. Figure 64 below provides the end state South African Air Force Air Command.

Figure 64: SA Air Force Air Command

21. The Air Force's operational forces are to be grouped under an Air Command, with the combat elements organised into squadrons grouped into five mission-focused wings, each of which has a specific operational focus. These wings are:

   a. **Fighter Wing.** This wing is the primary Air Force component of the overall deterrent capability, and is responsible for air defence, counter-air, interdiction, strike, maritime strike and tactical aerial reconnaissance operations. It is to comprise of multi-role and light fighter squadrons and specialised light ground attack/armed reconnaissance squadrons with turbo-prop aircraft for stabilisation and border security operations, and commands the Air Combat School and the bases from which it operates.

   b. **Combat Support Wing.** This wing is responsible for tactical operations in support of the Army and Navy. It is to comprise of the combat support helicopter, medium transport helicopter and maritime helicopter squadrons and several tactical airfield units to facilitate forward deployed operations.

   c. **Airborne Command and Reconnaissance Wing.** This wing is to be responsible for providing airborne command and control, early air warning and airborne maritime reconnaissance. Additionally it is to provide for operational communications flights.

   d. **Intelligence and Surveillance Wing.** This wing is responsible for air space control through operational and strategic air picture compilation and land based in-flight command and control.
e. **Transport Wing.** This wing is responsible for all transport operations other than rotary-wing tactical transport in direct support of deployed forces. It is to comprise of the VVIP and VIP transport squadrons and the strategic/heavy, medium and light transport squadrons. It is also to have an inherent tanker capability.

22. As it will take time to achieve the full set of capabilities required, the immediate focus must be on enabling greater tactical flexibility on the part of the land forces deployed on border safeguarding and closer integration of combat support helicopter force with the Army. In addition the short term focus must be on increasing the VVIP transport capability, introducing both medium strategic lift and maritime reconnaissance capabilities and the renewal of the light fixed-wing transport capability and the mobile and static radars for air space control.

23. In the medium term the requirement is to replace the medium fixed-wing transport and the acquisition of an air early warning capability. In the longer term the focus is to shift to renewal and expansion of existing fighter and helicopter capabilities to the required levels.

**SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY**

24. Figure 65 below provides the end state of the SA Navy Fleet Command.

![Figure 65: SA Navy Fleet Command](image)

25. The Navy’s operational forces are to be grouped under a Fleet Command, with the combat elements organized into six mission-focussed squadrons, each of which has a specific operational focus. The squadrons are responsible for doctrine development in respect of their missions, for the day-to-day operation of their ships, for the training of crews and for the routine maintenance of their ships. These squadrons are:

   a. **Frigate Squadron.** This squadron is to comprise of the Navy’s Frigates. It forms part of the primary naval component of the overall maritime deterrent capability. It is responsible for maritime defence, maritime strike, interdiction, distant patrols, escort of important vessels, anti-submarine operations, naval gunfire support for sea-landed and Special Forces operations and for surface reconnaissance operations.
b. **Submarine Squadron.** This squadron is to comprise of the Navy’s submarines. It too forms part of the primary naval component of the overall deterrent capability. It is responsible for strategic surveillance and reconnaissance, interdiction of hostile shipping, support for Special Forces operations and anti-submarine operations.

c. **Patrol Squadron.** This squadron is to comprise of the Navy’s Offshore and Inshore Patrol Vessels. It is responsible for safeguarding South Africa’s EEZ, its territorial waters and port approaches. The squadron is also to provide forces for patrol support to friendly countries.

d. **Combat Support Squadron.** This composite squadron is to comprise of the SA Navy’s Combat Support Ships, its Hydrographic Survey Vessel and the still to be acquired Sealift Ships. In addition to meeting the South Africa’s maritime survey needs this squadron is to responsible for providing an un-opposed ship-to-shore landing capability for the Army’s sea-landed forces through a major harbour or by means of landing craft through a minor harbour and for on-station support of such landed forces. It is further responsible for providing an afloat support base for light forces engaged in littoral operations, for non-combatant evacuation operations, for disaster aid and emergency relief operations and for transport or support missions.

e. **Maritime Reaction Squadron.** This composite squadron is to comprise of the Navy’s Protection Squadron, its Operational Boat Squadron and its Operational Diving Teams. The Protection Squadron is responsible for providing protection of static and forward bases, reaction forces for the protection of naval bases and stations and boarding and protection parties for deployed vessels. The Operational Boat Squadron is responsible for the seaward protection of naval bases and stations and commercial harbours, for conducting riverine and lake operations and for providing boarding forces. The Operational Diving Teams are responsible for clearance diving and explosive ordnance/hazardous material disposal.

f. **Mine Warfare Capability.** This capability is to provide the Navy with a defensive and offensive mine warfare capability. It is to be so configured that it comprises components organic to the other squadrons.

26. As it will take time to achieve the full set of capabilities required, the immediate focus must be on providing an extensive maritime domain awareness capability and an offshore patrol capability.

27. In the medium term the focus is to be on acquiring Sealift ships for the SA Army’s sea-landed infantry capability and to acquiring additional Combat Support Ships. At the same time the Protection Force is to be expanded to a Battalion size.

28. In the long term the focus is to be on the renewal of the Frigates and submarines and on the improvement of the mine warfare capability.

29. As is the case with the Army and Air Force, it will take considerable time to bring the Navy to the strength and capability mix required by regional responsibilities.
SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

30. Figure 66 below provides the end state SA Military Health Services’ Medical Command.

31. The Military Health Service provides combat service support. This is done through force health protection of deployed elements of the combat services and force health sustainment of non-deployed military personnel and their dependants, military veterans and their dependants and other designated persons. The Force Design of the Military Health Service must therefore be such that it can meet these responsibilities. To this end capabilities are grouped under a Medical Command and organised into a Level 4 Military Hospital, two Level 3 Military Hospitals and three Military Health Brigades having Battalion Groups under command. The Battalion Groups will consist of both static and deployable elements, these being Medical Task Teams, Level 2 Static Medical Facilities inclusive of Sick Bays and/or deployable Level 2 Field Hospitals.

32. The three Military Health Brigades will be aligned and organised to support the Mechanised Division, Motorised Division and Contingency Brigade of the SA Army respectively. The Military Health Brigade assigned to support the Contingency Brigade will also provide for the medical requirements of the Air Force and the Navy.

33. The Military Health Brigade Headquarters assigned to support the Army Divisions are to be geographically collocated with these divisional headquarters. The Medical Task Teams of the Medical Battalion Groups are to be permanently detached to the combat service elements they support.
SOUTH AFRICAN SPECIAL FORCES

34. The Special Forces will consist of operational regiments that will specialise in airborne and amphibious strategic reconnaissance as well as urban and anti-terror operations. The Special Forces will have responsibility for strategic reconnaissance and other strategic tasks, for deep reconnaissance in support of the combat services and for the execution of certain special operations *inter alia* hostage rescue outside South Africa.

INFORMATION WARFARE

35. The Defence Force is to take the lead in providing for common defence against an attack intended to disrupt or disable South Africa’s key national information systems and infrastructure. To this end the Defence Force will develop comprehensive defensive information warfare capabilities, which will be tied into the intelligence-related information systems of the intelligence services.

THE BLUEPRINT DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE

36. The Blueprint Defence Force Structure will assist defence planning by providing sufficient information of the following nature:

   a. The name, nature and purpose of each Force Structure Element.
   b. An indication of the opening or closing date of the Force Structure Element.
   c. The envisaged readiness level of the Force Structure Element.
   d. The mixture of Regulars, Reserves and Civilians in the Force Structure Element.
   e. An indication of the prime mission equipment of the Force Structure Element.

37. The Blueprint Force Structure excludes any temporary task force, temporary headquarter, group element or unit established by the Chief of the Defence Force for military exercises or operations¹¹⁷.

38. The Blueprint Force Structure will be presented by the Chief of the Defence Force to the Minister on at least a biennial basis for approval. It will be a configured and controlled defence document and will enjoy the force of policy. The achievement of the blueprint force structure however remains critically dependant on resources. Thus the Defence Force will continuously mitigate these resource constraints by adjusting the levels of readiness of force structure elements that make up the design and structure, as well as through a careful mixture of Regulars and Reserves within the One-Force approach.

39. Should the allocated or anticipated resources be insufficient to establish and sustain the capabilities required, adjustments to the defence requirement, the defence concept or the resource allocation (or a combination of these) will be required to establish a balance between intent and available resources.

READERS NOTE

DIAGRAMS HEREAFTER ARE ILLUSTRATIONS OF FUNCTIONALITY AND NOT ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
1. It is required that national security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law, and that national security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive. Consequently government is responsible for the Defence of the Republic of South Africa and every part thereof, and the defence sector is subject to civil oversight by Parliament and the Executive.

2. Civil control refers to the following relationship between government and the armed forces:
   a. The hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the armed forces, as outlined in the 1996 Constitution.
   b. The hierarchy of mechanisms that the state uses to exercise control over the armed forces, based on the principle of civil supremacy over the armed forces.
   c. The imperative for the armed force to demonstrate obedience to elected civil authority.
   d. Armed forces eschewing politics and applying their functional military expertise.

3. Civil control in South Africa is enforced by the following principles:
   a. The supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
   b. The inviolable authority of Parliament and the National Executive over Defence matters.
   c. The President appointing the military command.
   d. A member of the national executive appointed politically accountable for defence.
   e. Parliamentary oversight being exercised by Parliamentary Committees in both Houses of Parliament.
   f. Adherence to domestic and international law, including International Humanitarian Law.

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118 Constitution 1996: Section 198(c).
119 Constitution, 1996: Section 198(d).
120 White Paper on Defence, 1996.
121 Refer to Sections 198 (d), 199 (8), 200 (2), 201 (2) and (3), 202 (1) and (2), 203 (1) and (3) and 204 of the Constitution, 1996.
4. Parliamentary committees, established from the body of elected public representatives, play an important role to ensure civil oversight over the security services. This is reflected in Parliament’s responsibility to approve:

   a. The finances for the armed forces.
   b. The legislation governing activities of the armed forces.
   c. Approval of the policy framework within which the armed forces will function.

5. It is imperative that defence members are fully conversant with the features of the democratic system which they serve (hence the need for a robust civic education programme amongst its members), understand the integrated contribution Defence makes in terms of government’s key policy initiatives (especially when these relate to the encouragement of domestic development and stability) and are able, on a discursive basis, to interact with the elected civil authorities around a range of issues critical to the defence mandate.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

6. The President of the Republic of South Africa. The President of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred to as the President) is ascribed specific authority by the Constitution in that the President is both the Head of State and Head of the National Executive. It is in terms of the President’s authority as Head of the National Executive that:

   a. The President exercises authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.
   b. The President must appoint the Military Command of the Defence Force.
   c. The President may authorise the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service, in defence of the Republic, or in fulfilment of an international obligation.
   d. The President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to: preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; ensure the provision of essential services; support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; or effect national border control.
   e. The process and instruments for Presidential authorisation of operations are prescribed in the Manual on the Executive Acts of the President. This is exercised together with the Minister through the signing of a President’s Minute.

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122 Constitution, 1996: Section 84(a).
123 Constitution 1996: Section 202(1).
124 Constitution, 1996: Section 202(1).
125 Constitution, 1996: Section 84(1).
126 Constitution, 1996: Section 84(1).
128 Manual on the Executive Acts of the President, Chapter 2, Para 2.8(e).
129 Constitution, 1996: Section 85(2).
7. **Putting the Defence Force Into Service.**
   
a. The 1996 Constitution\(^{131}\) provides that when the defence force is employed for any purpose mentioned in Section 201(2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of
   
i. (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force;
   
ii. (b) any place where the force is being employed;
   
iii. (c) the number of people involved; and
   
iv. (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed.

b. If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in Section 201(2), the President must provide the information required in Section 201(3) to the appropriate oversight committee\(^{132}\).

8. **State of National Defence.** The 1996 Constitution however provides that the President should summon Parliament when declaring a state of national defence (Section 203 (2) and (3):

   *If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national defence is declared, the President must summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting within seven days of the declaration. A declaration of a state of national defence lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days of the declaration.*

9. **The Minister.** The Constitution requires that a member of the Cabinet must be responsible, for defence\(^{133}\). The following principles consequently apply:

   a. Command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance, with the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for defence, under the authority of the President\(^{134}\).

   b. The Minister of Defence (hereafter referred to as the Minister) exercises control over Defence and is accountable to Cabinet and Parliament for all defence activities.

   c. The President and the Minister formally confer on matters of Defence.

   d. The principle task of the Minister is obtaining direction from Government on defence and security related matters, setting the defence policy framework and acquiring the resources required for Defence.

   e. The Minister is responsible for the effective implementation of Government’s policy directions and the execution of approved programmes within allocated resources.

   f. The Minister sets the defence diplomacy policy and strategy direction.

\(^{130}\) Manual on the Executive Acts of the President, Chapter 3, Para 3.4.

\(^{131}\) Constitution 1996: Section 201(3).

\(^{132}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 201(4).

\(^{133}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 201(1).

\(^{134}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 202(2).
10. National Council on Defence. The establishment of a National Council on Defence will be provided in law whereby:

a. The mandate and functions of the National Council on Defence will relate to:
   i. Matters of National Defence.
   ii. Defence Policy.
   iii. Placing the Defence Force in service.
   iv. Strategic matters related to the defence function.

b. The President, the Minister, Secretary for Defence and the Military Command will comprise the National Council on Defence.

c. The President may appoint or co-opt any other person as it may be deemed necessary.

d. The National Council on Defence will meet at least every quarter.

e. The Military Command will present quarterly reports and an annual report on the state of defence to the Council.

PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES CURRENTLY IN OPERATION

11. Section 199(8) of the 1996 Constitution gives effect to the principles of transparency and accountability by providing for multi-party parliamentary committees which have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.

“To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament."  

12. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). The JSCD has been established with broad powers of oversight that can be used to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning of Defence, acquisition and procurement policy, and the state of readiness of Defence. It may perform other functions relating to Parliamentary supervision of the armed forces as prescribed by law.

a. The JSCD derives its powers and functions for oversight of the Defence Force in terms of the Interim Constitution of 1993. Section 228 was retained as one of the transitional arrangements carried over from the 1993 Interim Constitution:

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136 1993 Interim Constitution: Section 228.
137 1996 Constitution: Schedule 6, Section 24(1).
i. Section 228 of the 1993 Interim Constitution provides that a Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence shall be established, consisting of members of all political parties holding more than 10 seats in the National Assembly and willing to participate in the committee\textsuperscript{138}.

ii. The Joint Rules of Parliament (Rule 120A) further make provision for the establishment of the JSCD stating the following: “There is a Joint Standing Committee on Defence as required by section 228(3) of the Constitution of 1993”\textsuperscript{139}.

b. The mandate of the JSCD is found in section 228(3)(d) of the 1993 Interim Constitution: “The committee shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force and to perform such other functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the Force as may be prescribed by law.” The JSCD therefore has a unique and very important role pertaining to armaments and the preparedness (readiness) of the SANDF.

13. The Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD). The PCD is responsible for monitoring Defence by scrutinising and investigating defence business. It subsequently makes recommendations on the functions, budgetary allocations, rationalisation and restructuring of the defence organisational structure, policy formulation and any other relevant matters. It is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in Parliament.

a. The PCD derives part of its mandate from that of the overall National Assembly as contained in Section 55 of the Constitution, 1996 which states that:

(1) “In exercising its legislative power, the National Assembly may—

(a) consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation before the Assembly; and
(b) initiate or prepare legislation, except money Bills.

(2) The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms—

(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it; and
(b) to maintain oversight of—

(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; and
(ii) any organ of state.”

b. The Rules of the National Assembly (Rule 201) explains the functions of portfolio committees by stating that such committees\textsuperscript{140}:

“(a) must deal with bills and other matters falling within its portfolio as are referred to it in terms of the Constitution, legislation, these Rules, the Joint Rules or by resolution of the Assembly;
(b) must maintain oversight of —

\textsuperscript{138} Interim Constitution, 1993: Section 228(3)(a).
\textsuperscript{139} Joint Rules of Parliament, Rule 120A, p 57.
(i) the exercise within its portfolio of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation;

(ii) any executive organ of State falling within its portfolio;

(iii) any constitutional institution falling within its portfolio; and

(iv) any other body or institution in respect of which oversight was assigned to it;

(c) may monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations concerning any such executive organ of state, constitutional institution or other body or institution, including the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, staff and policies of such organ of state, institution or other body or institution”.

c. The PCD, as a committee of the National Assembly, is responsible for, inter alia, legislative matters relating to defence; ensuring oversight of Defence as part of the Executive; and ensuring that the Defence Force is held accountable for its activities. The PCD is responsible for monitoring the Defence, scrutinising and investigating what it does. It subsequently makes recommendations on the functions, budgetary allocations, rationalisation and restructuring of the defence organisational structure, policy formulation and any other relevant matters. It is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in Parliament.

d. The oversight powers of the PCD are furthermore contained in section 56 of the 1996 Constitution:

“The National Assembly (the NCOP and therefore the JSCD excluded) or any of its committees may- (a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents; (b) require any person or institution to report to it; (c) compel, in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person or institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of paragraph (a) or (b); and d) receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions.”

14. Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI). The JSCI is established by the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (as amended) and exercises oversight functions in relation to the intelligence and counter-intelligence functions of the Security Services, and report thereon to Parliament141. The function of the JSCI is, inter alia, to review and make recommendations regarding interdepartmental co-operation and the rationalisation and demarcation of functions relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence between the Agency, the South African Secret Service, the National Defence Force and the South African Police Service142.

15. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). SCOPA exercises oversight over all executive structures and constitutional institutions of the State on behalf of the Legislature to ensure accountability for resources and financial management in accordance with the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, as amended.

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142 Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) (as amended): Section 3(e).
16. The Select Committee on Constitutional and Security Affairs (SCOSCA). The SCOSCA in the National Council of Provinces has an oversight role on all defence-related legislation and policy. This oversight role largely focuses on the implications for the nine provinces of South Africa.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES NOT YET IN OPERATION


   a. Its envisaged functions are as follows:

   The Joint Committee has oversight of the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Service to give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability as envisaged in section 199(8) of the Constitution, and for that purpose the Committee must meet at least once a year to do an annual review of the security service concerned, including a review of (a) the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the South African National Defence Force; and (b) the budget, functioning, organisation, policy and morale of the South African Police Service.

   b. Joint Rule 119 further states that:

   “Rules 117 to 119 will have to stand over until section 228 of the 1993 Constitution is repealed. Until such repeal the Joint Standing Committee on Defence established by that section must perform the oversight function concerning the South African National Defence Force”.

PROPOSAL REGARDING PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE MATTERS

ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

18. Establishment of the Committee. A Joint (bicameral) Parliamentary Committee on Defence (JPCD) will be established in legislation, hereafter referred to as "The Committee".

19. Purpose of the Committee. The purpose of the Committee will be, subject to the Constitution, to perform comprehensive oversight in relation to the entire defence function and which will include defence administration, financial management and expenditure, and will report thereon to Parliament. This comprehensive oversight mandate will:

   a. Advance defence oversight in a manner consistent with national security and the stature of Parliament.

   b. Advance the development of the national interest.

   c. Advance the Defence Mandate, the stature of the Defence Force and its Military Command.

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DEFENCE POLICY, STRATEGY AND PLANS

20. The Committee will be competent to perform defence oversight with regard to the following:
   a. Defence policies.
   b. Defence strategies.
   c. Defence plans.
   d. The defence financial and resource management system.

DEFENCE BUDGET AND REPORTS OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

21. The Committee will be competent to consider and report on the appropriation of revenue or moneys for the defence function. This will extend to defence budgeting, financial administration and reports, and will not be limited to oversight of:
   a. The defence budget.
   b. Defence accounts and defence expenditure.
   c. Defence quarterly and other reports.
   d. The defence annual report.

22. Consider the Auditor-Generals audit report compiled in accordance with section 4 (6) of the Auditor-General Act, 1995 (Act 12 of 1995), and thereafter consider:
   e. Defence financial statements.
   f. Any audit reports issued on the defence financial statements.
   g. Any reports issued by the Auditor-General on the Defence Force and any other defence matter.

DEFENCE READINESS

23. The Committee will be competent to provide oversight of defence readiness. Such readiness refers to various interrelated and overlapping aspects concerning the ability of the Defence Force to meet the demands of South African national security and defence strategies and the operational commitments placed on the Defence Force. Defence readiness furthermore refers to defence capabilities, operational and joint readiness, as well as sustainability.
   a. Defence Capabilities. Defence capabilities refer to the size and composition of the Defence Force and extend to the modernisation and technical sophistication of combat services, weapon systems, equipment and support services.
b. **Operational and Joint Readiness.**

i. **Operational readiness** refers to units, platforms or weapon systems capable of performing the missions or functions for which they were established, organised or designed. It incorporates both equipment readiness and personnel readiness. The latter refers to personnel being available and qualified to perform their assigned missions or functions and their morale.

ii. **Joint readiness** refers to the task force commander’s ability to integrate and synchronise ready combat and support forces to execute an assigned mission.

c. **Sustainability.** Sustainability refers to the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve defence objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks.

**DEFENCE OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS**

24. The Defence Force may be put into service in terms of the Constitution, 1996 or the Defence Act, 2002 in the manner as indicated below.

a. Only the President, as Head of the National Executive\(^\text{145}\), may authorise the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service, in defence of the Republic, or in fulfilment of an international obligation\(^\text{146}\).

b. The President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to: preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; ensure the provision of essential services; support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; or effect national border control\(^\text{147}\).

25. The Committee will be established as the competent committee to perform the oversight functions related to the employment of the Defence Force as required in the Constitution, 1996 and the Defence Act, 2002. These procedures are indicated hereunder.

a. Section 201(3) and 201(4) of the Constitution, 1996 states that:

   (3) When the defence force is deployed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of-
   
   (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force;
   (b) any place where the force is being employed;
   (c) the number of people involved; and
   (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed.

   (4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee”

\(^{145}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 84(1).

\(^{146}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 201(2).

\(^{147}\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 18(1).
b. Section 18 of the Defence Act, 2002 further states that:

(2) When the Defence Force is employed for any purpose contemplated in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subsection (1), the President or Minister, as the case may be, must inform Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of the –

(a) reasons for such employment;
(b) place where the Defence Force is being employed;
(c) number of people involved;
(d) period for which the Defence Force is expected to be employed; and
(e) expenditure incurred or expected to be incurred.

(3) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the employment of the Defence Force as contemplated in subsection (2), the President or Minister, as the case may be, must provide the information required in that subsection to the appropriate oversight committee of Parliament on Defence.

(4) If the Defence Force is employed by the President for any purpose contemplated in section 201(2) of the Constitution, the President must also comply with subsection (2)(e).

(5) Parliament may by resolution within seven days after receiving information contemplated in subsection (2) from the President or the Minister –

(a) confirm any such authorisation of employment;
(b) order the amendment of such authorisation;
(c) order the substitution for such authorisation of any other appropriate authorisation; or
(d) order the termination of the employment of the Defence Force.

(6) An order contemplated in subsection (5)(b), (c) or (d) does not affect –

(a) the validity of the authorisation up to the moment of the passing of the resolution by Parliament;
(b) the validity of anything done by virtue of the authorisation up to the moment that the amendment, substitution or termination of the authorisation takes effect; or
(c) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred as a result of the authorisation for the employment of the Defence Force, up to the applicable moment contemplated in paragraph (b).

(7) (a) If authorisation by the Minister in terms of subsection (1)(a) cannot be obtained in time to avert imminent danger to life, health or property, the Secretary for Defence, with the concurrence of the Chief of the Defence Force, may, in accordance with a standing arrangement delegated by the Minister in this regard, authorise the employment of the National Defence Force for purposes of that subsection.

(b) The Secretary for Defence must inform the Minister as soon as possible of such authorisation and provide the Minister with the information referred to in subsection (2).

(c) The Minister may cancel the authorisation if he or she disagrees, in which case subsection (6) applies with the necessary changes.
(d) If the Minister agrees with the authorisation, subsections (2), (3), (5) and (6) apply with the necessary changes.

REPORTS OF THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

26. The Defence Service Commission will be an independent commission reporting to Parliament. The Commission will serve as an impartial advisory third party on matters related to defence personnel administration and service conditions.

27. The Committee will be the competent authority to receive and evaluate the reports of the Defence Service Commission, bearing in mind that it is intended that before the end of each financial year, the Defence Service Commission will provide Parliament with:

a. An annual Defence Personnel Review.

b. An annual Salary and Benefit Review.

c. An annual evaluation of the extent to which the constitutionally and statutory prescribed values and principles are complied with.

d. An annual report in respect of the Commission’s activities and its functions, including any finding made or any directions and advice it may have given.

REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL COMMITTEE

28. The Committee will be established as the competent committee to perform the oversight functions related to the reports as prescribed in the National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002 (Act 41 of 2002 as amended) and related conventional arms control matters.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE

29. The composition of the Committee will be based on the proportional representation of political parties in Parliament, according to the same formula as provided in Section 2(2) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994, as amended) namely:

"(2) (a) The Committee shall consist of 15 members of Parliament; appointed on the basis of proportional representation determined according to the formula in paragraph (c): Provided that-

(i) if the total number of seats on the Committee allocated to the political parties in terms of paragraph (c) is less than 15, the unfilled seats shall not be allocated to any political party, but the Committee shall nevertheless be deemed to be properly constituted; and

(ii) if one political party has been allocated more than eight seats in terms of paragraph (c) and more than five political parties are represented in Parliament, the five minority parties with the largest representation in Parliament are entitled to at least one member each on the Committee, and the Committee so constituted shall be deemed to be properly constituted regardless of whether the total number of seats so allocated on the Committee is more or less than 15; and

(iii) if any political party is unwilling to serve or to continue to serve on the Committee, the seats of such political party on the Committee shall not be allocated
to any other political party but the Committee shall nevertheless be deemed to be properly constituted.

(b) No member of Parliament shall be appointed as a member of the Committee before a security clearance has been issued in respect of that member by the National Intelligence Agency in a manner determined by the Minister as defined in section 1 of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act No. 39 of 1994), by regulation.

(c) Political parties shall be entitled to designate a member or members to the Committee in accordance with the principle of proportional representation and as determined according to the following formula: By dividing the number of seats held by the party in the National Assembly by the total number of seats in the National Assembly, multiplying the result by 15 and discarding all decimals.

(3) a member referred to in subsection (2) shall be appointed by the Speaker or the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, depending upon the House of Parliament from which the member is appointed, acting with the concurrence of the President, who shall act with the concurrence of the leader of the political party concerned.

CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMITTEE

30. The Chairperson of the Committee, being a Member of Parliament, will be appointed by the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces. Such appointment will be with the concurrence of the President, and after consultation with the leaders of the political parties represented on the Committee.

SUPPORT TO THE COMMITTEE

31. The Committee will be assisted in the performance of its functions by officers of Parliament designated for that purpose by the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces.

32. The Minister will further provide a committee secretariat, after consultation with the Speaker and the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces comprising appropriate members of the Defence Force and the Defence Secretariat.

MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

33. The principles of transparency and accountability will be espoused and pursued and the meetings of the Committee will, by routine, be open to public attendance and scrutiny.

34. The time, place and conduct of Committee meetings will be prescribed in terms of the rules and orders contemplated in section 58 of the Constitution, 1996. The Committee will be competent to initiate and recommend any such rules and orders related to the functioning of the Committee.

35. On representation by the Minister, and on good cause shown, the Chairperson may declare a meeting to be closed to public attendance.

36. The Committee may decide, on consensus, to jointly make a public statement concerning any matter under its scrutiny.
ACCESS TO DEFENCE INFORMATION

37. In the performance of its oversight functions, the Committee will have access to relevant defence information and documents, on condition that such access is necessary for the performance of such oversight functions and that such information or documents will be handled in accordance with written security guidelines, and the measures or the conditions prescribed or determined by the Chairperson with the concurrence of the Minister.

38. Such documents, after inspection thereof, will be returned to the Minister in the manner that may be prescribed.

CONFIDENTIALITY OF DEFENCE INFORMATION

39. The Committee will conduct its functions in a manner consistent with the protection of national security. No committee member may disclose any classified information or document provided for the performance of his or her oversight functions.

PUBLIC HEARINGS, PETITIONS AND ACCESS TO THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION AND ITS OFFICIALS

40. The Committee may:

a. Summon any defence official or defence organisation or defence sub-organisation to appear before it to give evidence, to produce documents or reports and to explain any aspect of a document or report.

b. Hold public hearings, and may receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions.

c. Deliberate upon, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and make recommendations on any defence related aspect, including defence administration and financial expenditure.

d. Consult with any member of the Cabinet appointed in terms of the Constitution, regarding the performance of the functions of the Committee.

41. The Committee, with the concurrence of the Minister, may conduct oversight visits within the defence organisation or any area of defence operational deployment.

REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE

42. The Committee will report to both Houses on:

a. Any matter referred to it, including any recommendations that the Committee may deem necessary.

b. Any matter relating to the performance of the functions of the Committee.

c. Its activities, at least once a year.

43. Nothing will be included in any report of the Committee, the inclusion of which will be more harmful to the national security than its exclusion will be to the national interest.
AMENDMENT OF LEGISLATION

44. As indicated above, Section 199(8) of the 1996 Constitution provides for multi-party parliamentary committees which have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.

“To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.”

45. It is thus proposed that the mandate and functions of the Committee indicated in the proposal above be comprehensively provided for in an amendment to the Defence Act, 2002.

46. As further indicated above, Section 228 of the 1993 Interim Constitution related to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence has not been repealed and is still in operation. This section would have to be repealed.

47. This review of legislation would also have to address the Joint Rules of Parliament (117-119)\textsuperscript{149}, which provide for a Joint Committee on Oversight of Security Matters regarding the SANDF and the SAPS.

48. Specific attention will be given in the legislation to the manner and mechanisms by which Defence will account to the Committee.

BASIC TENETS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

ENTITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

49. The Defence Act, 2002\textsuperscript{150} currently provides that the Department of Defence consists of: the Defence Secretariat, the Defence Force and any Auxiliary Service\textsuperscript{151}. This arrangement will be amended in order to provide for the following:

a. Differentiate and separate operations and operational issues from policy issues, in other words, separate policy from execution.

b. Support the Minister in his/her oversight responsibilities concerning Defence.

50. Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence will in future comprise (Figure 67):

a. The Office of the Minister of Defence and direct inner-office, including a research unit and ministerial protocol services.

b. The Offices of two Deputy Ministers and their direct inner-offices.

c. The Office of the Secretary for Defence.

\textsuperscript{149} Joint Rules of Parliament, Note 5, Rule 119, p 56.
\textsuperscript{150} Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 5.
\textsuperscript{151} Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 16(1).
d. The Defence Secretariat, comprising:
   i. A policy direction unit.
   ii. A performance evaluation unit.
   iii. Parliamentary and cabinet support unit.
   iv. Internal support unit.

e. A Military Secretary and military staff duties office.

f. An Internal Audit Committee.

g. Public entities over which the Minister will exercise ownership control\(^{152}\).

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\(^{152}\) **Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999): Section 1** "ownership control, in relation to an entity, means the ability to exercise powers to govern the financial and operating policies of the entity in order to obtain benefits from its activities."
SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE

51. A civilian secretariat for defence must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for defence. Subject to the laws governing the public service, the Minister will appoint a person to the post of Secretary for Defence as head of the Defence Secretariat.

52. The office of the Secretary for Defence will be established in the Ministry of Defence and the Secretary for Defence will be the Director General and top level budget holder of the Ministry of Defence.

53. Subject to sections 202(2) and 204 of the Constitution, the powers vested in the Secretary for Defence by or under the Defence Act, 2002 must be exercised subject to and in accordance with any direction of the Minister.

54. The Secretary for Defence must perform such functions as may be entrusted by the Minister, in particular those necessary or expedient to enhance civil control and legislative oversight by:

   a. The Minister over Defence.
   b. Parliament over Defence.
   c. Parliamentary committees having oversight over Defence.

55. The Secretary for Defence must:

   a. Advise the Minister on policy matters and must advise the Minister on any matter referred to him or her by the Minister. This extends to setting the following for the Minister’s authorisation:

      i. Defence policy direction.
      ii. Defence strategic priorities, planning guidelines and directives.
      iii. Defence diplomacy direction.

   b. Monitor compliance with policies and directions issued by the Minister to the Chief of the Defence Force. This will extend to:

      i. Monitor and evaluate defence organisational performance.
      ii. Monitor and evaluate defence financial performance.
      iii. Monitor and evaluate defence governance, compliance and risk.

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153 Constitution, 1996: Section 204.
c. Provide the Minister with parliamentary and cabinet administrative services, including parliamentary questions and the defence legislative programme.

d. Provide comprehensive internal support services to the Ministry of Defence.

56. The Secretary for Defence will further be responsible for:

a. The discipline of, administrative control over and management of ministry of defence employees, including their effective utilisation and training\(^{159}\).

b. Establishing internal systems and internal controls and managing the resources allocated to the Ministry.

57. Members of the Defence Force may, with their consent, be placed at the disposal of the Secretary for Defence to serve in posts in the Defence Secretariat without being demilitarised\(^{160}\).

CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

58. The Chief of the Defence Force will be:

a. Appointed by the President\(^{161}\) in the President’s capacity of Head of the National Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force\(^{162}\).

b. The Commander\(^{163}\) of the Defence Force and will have full command of subordinate units and any assigned auxiliary service, and as such:

   i. Is the head of the Defence Force.

   ii. Affirms the armed forces under Ministerial authority,

   iii. Defines the roles and relationships of senior officers and officials in the Defence Force.

   iv. Establishes, controls and directs the activities of the Defence Force.

   v. Provides armed forces to be placed at the disposal of Government.

a. Responsible to exercise command\(^{164}\) of the Defence Force in accordance\(^{165}\) with the directions of the Cabinet member\(^{166}\) (hereafter referred to as the Minister) responsible for defence, under the authority of the President.

b. The prime adviser to the Minister on military matters, including on the use of the military capabilities developed within the Defence Force.

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159 Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 8(g).
162 Constitution, 1996: Section 202(1).
164 Constitution, 1996, Section 202(a).
166 Constitution 1996, Section 201(1).
c. The defence accounting officer with full accounting powers and accounts to Minister and parliament on resource utilisation.

59. The Chief of the Defence Force will:
   
a. Subject to sections 202(2) and 204 of the Constitution, exercise any powers vested subject to and in accordance with any direction of the Minister\textsuperscript{167}

b. Execute any delegation conferred or any duty assigned by the Minister\textsuperscript{168} in terms of general powers\textsuperscript{169} or specific powers arising from the Defence Act, 2002.

c. Remain accountable for the achievement of Defence Goals and the efficient and effective utilisation of the resources voted to it by Parliament.

d. Account, through the Minister, to Parliament and multi-party Oversight Committees for the Defence Force in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament\textsuperscript{170}.

e. Appoint a general/flag officer as the Military Secretary to the Minister and appoint subordinate military administrative services staff. The Military Secretary, being of appropriate seniority and experience, will be competent to:
   
   i. Provide full-time support to the Minister on military matters.

   ii. Provide the Chief of the Defence Force with day-to-day liaison with the Ministry of Defence.

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE AND THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

60. The Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force are required to consult with each other on any substantive advice emanating from their areas of competence, or on any other substantive matter of defence policy, intended to be given to the Minister or other Ministers.

61. Such advice will preferably be given in-consultation, and where differences of opinion may arise, such advice must be given after-consultation. In such instances, the Minister is obliged to hear both advices.

62. The Minister may from time to time require the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force to consult formally with each other on any advice or substantive matter of defence policy that the Minister may require.

63. The Secretary for Defence or the Chief of the Defence Force may recommend that the Minister issues a requirement to consult. The Minister will inform the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force in writing of the Minister’s decision on the recommendation.

64. The requirement to consult will not affect any duty, obligation, or power of the Secretary for Defence or the Chief of the Defence Force.

\textsuperscript{168} Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 81.
\textsuperscript{170} Constitution, 1996, Section 199(8).
THE DEFENCE FORCE

65. There is a single Defence Force\(^{171}\) which is the only lawful military force in the Republic\(^{172}\) and must be structured and regulated by national legislation\(^{173}\).

66. The Defence Force will be organised, commanded and administered according to the following fundamental prescripts:

a. Must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force\(^{174}\).

b. Consists of a Regular Component, a Reserve Component\(^{175}\) and a Civilian Component.

c. Consists of the following services\(^{176}\):
   i. The South African Army.
   ii. The South African Air Force.
   iii. The South African Navy.
   iv. The South African Military Health Service.

d. Includes any auxiliary service established by the Minister\(^{177}\).

e. Must act, and must teach and require its members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic\(^{178}\). The Constitution provides that customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament\(^{179}\).

PUBLIC ENTITIES AND OTHER STATUTORY ENTITIES

67. The State will remain the sole shareholder in the following Public Entities and the Minister will exercise ownership control there over.

DEFENCE MATÉRIEL ORGANISATION

68. A Defence Matériel Organisation\(^{180}\) will be established. The Organisation will have two components as discussed hereunder.

\(^{171}\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(1).

\(^{172}\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(2).

\(^{173}\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(4).

\(^{174}\) Constitution 1996, Section 200(1).

\(^{175}\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 11 (a) & (b).


\(^{177}\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 16(1).

\(^{178}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 199(5).

\(^{179}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 232.

\(^{180}\) Armscor Act, 2003 (Act 51 of 2003): Section 1(g) “defence matériel” means any material, equipment, facilities or services used principally for military purposes.
69. **Defence Acquisition.**

   a. Which will be jointly comprised of the current Defence Matériel Division of the Department of Defence and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited.

   b. Which will be responsible for the functions listed in Section 4 of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act, 2003 (Act 51 of 2003), excepting the tender management system envisaged in Section 4(2)(e). This is not limited to the following:

   i. Engineering expertise in the field of Category 1 Defence Matériel.

   ii. A system of Programme Management for the acquisition of Category 1 Defence Matériel.

   iii. A system of In-Service Support to Category 1 Defence Matériel.

   iv. A system of Contract Management for the acquisition of Category 1 Defence Matériel.


   vi. A system of Compliance Administration for the Department as required by applicable international law, the National Arms Control Act, 2002 and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993.

   vii. A system of Quality Assurance for the acquisition of Category 1 Defence Matériel goods and services.

   viii. A system to manage the expenditure of Special Defence Account Funds.


   x. A system of Disposal of Category 1 Defence Matériel in consultation with the entity or Government of Origin who originally manufactured the equipment.

   c. The Chief Executive Officer will be the Accounting Authority of the Organisation.

   d. The Defence Matériel Organisation will be deemed to be the contracting authority for tenders awarded. Financial authorisation will be required from the Accounting Officer of the Defence Force before contracting can commence. (Separation of R1 and R2 Powers).


70. **Research and Development, Test and Evaluation.**

   a. The research and development portion of the defence allocation will be managed corporately to the best benefit of the State and the existing research and development capabilities in the Defence Force, ARMSCOR and Denel will be amalgamated to the best benefit of the State.
b. Similarly, existing test and evaluation facilities in the Defence Force, ARMSCOR and Denel will be amalgamated to the best benefit of the State.

**DEFENCE MATÉRIEL TENDER BOARD**

71. A Defence Matériel Tender Board will be established in terms of national legislation.

72. The Defence Matériel Tender Board:

   a. Will function within the ambit of any regulations or instructions that the National Treasury may make or issue concerning the determination of a framework for an appropriate procurement and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective.\(^{181}\)

   b. Will be competent to consider and evaluate all acquisition recommendations made by the Defence Matériel Organisation for the purpose of approving of inter alia the following: the supplier; the product; the agreed price; and delivery arrangements.

   c. Will be supported by a Tender Secretariat.

   d. Will be competent to make recommendations and direct performance on the following to the benefit of the State and the Defence Force in particular:

      i. Specific contracting conditions and considerations.

      ii. Specific performance criteria.

      iii. Specific and appropriate controls.


73. Defence Matériel Tender Board may:

   a. Refer acquisition recommendations back to the Defence Matériel Organisation for further consideration and investigation, as appropriate.

   b. Issue delegations to any authorisation committee(s) that it may wish to establish, provided that such committee(s):

      i. Are not in conflict with any regulations or instructions that the National Treasury may make or issue concerning the determination of a framework for an appropriate procurement and provisioning system.

      ii. Are subject to any limitations and conditions that the Defence Matériel Tender Board may impose.

      iii. Does not divest the Defence Matériel Tender Board of the responsibility concerning the exercise of any power or the performance of any duty.

\(^{181}\) Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999): Section (76(4)(c).}
DENEL

74. Incorporated as a private company in 1992 in terms of the South African Companies Act (No 62 of 1973), Denel’s sole shareholder is the South African Government. Ownership control of Denel will transfer from the Minister of Public Enterprises to the Minister of Defence.

THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

75. A Defence Service Commission, as discussed more fully in Chapter 11, will be established with the mandate to oversee and make recommendations concerning defence service systems including remuneration and conditions of service\textsuperscript{182}.

THE DEFENCE OMBUD

76. The Defence Ombud will have the investigative mandate contemplated in the Military Ombudsman Bill\textsuperscript{183} with respect to the resolution of collective and individual grievances or complaints by members of the Defence Force or members of the public.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGENCY

77. Defence has the obligation to establish an arms control and compliance system for the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) to administer the National Conventional Arms Control Act 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002), the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006 (Act 27 of 2006), any further statute that may be promulgated in this regard and the international obligations of the Republic with regard to conventional arms control.

78. A Conventional Arms Control Agency will be established to fulfil the following obligations:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] Provide effective and efficient administrative support to the NCACC through the rendering of a Conventional Arms Control Secretariat to:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item[i.] Administer the conventional arms control function.
      \item[ii.] Provide administrative and professional services to the NCACC in respect of the regulation of conventional arms transfers, including departmental review of all arms control permits as part of the review system.
      \item[iii.] Process all applicable arms transfer permits and foreign military assistance authorisation.
    \end{itemize}
  \item[b.] Support the inter-departmental Scrutiny Committee and the National Conventional Arms Control Committee.
  \item[c.] Provide ICT systems for the administration of the Acts.
  \item[d.] Effective administrative and professional services to the NCACC in respect of the Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{182} Defence Amendment Act, 2010 (Act 22 of 2010): Sections 1(a) and 5.
\textsuperscript{183} Military Ombudsman Bill (Bill 9 of 2011).
e. Provide an inspectorate, whose function it is to ensure that trade in conventional arms and foreign military assistance is conducted in compliance with the Acts and the internal regulatory processes of the Committee.

DEFENCE HERITAGE AGENCY

79. A Defence Heritage Agency will be established to secure and promote South Africa’s rich defence heritage. The Agency will be responsible for the heritage value of defence assets related to:

a. Defence Museums and Collections.
b. Defence Graves and Memorials.
c. Battle Fields.
d. The Castle of Good Hope and Endowment Properties.

80. This will be furthered in legislation and regulation.

THE RESERVE FORCE COUNCIL (RFC)

81. The role of the Reserve Force Council, as envisaged in Section 48 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002) will be augmented to provide for a Council which is competent to provide specialist policy advisory support to the Minister on matters affecting the Reserve Component. The Council will, without fear, favour or prejudice, pursue the mandate set below.

a. Further the principles of a viable Reserve Component by promoting the one force approach to defence planning, programming and administration.
b. Promote the effective resourcing, capacitation, preparation, functioning and utilisation of the Reserve Component.
c. Evaluate and consult on any matter of legislation, policy or administration that may impact on the Reserve Component and to advise accordingly.
d. Advise the Defence Service Commission on the dispensation, service conditions and benefits concerning the Reserve Component.
e. Research or investigate or advise on any matter as may be requested by the Minister or ministry and not limited to Reserve Component matters.
f. Research or investigate or advise on any matter as may be requested by the Chief of the Defence Force through the Ministry.
g. Maintain relations with other international Reserve Officer Associations as directed by the Minister.

82. Regulations will be promulgated to set the election, membership, term, functioning, procedures and duties of the Council.
83. The Reserve Force Council, and as is contemplated in the RFC regulations being promulgated, shall:

a. Comprise, in the proportions specified in the regulations,:
   i. Members elected from nominations made by units of the Defence Force’s Reserve Component.
   iii. Members nominated by the Minister of Defence in consultation with the Chief of the Defence Force.

b. At the commencement of each term, prepare a Reserve Force Council Constitution for the consideration and approval of the Minister.

c. Be funded through a transfer payment from the Defence Vote.

d. Report, quarterly and annually, on its activities to the Minister and provide audited annual financial statements in accordance with statutory requirements.

BASIC TENETS FOR THE ORGANISATION OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

84. The Defence Force will be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely G1-G9. The General Staff System (Figure 68) will be established and be reflected at all levels of command to facilitate functional liaison and promote effective command and control.

Figure 68: Defence Force Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart
85. The Defence Headquarters will comprise the Chief of the Defence Force, Deputy Chief of the Defence Force, a CoS and the following staff divisions:

a. CS1 – Personnel.

b. CS2 – Intelligence.

c. CS3 – Operations.

d. CS4 – Logistics.

e. CS5 – Planning.


g. CS7 – Training.

h. CS8 – Finance.

i. CS9 – Specialist Staffs.

86. The Chief of the Defence Force will have the following services and formations under command:

a. Permanent Operations Headquarters (Operational Level HQ).

b. South African Army.


e. South African Military Health Service.

f. Special Forces Command.

g. Logistics Command.

h. Information and Communications Systems Command (JICS).

i. Training Command.

87. The Defence Force, across capabilities and at all levels, will be structured in recognised combat formations adhering to the axiom: "We train as we fight".
PRINCIPLES INFORMING THE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE RESOURCES

88. The following principles inform the management of defence resources.

a. The main divisions of defence resources are:
   i. Defence Personnel.
   ii. Defence Logistics, including fixed and moveable assets and services.
   iii. Defence capital systems, namely prime mission equipment.
   v. Defence Finance.

b. The Chief of the Defence Force is the Defence Accounting Officer and must consequently account for all defence resources allocated.

c. The Chief of the Defence Force must be appropriately supported and capacitated to manage financial and other resources within the prescripts of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, (Act 01 of 1999, as amended) and the Treasury Regulations promulgated in terms of the Act.

d. The defence resource management system will be compliant to prescripts of all resource administration prescripts in statute and regulation.

e. The utilisation of defence resources must be audited and reported upon to the National Executive and the Legislature, as may be prescribed in law.

f. The Chief of the Defence Force will report primarily to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence on any matter within the remit of the Committee.

g. The general principle of transparency is espoused and will be pursued. Notwithstanding, care will be taken to provide, within the Rules of Parliament, for reporting on confidential aspects of the broader defence function.

THE ROLE OF THE DEFENCE ACCOUNTING OFFICER

89. Chapter 5, Part 2 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended) prescribes the responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Force as the Defence Accounting Officer:\(^{184}\):

a. General responsibilities.

b. Responsibilities relating to budgetary control.

c. Reporting responsibilities.

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\(^{184}\) Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 01 of 1999) (As Amended): Sections 38-43
d. Information to be submitted.

e. Responsibilities when assets and liabilities are transferred.

f. Virement between main divisions within votes.

SUPPORT AND CAPACITATION OF THE DEFENCE ACCOUNTING OFFICER

90. To provide appropriate support and capacitation for the Chief of the Defence Force to manage and account for defence resources, the following staff arrangements will be pursued:

a. **Deputy Chief of the Defence Force.** The characteristics of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Force will be:

i. The Deputy Chief will not have the same executive power or decision-making ability as the Commander, thus needs to remain in regular contact with the Commander. The duties of the Deputy Chief will be determined by the Commander through written delegation.

ii. The Deputy Chief will provide continuity and a senior focus when the Commander is away from the HQ.

iii. The Deputy Chief will be senior in appointment to other Component Commanders.

iv. A senior officer is normally appointed as the Deputy Chief for his/her last appointment before retirement.

b. **Chief Financial Officer.** The Chief Financial Officer (CFO), being a Chartered Accountant, will, within the defence staff system:

i. Perform the functions prescribed of the Chief Financial Officer as prescribed in the Treasury Regulations with regard to the management of defence resources.

ii. Specifically assist the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging resource management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.

iii. Consequently provide high-order resource policy, comprehensive resource directives, resource policy direction and oversee the integration of defence resource management systems.

iv. Coordinate the resource governance, risk and control (GRC) responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Force.

c. **Defence Internal Audit.**

i. Defence has a statutory obligation to have and maintain a system of internal audit under the control and direction of an audit committee complying with and
operating in accordance with regulations and instructions prescribed\textsuperscript{185}.

ii. Defence Internal Audit will provide an independent and objective internal audit function, which is responsible for measuring, evaluating and reporting on performance, the effectiveness of the risk management, control and governance processes.

iii. Defence Internal Audit will provide an annual audit opinion.

iv. The development and delivery of the audit programme is overseen by the Defence Audit Committee.

v. Defence Internal Audit will provide functional audit service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

d. Inspector General.

i. The Inspector General, having access to any Defence Force headquarters or unit, is responsible for the independent investigation, evaluation and assessment of:

(1) Training.

(2) Economy, effectiveness and efficiency.

(3) Morale.

(4) Readiness.

ii. The Inspector General will provide certificates of compliance related to the above evaluations and assessments.

iii. The Inspector General will determine the anti-fraud and corruption strategy and will investigate any alleged irregularities thereto.

iv. The Inspector General will provide functional inspection service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

e. Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (CoS) will, within the defence staff system:

i. Support the Chief of the Defence Force in the decision-making process by integrating and coordinating the activities of the allocated staffs.

ii. Coordinate the work of the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities, thus in effect acting as the “programme director”.

iii. Impose order within the headquarters, arbitrate any disputes between members of the staff, facilitate the workflow between the staffs, communicate decisions to all members of the staffs and provide for the management of the veracity of all management information pertaining to information emanating from supporting staffs.

f. **Chief Staff Personnel.** The Chief Staff Personnel:

i. Provides the staff capacity for the establishment of defence personnel philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.

ii. Assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging personnel management duties prescribed in:

1. Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.

2. The Public Service Act, 1994 (Act 103 of 1994) and Public Service Regulations.

iii. Coordinates the execution of any other statutory personnel obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

g. **Chief Staff Logistics.** The Chief Staff Logistics:

i. Provides the staff capacity for the establishment of defence logistics philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.

ii. Assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging logistic management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.

iii. Coordinates the execution of any other statutory logistic obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

h. **Chief Staff Communication and Information Systems (CIS).** The Chief Staff CIS:

i. Provides the staff capacity for the establishment of defence ICS philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.

ii. Assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging ICS management duties prescribed in:

1. Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.


iii. Coordinates the execution of any other statutory ICS obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

i. **Chief Staff Finance.** The Chief Staff Finance:

i. Provides the staff capacity for the establishment of defence financial management philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.

ii. Assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging financial management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act,
1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.

iii. Coordinates the execution of any other statutory financial obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

91. The Chief Financial Officer will, in consultation with the Chief of the Defence Force, have direct responsibility to ensure that defence resource management responsibilities are undertaken. The core outputs of the Chief Financial Officer, within the defence staff system, will be to:

   a. Determine the strategic defence resource plan in terms of personnel, equipment, services, systems, information and finances.

   b. Determine the required defence resource information system, in terms of architecture, policies, processes, infrastructure and security.

   c. Control defence resource utilisation in terms of expenditure control, financial control and performance and risk control.

92. This will be done through the provision of high-order resource policy, comprehensive resource directives and resource policy direction that addresses:

   a. Defence Plans, Programme and Budget.

      i. Defence strategy and plan.

      ii. Defence estimate of expenditure.

      iii. Defence budget allocation.

      iv. Defence appropriation statement.

      v. Defence financial assessment.

   b. Defence Reports and Submissions.

      i. DOD Financial reports.

      ii. DOD Financial statements.

      iii. Defence submissions to treasury.

      iv. Replies to Auditor-General audit queries and audit reports.

      v. Adverse audit findings.

      vi. Cabinet Memoranda, and in particular cabinet memoranda having resource implications.

   c. Defence Resource Planning and Direction.

      i. Defence risk assessment.
ii. Defence resource management system.

iii. Defence resource directives.

iv. Defence resource delegations framework.

d. Defence Organisational Performance.

i. Defence Business Architecture.

ii. Defence accountability management services.

iii. Defence supply chain oversight.

e. Defence Resource Compliance Monitoring.

i. Resource control and evaluation.

ii. Performance control and evaluation.

THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

93. The Chief of Staff assist the Chief of the Defence Force in the following capacities as:

a. Organiser. The Chief of Staff, as organiser, directs the activities of the staff towards the results and plans all the necessary resources.

b. Administrator. The Chief of Staff, as administrator, performs operative management to ensure the normal flow of all the processes of the staff division, as well as proportional distribution of the resources and overseeing their effective use.

c. Manager and Leader. The Chief of Staff, as manager and leader, implements the integration of staff issues, when the work of the staff members will be encouraged and directed towards the results.

ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN SYSTEM OF INTERNAL RESOURCE CONTROLS

94. The Chief of Staff is, within the defence staff system, to maintain a system of Defence Administrative, Operational and Technical (AOT) Policy as a key component of the statutory obligation to have and maintain effective, efficient and transparent systems of financial and risk management and internal control. In this regard:

a. Such Defence AOT policy will control discretion and standardise decisions in defined circumstances. It is authoritative, and may extend to strategy, doctrine, directives, orders, instructions, operating procedures, operating standards, processes, delegations, constitutions and curricula.

b. Functional authorities will be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of own functional policy within the constraints of the system established by the Chief of Staff.

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c. Non-compliance with such Defence AOT policy by a defence official may lead to disciplinary action.

95. The Chief of Staff will:

a. Determine sound standards, prescripts and templates against which all functional policy will be formulated and published.

b. Provide a corporate policy management system that is the repository of all functional policies in the Defence Force. The policy management system must:

i. Ensure configuration control of functional policies.

ii. Establish a Master Record Index for functional policies.

iii. Ensure proper promulgation of functional policies.

iv. Ensure the electronic and physical storage of functional policies.

v. Ensure the accessibility and dissemination of functional policies.

c. Convene a Defence AOT Policy Board, together with all functional authorities and key process owners, taking effective control over policy products according to a set constitution.

PERMANENT OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS

AUTHORISATION OF OPERATIONS

96. Only the President, as Head of the National Executive\(^{187}\), may authorise the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service, in defence of the Republic, or in fulfilment of an international obligation\(^{188}\).

97. The President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to: preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; ensure the provision of essential services; support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; or effect national border control\(^{189}\).

98. The process and instruments for Presidential authorisation of operations, as Head of the National Executive\(^ {190}\), is prescribed in the Manual on the Executive Acts of the President. This is exercised together with the Minister\(^ {191}\) through the signing of a President’s Minute\(^ {192}\).

\(^{187}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 84(1).

\(^{188}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 201(2).

\(^{189}\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 18(1).

\(^{190}\) Manual on the Executive Acts of the President, Chapter 2, Para 2.8(e).

\(^{191}\) Constitution, 1996: Section 85(2).

99. Amendment of Legislation and Procedure. Recent experience has demonstrated a necessity for the review of legislation and procedure with regard to putting the Defence Force in to service. Therefore amendment is needed to:

a. Clarify levels of authority to put the Defence Force in Service as provided in Section 18(1) of the Defence Act, 2002.

b. The authorisation of operations of a sensitive and/or secret nature and the informing of Parliament thereof.

c. The protection of South African citizens and assets abroad.

d. A more streamlined approach will be sought to facilitate the authorisation of a Presidential Minute when the Defence Force is put into service in support of the Police Service.

e. A standing proclamation for the Defence Force to render immediate assistance in times of disaster or civil emergency.

100. National and Provincial Coordination. Where operations extend through the spectrum of the security cluster, the National Joint Operations Centre (NATJOC) and the Provincial Operations Centres (PROVJOCS) will direct inter-agency/inter-departmental operations. Deployed Defence Force elements will remain under military command. Consideration will be given to retaining the NATJOC and its provincial structures on a permanent basis.

DIRECTING OF OPERATIONS

101. The Chief of the Defence Force retains operational command over the Defence Force and confers operational control over assigned forces to General Officer Commanding (GOC) at the Permanent Operations Headquarters for the conduct of authorised operations.

102. The Chief of the Defence Force may establish such temporary task force, group element or unit as may be required for military exercises or operations, and may for that purpose establish such number of temporary headquarters as may be required.

103. Chief Staff Operations (CS3), on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force: liaises with multi-lateral organisation, international and domestic stakeholders and the spheres of government; establishes all necessary legal instruments related to the deployment of the force in terms of the Constitution, international law and the Defence Act; conducts high-level joint operational planning; and, prepares directives on the conduct of operations.

104. Chief Staff Operations (CS3), on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force, determines:

a. The philosophy, doctrine and configuration of the command and control system for the Defence Force, whilst Chief Staff Command and Communication Systems Management (CS6) establishes and maintains the communications system architecture for command and control.

b. The Joint Force Employment (JFE) Strategy and the implementation thereof to ensure that capability requirements are accurately defined. (CS5)
c. Short-term force generation requirements. (CS5)

CONDUCTING OF OPERATIONS

105. The GOC at the Permanent Operations Headquarters orchestrates, directs and controls operations as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force within the parameters stipulated. The Permanent Operations Headquarters, being the operational level headquarters, will have inherent staff support (JS1-JS9) as well as attached specialist staff as may be required for the duration of the planning and conducting phases of an operation. (Figure 69)

Figure 69: Permanent Operations Headquarters Functional Flow Diagram

106. The GOC at the Permanent Operations Headquarters, supported by combat services and staff divisions, will execute standing domestic operations through tactical level headquarters established for this purpose. Other tactical level headquarters, temporarily established from the combat formations of the Services, as may be required for a specific operation, will execute all other operations as may be directed and controlled by the Permanent Operations Headquarters (Operational Level Headquarters).

107. The Permanent Operations Headquarters will further be positioned to:

a. Develop and rehearse operational theatre contingencies and manage and coordinate the theatre in terms of situational awareness, intent, objectives and plans.

b. Ensure mission preparedness, deploy forces, coordinate support to the mission area and demobilise the forces after the mission has been completed.

c. Administer, control and sustain specialist staff and formed units provided by the combat services to a mandated multi-lateral operation.

d. Control and direct tactical headquarters provided by the combat formations of the Services in order for South Africa to assume command responsibility as a lead nation to plan, mount and execute a coalition military operation.
THE PROTECTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALS AND TERRITORY ABROAD

108. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter gives effect to the principle of customary international law which recognises that states have the right to use force to protect their nationals abroad where they face imminent danger, failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign state to protect them, and if the measures taken by the intervening nation are strictly confined to the object of protecting its nationals against injury or death.

109. Section 232 of the Constitution (1996) recognises customary international law as law, and thus recognises the right of a state to protect its nationals.

110. Section 200(2) of the Constitution (1996) makes provision for the Defence Force to exercise its primary object of defending the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principle of international law regulating the use of force. Section 200(2) thus provides a legal platform against which a Defence Force deployment could be executed for the emergency evacuation of nationals abroad.

111. The Defence Act, 2002 will be amended to adequately and comprehensively provide the mandate and procedures to protect South African nationals and territory abroad.

SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY

DIRECTING PRINCIPLES

112. The Chief of the Army, as a member of the military command, commands the Army and provides the capabilities for landward defence. As such, the Chief of the Army is the primary advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force on land warfare and concomitant contingencies. The South African Army will be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely GS1-GS9 (Figure 70).

Figure 70: SA Army Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart
113. In order to execute the Defence Mission and Goals and tasks, the South African Army must have a balance of capabilities. These capabilities will be organised into coherent combat formations consisting of Regular and Reserve units.

114. The building block of the Army Combat Formations will be Brigades and Divisions with permanently assigned combat, combat support and combat service support units under command. At all levels, provision must be made for attaching joint planning components as required.

115. Such combat formations will:
   a. Have full command over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.
   b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.
   c. Account for resources assigned.

116. The combat formations will have responsibility to:
   a. Provide force generation over the short, medium and long-terms.
   b. Provide mission-ready integrated forces tailored for operations.
   c. Provide rapid reaction when ordered to do so.
   d. Come under operational command of the operational level headquarters when deployed.
   e. Enhance and optimise cooperation with other departments and agencies concerning both support to civil authority and promoting the developmental agenda of Government.

117. The building block for the South African Army’s deployable capability, provided from the combat formations, will be sustainable Combat Groups\(^{194}\). The deployable capability must be able to step-up to sustainable Brigade(s) over time.

118. To achieve the Defence Goals and Tasks, the South African Army will have an adequate footprint in each Province. By so doing, the collateral capability of the geographically dispersed army units will be positioned to contribute to the developmental agenda of Government.

**LANDWARD CAPABILITY**

119. The South African Army, as the major component of the joint landward capability, is required to remain robust and relevant within the evolving nature of warfare and spectrum of conflict. This implies that the South African Army must be balanced and technologically advanced, having enhanced manoeuvrability, firepower and lethality. It must be able to conduct and sustain operations over extended periods of time and over long distances. The South African Army will be competent in the physical, informational and psychological dimensions of warfare.

\(^{194}\) (1) Force specially composed for a specific task and of which the biggest element is not bigger than a unit. It can be so composed that it is logistically self-contained. (2) Tactical grouping consisting of armour and infantry based on the HQ of a unit; supported by the necessary support arms and services.
120. The future defence environment will be volatile, complex and rapidly changing, thus requiring the South African Army to execute operations either independently or multi-nationally, inclusive of other government departments and agencies. Interoperability will be a priority. The initial focus on interoperability with coalition partners will be on command and control capabilities, as well as doctrine.

121. The South African Army combat capability sets will include:

a. **Command, Control, Surveillance and Information.** A command, control, surveillance and information capability is required for the effective conduct of landward operations. The following capabilities are to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for landward operations. The South African Army command and control system will be embedded in the headquarter elements of Divisions, Brigades and Battalions with the requisite C4ISR. The deployable elements of the Divisions, Brigades and Battalions will provide the foundation for joint tactical command and control capacity to deployed South African Army forces.

b. **Intelligence.** Army Intelligence will provide the tactical intelligence picture regarding the enemy, terrain, population and other influences that allows for detailed tactical planning and the successful execution of operations.

c. **Signals.** Army Signals will provide information and communication systems and services. Capabilities will include tactical communication equipment, satellite communication systems, deployable local area network capabilities, maintenance and repair on signal equipment and electronic warfare capabilities.

d. **Artillery.** Artillery will provide effective fire support during landward operations. Artillery will consist of air-droppable, towed and self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and heavy mortars that can be applied in the indirect and/or direct fire roles.

e. **Air Defence Artillery.** Air Defence Artillery will protect deployed forces against enemy air attack, making use of guns, and missiles to counter air attack. Air defence artillery guns may also be used in the ground role.

f. **Infantry.** The Infantry will engage and destroy the enemy and hold captured ground. Infantry will use infantry combat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and light vehicles. Rapidly deployable Infantry will be airborne, air-landed and sea-landed. Other special Infantry may use motorcycles and horses.

g. **Armour.** Armoured units will penetrate enemy positions and destroy priority targets behind the enemy front line. Armoured combat vehicles consist of tanks, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and medium/light armour.

h. **Engineers.** Army Engineers will enhance own force mobility and impede opponent mobility. Other specialist skills will include construction, demolition, water purification, well drilling and the management of geographic information.

122. The following will be established in the South African Army:

a. A Land Command responsible for providing mission-ready forces.

c. A Support Command responsible for sustaining forces during peace, conflict and war.

FUTURE SA ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

123. The future South African Army combat capability will be contained in:

a. A **Mechanised Division** as the heavy war-fighting capability to prevent and deter conflict and to defend and protect South Africa.

b. A **Motorised Division**, a deliberately structured medium capability, complementing the mechanised forces, to safeguard South Africa, contribute to peace and security in the region and support the Police Service, civil authority and other organs of state and conduct constabulary operations.

c. A **Contingency Brigade**, which will provide a rapidly deployable capability, as well as the highly mobile elements to support the other formations. This brigade will be structured and equipped to support deep operations, rapid deployment and early entry operations.

ARMY MIGRATION PRIORITIES

124. In the interim, the South African Army will seek to consolidate its existing force structure within the context of a Land Command comprising two Divisions, notably:

a. A Motorised Division.

b. A Contingency Brigade.

c. An Armoured Brigade.

125. The above will be the initial building block towards the attainment of its future force structure as described earlier.

126. The consolidation of the existing capabilities and the development thereof towards the future force structure will be pursued in the following manner:

a. A steady and sustained consolidation of the mechanised elements of the South African Army, such as the mechanised infantry, artillery, air defence artillery and armour and building these towards an accelerated growth in the more medium term.

b. An accelerated initial growth path for the light and motorised forces, airborne forces, intelligence and engineer elements that are used mainly in the support of international commitments, border safeguarding and rapid reaction.

127. The practice of multi-rolling and multi-skilling of units and the raising of Reserves will continue as critical tools contributing to the South African Army’s ability to sustain its force provision obligations.
DIRECTING PRINCIPLES

128. The Chief of the Air Force, as a member of the military command, commands the Air Force and provides the capabilities for the air battle. As such, the Chief of the Air Force is the primary advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force on air warfare and concomitant contingencies. The South African Air Force will be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely AS1-AS9. (Figure 71)

![Air Force Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart]

Figure 71: Air Force Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart

129. In order to execute the Defence Mission and Goals and Tasks, the South African Air Force must have a balance of capabilities. These capabilities will be organised into coherent combat, combat support and combat service support formations consisting of Regulars and Reserves.

130. The combat capability of the South African Air Force will be organised under an Air Command with a Command Post\(^{195}\) to affect the full spectrum of command and control. The Air Command will have responsibility to:

- Provide force development, force support and force preparation.
- Provide force generation over the short, medium and long-terms.
- Provide mission-ready integrated forces tailored for operations.
- Provide rapid reaction when ordered to do so.
- Come under operational command of the operational level headquarters when deployed.

131. The building block of the South African Air Force combat capability will be Air Squadrons of mainly similar type airframes, supported by static or mobile Air Bases and Depots which provide

\(^{195}\) Structured to attach joint planning components as required.
both combat support and combat service support. Such Air Bases and Depots will:

a. Have full command over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.

b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.

c. Account for resources assigned.

132. The South African Air Force’s deployable capability may range from individually operated platforms to air wings and air squadrons, and will extend to mobile combat support and service support systems.

133. To achieve the Defence Goals and Tasks, the South African Air Force will use its collateral capability to contribute to the developmental agenda of Government.

AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY

134. The South African Air Force, as the major component of the joint Air Defence capability, is required to remain robust and relevant within the evolving nature of warfare and spectrum of conflict so as to achieve a favourable air situation thereby allowing freedom of movement for own forces in the air, on the land and at sea. This implies that the South African Air Force must be balanced and technologically advanced to meet the demands of the African battle space.

135. As such, the South African Air Force is required to provide a resilient integrated air defence function that delivers appropriate firepower, ensures defence mobility and enables the flow of defence information. This requires a diverse air defence capability, suited to varying operational environments, that is sufficiently agile and integrated to anticipate eventualities and react swiftly to contingencies. An effective air defence support capability is required to sustain deployments over time and distance. Reserves will be embedded in units, depots, squadrons and headquarters of the SA Air Force, as well as the utilisation of Reserves with their own aircraft.

136. The future demands of air operations will require:

a. Coordination of all air defence assets.

b. Balanced real time situational awareness to include target acquisition and battlefield assessment (C3I2RS) in a defined area of responsibility.

c. A modular, tactical and flexible force, deployable at short notice across the full spectrum of conflict.

d. A night operating capability in all weather and light conditions.

e. Participation in the information warfare environment.

137. The capability sets of the South African Air Force will include:

a. Command, Control, Surveillance and Information. A command, control, surveillance and information capability is required for the effective conduct of air operations. The following capabilities are to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for air defence operations over land and sea:
i. Integrated air situation awareness capability.

ii. Land-based Air Defence command and control capability.

iii. Joint airborne command and control capability.

iv. Maritime surveillance capability.

v. Tactical air reconnaissance capability.

vi. Tactical airfield capability with inherent support.

b. **Air Combat Capability.** An air combat capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of counter-air, air-to-ground and sea, surveillance and combat support over land, at sea and in the air. These are provided by:

i. An advanced multi-role fighter capability.

ii. A light fighter capability.

iii. An in-flight refuelling capability.

iv. A combat support helicopter capability.

c. **Military Air Transport**\(^{196}\). A military air transport capability\(^{197}\) is primarily required in the defence, protection and safeguarding of South Africa, to promote regional security and meet South Africa's treaty obligations in terms of maritime search and rescue. Diverse military air transport operations are conducted over land and at sea. The military air transport capability is further required to provide support to the Police Service and other civil authority, humanitarian relief operations, search and rescue operations and treaty obligations. The following military transport capabilities are to be provided:

i. Heavy fixed and rotary-wing cargo and troop transport capability.

ii. Medium fixed and rotary-wing cargo and troop transport capability.

iii. Light fixed and rotary-wing command and control capability.

d. **VIP Air Transport.** The VIP air transport capability is required to provide:

i. Presidential and Deputy Presidential intercontinental air transport capability;

ii. VIP intercontinental air transport capability; and

iii. VIP continental air transport capability.

\(^{196}\) Consideration must be given to standardising air transport platforms that can be multi-rolled.

\(^{197}\) Strategic projection will be at battalion level.
AIR FORCE MIGRATION PRIORITIES

138. In migrating towards the future Air Force force structure, priority emphasis must be given to:

a. Meeting the full requirements for VIP Air Transport.
b. Air capabilities required for the Safeguarding of South Africa, with specific attention to dedicated air capabilities required for border safeguarding.
c. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift in support of landward deployments, with specific attention to the air capabilities required for rapid reaction and Special Force operations.
d. Interception and interdiction and close air support for deployed forces.

SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

DIRECTING PRINCIPLES

139. The Chief of the Navy, as a member of the military command, commands the Navy and provides the capabilities for the sea battle. As such, the Chief of the Navy is the primary advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force on maritime warfare and concomitant contingencies. The South African Navy will be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely NS1-NS9 (Figure 72). In order to execute the Defence Mission and Goals and Tasks, the South African Navy must have a balance of capabilities. These capabilities will be organised into coherent combat, combat support and combat service support formations consisting of Regulars and Reserves.

Figure 72: Naval Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart

140. The combat capability of the South African Navy will be organised under a Maritime Command with a Command Post to affect the full spectrum of command and control. The Maritime Command will have responsibility to:

a. Provide force development, force support and force preparation.

198 Structured to attach joint planning components as required.
b. Provide force generation over the short, medium and long-terms.

c. Provide mission-ready integrated forces tailored for operations.

d. Provide rapid reaction when ordered to do so.

e. Come under operational command of the operational level headquarters when deployed.

141. The building block of the South African Navy combat capability will be Naval Squadrons of mainly similar vessels, supported by static or mobile Naval Bases and Depots which provide both combat support and combat service support. Such Naval Bases and Depots will:

   a. Have full command over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.

   b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.

   c. Account for resources assigned.

142. The South African Navy's deployable capability may range from individual platforms to maritime task forces.

143. To achieve the Defence Goals and Tasks, the South African Navy will use its collateral capability to contribute to the developmental agenda of Government.

MARITIME DEFENCE CAPABILITY

144. The South African Navy, as the major component of the joint Maritime Defence capability, is required to remain robust and relevant within the evolving nature of warfare and spectrum of conflict so as to protect and defend South Africa's maritime interests through concentric layers of maritime defence involving surface, sub-surface and air dimensions. The concentric layers are focussed on South Africa's ports, territorial waters, trade routes and marine resources.

145. This implies that the South African Navy must be balanced and technologically advanced to provide robust maritime defence capabilities. The SA Navy will be a versatile littoral maritime force with a credible deep ocean capability, having strategic reach and being capable of rapid response and sustaining protracted deployments.

146. The capability sets of the South African Navy will include:

   a. Command, Control, Surveillance and Information. A command, control, surveillance and information capability is required for the effective conduct of maritime operations. The following capabilities are to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for maritime defence operations:

      i. An integrated Maritime Domain Awareness\(^{199}\) capability.

      ii. Shore-based Maritime Defence command and control capability.

\(^{199}\) Maritime Domain Awareness is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the RSA or its forces.
iii. Joint seaborne command and control capability.

iv. Forward deployable base capability with inherent support.

b. **Surface Combat Capability.** A surface combat capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of defence against hostile air, surface and sub-surface threats. This capability is, furthermore, required to provide combat support to land forces and provide a sea-borne joint command and control capability. This capability will primarily be vested in Frigate type of vessels.

c. **Sub-Surface Combat Capability.** A sub-surface combat capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of defence against hostile surface and sub-surface threats and the gathering of strategic intelligence. This capability is, furthermore, required to provide combat support to land forces and will primarily be vested in submarines.

d. **Maritime Patrol Capability.** A maritime patrol capability is required to contribute to the defence and protection of South Africa, ensure territorial integrity and safeguard the EEZ and meet South Africa’s treaty obligations in terms of maritime search and rescue. This capability is further required to contribute to peace and security in the region, contribute to situational awareness and conduct constabulary operations through supporting the Police Service, civil authority and other organs of state. This capability will be vested in lightly armed inshore and offshore patrol vessels.

e. **Mine Warfare Capability.** A mine warfare capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of offensive and defensive mine laying and defensive mine countermeasures. Mine laying will be done from diverse platforms and the mine counter-measures capability will consist of portable systems using unmanned or remote controlled vehicles for mine detection and neutralisation.

f. **Strategic Force Projection Capability.** A strategic force projection capability at battalion level is required to deter threats, project strategic influence, promote regional and continental security and respond to disasters and humanitarian crises through both combat service support to the fleet and combat support to land forces. This capability will further provide for sea-based joint command and control and hospital services. This capability will be vested in a combination of combat support ships and landing platforms.

g. **Hydrographic Capability.** A hydrographic capability is required in support of the Fleet and to fulfil South Africa’s treaty obligation of hydrographic services to the maritime community. This capability will provide for surveying, meteorology, cartography and combat surveys. This capability will be vested in survey vessels and ashore hydrographic infrastructure.

h. **Maritime Reaction Capability.** A maritime reaction capability is required to provide combat support to the Fleet and other defence combat formations for the defence and protection of South Africa, to promote regional and continental security and support the Police Service and civil authority. This capability will provide for inshore and inland water patrols, operational diving, combat search and rescue and the protection of military assets ashore and in harbours and anchorages. This capability will be vested in
deployable small craft, clearance divers and protection force elements.

i. Naval Coordination and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS) Capability. A NCAGS capability is required to support the defence and protection of South Africa by the routing of merchant shipping through areas of least danger and the avoidance of enemy combatants in times of conflict.

NAVY MIGRATION PRIORITIES

147. In migrating towards the future South African Navy Force Structure, priority emphasis must be given to:

a. Maritime capabilities required for the Safeguarding of South Africa, with specific emphasis on Border Safeguarding and meeting the full requirements of the national maritime security strategy.

b. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift in support of landward deployments, with specific attention to the maritime capabilities required for rapid reaction and Special Force operations.

c. Hydrographic obligations of the Republic.

MILITARY HEALTH SUPPORT

DIRECTING PRINCIPLES

148. The Surgeon General, as a member of the military command, commands the Military Health Service and provides the capabilities for the medical operations. As such, the Surgeon General is the primary advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force on military health matters. The South African Military Health Service will be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely MS1-MS9 (Figure 73).

![Figure 73: Military Health Service Command and Staff Functional Flow Chart](image-url)
149. In order to execute the Defence Mission and Goals and tasks, the South African Military Health Service’s structures must be aligned with the structures of the combat services. Furthermore, it must have a balance of military medical capabilities. These capabilities will be provided through a Medical Command having three coherent Medical Brigades under command.

150. The characteristics of military health support to be provided by the Medical Command are:

- a. Flexible, stepped-up building blocks of military health support across the spectrum of operations.
- b. Sustained medical support, inclusive of emergency care and evacuation, for deployed landward, maritime, air defence and Special Forces.
- c. Layered hospitalisation addressing military unique injuries and health challenges.

151. The Medical Command will have the responsibility to:

- b. Provide force generation over the short, medium and long-terms.
- c. Provide mission-ready integrated forces tailored for operations.
- d. Provide rapid reaction when ordered to do so.
- e. Provide deployable specialised medical staff for special forces, aviation and maritime forces.
- f. Come under operational command of the operational level headquarters when deployed.

152. Medical Brigades, consisting of both Regulars and Reserves, will pursue the following “dual-mission” approach:

- a. **Force health protection (FHP)** to support deployed forces through the provision of deployable health services[^1] across the full spectrum of military operations. This achieved through deploying military medical capabilities with strategic reach in support of operations and may range from casualty management and evacuation for hospitalisation.
- b. **Force health sustainment (FHS)** to support the Defence Force, family members and other designated persons through comprehensive military health services delivered from primarily static capabilities.

153. The Military Health Service will focuses on preparing for its dual mission of force health protection through operational health and military skills and force health sustainment utilising mainly clinical skills.

154. The Medical Battalion Groups will have a deployable function for force health protection and a static function for force health sustainment. The deployable function will primarily be executed

[^1]: “Health” indicates the optimal health that can be expected of a customer, and “Military Community” indicating the scope, inclusive of members and dependants and other entities functioning as members of the defence community.
through detached Medical Task Groups whereas the static function will primarily be executed through base hospitals and sickbays.

155. Medical Battalion Groups will be so structured that provision is made for attaching joint planning components to its deployable capability, as required. Furthermore, the Medical Battalion Groups will:

a. Have full command over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.

b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.

c. Account for resources assigned.

156. The Level 4 hospital and specialised institutes will be attached to the Medical Command and the Level 3 hospitals to the Medical Brigades.

157. The Military Health Service will be interrelated with accredited training institutions in health training in the country to train own personnel in all relative clinical fields through a Faculty of Military Medicine affiliated to a university accommodating training in the main streams of military medicine.

158. To achieve the Defence Goals and Tasks, the South African Military Health Service will have an adequate footprint in each Province. By so doing, the collateral capability of the geographically dispersed military health units will be positioned to contribute to the developmental agenda of Government when so tasked.

**MILITARY HEALTH CAPABILITY**

159. The South African Military Health Service will prepare, provide and employ military health forces to joint and independent operations. Clinical services will provide both force health protection and force health sustainment. The South African Military Health Service must be able to conduct and sustain military medical support to operations over extended periods of time and over long distances.

160. The South African Military Health Service capability sets will include:

a. **Command and Control.** A medical command and control capability is required for the effective conduct of medical operations. These are provided through static and mobile capabilities. The operational command and control capability will reside in the Medical Command whereas the Brigades and Battalion Groups will provide tactical command and control.

b. **Health Intelligence Capability.** A health intelligence capability, including limited epidemiology, will provide tactical health intelligence to determine and coordinate the health support plan.

c. **Deployable Military Health Support Capability.**

i. The Medical Brigades and their deployable components are required to render support to division strength combat forces. Depending on the nature, size and
duration of an operation, sub elements of the Medical Brigade may be mobilised and deployed to support operations. These sub elements are:

(1) Medical Battalion Groups will support brigade strength combat forces with inherent capabilities to sustain task group functions.

(2) Medical Task Groups will support battalion strength combat forces and may be specialised in specific areas of operational support, such as airborne forces, maritime components or Special Forces.

(3) Medical Task Teams will support company strength combat forces.

ii. The following specialist capabilities may be embedded in the Medical Task Groups and Teams.

(1) Emergency Care Capability. Operational emergency care providing battlefield resuscitation, basic evacuation of casualties and first-line primary health care for treatment of minor ailments.

(2) Evacuation Capability. Specifically equipped evacuation teams manage the evacuation of casualties on land and by air and assist in maritime evacuations.

(3) Environmental Health Capability. A deployable environmental health capability is required to support deployed forces with environmental health aspects.

(4) Chemical, Biological and Radiation (CBR) Defence Capability. CBR defence capability to detect chemical, biological and radiation threats and to further treat contaminated personnel, casualties and vehicles.

(5) Animal Health. The capability renders support during operations for canine patrols and explosive detection. Animal health capabilities are also deployed in support of search and rescue operations to take care of search dogs.

iii. The deployable military health support capability must be able to provide the following levels of clinical care in a peace support operation:

(1) Level 1 Medical Post. This provides a lifesaving capability, stabilisation, primary and secondary health care and evacuation to the next level. A Level 1 Medical Post consists of resuscitation, surgical and minor ailment treatment capabilities.

(2) Level 2 Field Hospital. This capability provides triage, emergency resuscitation and stabilisation, surgery, second line health care, general specialist services (general surgery, anaesthesia, and orthopaedic surgery and specialist internal medicine services), pharmacy, basic laboratory facility, basic diagnostic capabilities, dental care, operational stress management, social work interventions, casualty evacuation to the next level and a preventative health service.
d. **Static Military Health Support Capability.** The static military health support capability will render health sustainment to forces while at base, their families and other eligible persons. This service is delivered through base orientated infrastructure.

i. **Sickbays and Military Medical Clinics.** Sickbays and military medical clinics are positioned within geographical concentrations of clients and render a primary health care service through various components of the multi-professional health team. These facilities are normally positioned within unit lines.

ii. **Palliative Care.** Palliative care is delivered through community orientated home-based care, supported by hospice capabilities.

iii. **Military Base Hospitals.** The military base hospital facilities provide a comprehensive primary and secondary health care capability in larger military basis with an admission and operating theatre capability. These can be configured as Level 3 hospitals in peace support operations. Level 3 hospitals are generally established at existing infrastructure, and include specialist diagnostic resources, specialist surgical and medical capabilities, ancillary health services, dentistry, psychology and social work.

iv. **Military Hospitals.** The military hospital facilities are positioned in specific geographical locations, based on the military footprint, to render a comprehensive hospitalisation service to patients. These capabilities are also utilised in support of operations. Military hospitals render secondary and tertiary levels of care including rehabilitation functions. These can be configured for Level 4 hospitals in peace support operations and normally comprise of specialist surgical and medical procedures, reconstruction, rehabilitation, convalescence, and psychological and social support.

v. **Specialised Institutes.** Specialised institutes render a specialist function in specific areas of military medicine through specialised capabilities and research.

161. The following will be established in the South African Military Health Service capability:

a. A Medical Command responsible for deployable military medical capabilities and for static military medical support in terms of tertiary health (hospitals and health institutes) and area military health capability.


c. A Support Command responsible for medical unique logistical requirements during peace, conflict and war.

**MILITARY HEALTH MIGRATION PRIORITIES**

162. In migrating towards the future South African Military Health Force Structure, priority emphasis must be given to the establishment of the Medical Brigades and their subordinate structures.
163. Special Forces are critical to prevent and deter conflict, defend and protect South Africa and to defend South Africa’s vital interest. The South African Special Forces provide the capabilities for special force operations and the commander is the primary advisor to the Chief of the Defence Force on special force operations. Special Forces shall be controlled at the highest level by the Chief of the Defence Force and the Minister of Defence. The Brigade Commander commands the Special Forces.

164. Special Forces shall be structured according to command and staff lines. The staff system supports the command line and will be organised according to the General Staff System, namely SF1-SF9 (Figure 74). Special Forces shall uniquely have a force preparation, force support and force employment capability.

165. In order to execute the Defence Mission and Goals and tasks, Special Forces must have a balance of capabilities. These capabilities shall be organised into coherent combat formations consisting of Regulars and Reserves.

166. The Special Forces linkage to the Contingency Brigade of the SA Army is reliant on joint planning and preparation for the various contingencies, interoperability and cross-training in selected fields. This also holds true for cooperation with the specialised elements in the other Services.

167. The building block of the Special Forces shall be a Special Force Brigade and Special Force Regiments with permanently assigned combat, combat support and combat service support elements under command. At all levels, provision must be made for attaching joint planning components as required.

168. The Special Force Capability shall:

   a. Have full command over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.
b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.

c. Account for resources assigned.

169. The Special Force Capability shall have responsibility to:

a. Provide force generation over the short, medium and long-terms.

b. Provide mission-ready integrated forces tailored for operations.

c. Provide rapid reaction when ordered to do so.

d. Come under operational command of the operational level headquarters when deployed.

SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITY

170. The Special Forces shall be organised as a Special Forces Brigade under command of the Chief of the Defence Force.

171. The Special Forces Brigade is required to remain robust and relevant within the evolving nature of warfare and spectrum of conflict. This implies that the Brigade must be balanced and technologically advanced and be able to conduct and sustain operations over extended periods of time and over long distances. The Special Forces Brigade will be competent in the physical, informational and psychological dimensions of warfare.

172. The Special Forces Brigade shall be employed as an enabler throughout the spectrum of operations. The Special Forces Brigade must be deployable in conjunction with the SAPS and with other Special Forces capabilities throughout the SADC region. The Brigade shall consequently have the responsibility to maintain a small but permanently ready force for the conduct of joint or autonomous operations, inclusive of urban warfare, counter-terror and non-combatant evacuation operation. The current capability will thus have to be expanded through the addition of an urban warfare and counter-terror capability.

173. The Special Forces Brigade will not be structured with their own inherent air, naval and support assets. Services and Divisions have a distinct responsibility towards ensuring the strategic capability of Special Forces through participation in Special Forces training and employment. Personnel and equipment provided in support of such training and operations must meet the rigorous criteria demanded in this specialist environment.

174. The following will be established in the Special Force Brigade:

a. Special Forces headquarters.

b. Air-borne, sea-borne & inland water, urban and anti-terror combat capability.

c. Special Forces training.

d. Special Forces support.
175. Related defence acquisitions pursued by other Services and Divisions should be supportive of Special Forces requirements. Included are heavy and medium fixed wing lift and air supply, heavy rotary wing lift and interoperability with naval assets.

176. Chief Staff Operations (CS3) (Directorate Special Forces) shall be responsible to:

   a. Provide the day-to-day staff work for the operational utilisation of the Special Forces.
   
   b. Integrate air, land and maritime Special Force requirements.

177. A unique approach to recruitment, training, termination of service and leadership development is required to ensure that the manpower resource is effectively managed. Conditions of service need to reflect these unique requirements. Given the sensitive nature of some of the tasks, the organisation must have an inherent capacity to look after itself in a high-risk environment. Its personnel need to conform to the highest level of security clearance.

SPECIAL FORCE MIGRATION PRIORITIES

178. In migrating to the future Special Forces Force Structure, priority emphasis must be placed on the reintroduction of the urban warfare and counter-terror capability.

LOGISTICS COMMAND

179. The Logistics Command, within the joint logistics policy and doctrine developed by Chief Staff Logistics (CS4), plans, coordinates and delivers joint logistic support to operations and exercises through the provision of common logistic services and is the competent authority for explosives and ordnance.

180. The Logistics Command supports all Defence Force domestic, regional, continental and international operations by planning and executing the delivery of national-level operational support for theatre activation, sustainment and termination of an operation, including combat service support functions. The Logistics Command must provide support to land, air and maritime combat forces over protracted periods of time, over extended distances, in diverse and complex theatres and along multiple lines of communication. This involves the supply of services, equipment, facilities, consumables, replacement of combat losses and non-combat attrition.

181. Combat services and staff divisions are responsible for their own unique 1st to 5th line sustainment to deployed forces and own specific operations.

182. The Logistics Command will manage:

   a. Defence estates.
   
   b. Environmental matters.
   
   c. Common logistic ICT systems.
   
   d. Common contracts.
   
   e. Common commodities.
CONSULTATIVE DRAFT

f. Common vehicles.
g. Common rations.
h. Common ammunition.
i. Common engineering and technical services.
j. Forward Movement Control.
k. Fuel, petrol, oil and lubricants.
l. Logistic codification.
m. Disposal of Category II items.

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (ICS) COMMAND

183. The Information and Communications Systems Command, within the joint communications policy and doctrine developed by Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems (CS6), provides common information and communications support transversely across the Defence Force. Combat services and staff divisions are responsible for their own unique information and communication systems support from the 1st to the 5th line.

184. The Information and Communications Systems Command is the communication systems and information integrator for the Defence Force across both common and universal/transverse systems and will provide the operational management of defence information systems through the objectives listed hereunder. This may occur at both Level 3 and Level 4 of the organisation.

a. Information as a Strategic Resource. At the operational level, the Command will manage defence information as a strategic resource through the following objectives:

i. Information Resource Management.

ii. Operational control of records and content management services.

iii. Integration of defence information requirements.

iv. Defence information liaison services.

v. Improved utilisation of defence information.

vi. The management of defence information projects and the provision of defence information enablers (systems).

vii. Defence information system contract management services.
b. **Spectrum Management Services.** At the operational level, the Command is responsible for the defence spectrum management system, and by so doing manages defence:
   
i. Spectrum assignments.

ii. Radio frequency assignments.

iii. Radio site facilities.

c. **Information and Communication Infrastructure Product Systems.** At the operational level, the Command is responsible for the provision of the following information and communication infrastructure services:
   
i. Infrastructure technical support services and requirements.

ii. Infrastructure Projects.

iii. Call cost management technical support services.

iv. Central server technical support services.

v. Distributed voice and video computing technical support services.

vi. Carrier infrastructure technical support services.

d. **Information Systems capability.** At the operational level, the Command is responsible for the management of joint information systems through:
   
i. Support of common defence information applications.

ii. Continuous improvement of defence information systems competency.

iii. Sustained defence information systems performance.

e. **Information System Security.** At the operational level, the Command is responsible for information system security support services through the provision of information system security:
   
i. Operational planning and support.

ii. System renewal.

iii. Performance control.

f. **Information Warfare.** At the operational level, the Command is responsible for Information warfare support services:
   
i. Operational planning and support.

ii. Performance control.
g. Defence Communication Security. At the operational level, the Command has the responsibility to enable secure defence communications through the evaluation, provision and maintenance of cryptographic:

i. Sites.

ii. Technical support services.

iii. Operator training.

iv. Procedures and processes.

h. Defence Archival Services. At the operational level, the Command is responsible for the provision and assurance of:

i. Archived defence information.

ii. Specialised logistics support to archives.

iii. Secure preservation of defence correspondence records, multi-media and personnel records.

TRAINING COMMAND

185. The Training Command, under command of the Chief of the Defence Force, is responsible for military education and joint formative training and development of personnel. This is done within the context of the policy and doctrine developed by Chief Staff Personnel (CS1). The major institutions for this requirement are:

a. Military Academy.

b. Defence College.

c. War College.

d. Peace Mission Training Centre.

e. College for Education and Training (COLET).

186. Such Training Command will:

a. Have full control over necessary resources cascaded to the lowest level possible.

b. Have all necessary financial and procurement delegations cascaded to the lowest level possible.

c. Account for resources assigned.

187. The Training system is discussed more fully in Chapter 11 as a critical short-term intervention.
188. The Defence Force requires an appropriate balance between the following personnel components.
   a. Regulars.
   b. Reserves.
   c. Civilian staff
   d. Auxiliary members.

189. Chief Staff Personnel will develop and introduce personnel systems enabling execution at the lowest possible level and that provide for:
   a. The separate augmentation of the Reserves and the Regulars with appropriately trained young military professionals.
   b. Loyal, disciplined and patriotic junior leaders.
   c. Direct appointment of qualified professionals and scarce skills.

190. Chief Staff Personnel will provide the Chief of the Defence Force with sound human resource management systems and practices that will ensure mission-ready human resources. Chief Staff Personnel will further provide policy direction for the:
   a. Decentralised marketing, recruitment, selection and appointment of personnel.
   b. Continuous education, training and development of all serving members and employees.
   c. Development of appropriate conditions of service and service benefits.
   d. Development of remunerative and non-remunerative initiatives to acquire and retain defined scarce skills.

191. Chief Staff Personnel will provide functional personnel service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

192. The Reserves will be maintained at a sufficient level to provide the expansion ability for operations. Thus the capacity of the Reserves, especially in the SA Army, will continue to be developed at a robust pace. This will include increased recruitment, training and utilisation of the Reserves.

193. The Reserves will further provide scarce professional skills in the health, engineering, planning, legal and religious environments, amongst others. The University Reserve Training Programme will be used to source quality junior leaders and access scarce skills for Defence.
194. Gender mainstreaming, as well as broad-based representation at all levels, will remain an objective. Equally, the utilisation of disabled uniformed personnel in suitable posts and the appointment of persons with disabilities in civilian posts will also be a priority.

CS2 – INTELLIGENCE

195. The Defence Force requires intelligence and counter-intelligence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Defence Intelligence is required to provide shared situational awareness at the strategic and operational levels\(^\text{200}\) whilst the tactical level of intelligence will remain with the combat services.

196. Chief Staff Intelligence will execute the functions specified in Section 2(4) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 1994 (Act 39 of 1994).

197. Chief Staff Intelligence must provide vital intelligence products and services and is responsible for:

   a. The collection of information overtly, covertly\(^\text{201}\), electronically and by means of strategic and operational sensors.

   b. The processing and the integration of strategic, operational, geospatial and technological information.

   c. The timely dissemination of intelligence.

   d. Counter-intelligence to protect of own assets and personnel.

   e. Defence Intelligence cooperation and liaison with the domestic intelligence community and the defence intelligence services of the SADC and further abroad.

198. In support of the Defence Diplomacy Strategy and the international objectives of government, Intelligence will manage the:


   b. Relations with the resident Military Attaché Corps.

   c. Provision of consular and protocol services.

   d. Development and maintenance of country profiles.

199. Major trends and decisive shifts in the security environment may allow time for the adjustment of defence capabilities, but specific events may occur unexpectedly. Intelligence must be provided proactively, affording decision-makers at all levels of command the fullest possible understanding of all threats and opportunities and the complete battle space.

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\(^{200}\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002): Section 34.

\(^{201}\) In accordance with the National Strategic Intelligence Act (Act 39 of 1994), only Defence Intelligence shall conduct covert collection of information for Defence.
200. Chief Staff Intelligence will centrally manage counter-intelligence in the DOD. This will be done by being more vigilant and enforcing the security of personnel, information and materiel and combat own actions that can endanger security. Technologically supported security vetting will be used to ensure that DOD personnel are cleared to work with the level of security that is required for their posts.

201. Chief Staff Intelligence will publish a Defence Intelligence Estimate (DIE) every five years to explain strategic threat patterns and trends. In the years between, a Defence Intelligence Annual Assessment (DIAA) will cover current intelligence developments.

202. Chief Staff Intelligence will provide functional intelligence training for all combat services and staff divisions.

**CS3 - OPERATIONS**

203. Chief Staff Operations will provide the staff capacity by which the Chief of the Defence Force can:

   a. Determine the approved philosophy, doctrine and concepts of the Defence Force.
   b. Issue Joint Warfare Publications.
   c. Determine the Command and Control system for the Defence Force and specify the communications system architecture requirements.
   d. Provide an annual Joint Force Employment Strategy that indicates the forces to be earmarked and prepared for employment within the Medium Term Expenditure Framework.
   e. Provide long-term force generation direction.
   f. Prepare general directives and instruction on the conduct of operations.
   g. Understand and respond to “lessons learnt” from operations conducted.

204. Chief Staff Operations will compile the Defence Doctrinal Manual outlining the operational level principles required to plan and conduct operations through the full spectrum of possible conflict. The Defence Doctrine Manual will be the Defence Force’s keystone doctrine document. Doctrine will be assessed on a continuous basis in the context of the changing nature of conflict and related technological developments.

205. The Defence Force will be put into service within the prescripts of the Constitution, the Defence Act and international law regulating the use of force. Operations will provide the Chief of the Defence Force with the capacity to direct the employment of the Defence Force by means of:

   a. Liaising with multi-lateral organisations, international and domestic stakeholders and the three tiers of government.
   b. Conducting high-level joint operational planning.
c. Issuing operational directives to the Permanent Operations Headquarters, combat services and combat support services concerning operations and joint and combined force preparation.

206. Chief Staff Operations will be the Chief of the Defence Force’s staff authority to direct, orchestrate and control the execution of defence diplomacy policy, strategy and initiatives as may be required by the Minister. Execution may occur at all levels across the Defence Force. The responsibilities of Chief Staff Operations may extend to:

a. Pursuing set multi-lateral security objectives and initiatives.

b. Establishing and maintaining country cooperation plans.

c. The high-level coordination of the following actions together with the relevant executing authority:

i. Defence responsibilities vis a vis global, continental and regional security organisations.

ii. Establishing necessary legal instruments related to the deployment of the force.

iii. Formal international engagements and meetings, such as Defence Committees and Staff Talks.

iv. Training exchanges, both incoming and outgoing.

v. Defence personnel exchanges.

vi. Secondment of defence personnel to foreign organisations.

vii. Combined military exercises and observer exchanges.

viii. Marketing support to the South African defence industry.

d. Guidelines directing the deployment of South African forces vis a vis:

i. General military assistance missions.

ii. International humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

iii. Security Sector Reform initiatives, within the wider framework of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development.

iv. Mandated multilateral peace mission.

v. Interventions under grave circumstances.
207. Chief Staff Logistics will provide the staff capacity whereby the Chief of the Defence Force can:

   a. Determine the defence logistics philosophy and doctrine.
   b. Determine logistics policy, instructions and technical publications.
   c. Determine supporting logistic ICT systems.
   d. Establish and maintain the Defence Asset Register.
   e. Direct equipment life-cycles.
   f. Setting binding rules and standards for the provision of services.
   g. Direct logistic accounting.
   h. Establish, manage and maintain Defence Facilities.
   i. Prescribe ordnance standards.
   j. Determine Military Standards.
   k. Provide item codification.

208. Chief Staff Logistics will further provide the staff capacity for Chief of the Defence Force to:

   a. Prescribe the level of reserve stocks to be maintained during peace time to combat operations. This will include:

      i. Strategic Reserves required for mobilisation.
      ii. Operational Reserves for foreseeable operational contingencies.
      iii. Tactical Reserves for operational and combat support units.

   b. Direct the pre-positioning of sustainment at identified land and sea positions.

   c. Determine static installations to support day-to-day activities and operations and the defence storage and distribution network.

   d. Prescribe policy direction to:

      i. Joint Logistic Command.
      ii. Defence Works Formation.
209. Chief Staff Logistics will provide functional logistic service training for all combat service and staff divisions.

CS5 – PLANNING

210. Chief Staff Planning will provide the staff capacity by which the Chief of the Defence Force can set strategic direction through the establishment of outcomes, outputs and targets and which enable planning and the allocation of resources. To this end, Chief Staff Planning is responsible for the management of the Defence Strategy and Planning Process and by so doing determines:

a. Annual Strategic Environmental Analysis. An annual disciplined military reasoning process to assess the strategic environment for purposes of informing both strategy and planning.

b. Defence Strategy.

i. The Defence Strategy, by which the Defence Force implements the National Security Strategy, the Defence Mission and Defence Strategic Goals.

ii. Concurrent detailed strategy direction (short, medium, long and extended-long term) for programme and sub-programme owners to translate the Defence Strategy into functional strategies and plans. These will be consolidated into three categories, namely:

(1) Capability strategies for the combat services.

(2) defence resource strategies, namely human resources, Matériel, information and finance.

(3) The defence capital strategy, and the translation thereof into the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan and the Defence Industry Cooperative Plan.

c. Defence Capabilities. Planning is the Chief of the Defence Force's staff authority on the capabilities required to meet defence objectives, desired operational outcomes and effects. Defence Capabilities are made up of force elements (ships, aircraft, combat forces and other force enablers) with associated personnel, training, equipment, logistics, information, infrastructure, concepts, doctrine and organisation. This will be expressed formally as the Chief of the Defence Force's Force Design.

d. Defence Programmes. Planning is the Chief of the Defence Force's authority to set the Defence Programme and Sub-Programme architecture.

e. Defence Planning. Planning is required to:

i. Direct, orchestrate and control the annual defence planning process, which will in turn support the delivery of the Defence Strategy by articulating the strategic outcomes required and allocating outputs and targets to programme and sub-programme owners (Figure 75). This is achieved through annual planning
guidelines that inform the next annual planning process.

ii. Construct the Defence Plan in three parts:

(1) A Long Term\textsuperscript{202}/Extended Long Term\textsuperscript{203} Defence Plan.

(2) A five-year Defence Plan.

(3) An Annual Defence Performance Plan.

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\textsuperscript{202} Long term is a 10 year horizon.
\textsuperscript{203} Extended Long Term is a 20 year horizon and beyond.
iii. Manage enterprise and strategic risks and compile and execute appropriate risk mitigation strategies and plans.


g. **Performance Reporting.** Performance reporting will be achieved through:

i. A quarterly performance and risk report showing progress in implementing the outcomes, outputs and targets set out in the Defence Plan.

ii. An annual audited report of the performance of programmes and sub-programmes against the Defence Plan.

h. **Cluster Management.** Planning will establish and maintain a DG level Cluster Management system for timeous and relevant defence reports and policy inputs to the cluster system. Planning will ensure:

i. Appropriate Defence representation and participation in the DG Cluster system in accordance with Government objectives.

ii. Timeous Defence responses and quality positions.

iii. The defence agenda is driven in the clusters.

iv. Coherence on security matters in the Cluster.

v. Defence decision makers are kept updated on cluster activities.

vi. The integration of government priorities into defence strategic planning.

i. **Defence Structure Management.** Planning will ensure the establishment and the maintenance of an effective defence structure management service that directs enterprise business processes and structures that are supportive to the implementation of the Defence Strategy.

   i. Planning will:

   1. Determine the policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine for structure management throughout the Defence Force in a manner that provides for rapid and responsible structure alignment as required.

   2. Ensure the establishment and regular updating of a Defence Macro-Structure as approved by the Minister.

   3. Ensure the appropriate delegation of structure management practices to the combat services and staff divisions, with concomitant composite guidelines and restrictions.

   4. Ensure quality control of structure management practices.
ii. Combat services and staff divisions will have own capacity to administer own structures within the context of given delegation, policy, guidelines and restrictions.

211. Chief Staff Planning will provide functional planning training for all combat services and staff divisions.

CS6
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (ICS)

212. The Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems (ICS) (CS6) is the Defence Information Technology Officer responsible for Information and Communication Systems (ICS) related governance, risk and compliance and is the Chief of the Defence Force’s staff authority to determine policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine for:

a. Computing and communications technology.

b. Enterprise management systems.

c. Network enabled command and control systems.

d. Defensive and offensive information warfare.

213. Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems will provide the strategic direction required for the acquisition, development, implementation, sustainment and disposal of information and communication technologies and will consequently direct:

a. An integrated defence enterprise information system and a robust information and enhanced telecommunications infrastructure that will support military command and control and defence administration both domestically and internationally.

b. The migration from the existing defence logistic, personnel and financial systems to an integrated defence resource system that complies with reporting requirements.

c. The development of the information warfare capability to support landward, air and maritime defence for both defensive and offensive information warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum, network information spectrum and human domains to achieve the following objectives:

i. To defend and protect defence information, communication systems and the defence information infrastructure and processes to enhance its information superiority.

ii. To disrupt, destroy, deny and exploit the information and communication assets and processes of the Opposing Force to enhance own information superiority.

iii. To deter any potential information onslaught against Defence.

d. The Defence Force contribution to protect government systems, national infrastructure and business systems (Information Warfare).
214. Combat services and staff divisions are responsible for own unique information and communication technology service delivery, maintenance and disposal portion of the life-cycle management process.

215. Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems will further:
   a. Provide the policy for defence registries, whilst the staff divisions and combat services will maintain own registries.
   b. Warehouse and archive physical and electronic defence information.
   c. Provide functional ICS service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

216. Chief Staff Training is the Chief of the Defence Force’s staff authority to determine policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine for:
   a. Learning pathways for officers and non commissioned officers.
   b. Joint developmental training and education.
   c. Assessment standards and practices.

217. Chief Staff Training is responsible to develop training compatible with defence doctrine that will best serve the future needs of the Defence Force. This will include directing:
   a. Induction, continuation and collective training programmes and syllabi.
   b. Electronic simulation systems for collective training.
   c. Infrastructure and resources requirements for collective training.

218. Chief Staff Training will contribute to the Defence Diplomacy Strategy by:
   a. Accessing international learning opportunities.
   b. Coordinating the provision of training opportunities to international partners.

219. Chief Staff Training will exercise functional oversight and control over the Training Command.
220. Chief Staff Finance is the Chief of the Defence Force’s staff authority to determine policy on:
   a. Financial Administration.
   b. Budget Control.
   c. Expenditure Control.
   d. Internal Audit.

221. Defence budget management services and financial administration services will be cascaded under command to the lowest possible level of command.

222. Chief Staff Finance is responsible to ensure that the Defence Force operates within the broader framework of public expenditure planning, control and accountability. Defence Finance is responsible to monitor and control defence expenditure and ensure that it remains within the administrative controls set by the National Treasury and the legal limits set by Parliament.

223. Chief Staff Finance is the staff capacity to assist the Chief of the Defence Force to account to Parliament on financial performance. In this regard, Defence Finance is responsible for:
   a. Financial guidelines to the annual planning process.
   b. Financial delegations to the lowest possible level of command.
   c. Consolidating the budget, expenditure and cash flow plans of the Defence Force.

224. Chief Staff Finance will provide functional finance service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

225. Chief Specialist Staff is the Chief of the Defence Force’s staff authority for the collective management of a number of organisations that deliver specialist services at the corporate level. These include:
   b. Adjutant General.
c. Stakeholder Relations.

d. Defence Reserves.

e. Chaplaincy Services.


a. The Provost Marshal General will:

i. Be the professional head of the defence police function, supported by an appropriate staff to determine the policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine for military policing.

ii. Provide functional military police training for all combat services.

iii. Provide a centralised Defence CID service, falling directly under the Provost Marshall General, with powers to carry out duties irrespective of rank and service and being staffed by promotion from the uniformed military police of the three services.

iv. Provide centralised VIP and VVIP close protection.

v. Provide policy, doctrine and training oversight for the close protection teams of the three combat services.

b. Combat services will:

i. Provide own specialised military policing capabilities, services and support, including Regiment Police if applicable.

ii. The military police, air force police and naval police, will remain under the command of their respective service with powers of disciplinary authority and arrest over the members of other services and the supporting services and divisions whom they may encounter in the act of committing a disciplinary or criminal offence.

iii. Provide the deployable elements of the Military Police, giving specific attention to building deployable capacity concerning:

   (1) Military police services.

   (2) Convoy management.

   (3) Management of refugees and displaced persons.

   (4) Management of Prisoners of War.

227. Adjutant General.

a. The Adjutant General will:
i. Provide legal advice, operational law support, manage litigation and manage the defence legislative framework.

ii. Provide functional legal service training for all combat services and staff divisions.

b. The Adjutant General will provide the military discipline and justice system and concomitant capabilities for:

i. Military Court Administration.

ii. Military Judges.

iii. Military Court Prosecution Services.

iv. Military Court Defence Services.

228. Defence Communications.

a. The following key principles will apply:

i. Defence communications' key task is to contribute to the shaping of the strategic defence environment through:

   (1) Publicly promoting the professional image of the Defence Force.

   (2) Engaging key defence stakeholders in pursuit of defence objectives.

   (3) Providing operational level communication support.

ii. The Minister of Defence will give ministerial-level direction informing defence communications, and will retain own communication specialists.

iii. The head of defence communications will be a uniformed member from a combat branch with appropriate corporate communications training and experience.

iv. Defence communication will remain a command responsibility at all levels.

v. Communication will be a critical consideration in all defence activities and a specific factor to be considered in all operational planning.

vi. Defence communication will be executed in a decentralised manner, to the level appropriate, in accordance with centralised direction.

vii. Defence communication support will be planned and executed from the 5th to the 1st line of support.

viii. Communication capabilities will be organic to the unit level, including a deployable capability.

b. The head of defence communications will, at the corporate level:
i. Determine the policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine for defence communications.

ii. Provide specific direction to:
   (1) The doctrine and guidelines for defence communication support during operational deployments across the spectrum of military operations.
   (2) The integration of defence communications with:
       (a) Psychological Operations.
       (b) CIMIC activities.

iii. Determine the development of a defence communication strategy.

iv. Coordinate defence communication with the GCIS and other governmental entities.

v. Coordinate the building of relationships between the Defence Force and its internal and external stakeholders to foster understanding on the role and functions of Defence.

vi. Coordinate defence communication within the cluster system.

vii. Conduct stakeholder relations at the corporate level for the Defence Force through:
    (1) Media Liaison Services.
    (2) Electronic Communication Services.
    (3) Community Relations Services.
    (4) Corporate Visits and Events.
    (5) Defence Shows and Exhibitions.
    (6) Publications and Documentation.
    (7) Corporate Information Services.

viii. Establish, manage and facilitate a pool of accredited defence correspondents.

ix. Establish a protocol with the South African Forum of Editors concerning defence correspondents accompanying deployed South African forces.

c. Combat services will provide own defence communication capabilities, services and support and provide the deployable communication capability.

d. The future defence communications strategy will:
i. Go beyond the mere provision of public information to develop and maintain relationships with stakeholders to promote the broader role which defence plays in and beyond the mainstream South African security environment.

ii. Be proactive, future orientated, technologically advanced and in-time.

iii. Direct a high impact, coordinated advocacy campaign to raise the level of understanding on defence issues.

e. In support of the Defence Diplomacy Strategy and the international objectives of government, defence communications will manage all matters related to incoming and outgoing foreign visits.

f. Defence communications will provide functional defence communication training for all combat services.

229. Defence Reserves Direction. The Chief Director Defence Reserves will:

a. Direct the renewal of the Reserves on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force.

b. Provide specialist advice and consult to the Chief of the Defence Force including his or her staff on all Reserve matters.

c. Provide strategic direction within the Defence Force on the development and maintenance of a viable Reserve Service System.

d. Determine policy, philosophy, concepts and doctrine regarding the maintenance and utilisation of Reserves in order that the Reserve Component is able to:

i. Augment the Regulars in ongoing operations and activities of the Defence Force.

ii. Form part of both the standing and surge military capability and inherent force design.

iii. Provide the expansion capability of the Defence Force for major combat operations and crises.

iv. Provide certain specialist and scarce skills to the Defence Force.

v. Provide the main capabilities for Reconstruction and development.

vi. Enhance the relationship between the Defence Force and the public and private sectors.

e. Monitor the implementation of Reserve Component policy, strategy, philosophy and concepts.

f. Make proposals in respect of priorities and the allocation of resources to the Reserve Component to achieve the Defence Force strategy.

g. Make proposals on any changes required to legislation and regulation to enable an effective Reserve Service System.
h. Maintain relations with the Reserves of international Defence Forces, as well as other international Reserve organisations.

i. Establish and maintain regional employer liaison structures for the purpose of ensuring employment opportunities for Reserves.

j. Promote and market the Reserves and the Reserve Service System to stakeholders.


a. The Chaplain Service will represent all faith groups in the Defence Force and provide advice on and give spiritual, moral and social support to all members.

b. The four Religious Advisory Boards (Christian; Hindu; Jewish; Muslim) advise the DOD on the establishment or update of religious polices, act as an oversight mechanism on the adherence thereof and provide or second appropriate clergy to serve as Chaplains in the DOD.

c. The Chaplaincy Service will also continue to address urgent social issues by running programmes of moral regeneration, reconciliation and healing and the combat of HIV/AIDS through spiritual and ethical conduct.

d. These programmes will not only be run within the Defence Force, but are also made available to other government departments, schools, NGOs, religious bodies and SADC countries.

KEY DEFENCE MANAGEMENT FORA

231. Various Defence Command and Management Bodies will be constituted to administer policy decisions, commands, orders and directives. These are the following:

a. Council on Defence. The Council on Defence will be the Statutory Council by which the Minister executes the functions conferred.

b. Secretariat Council. The Secretariat Council will be the body through which the Secretary for Defence coordinates support to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.

c. Military Council. The Military Council will be the statutory council through which the Chief of the Defence Force coordinates the command of the combat services. Critical to the defence value chain, the Chief of the Defence Force considers and oversees readiness and, in particular, the preparation, employment and support of military operations.

d. Military Staff Council. The Military Staff Council will be the statutory council through which staff coordination and planning takes place regarding policies, strategies, plans, programmes and budgets. The Military Staff Council responds to strategic objectives, including the alignment of defence capabilities with the Defence Strategy.
e. **Service Command Councils.** Service Command Councils will be the bodies through which Service Chiefs execute (direct and control) their mandates.

f. **Staff Councils.** Staff Councils are constituted to consider recommendations emanating from staff work at the appropriate level and to apply or collate such recommendations for administration purposes or as advice to the appropriate council(s), respectively.
1. The rapidly changing strategic environment requires Defence to constantly adapt to new demands. This requires a balanced military force that can execute its function in pursuit of national security in the most efficient and effective way possible, across the spectrum of the defence mission, strategic tasks and strategic goals. Flexibility thus becomes an imperative.

2. The Defence design, structure, profile and footprint are critical for establishing affordability and therefore sustainability. The execution of the defence function is achieved through the integration of the force design, the supporting capabilities vested in the force structure, resources and efficient business processes. This integration is managed by the staff system and enabled by an integrated ICT system with a business process architecture tailored to defence needs.

3. At the highest level these functions are directed, orchestrated and controlled by the respective Chiefs of Staff Divisions. Units, across the different levels, must be structured for the required support capabilities necessary for the successful attainment of the respective task. The functional resource areas and the impact of transverse resource systems are depicted in the cross impact matrix below (Figure 76).

4. Whilst the cross impact matrix depicts the transverse relationship between design, structure and functionality, the core business processes of defence are depicted in Figure 77 below.
5. Defence’s legacy information systems no longer support the business efficiently and are becoming unaffordable to operate and sustain. This results in the majority of funding available being directed to the operating and sustaining of these legacy systems and therefore insufficient funding available for renewal and investment of new solutions.

6. The first primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is therefore the establishment of an integrated management system to drive both defence administration and defence command and control. To this end an ‘integrated defence enterprise system’ will be established as the backbone information system for end-to-end defence business processes.

7. The pursuit of an integrated defence enterprise system will be a matter of utmost priority, as it is against this crucible that effective defence management will take place. This defence enterprise system will replace the disjointed legacy defence information systems and will provide automated, real-time, end-to-end defence management - supporting both defence administration (blue network) and military command and control (red network).

8. The National Treasury programme, Integrated Financial Management System, will have a major impact on the replacement of the current legacy defence corporate systems and will imply that Defence will have to develop the unique functionalities to conduct those elements of its business which are not included in the integrated financial management system. The implementation of the National Treasury's integrated financial management system implies that Defence will be utilising
transverse information systems.

INTEGRATED DEFENCE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM

9. The integrated defence enterprise system and ‘general defence network’ (blue network) will be established as the foundation for all defence business processes and activities, including adding and reusing information functionality as it becomes available (Figure 78 below).

Figure 78: Next Generation Enterprise Architecture

10. The integrated defence enterprise system means the complete spectrum of:

   a. Establishing agile and dynamic policy on systems, software and standards, with cascading directives and delegations. This must be based on best-practices policy standards across the technology platform and may require Defence to obtain cutting edge decision-support services during this process.

   b. Collaboratively building the enterprise system, by establishing in parallel the following dimensions:

      i. Business processes across the resource areas.
ii. The communication and network infrastructure.

iii. Granular security.

c. Establishing web-based business systems that enhance functionality and end-to-end values chain in all resource areas.

d. Establishing resource services processes in all functional areas.

e. Ongoing enhancement of the platform through new business processes, services and functionality.

11. The enterprise system must integrate and optimise all defence information system requirements and serve as a basis for ensuring standardisation, compatibility, connectivity and interoperability.

12. Proven systems are in service in some Defence Forces across the world and which have already been adapted for unique military use. An option is to procure such a proven Military-off-the-Shelf (MOTS) enterprise system where the development and adaption costs have already been borne by other parties and which has already been tailored for both military use and modern compliance, accounting and reporting standards. A Military-off-the-Shelf enterprise system must be able to interface with government information systems, yet provide modular security for defence information.

13. The priority milestones in this process will include:

a. Migration from mainframe to web-based services. Such web-based services may by necessity not necessarily be internet connected.

b. Enhanced personal connectivity for defence members.

c. Revolutionised office automation.

d. Institution of information systems training at all levels of the Defence Force.

e. Data cleanup of all legacy functional systems by functional owners.

f. Data integrity determination by functional owners.

g. Staggered migration of personnel, logistic, finance and procurement systems to the 'integrated IT management system'.

h. Archiving of data.

14. The characteristics of the defence enterprise system will include:

a. The enablement of combat service support through automated, tracked, in-transit visible, real-time information which is integrated with various resource system databases and networks.

b. The defence enterprise system must be:

i. Driven by core defence force doctrine and functional area doctrine.
ii. Granular secure and accessible.

iii. Compliant with defence regulatory framework standards.

iv. Integrated across all resource areas.

v. Deployable at all locations of defence activity.

vi. Operational to the lowest functional level in the field, performing over limited bandwidth and non-persistent network infrastructure, or even independently at remote locations.

vii. Complete business-to-business system integration with information at the 5th line of support, industry standard information systems and other defence information management systems.

viii. Enabling of data integrity and cleanup of disparate information.

ix. Enabling of accountability and reporting across all levels and functions.

x. Enabling of organisational auditability and set standards.

xi. Enabling of compliance with standards.

xii. Enabling of aggregated business intelligence.

xiii. Contribution to organisational performance management and organisational reporting.

xiv. Contributes to early warning and risk aversion.

c. The defence enterprise system must be able to adapt to rapidly changing business process architecture, data and technology with minimal delay and cost, and without requiring changes in the information system platform and software.

15. As a general principle, the cost and effort for the “defence enterprise will be structured as follows:

a. Infrastructure and Implementation: 40%

b. Data Cleanup, Data Integrity and Data Migration: 30%

c. Training and Operator Effectiveness: 30%

DEFENCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

16. The ability to Command and Control is critical to the effective execution of the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks. The diversity of military tasks performed by different combat, combat support and other supporting elements of Defence requires both single service and joint command and control capabilities.
17. Military command and control will be driven by the concept of “Network Enabled Command and Control” through standardised new generation digital communication equipment capable of transferring all types of data on the battlefield, thus facilitating network-enabled operations and improved situation awareness.

18. The command and control network (red network) will be a sub set of the defence enterprise network (blue network) within the ‘next generation technology platform’, supported by enhanced granular security. This network will prioritise reliance and reliability.

PERSONAL CONNECTIVITY OF DEFENCE MEMBERS

19. Interconnectivity between members and employees, independent of the place of work and from remote locations, is crucial for both effective command and control and management in the workplace. To this end, web-based connectivity between members and employees at appropriate levels in the organisation must be enhanced. The defence enterprise system must thus provide integrated workplace electronic connectivity enabling real time communication between members responsible for the command and management of the organisation.

DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

REQUIREMENT

20. The second primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the establishment of a comprehensive Defence Service Commission reporting to Parliament to undertake the functions as envisaged by section 196 of the 1996 Constitution specifically for defence personnel.\(^\text{204}\)

21. The unique nature of military service means that soldiers have some of their civil rights limited or constrained to the extent that is justifiable in a democratic society.

"Although a soldier becomes subject to the military system, he does not cease to be a citizen and his rights, as a citizen, remains relevant, albeit in amended form." \(^\text{205}\)

22. The rigor of military service requires that a specific dispensation be established for the oversight and the management of defence service conditions, the management of grievances and ensuring the promotion of civil rights within the constraints of the military milieu. Government recognizes this requirement and posits a covenant that advances its commitment to its soldiers in lieu of the sacrifices that they make.

23. This will occur in two-phases, namely:

a. **Phase 1:** The Defence Service Commission will have immediate jurisdiction over the Regular and Reserve Components of the Defence Force and any Auxiliary Service that may be established.

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204 Defence personnel is meant inclusive of Regulars, Reserves, the civilian component of the Defence Force and any member of an Auxiliary Service that may be established in terms of Section 16 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002).

b. **Phase 2:** A specific dispensation will be established for the Civilian Component and such civilian members will in due course fall under the jurisdiction of the Defence Act.

### MANDATE OF THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

24. A Defence Service Commission will be established, separate from the Public Service Commission as contemplated in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, for Regular, Reserve, Civilian and Auxiliary members employed in Defence, ultimately within one dispensation under the Defence Act (2002). The Commission will:

   a. Perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.

   b. Be competent to promote the constitutionally enshrined democratic principles and values of public service within a defence context by monitoring, investigating, evaluating and reporting on the personnel administration within the Defence Force.

   c. Promote a professional and ethical defence environment that is accountable, equitable, efficient, effective, corruption free and responsive to the needs of the people of South Africa.

25. The Defence Service Commission will be an independent commission appointed by the Minister and will report on its activities to Parliament. The Commission will serve as an impartial advisory third party on matters related to defence personnel administration and service conditions, acting independently and impartially of the military chain-of-command, and will not interfere with the chain of military command.

### FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

26. The Defence Service Commission mandate will include oversight and recommendations over defence service systems with respect to the following functions:

   a. Promote the constitutionally and statutory prescribed values, principles, standards and measures governing defence administration.

   b. Promote the protection of the public interest in defence administration matters.

   c. Oversee, develop and maintain the conditions of service for all defence members.

   d. Recommend to Parliament improvements in the conditions of service and fringe benefits of defence members.

   e. Investigate, monitor and evaluate the defence organisational, administrative and personnel practices.

   f. Advise Parliament on the implementation of any policy or regulation and any non-compliance with such policy or regulation.

   g. Propose measures to ensure effective and efficient defence performance.
h. Provide directives aimed at ensuring that defence personnel procedures relating to recruitment, transfers, promotions, and dismissals comply with the constitutionally prescribed values and principles.

i. Advise Parliament regarding:

i. Defence personnel practices, including those relating to the recruitment, appointment, transfer, discharge and other aspects of the careers of defence members.

ii. Programs to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of defence personnel management.

27. In addition to the above, the Defence Service Commission will:

a. Confer, from time-to-time and as the need arises, with the Public Service Commission and the Intelligence Service Commission.\(^{207}\)

b. Evaluate any conflict of interest that may come to its attention and make recommendations on its remedy to Parliament.

28. The Defence Service Commission may establish provincial structures to assist it in the performance of its duties.

29. The Defence Service Commission may, on request of the Minister:

a. Evaluate the performance agreements of all defence senior management service personnel in the Defence Force, Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence. The Commission will advise the Minister on the quality and reasonableness such performance agreements.

b. Evaluate the annual performance assessment of all top-level budget holders and report such findings to the Minister.

c. Evaluate the defence financial disclosure framework for senior defence members for matters of propriety and advise the Minister accordingly.

30. The Defence Service Commission will provide in its structure the capacity to direct defence personnel administration in respect of:


b. Fostering civil rights for defence members and ethical conduct.

c. Undertaking defence administration investigations.

d. Monitoring and evaluating service delivery by defence personnel systems.

e. Directing and conducting civic education programmes at defence establishments.

f. Maintaining necessary databases.

\(^{207}\) Established in terms of Section 22 of the Intelligence Services Act (Act 65 of 2002).
g. Provide corporate services.

MANDATORY REPORTS OF THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

31. Before the end of each financial year, the Defence Service Commission will provide Parliament with:

   a. An annual Defence Personnel Review.
   b. An annual Salary and Benefit Review.
   c. An annual evaluation of the extent to which the constitutionally and statutory prescribed values and principles are complied with.
   d. An annual report in respect of the Commission’s activities and its functions, including any finding made or any directions and advice it may have given.

SUPPORT TO THE DEFENCE SERVICE COMMISSION

32. The Minister of Defence, the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force must provide the Commission with assistance as may be reasonably required.

33. The Defence Service Commission will:

   a. Have right of access for any record, person or unit as may be required to perform the duties of the Commission.
   b. Be funded through a transfer payment from the defence budget.
   c. Account for such transfer payment through the Chairperson of the Commission who will be the accounting authority for the Commission.

AMENDMENT OF LEGISLATION

34. The Defence Amendment Act, Act 22 of 2010, providing for a Defence Force Service Commission in terms of Section 6, will be expanded to provide for the mandate and functions listed here above, including the Defence Service Commission's responsibilities to Parliament.

35. With the Defence Service Commission assuming the responsibility to protect the rights of defence members; Section 50 (4) (industrial action) and Section 50(6) (collective representation and bargaining) of the Defence Act (Act 42 of 2002) will be amended to limit such activities in their entirety. Defence members will not be free to enjoy peaceful and unarmed assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition, nor will they be free to join and participate in the activities of trade unions and other organisations.
36. The third primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the establishment of the Office of the Defence Ombud reporting to the Minister of Defence and who is competent to investigate complaints and ensure that such complaints are resolved in a fair, economical and expeditious manner. The President must appoint the Defence Ombud and the Deputy Defence Ombud. The work of the Defence Ombud must promote the observance of the fundamental rights of defence members.

**FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENCE OMBUD**

37. The Office of the Defence Ombud will be competent to:

a. Investigate complaints by defence members and members of the public.

b. Undertake investigations at the request of the Minister.

c. Either on own accord or on receipt of any complaint:
   
   i. Investigate grievances of defence members concerning official acts or omissions of the Defence Force, and recommend appropriate remedies.
   
   ii. On complaints of financial misconduct, undertake forensic audits or investigations.

   d. Ensure that complaints emanating internally and externally to Defence are investigated and resolved in a fair, economical and expeditious manner.

   e. Resolve any dispute by means of mediation, conciliation or negotiations or in any other expedient manner.

   f. Have right of access to any record, person or unit as may be required to perform the duties of the Defence Ombud.

   g. Summon any person to submit an affidavit or affirmed declaration or to appear before him or her to give evidence or produce any document that has a bearing on the matter before the Ombud.

38. In addition to the above, the Office of the Defence Ombud will:

a. Confer, from time-to-time and as the need arises, with the Public Protector concerning any matter related to the duties of the Defence Ombud.

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209 Military Ombudsman Bill, 2011, (Bill 09 of 2011): Section 5(1) and 5(2).

210 Defence personnel is meant inclusive of Regulars, Reserves, the civilian component of the Defence Force and any member of an Auxiliary Service that may be established in terms of Section 16 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002).

211 Established in terms of Section 182(1) of the Constitution, 1996.
b. Ensure that complaints emanating internally and externally to the Defence Force are investigated and resolved in a fair, economical and expeditious manner.

c. Have right of access for any record, person or unit as may be required to perform the duties of the Defence Ombud.

d. Maintain an anti-corruption hotline on defence matters.

e. Maintain necessary databases for complaints.

f. Evaluate any conflict of interest that may come to its attention and make recommendations on its remedy to Parliament.

39. The Defence Ombud may not investigate a complaint unless the Defence Ombud:

   a. Has in writing informed every other interested party to the complaint of the receipt thereof;

   b. Is satisfied that all interested parties have been provided with such particulars that will enable the parties to respond to the complaint.

   c. Has afforded all interested parties the opportunity to submit a response to the complaint.

40. After investigating a complaint, the Defence Ombuds must:

   a. Confirm or dismiss the complaint, or issue an alternative resolution.

   b. Recommend an alternative resolution.

   c. Refer the complainant to the appropriate public institution for finalisation, if the matter falls outside his or her jurisdiction.

41. If the Defence Ombud confirms the complaint, the Defence Ombud must order Defence to comply with the determination or his or her alternative resolution within the period determined by the Ombudsman.

42. The Defence Ombud must immediately after finalisation of the investigation, and in writing, advise the complainant and any other affected person of the outcome of the investigation.

43. The Defence Ombud will provide in its structure the capacity to:

   a. Evaluation and resolution of grievance and complaints by defence members or the public.

   b. Undertaking grievance investigations on defence administration matters.

   c. Maintaining necessary databases.

   d. Provide corporate services for the Office of the Defence Ombud.
44. Before the end of each financial year, the Ombud will provide the Minister with an annual report in respect of the activities and its functions of the Defence Ombud, including any finding made or any directions and advice it may have given.

**SUPPORT TO THE DEFENCE OMBUD**

45. The Minister of Defence, the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force must provide the Defence Ombud with assistance as may be reasonably required.

46. The Office of the Defence Ombud will be funded through a transfer payment from the defence budget. The Defence Ombudsman will be the accounting authority for the Office of the Defence Ombud.

**MILITARY LEADERSHIP**

**REQUIREMENT**

47. The fourth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the pursuit of excellent military leadership. Leadership challenges of the 21st century require knowledge, skills and attitude coupled to an intellectual capacity that can cope with volatile, ambiguous and uncertain environments. The complexities, inherent to the operating environment, require the military to transform its leadership paradigms and adapt mechanisms that will give military leadership the competitive edge.

48. Leadership is intangible and ultimately the effect of the integration of a number of traits within individuals centred on the “what” the leader should be, know and do. Dynamic, visionary and transformational leadership, underpinned with knowledge, skill and attitude, is the foundation for successful leaders in the Defence Force. To this end, defence leaders will be subject to intensive education, training and development programs.

49. Leadership within the Defence Force is embodied in its Officer, Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officers Corps.

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS**

50. The Officer Corps is the collective commissioned leadership of the military, without which the armed forces cannot function to any effect, and without which a military force will certainly not develop to meet new and evolving challenges. The Officer Corps must, therefore, have a comprehensive and sound education, comprehensive and up-to-date training, and the experience to enable it to meet new challenges effectively as they arise and evolve.

**CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICER CORPS**

51. The education, training and development of the Officer Corps must be structured to provide competent officers, who can either command forces under both conflict and peacetime conditions or provide professional staff support to such commanders. Officer corps education, training and development must thus be structured to capacitate officers to perform the following core functions:

   a. To command and lead all persons placed under authority.
b. To plan and command operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

c. To develop strategies, doctrines and concepts on assessment of the prevailing strategic, operational and tactical situations.

d. To develop force structure, force design and equipment requirements.

e. To develop, implement and oversee education and training programmes.

f. To develop, implement and exercise control over administrative, personnel, logistic and technical support systems.

g. To be the custodians of the profession of arms.

52. The education, training and development of the officer must, therefore, prepare the officer to be able to perform these functions effectively under circumstance of extreme stress and danger.

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE OFFICER CORPS

53. The Officer Corps must first and foremost be military professionals, and must receive the focused education, training, service development and experience that will enable effective and efficient functionality at various leadership positions. The officer must be provided the opportunity and the ability to expand and hone professional skills throughout the officer’s career.

54. Career paths must be planned to deliberately endow officers with the correct education, training and service experience necessary to be able to command at all levels, inclusive of international security structures.

55. The fundamentals of soldiering and officership, military administration and military law must be taught as part of the basic officer training. An officer must attend a series of formative courses, coupled to the functional and battle-handling courses of the particular corps. Such series will comprise:

a. Junior Officer Formative Education, Training and Development.

b. Junior Command, Warfare and Staff Course.

c. Senior Command, Warfare and Staff Course.

d. Joint Strategic Studies Course.

TRAINING, EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED OF THE OFFICER

56. In order for an officer to progress to senior appointment in the Defence Force a broad understanding of the various elements of own service and the other services, and a wider insight into the military profession as a whole, is required. Education and training will provide only a part of that. The remainder must come from balanced experience gained throughout his/her career, covering, as an illustrative example:
a. Basic military leadership\textsuperscript{212}.

b. Command at the sub-unit, unit and formation level.

c. Operational staff assignments at unit, formation and headquarters levels.

d. Training and education duties at unit, corps school and Service level.

e. Appointments to posts in joint structures.

f. Attachments to foreign armed forces, including course attendance and attaché duty.

g. Postings at various levels in international/multilateral forces.

57. The career planning system must ensure that officers obtain sufficient broad experience and specialisation before the rank of colonel/Naval captain.

FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING

58. Officers will be required to read for post-graduate qualifications and contribute to professional journals. Officers must possess a post graduate qualification for appointment as general and flag officers.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARRANT OFFICER AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER CORPS

59. The Warrant Officer (WO) Corps forms the ‘backbone’ with the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps forming the ‘skeleton’ of the Defence Force. It is these bodies of tough and experienced WOs and NCOs who train soldiers, airmen and sailors and provide their officers with combat ready combatants with which to execute missions. They also ensure that forces remain functioning during combat.

CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

60. The WO and NCO Corps must be properly educated and trained for their role and be given opportunities to develop. The focus of WO and NCO training must be on both warfare and support, but with a concentration on the skills required for combat operations.

61. The core functions of the WO and NCO Corps are:

a. Lead soldiers in combat.

b. Form the instructor corps for the training of recruits and have specific responsibility for inducting them into military life and inculcating soldiering skills.

c. Form the instructor corps for functional training.

d. Maintain and regulate discipline within their units.

e. Monitor the welfare of the soldiers in their units, and ensure remedial action when required.

\textsuperscript{212} Platoon Level.
f. Ensure efficient running of the unit routine and its administrative, facility and technical infrastructure.

g. Assist their officers in developing combat, administrative and technical procedures.

h. Identify soldiers who have the potential for technical specialisations, or to be developed as NCOs, or to be considered for officer selection.

i. Assist their officers in developing education and training systems.

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

62. The value of the WO and NCO arises from the experience built up over many years of service. WOs and senior NCOs have more experience than most junior officers with whom they will work. Senior NCO skills are developed over time and founded in practical application. It is this body of experience that makes the senior WO or NCO an invaluable asset to the Defence Force.

63. The technical specialists of the WO and NCO corps carry the responsibility for ensuring that the assigned equipment is properly maintained and serviceable for use when required, while the administrative specialists carry the responsibility for the effective and efficient running of the unit, and particularly for ensuring that the personnel, logistic and financial systems are implemented correctly and function effectively.

64. The combat WO and NCO corps are in many respects the military craftsmen, skilled in the craft of individual and small group combat tactics, in leadership and in the combat aspects of the particular branch of the Service. The WO and NCO corps must receive the focused education, training and service experience that will enable them to function effectively and efficiently in various posts and to expand and hone skills throughout the course of their career.

65. WO and NCO corps education, training and Service experience must be planned to provide:

a. An outstanding understanding of people under stress, the skills to lead and manage them and the ability to instil discipline based on mutual respect and individual self-respect.

b. The ability to teach, train and enthuse, trainees.

c. The basic skills of soldiering, a thorough understanding of the relevant weapons and equipment, their maintenance and the ability to use them to optimal effect.

d. A sound grasp of battle drills, and the ability to execute them under conditions of extreme stress.

e. The tact to work effectively and cordially with junior officers who are often far less experienced but nonetheless bear command responsibility.

TRAINING, EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

66. Although courses convey specific skills, good WOs and NCOs are primarily created by service experience that imbues knowledge, wisdom and judgement. The WO and NCO career planning system must ensure that their career progression allows for the widest possible experience at every level of appointment. WO and NCOs are required to spend sufficient time in each rank group in
order to develop a depth of experience. This exposure may extend to:

a. An ordinary soldier in the smallest element of the branch of the service.
b. A junior leader.
c. An instructor under training.
d. A specialist or supervisory instructor.
e. A senior NCO.
f. A WO who directly supports his/her commanding officer.

**WO AND NCO CORPS CAREER PATH**

67. The Defence Force must develop a career path for WOs and NCOs. The foundation of this career path must be a rank structure that provides sufficient rank levels and visible progression accompanying performance and seniority that ensures a satisfying career.

**FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

68. In addition to the courses that WOs and NCOs are required to undergo during their career, they will also be afforded the opportunity to further their military and general education.

**THE RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ‘ONE FORCE’**

**REQUIREMENT**

69. The fifth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the assurance of a viable, cohesive and sustainable Reserve Component able to provide additional capacity to the Defence Force as and when required. The Reserves\(^{213}\) as contemplated in the Defence Act\(^{214}\) will be maintained as a national strategic asset and therefore remain essential for enhancing South African national security. The Reserve Component, as a force for good in the community, effectively representing both Defence and Society, will enhance the Clausewitzian trinity between Government, Defence and the People.

70. The Reserve Component will be an integral element of the ‘One Force’ and will be optimised to deliver assured capabilities for all internal and external military goals and tasks. The Reserve Component will also harness the widest pool of societal talent for Defence and will uphold a volunteer ethos. It will be sustained by formal governance mechanisms and safeguards and be appropriately and equitably resourced.

71. The ‘One Force Concept’ seeks to ensure that Defence is supported by the most sustainable, effective, integrated and affordable balance of Regular military personnel, Reserve military personnel, civilians and auxiliary service personnel.

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\(^{213}\) To be distinguished from reserve stocks
72. The Reserve will provide a cost effective mechanism for capacitating the Defence Force for operational surges, protracted operations and major combat operations as well as providing specialist and scarce skills not normally found in Defence. These may include *inter alia* the command and management of Defence, information technology and cyber specialists, health services, engineering, planning, legal and religious mustings. The Reserve Component will therefore be organised, staffed, equipped, trained and maintained at an appropriate level of combat readiness.

73. The Reserve Component will be structured, maintained and resourced to be able to:

a. Augment the Regulars in ongoing operations and activities of the Defence Force.

b. Form part of both the standing and surge military force design.

c. Provide the expansion capability of the Defence Force for major combat operations and crisis response.

d. Provide certain specialist and scarce skills to the Defence Force.

e. Provide the main specialist capabilities for Reconstruction and development.

f. Enhance the relationship between the Defence Force and the public and private sectors.

74. Reserves will serve at all levels of command and management. To this end, thirty percent of active funded staff posts at all levels in headquarter structures will be dedicated for Reserves to rotate through.

75. Membership of the Reserve Component will be voluntary and open to all South African citizens irrespective of race, gender, language, culture or religion provided that they meet the physical, psychological, intellectual and vetting standards of the Defence Force.

**RESERVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

76. The Defence Force will develop an appropriate Reserve Service System that is viable and functional within the context of a developing South Africa that has a relatively high unemployment rate. The Reserve Component is unlikely to deviate from this contextual reflection for the foreseeable future and will be predominantly made up of members who are otherwise unemployed. A change to this dynamic is only expected to develop over the long term and will be closely related to the expansion of the South African economy.

77. The development of the Reserve Service System will therefore take into account the social and economic realities of South Africa coupled to the organisational requirements of Defence. The Reserve Service System will be based on an understanding that there will, in all probability, always be a large junior component of the Reserve that will be unemployed in the private sector. To this end, recognition will be given to the following two broad component categories:

a. **Junior Reserve Members.** This category presents Defence with an opportunity to establish a cost effective guaranteed deployable capacity without growing the Regulars. Logically this component will contribute to the ongoing activities and operations of Defence and be in a position to provide the required force levels and capacity requirements for protracted periods. Augmentation of the Regulars and being part of the Standing Force are typically the roles that would be practically assigned to this Component. Due to their availability, members may be utilised on a semi-permanent
basis which will create stability in the system and provide the required capacities for operations whilst providing a measure of ‘security of tenure’ for the individual. Extended use of these members must be linked to funded alternative vocational training opportunities with a view to obtaining full time civilian employment.

b. Senior Reserve Members. This category, by its nature will have greater restrictions with regard to availability. Providing the expansion capability of the Defence Force for major combat operations, providing specialist skills and enhancing the relationship between Defence and employers and the community are practical roles that can be assigned to this component. Members in this Component, other than those with specialist and scarce skills that may be required for extended periods, would otherwise be utilised, during peace time, on a part-time basis to fulfil the needs of the organisation. The law provides for the extended use of Reserves during times of need or war.

78. The Reserve Service System will be formalised as specific business sub-programmes, on Defence and Service levels, with funding linked to specific outcomes. These outcomes are to be quantified into measurable targets for each Service and be reflected in the performance agreements of Commanders.

79. The Reserve Component will be quantified by means of establishment tables and a post structure will be reflected on the Defence structure management system that will enable costing and resource allocations in accordance with readiness requirements. Furthermore, a policy will be formulated to direct the Reserve Component staffing levels within each post. The command element however, due to delegations, may only have one incumbent per post whereas other posts may have numerous incumbents.

80. Planning for the Reserve Component as a capability will be embedded within the strategic management programs of the Services. The Reserve capability will thus be integral to the design and structure of the Services as well as their development trajectories.

81. The Reserve Service System will continue to be enhanced to ensure that the requirements of Defence are met. Special focus will be given to the feeder system for the Reserves, the leader element of the Reserves, continuation training and increasing utilisation levels and the retention of Reserve members.

82. Whilst the Reserves are part of the ‘One Force’ together with the Regulars, their management and development will be approached and tailored with an understanding of their unique and specific requirements. In the final outcome however, the Reserves will conform in every respect to a professional military force capable of complex war fighting alongside their Regular counterparts.

RESERVES TYPES

83. The Reserve Component will be made up of the following types of members.

a. Active Reserve. The Active Reserve being the list of individuals who are considered current and available and as such continue to be trained and utilised according to organisational requirements. These members are actively managed as part of the Reserve personnel list and are utilised for training, operations and any other tasks as may be required.
b. **Short Term Contracted Reserve.** The Short Term Contracted Reserve members being the members who are scheduled for utilisation for periods longer than 180 days per calendar year and up to 3 years continuous for specific circumstances. This utilisation may be for extended training and operational deployments or for projects. These contracts are reviewed annually and renewal is based on organisational requirements and individual performance. These members are drawn from the Active Reserve.

c. **Corps of Specialists.** The Corps of Specialists being the list of individuals who avail themselves for service by providing specialist and scarce skills to the Defence Force. These members are assigned to specialist posts or musters and their skills may either be military or non-military in nature. These members are utilised throughout the Defence Force in accordance with organisational requirements. These members are to be utilised as and when required by Defence in preference over the utilisation of external consultants.

d. **The University Reserve Training Programme (URTP).** The URTP being the members who are recruited from tertiary education institutions and undergoing military training for future appointment as leaders in the Reserve or Regular Components of the Defence Force.

e. **National Reserve.** The National Reserve being the list of individuals on the National Archive reflected as members who have been trained but are no longer available for utilisation. There is no management or planning consideration given to these members after transfer to this list, only the maintenance of the data base.

### RESERVE PERSONNEL FEEDER PROGRAMS

84. The Reserve Component will be provided through or sourced from the following areas:

a. **A separate dedicated initial military intake stream for the Reserves in accordance with Service requirements.** Recruitment is decentralised and done by Reserve Units or Management Centres and is based on the individual’s motivation and passion and not on just seeking employment. Selection is centralised and in accordance with Service specific profile requirements.

b. **Focussed direct recruitment by Units or Reserve Training and Management Centres according to Service requirements.** This will include individuals who participated in Service specific Youth Development Programmes. These members are trained and developed on a decentralised basis at the Reserve Management and Training Centres or nodal points under the auspices of the Service Training Centres of Excellence that ensure training outcome standards.

c. **Tertiary training and education institutions.** The University Reserve Training Program (URTP) conducted by Services according to their specific requirements provides members and leaders with professional and or technical skills to Defence.

d. **Members from the former forces (statutory and non-statutory forces) who volunteer to serve in the Reserves.

e. **Former National Defence Force Regulars who leave and volunteer to serve in the Reserves.**
f. Professionally qualified specialists who volunteer to serve in the Reserves.

RESERVE TRAINING

85. The training outcomes required by the overarching Defence Human Resource Development Strategy will remain relevant equally to the Reserve and Regular Components however the methodology used in achieving the same will be adapted.

86. Centralised and decentralised, residential and non-residential blended learning methodology options are to be provided. Developmental training of individuals must be structured and presented in a manner that addresses Reserve unique aspects.

87. Continuation training and the maintenance of combat readiness must be structured around Service readiness priorities and requirements. This training may be integrated with Regular continuation training where appropriate.

88. The leader-group will be provided and developed from the following components:
   a. The dedicated Reserve intake stream 2nd year members.
   b. Selection from existing members of Units who have the right attributes.
   c. URTP members.
   d. Members leaving the Regulars and joining the Reserves.

RESERVE COMPONENT SIZE

89. The Reserve will be organised to provide the following capacity:
   a. As a principle, Reserves will provide capacity to the command and management structures of the Ministry and the Defence Force so as to enhance the command and management capabilities and capacity of the Defence Organisation. To this end, Reserves will be provided with continuous opportunities to be rotated through middle and senior management positions and to work alongside their Regular counterparts.
   b. Certain capabilities within the Defence organisation, particularly those that are technical in nature, may require a mix of both Regulars and Reserves as an optimum model to enhance functionality. To this end Reserves and Regulars will be integrated to constitute the capability.
   c. Reserves may also be constituted as fully fledged stand alone design or structure elements under command of a higher order single Service or joint headquarters.

90. The relative size of the Reserve Force remains dependant on the strategic situation but, none the less, must be able to:
   a. Provide for the structure and capacity to rapidly expand the Defence Force in times of need.
   b. Meet the force level forecast for internal and external operations.
c. Meet the required development trajectory capacity requirements for the Service force designs and structures.

d. Meet capacity forecast requirements for operations and other tasks and activities within Defence.

e. Provide the specialist and scarce skill capacity requirements of the Defence Force.

91. In the SA Army, the ratio will be determined by force design and force structure requirements. The SA Army will provide for the application of Reserves in command and management positions throughout its organisation and build a pool of specialists according to its requirements.

92. The SA Air Force will continue to develop its Reserve Squadrons and pursue an integrated approach to the staffing of its conventional capabilities. The SA Air Force will provide for the application of Reserves in command and management positions and build a pool of technical and professional specialists according to its requirements.

93. The SA Navy will continue to make posts available for Reserves on naval vessels as well as in headquarters and other structures. The SA Navy will build a pool of technical and professional specialists according to its requirements.

94. The SAMHS will build its Reserves as part of the deployable capability that supports other Services in operations. SAMHS will build a pool of health professionals that can deploy as well as capacitate base oriented health services, in both urban and remote areas, as well as provide capacity to replace the Regulars when they are deployed. Reserves will also serve in headquarter command and management positions.

95. Furthermore, extensive use will be made of Reserves in all staff divisions on all levels of the Defence Force.

96. The growth trajectory planning of the Reserve Component of the Defence Force must be mindful of the ability to utilise them constructively. Reserves by enlarge want to make a contribution and want to serve, so extended periods of non-utilisation are a de-motivator and often lead to the loss of the individual to the organisation.

SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND JOB PLACEMENT

97. Measures will be taken to involve business and state entities to assist young Reserves with employment opportunities. The incentivisation for employers to make employees available for service in the Reserves requires further development. To this end, Defence Provincial Liaison Councils will be established in each Province of South Africa where Defence, Business, Organised Labour, Education and Academia, State Departments and the Provincial Executive further the support for Reserve service.

98. Vocational skills development in collaboration with the Sector Training Authorities (SETAs) and job placement of the members will be an ongoing activity and will be decentralised to Service level with outsourcing contracts awarded to reputable companies that specialise in these services.

99. Services will endeavour to coordinate and facilitate the re-skilling of Reserve members with vocational skills for the purpose of obtaining civilian employment. Vocational skills development and job placement of Reserve members over time must be planned for and will be subject to the following considerations;
Skills development programmes will be mainly provided and funded by the private sector and in collaboration with the relevant SETAs. Services will enter into agreements with training providers in conjunction with the SETAs to achieve this end.

Job placement services will be subject to agreements placed at Service level preferably with independent resettlement agencies through a public private partnership (PPP).

Job placement activities will be supported by the Defence Provincial Liaison Councils that are managed by the Chief of Defence Reserves.

Job placement coordination will be decentralised to Service Reserve Training and Management Centres or nodal points.

The Reserve Component footprint and location will be realigned and expanded within each Service in accordance with long term development plans. The strategic location of Reserve Units will enhance the ability of the Defence Force to execute defence tasks in remote areas.

Reserve Units will be spread throughout South Africa so as to enable access to Reserve service by citizens in both urban and rural areas. Reserve units will also provide a platform for the Defence Force to contribute to ordered developmental tasks.

Specialist skills vested in the Reserves will be applied, as ordered, to the developmental needs of urban, peri-urban and rural communities both internally as well as to external post-conflict reconstruction and development operations.

Reserve Unit names will be reviewed in accordance with Service approved options. In particular, names that are anachronistic or those that refer to previous descriptions of geographical areas will be changed.

Additional supporting legislation to enhance the Reserve Service System, including an update of the Moratorium Act, legislation that protects members from discrimination by employers and legislation that enables employer benefits for supporting Reserve service, will be reviewed and amended, developed and promulgated.

Service benefits to Reserves may be extended to include, for example, and subject to further investigation:

- Education benefits and the ability to study at state expense or through a defence bursary system.
- Funeral benefits.
- The introduction of a compulsory pro rata contribution to a provident fund.
- Permanent access to military medical care.
106. Individual performance assessments and the incentives and disincentives that go with them will be made equitable between Reserves and Regulars.

RESERVE MANAGEMENT

107. Additional management considerations will include the following:

a. All Personnel policies and procedures including the Personnel Management Code (PMC) will be reviewed and updated. Personnel management capabilities and functions must address the capacity to administer the Reserve Component.

b. Reserve Units and Training and Management Centres will have a Regular Component personnel functionary staffed to provide personnel management functions.

c. Career management and learning pathways must be applied with consequence.

d. Transformation in terms of gender and demographic representivity in the leader-group will receive focussed attention and accelerated career progression will be applied to talented members until such time as the required balance has been achieved.

e. Logistics functions, support and procurement will be reviewed to remove apparent obstacles peculiar to Reserve Units. Support bases will accommodate Reserve Unit requirements particularly for after hours training. A Regular Component logistician will be staffed at Reserve units to ensure processes and procedures are correctly executed.

f. All Reserve units will have an Adjutant on the post establishment table, with assigned military disciplinary delegations.

g. Military health services to Reserve members must be enhanced. The military medical service will ensure a capability to enable health assessments of Reserves.

h. Reserve service will be categorised and developed in alignment with the Reserve Service System and the Defence Force requirements. There will be different call-up regimes with differing obligations and benefits.

i. A guaranteed minimum call-up, for members who are unemployed in the private sector, with utilisation in accordance with Service training and operational commitments will create stability in the system.

j. Reserve members may be utilised for extended periods of up to three years based on organisational requirements and the individual’s availability. An annually reviewable short term contract system to simplify extended utilisation of available members will be introduced and implemented. This will provide the necessary guaranteed force levels over the short and medium term without having to expand the Regular Component.

k. The call-up of specialist individuals for projects extending beyond 180 days must be linked to skills transfer to ensure the creation of additional capacity.

l. Consistency must be established with respect to call-ups and be based on a fair distribution of the individuals benefiting.
m. A resilience program must be introduced in order to prepare Reserve members and their families for extended operational deployments. This will include the maintenance of contact with the families throughout the deployments as well as the reintegration after deployment.

108. The Reserve Component will be maintained as a fully functional system that is utilised to sustain excellence in defence.

DEFENCE TRAINING

REQUIREMENT

109. The sixth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is to be directed at formative training, functional training and tertiary education within the Defence Force. This as future defence leaders will require a high level of education and training if they are to succeed in future complex military environments. The envisaged Joint Training Command under the functional direction of Chief Staff Training will be responsible to operationalise these imperatives. Once implemented, academic achievement will be incentivised, recognised and acknowledged in individual career progression.

UNDERPINNING TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

110. Formative Training. Formative training is provided by both the Services and by the institutions of the envisaged Joint Training Command and is equally applicable to both Regulars and Reserves. The division of this responsibility will be:

a. Services
   i. Induction training for new officer cadets. On recruitment into the Defence Force all members initially selected for possible future appointment as officers undergo Service specific basic training and induction. At the end of 12 months those having the necessary attributes and potential are then sent to the Military Academy to attend the Junior Officers’ Cadet Formative Training programme.

   ii. Junior Command and Staff Training.

   iii. Senior Command and Staff Training.

   iv. Junior and Senior NCO Formative Training.

b. Joint Training Command
   i. Junior Officers Cadet Formative Training. This programme will be presented by the Military Academy. It is to be attended by officer cadets selected by the Services and runs for a period of twelve months. The aim of this programme is to develop the cadets through the presentation of foundation military studies, inclusive of civic education, to a level where they can on successful completion of the programme be commissioned as 2nd Lt/ Ensigns within the Defence Force.

   ii. Junior and Senior Joint Warfare Training.
iii. Strategic Studies.

iv. WOs formative training.

v. Tertiary education for officers, WO and Senior NCOs.

111. **Functional Training.** Functional training is the preserve of the Services and/or other Staff Divisions that may have specific functional training requirements.

112. **Tertiary Education.** Tertiary education will be of both a general and a specialist nature. This education will be provided as follows:

a. The envisaged Joint Training Command will have responsibility for the coordination and administration of general (non-vocation specific education in the humanities, commerce and sciences) tertiary education. Such education is to be provided by external tertiary educational institutions contracted to the Defence Force.

b. Services will be responsible for ensuring that their members receive vocational tertiary education specific to their service or division. Such education which may include medical, engineering and other advanced fields is to be provided by external tertiary educational institutions contracted to the Defence Force.

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**DEFENCE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES SYSTEM**

**REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENCE DISCIPLINE**

113. The seventh primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is to establish a revised and cohesive Military Disciplinary System and a Minor Corrective Measures System. This intervention is essential to meet the constitutional requirement that “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”\(^2\).\(^1\)

114. The current military disciplinary system (which entered into force in 1999) has not served its intended purpose and has conversely served to weaken military discipline and undermine the power of commanders. The current system of criminal justice is based mainly on the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures (Act 16 of 1999) as read with its Rules of Procedure and the Military Discipline Code (MDC)\(^2\).\(^2\). The current system has specifically disempowered commanders by removing the summary discipline system and away from the commander to the military courts. This has consequently elevated minor offences to the realm of the military courts and resulted in significant backlogs in the military court system.

**MILITARY DISCIPLINE**

115. An effective soldier is proud, tough, disciplined and displays morale, cohesion, trust, shared soldiering values and high standards of military conduct at all times. Soldiers, in joining the military, agree to accept the lawful direction of those placed in authority over them. Soldiers train for the application of lethal force under conditions of conflict and in so doing accept the risk of death or...
serious injury in the execution of orders. Military discipline is that mental attitude and state of training which renders military obedience instinctive under all conditions and, if necessary, for soldiers to engage in armed conflict to defend and protect South Africa and its people – even to the forfeiture of one’s own life. It is this function that distinguishes military service from all other sections of our society.

116. Military Discipline is the cornerstone of a professional and functional defence force which is founded upon respect for, and the loyalty to, properly constituted authority. It is achieved through rigorous training that develops self control, character and efficiency. Such training implies subjection to control exerted for the good of the group. Justice Kriegler of the South African Constitutional Court clearly spells out the requirement for military discipline in his judgment on the Minister of Defence vs Potsane and Another, and concurred with by Justices Chaskalson, Langa, Ackermann, Madala, Mokgoro, O’Regan, Sachs, Yacoob, Du Plessis and Skweyiya. 217

“The ultimate objective of the military in time of peace is to prepare for war to support the policies of the civil government. Military organization requires, as no other system, the highest standard of discipline [which] can be defined as an attitude of respect for authority that is developed by leadership, precept and training. It is a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant the task to be performed. This is not the characteristic of the civilian community. It is the ultimate characteristic of the military organization. It is the responsibility of those who command to instil discipline in those who they command. In doing so there must be the correction and the punishment of individuals.” 218

Modern soldiers in a democracy, those contemplated by chapter 11 of the Constitution, are not mindless automatons. Ideally they are to be thinking men and women imbued with the values of the Constitution; and they are to be disciplined. Such discipline is built on reciprocal trust between the leader and the led. The commander needs to know and trust the ability and willingness of the troops to obey. They in turn should have confidence in the judgment and integrity of the commander to give wise orders. This willingness to obey orders and the concomitant trust in such orders are essential to effective discipline. At the same time discipline aims to develop reciprocal trust horizontally, between comrades. Soldiers are taught and trained to think collectively and act jointly, the cohesive force being military discipline built on trust, obedience, loyalty, esprit de corps and camaraderie. Discipline requires that breaches be nipped in the bud demonstrably, appropriately and fairly. 219

The most common form of disciplinary proceeding against a soldier is a summary and relatively informal appearance before the commanding officer of his or her unit. This swift and purely internal disciplinary procedure is retained in the Act which also creates courts of first instance staffed by military judges with more extensive punitive jurisdiction. 220

For a civilian prosecutor, even one attached to the particular military unit but not forming part of the command structure, to have to take [such] decisions would be unfair to both the prosecutor and the accused. For such decisions to have to be debated at a more senior level by or with the officials of the NDPP, who have no knowledge of and little feel for the local circumstances would be even more problematic. In either event the effect on military lines of

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217 Kriegler, J: Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 14/01 dd 05 October 2001.
authority and command would be potentially disastrous."\(^{221}\)

117. The effectiveness of a military organisation is inextricably linked to the concepts of command, leadership and discipline. In essence, military discipline is that state of good military order which exists in a military command. A lack of discipline compromises the effectiveness of the Defence Force and renders it unable to perform its constitutional mandate of defending and protecting South Africa and its people. It is this good order that allows all members of a military command to act together as a cohesive fighting force. Deviation from this state of good military order is dealt with within uniquely military disciplinary and corrective measures systems.

118. Disciplinary or corrective action may be taken against a defence member who fails to meet or uphold the Defence Force’s standards of conduct. This is entirely consistent with the defence doctrinal tenet of ‘mission command’ whereby commander have fully control of their resources and are empowered to make command decisions within their areas of direct competence.

119. Military discipline must not be confused with corrective interventions and criminality. Thus:

- **a.** In the first instance, military discipline is not about punishing crime or maintaining and promoting law, order and tranquillity in society, but about having an effective military force capable and ready to protect the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its people\(^{222}\).

- **b.** In the second instance, the military disciplinary system exists to uphold good military order and discipline using statutory powers to:
  - i. Deal with minor infringements summarily and apply minor sanctions though a Summary Hearing.
  - ii. Address repeat and consistent transgressions and more serious contraventions in a formal manner through a Court Marshall.
  - iii. Provide for extra-territorial jurisdiction when the Defence Force and other members subject to the military disciplinary system are deployed externally to the Republic.

- **c.** In the third instance, military disciplinary measures must be distinguished from minor corrective measures that the Defence Force may routinely pursue to address service related problems that may from time to time arise regarding the personal and professional performance of a defence member. Corrective measures are military interventions to embed military standards, correct errant behaviour or adjust behaviour inconsistent with military norms.

- **d.** In the fourth instance, defence offences must be distinguished from criminal offences, which in the main refers to criminal proceedings which are best dealt with by civilian courts.

\(^{221}\) *Ibid*: Para 41.

\(^{222}\) Constitutional Court: Minister of Defence vs Potsane and Another: 2002 1 SA 1.
MINOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES SYSTEM

120. **Purpose.** The fundamental purpose of the Minor Corrective Measures System is to:

   a. Provide commanders at all levels with a swiftly delivered and reviewed, legal, fair and formally regulated way of dealing with minor failings or defaults related to standards and performance.

   b. Foster, promote and uphold the requisite discipline and behaviour for the maintenance of operational effectiveness.

121. **Terms and Principles.** The following terms and principles are defined:

   a. **Minor Corrective Measures.**

      i. Minor corrective measures may be taken by the chain of command, using command authority, to rehabilitate, censure or initiate sanctions to correct minor professional or personal failings and defaults for purposes of safeguarding or restoring operational effectiveness and efficiency.

      ii. Specific sanctions may be applied to restore and safeguard operational effectiveness through minor corrective action.

      iii. Corrective measures:

          (1) Are intended to correct minor professional and personal shortcomings and defaults.

          (2) Are not appropriate for:

              (a) Criminal transgressions.

              (b) Habitual repetition of minor transgressions.

   b. **The Minor Corrective Process.** The minor corrective process will involve: investigation; reporting; determination; sanction, review and implementation.

   c. **Redress of Grievances:** Ultimately, if individuals consider themselves to have been wronged by any minor corrective action, they are entitled to submit a complaint through the channels of command seeking redress of the individual’s grievance.

122. **Authority.** The authority for the administration of minor corrective measures is derived from the command authority of commanders at all levels according to powers appropriate to rank and which will be authorised in accordance with a schedule to be provided in regulations.

123. **Applicability.** Minor corrective measures may be applied to both members of the Regular Component and the Reserve Component (when on active call-up) up to and including the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or Commander, whether on or off duty.

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223 SANDF Military Dictionary, Pg 79: Command Authority is the lawful authority every officer has over soldiers in his/her charge by virtue of the respective officers rank and appointment.
124. **Application.** Officers, Warrant Officers and Non Commissioned Officers may take use the minor corrective measure system to apply a sanction to any direct subordinate within the schedule of sanctions to be provided in regulations.

125. **Minor Corrective Sanction.**

a. A minor corrective sanction must:
   
i. Be formerly recorded in a prescribed corrective measures register.
   
ii. Where possible, be applied with a sense of immediacy.
   
iii. Promote or enforce the maintenance of routine discipline within a unit.
   
iv. Comply with the principles of proportionality and common sense.
   
v. Be appropriate to:
      
      (1) The transgression or default.
      
      (2) The impact on operational effectiveness.
      
      (3) The adverse impact, or likely impact, on the individual or unit.
      
      (4) The transgressors/defaulters rank, age or rate or remuneration.
   
vi. Enjoy speedy review (Within 24 hours or the next working day) before the implementation of the sanction and which review must:
      
      (1) Evaluate the transgression/default against a test to be prescribed.
      
      (2) Consider mitigating circumstances.
      
      (3) Consider fairness and appropriateness.
   
   vii. Be dismissed if failing the prescribed test.
   
   viii. Be carried out under appropriate supervision.

b. A minor corrective sanction must not:
   
i. Be unreasonable.
   
ii. Result in public humiliation.
   
iii. Result in discrimination.

b. Will be limited to a defined number of non-punitive measures, such as:
   
i. Corrective drill periods.
   
ii. Corrective physical training periods.
iii. Corrective training periods.

iv. Corrective additional duties.

v. Financial loss.

**MILITARY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM**

126. The military disciplinary system will be revised to empower commanders to effectively enforce military discipline through both disciplinary and corrective interventions. The fundamental purpose of the new disciplinary system will be to foster, promote and uphold the discipline and behaviour required for the maintenance of operational effectiveness.

127. **Terms and Principles.** The following terms and principles are defined:

   a. **Disciplinary Measures.** Disciplinary measures may be taken by the chain of command, using statutory powers, to uphold good order and military discipline. Disciplinary Measures are taken where a criminal or a statutory defence offence has been committed and it is necessary to punish the individual or to deter others.

   b. **Military Justice System.** The Military Justice System will include: investigation; charge; trial; conviction and sentence; review and appeal. Sentences may range from admonition and restriction of privileges to detention or imprisonment in the instance of serious offences.

128. **The Military Disciplinary System emphasises the need for:**


   c. Military law training each level of staff training.

   d. The disciplinary role of the unit Adjutant and the Regimental Sergeant-Major.

**SUMMARY HEARINGS**

129. Most offences by military members in terms of the Military Disciplinary Code will be dealt with by commanders up the chain of command through a summary hearing system.

   a. An Officer Commanding may deal with an offence by a summary hearing if the offence is minor and the accused is of or below field rank.

   b. Brigade and Division level commanders, and staff equivalents, will have powers to discipline officers above field rank.

   c. General or Flag Officers will automatically be subject to a Court Marshal.

130. Minor statutory defence offences can be dealt with through a summary hearing in front of an appropriate Officer Commanding as prescribed in the Military Disciplinary Code, but excludes serious statutory defence offences.
131. The appropriate Officer Commanding can, within the summary hearing system, find an offender guilty of a minor statutory defence offence and can impose a range of punishments and fines as prescribed in the Military Disciplinary Code. This may extend to a loss of seniority, reduction in rank, a term of military detention, extra work or drill, loss of personal privileges or loss of entitlement to leave.

132. The accused, if entering a plea of guilty or is found to be guilty of a transgression, can be awarded a disciplinary sanction. The accused will be given the option of appealing the sanction awarded. If an appeal is lodged, the findings of the Summary Hearing will be sent for review to the next highest level of command, and who:

a. May set aside the sanction.

b. May uphold the sanction.

c. May institute a reduced sanction.

133. The sanction awarded by the next highest level of command may not exceed the sanction awarded by the lower level of command. The decision of the next highest level of command will be final and binding. No further appeal will be entertained.

**COURT OF A MILITARY JUDGE**

134. Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 1999 (DSMA), establishes the following military courts:

a. A Court of Military Appeals (CMA).

b. The Court of a Senior Military Judge.

c. The Court of a Military Judge.

d. The Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing.

135. The DSMA creates new terminology which steps away from internationally recognised terminology. This is counter-productive and it is recommended that the term “Courts Martial” is reintroduced into the South African Military system. A Military Court may try any statutory defence as well as all criminal offences. The punishments which can be imposed by a Court Martial will range from imprisonment in a civilian correction facility, detention in a military detention facility, dismissal from the armed services (with or without disgrace) a fine and those punishments which can be awarded by a commander.

136. The powers of a military court must extend to those civilians who are subject to the terms of military discipline, but sanction excluding military detention.

**COURT MARTIAL APPEALS COURT**

137. A person found guilty of an offence by a military court can appeal against the punishment, or against both conviction and punishment, to the Court Martial Appeals Court.
138. The Court of Military Appeals will exercise full appeal and review competencies in respect of the proceedings of any case or hearing conducted before a military court. The Court will give rulings on matters of law including practice and procedure and may grant or dismiss the appeal or substitute the finding for another finding on the basis of the evidence presented.

139. The Court of Military Appeals must be independent of the command system and be seen to be impartial and objective. This means that the appointed members will be retired judges and the military members will be at the end of their careers and not subject to command influence.

140. Further appeal can be made to the Supreme Court of Appeals\(^\text{224}\).

**CIVILIAN COURT**

141. Cases involving criminality outside the Defence Force may be handled by a civilian court, provided that a person is tried once only for a particular offence.

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**DEFENCE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURING**

**DEFENCE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE**

142. The eighth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the transformation of defence organisational structuring to resolve the current unresponsiveness to strategic change. The design and structure of the Defence Force will be informed by the defence mandate, mission, goals and tasks coupled to defence doctrine as expanded upon in Chapters 6 through 9 of this review. The role, shape and size and footprint of the Defence Force is to be determined as a firm basis for future defence planning.

143. **Definition of Terms.** It is necessary to clarify the following concepts.

   a. **Force Structure.** The force structure is the complete structure of the entire defence organisation, ranging from the Ministry of Defence (Level 0) at the highest level to the diverse units at Level 4 in the organisation. Each headquarter, combat formation, school, depot and unit is an individual Force Structure Element (FSE).

   b. **Force Design.** The force design is those components of the Defence Force, within the wider defence force structure, which can and may be mobilized for operational deployment or which directly support defence operations.

      i. This includes combat, combat support, combat service support as well as command and control units that may be deployed to execute operations.

      ii. Non deployable units in the force design may include static depots, headquarters, hospitals and support structures.

\(^\text{224}\) Charnelley notes that "review to the High Court has not been, and should not be, excluded" Pg77 in the Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 33, Nr 2, 2005: The South African Military Court System – Independent, Impartial and Constitutional?"
DEFENCE STRUCTURING PRINCIPLES

144. The Defence Act 2002 will be amended to provide a clear and sagacious mandate for the management of defence structures. The following principles will be embedded in the amendment:

a. The policy, philosophy, concept and doctrine for structure management must provide for rapid and responsible structure management and alignment.

b. A Defence Macro-Structure will be established by the Minister.

c. The Defence Macro Structure of the Defence Force will be reviewed every five years; or if there are required changes to the troop list or if there is any other amendment the Minister may deem necessary.

d. The Minister will retain the authority to open and close force structure elements and commission and decommission ships, vessels and aircraft.

e. The Defence Macro-Structure will include for each combat service and staff division:
   i. The mandate of each defence portfolio.
   ii. The deliverables for each defence portfolio.
   iii. The Post Structure Threshold, inclusive of the Regular, Reserve and Civilian Components, and indicating thresholds of both active and non-active posts.
   iv. A Personnel Budget Ceiling.

f. As a general principle, 30% of active posts on the force structure will be reserved for Reserves to rotate through. This number may be higher at unit level and lower at headquarters level.

g. Combat services and staff divisions will:
   i. Receive appropriate delegations to undertake structure management within the context of composite guidelines and restrictions.
   ii. Have own inherent capacity to administer own structures within the context of given delegation, policy, guidelines and restrictions.
   iii. Constantly pursue a balance between personnel, operating and capital costs.
   iv. Remain aligned with the approved Defence Macro-Structure.
   v. Ensure sustainability of prescribed macro capabilities and achieve set deliverables.

h. Chief Staff Planning is responsible to:
   i. Provide structure management practices, procedures and standard.
   ii. Provide functional training on structure management.
iii. Ensure quality control of defence structure management.

iv. Maintain the Blueprint Defence Force Structure and Design which integrates all Force Structure Elements.

PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION

REQUIREMENT

145. The ninth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the promotion of excellence in defence performance. Defence Performance Management is defined as a set of management processes, supported by information technology, that help to improve the execution of strategy, day-to-day management and decision making.

146. Performance management enables the definition and communication of identified strategies, performance plans, measures and targets that are to be pursued toward improving organisational performance. Figure 79 below depicts the national planning, budgeting and reporting cycle.
147. The performance management process must enhance the formulation of strategic objectives, provide measures for performance and analyse and generate reports on the performance as well as align the people and culture towards achieving the set objectives. Reporting on Defence performance for both financial and non-financial accountability is therefore essential in measuring and quantifying organisational performance and compliance.
148. The accurate provision of financial information such as budgets, expenditures and revenues remain critical for determination of the costs and efficiencies of programmes. On the other hand, the accurate provision of non-financial information such as outcomes and outputs is equally important for assessing effectiveness and progress of the organisation.

149. Performance information must be appropriate and allow for the results-based management approach, where such results are measured against a determination of risk, success or failure and therefore are drivers to an adjustment to future oriented strategies. Measurement of performance therefore ensures inter alia that:

   a. Civil oversight and control is enhanced.
   b. Organisational policy and plan is complied with.
   c. Policy, planning, budgeting and reporting are aligned to ensure enhanced efficiency and effectiveness
   d. Funding equates to measurable results.
   e. Information is utilised strategically to improve policy and funding choices.
   f. Civil society obtains value for money.
   g. Individual employee performance and accountability is enhanced.
   h. Organisational and individual focus remains on the mandate and policy priorities.

DEFENCE PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND EVALUATION

150. Performance management has numerous facets which are broadly grouped to the following areas:

   b. Employee performance.

151. The selection of a performance management tool is critical and must allow for full range performance management inclusive of the assessment of the organisation as measured against the achievement of its objectives or required outcomes.

152. The performance management tool must also provide the ability to assess and manage the performance of individual employees against their respective individual performance agreements which must be concomitantly aligned to organisational outcomes. In so doing, the employees will be aligned to the required outcomes of the organisation.

153. Each area of performance management is continuously tested and evaluated in accordance with a cycle as depicted in Figure 80 below.
154. Monitoring and Evaluation forms part of the overarching performance management process of the organisation as is inculcated and integral to planning, not an add-on after thought. It is the ongoing process that feeds into Government wide processes in order to enhance oversight and improve performance. Monitoring and evaluation findings must feed into the next planning process so that new outcomes, outputs and performance baselines and indicators can be set.

155. Figure 81 below depicts the monitoring and evaluation process and sub-processes that culminate in the required performance reports that enhance civil oversight and control.
156. Risks to organisational performance are identified during the annual planning phase and are then aligned to performance indicators and targets as set out in the annual performance plans. These identified risks are generally based on assumptions made during the planning phase.

157. The application of risk management during planning allows for the development of contingencies and a systematic approach to mitigation of the negative consequences of the risks materialising. When risks are properly identified, there is a correlation between the deviations from planned performance and the risks that were identified.
THE HEALTH OF THE FORCE

REQUIREMENT

158. The tenth primary intervention with respect to transverse resource matters is the enhanced health of defence members.

COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAMME

159. In as much as Government has a responsibility to maintain a healthy force, individual defence members have a corollary responsibility to meet the health and fitness requirements of the Defence Force. To this end, the Defence Force shall institute a revised comprehensive health programme whereby bi-annual health assessments are conducted with all members, regardless of age or rank. Bearing in mind sex, age and matters such as disabilities, each defence member shall:

   a. Undergo a fitness evaluation.

   b. Undergo a body mass index evaluation.

160. The standards for the above shall be set in regulations. Defence members not complying to the set standard will be given opportunity to remedy any non-compliance. Continual non-compliance will result in dismissal from the force.
DEFENCE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

1. Defence combat service support is an overarching function providing combat services with support across the full spectrum of conflict. It is the process of supplying combat services with resource support including equipment, facilities, consumables, personnel and finance support for the successful attainment of the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks. In simple terms, defence combat service support includes health support, personnel resources, logistic resources, financial resources, organisation structure and the ability of the force to continually sustain and restore itself. It is thus clear that defence combat service support is, and only can be, a joint defence endeavour.

2. This combat service support doctrine is applicable to all support functions and support commands.

3. All combat service support will be focused on supporting the manoeuvre approach to war-fighting across the spectrum of landward, maritime and air operations.

4. All combat service support is premised on a proactive ‘push’ approach of common resources to combat forces.

5. The Defence Enterprise Information System is a critical intervention to drive all combat service support. Combat service support is critically reliant on such a transverse system.

6. Combat service support will be provided within (Figure 82):

   a. 5th Line Support. Support from the industrial and commercial base of both national and international partners. This may include the national and international defence industry and various civilian institutions and is commonly known as the 5th line support.

   b. 4th Line Support. Support from the deeper levels in the Defence Force, extending to static bases, mobilisation centres, depots and other static establishments in the rear area, and is commonly known as the 4th line support. The delivery of this support is a joint responsibility of both combat services and combat service support– common and unique support.

   c. 3rd Line Support. Support from both static and mobile Defence Force capabilities deployed in the communication zone to shorten the lines of communication to deployed combat forces in the combat zone, and is commonly known as the 3rd line support. In the SA Army, it would be the responsibility of the Division to provide 3rd line
support. This may include forward basing, preposition and forward mounting. This may include forward basing, preposition and forward mounting.

d. **2nd Line Support.** Intermediate support capability which is provided in the theatre of operations, and is commonly known as the 2nd line support. In the case of the SA Army, it would be the responsibility of the Brigade to provide a second line support.

e. **1st Line Support.** Organisation and organic support at the unit level, and which is commonly known as 1st line support, provided organisationally at unit level in the theatre of operation. The unit is required to provide support to its sub-units and lower organisations. In the case of the SA Army, 1st line support is organisationally provided at the Battalion level.

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**Figure 82: Direct Orchestrate and Control Support**

7. The following common principles will guide all components of the defence combat service support system through centralised direction and decentralised execution.

a. **Functional Authority.**

i. Functional control is embedded in the respective staff division, which is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control support through *inter alia* the provision of functional policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation, and training curricula.

ii. Functional authorities are responsible for the integration of functional doctrine with Defence Force doctrine, multinational doctrine and practices.

b. **Functional Competency Authorities.** Functional competency authorities are, of necessity, appointed and mandated from both combat services and staff divisions to provide military certification for defence prime mission equipment, support equipment, munitions, personnel selection, and personnel competency certificates.
c. **Combat Services.**

i. Combat forces will have all necessary inherent support capabilities up to the battalion or equivalent level.

ii. Combat forces are, in turn, sustained by the intermediate and deeper level support structures.

iii. Combat services are responsible for their unique own 5th to 1st line support.

d. **Common Support.** Transverse support of a common nature, normally of significant quantity, will be provided through the Logistics Command, the Training Command and the staff divisions of the Chief of the Defence Force. This may extend to **inter alia:**

i. Setting of term and transverse procurement contracts.

ii. Management of common commodities and services.

iii. Facilities.

iv. Career management.

v. Pension management.

vi. Professional development training.

vii. Military tertiary education and development.

**DEFENCE SUPPORT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL**

8. The National Executive provides strategic guidance on priorities and national interests. It further determines the national Defence policy, and determines the quantity, quality and level of strategic national resources required (eg: oil, ammunition, strategic lift, etc). This sustainment may be coordinated with international partners. The Minister will approve the defence force structure after consultation with the Executive and the Legislature.

9. The national Defence policy is resourced according to the priorities of Government. The Commander-in-Chief, together with the National Executive, determines the defence budget in times of peace, conflict and during a state of national defence. Funds will be appropriated by Parliament by means of a vote.

10. At the national level, sustainment is planned and coordinated interdepartmentally with role-playing departments responsible for various national strategic resources and industry.

**CONCEPTS TO ENHANCE DEFENCE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

11. The Defence Force is responsible, within resource guidelines set by the Executive, to ensure adequate and appropriate combat service support. The Defence Force is responsible to mobilise and prepare adequate defence personnel and to conclude contracts with the defence industry for product acquisition, services, maintenance, procurement, sustainment, movement and concentration of defence matériel.
12. The defence combat service support system must have the capability to support and sustain combat forces over protracted periods of time, over extended distances, in diverse and complex theatres and along multiple LOC. Given inherently long supply lines, planning must ensure the physical security of sustainment installations and LOC.

**Expeditionary Support**

13. Deployed forces must have joint and expeditionary sustainment capabilities that support the full spectrum of conflict, consistent with the Joint Operational Concept. This requires a single, integrated, responsive end-to-end distribution system, capable of interfacing with inter-agency and multinational capabilities.

**Forward Basing, Preposition and Forward Mounting**

14. The foundation of the expeditionary sustainment system is the maintenance of strategic, operational and tactical reserve stocks and the pre-positioning (forward sustainment) of stock at identified land and sea positions in accordance with the operational requirements that may exist at a particular time.

**Ji²M Support**

15. Defence will support its interdepartmental and inter-agency activities within the framework of the given mission.
   
   a. Within joint forces, the Joint Force HQ will be responsible to sustain its forces with regard to common items.
   
   b. The Joint Force HQ will also be responsible for equipment that is mission-specific but that is not part of normal Service equipment.
   
   c. Combat services will provide own unique sustainment.

**Defence Reserve Stock Levels**

16. Defence must prescribe the level of reserve stocks to be maintained to support the spectrum defence mission, goals and tasks. These must be able to support rapidly escalating force levels as the core force expands into the surge force. This includes:
   
   a. **Strategic Reserve Stocks.** Reserves that are determined by the full spectrum of potential threats to security. These reserves are maintained to bridge the gap between peace and national defence (i.e. mobilisation reserves).
   
   b. **Operational Reserve Stocks.** Operational reserves are determined by risks emanating from foreseeable operational contingencies such as imminent military threats, regional disasters, regional instability, crime and homeland instability (i.e.: health care, disaster relief and air supply).
   
   c. **Tactical Reserve Stocks.** Tactical reserves are designed to achieve superiority during military engagements through the employment of operational and combat support units (i.e.: support echelons, spare bandwidth and deployment-in-depth).
STRATEGIC RESOURCE ALIGNMENT

17. Strategic alignment and convergence must be achieved between the various resource systems in order that common implementation approaches are adopted and that strategic synergy is achieved. Common approaches and processes are to be used to support both force preparation and force employment so that sustainable combat-ready forces are produced and employed. This entails the harmonisation of the approaches between the various defence resource systems:

a. A single Defence Plan identifies the resources required to meet defence objectives. This Defence Plan ensures alignment between assigned objectives and allocated resources per programme. The single Defence Plan forms the basis for the consequent acquisition, utilisation and management of the allocated resources to ensure the successful execution of the Defence Mandate.

b. The annual Defence Budget Vote appropriates funds to enable investment in defence resources in accordance with the authorised medium-term Defence Strategic Business Plan and Programme. The Defence Vote allocates funds (spending ceiling) to the main and sub-programmes enabling the management of resources on inventory as well as the procurement of replacement and/or supplementary resources.

c. While this single departmental plan entails a process of centralised strategic direction and functional authority, the execution of the plan and the subsequent utilisation of the resources will be decentralised to ensure its effective, efficient, and economical management. The realisation of a credible force design and force structure for the SANDF is dependent on the appropriate allocation of resources.

d. Support is a command function. As such, Commanders at all levels will be responsible, accountable and empowered to execute the plan through the management of all resources, the fostering of appropriate human skills and appropriate personnel, logistics and financial delegations and authorities.

e. The effective, efficient and economical utilisation of such critical resources within each resource management system is of paramount importance to meet functional requirements.

f. All resource systems must provide management information and advice to defence decisions makers. The information provided in each area must integrate with all other resource areas, using a Defence Enterprise Systems.

g. All commanders and managers must account for their compliance with policy and performance against the Defence Plan and Programme on a quarterly and annual basis as prescribed in national legislation.

h. Internal controls, risk and performance management must be an integrated aspect of each resource system.
18. Defence personnel, inclusive of Regulars, Reserves, Civilians and Auxiliaries, are a key resource, the level and quantity of which is determined by the defence mission, goals and tasks, the derived force structure and an appropriate balance between rank and salary levels.

19. A single, comprehensive, and rigorous personnel system that can be tailored to requirements and that is capable of delivering support both internally and externally, from the 5th to the 1st line of support, in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine, will be established.

DEFENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM

20. The Defence personnel environment is multifaceted. The defence personnel management system includes personnel acquisition, personnel maintenance, personnel development, career management and personnel separation. Together these constitute the transverse and interlinked defence personnel value chain and is enabled by policies and processes, technology, quality personnel functionaries and budget (Figure 83).
21. The defence personnel system will focus on the organisational requirements of defence and will ensure well managed and administered and capable defence personnel through the application of sound defence personnel practices. It will enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through pursuit of the ‘one force’ principle by establishing an appropriate balance between the Regular Component, Reserve Component, Civilians and Auxiliaries through tailored personnel feeding systems.

22. The system must further:
a. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations.

b. Support participation in international operations.

c. Accord equal priority to all defence strategic goals and strategic tasks.

d. Comply with the national regulatory framework, government priorities, internal governance and stakeholder requirements.

e. Maximise personnel outputs while minimising costs.

f. Reduce personnel risk to as low a level as reasonably practicable.

23. Personnel Management Principles. The personnel system must be based on the following principles. It must:

a. Be Compliant with the relevant prescribed provisions of the regulatory framework.

b. Pursue the execution of the Defence Strategy.

c. Reinforce the competent management of personnel as a command responsibility, duly assisted by quality personnel HR functionaries to provide specialist advice and guidance and the execution of day-to-day personnel functions.

d. Be comparable to military best practices found in defence forces across the world.

e. Be flexible to meet both defence operational requirements and the needs of individual defence members.

f. Ensure functional alignment with the defence structural design across a four-tier system.

g. Be directed towards the continuous capacity building and empowerment of all defence members through soundly planned and executed education, training and development opportunities.

h. Place the 'right person in the right post at the right time', thereby establishing an optimal organisational fit between people and structures.

i. Possess appropriate technology to facilitate accountable, productive, effective, efficient, economical and transparent personnel management.

j. Recognise and reward appropriate individual and group performance.

k. Apply corrective measures to improve undesired levels of performance.

24. Gender mainstreaming as well as broad-based representation at all levels, will remain an objective. Equally, the utilisation of disabled uniformed personnel in suitable posts and the appointment of persons with disabilities in civilian posts will be pursued.
DEFENCE PERSONNEL BUDGET THRESHOLD

25. In order to achieve sustainability of the organisation as a whole, the ‘compensation for employees’ component of the budget will not exceed 40% of the annual allocation to Defence. Of this, at least 10% (i.e. 4% of the Defence allocation) will be ring-fenced and dedicated to the development and utilisation of the Reserve Component, but escalating in the contingency of higher levels of operational readiness.

26. The defence personnel establishment will be based on a 40:30 ratio between the Reserve Component and the Regular Component. To this end, the total force structure will be:

   a. 56% reserves members.
   b. 35% uniformed members.
   c. 9% civilian members.

27. The post structure for any Auxiliary Service will be established by the Minister.

DIRECT DEFENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

28. The strategic direction for defence personnel management will be centralised, while the execution of personnel management will be decentralised. Defence personnel management will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

29. Chief Staff Personnel (CS1) is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control personnel matters through inter alia the provision of personnel policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation, and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

   a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.
   b. Determining personnel output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.
   c. Positioning the civilian sector and military education and training institutions to support the development of defence members.
   d. Determining strategic, operational and tactical personnel reserves through a risk-based approach to ensure that the characteristics of demand and supply are affordably reconciled.
   e. Supplying strategic direction to the Joint Training Command.

30. Defence will develop and implement its personnel strategy through personnel sub-strategies that specifically address the following:

   a. Integrated corporate personnel support plans coupled to the medium term strategic framework and the medium term expenditure framework.
   b. Rigorous governance, compliance monitoring, risk management and appropriate wellness programmes.
c. Individual and organisational performance management with a jeopardy and reward system in performance monitoring that enhances accountability and responsibility.

EXECUTE DEFENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

31. Combat services and units at all levels will execute their own personnel management. Personnel and financial delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not beyond the unit level. To this end, personnel management capabilities will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub-sub-unit level.

DEFENCE PERSONNEL INFORMATION SYSTEM

32. It is critical that the future defence personnel information system is based on a single, rigorous, comprehensive and suitably tailored personnel process. The personnel information system will be a seamless component of the defence enterprise system enhancing effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity and providing (inter alia):
   a. Real-time personnel information.
   b. Real-time fault diagnostics.
   c. Optimal personnel data integrity.
   d. Automated personnel accounting.
   e. Automated personnel reporting.
   f. Personnel administration.
   g. Personnel payments.
   h. Military education, training and development scheduling.
   i. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems
   j. Work scheduling.
   k. Support to the total personnel process and provision for the implementation of new processes and policies.

ACQUISITION OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL

33. Defence will pursue improved marketing, recruitment, selection and appointment processes for all its service systems. The annually recruitment of personnel will be driven by the approved defence post establishment, personnel turnover tendencies and the specific requirements of Corps and Musterings. To prevent excessive growth of the Regular Component, annual intakes must be based on the annual attrition rate.

34. Targeted country-wide recruitment campaigns, designed to meet the rejuvenation requirements of both the Regular and Reserve Components, will focus on: a balance between rural and urban areas; top scholars from both secondary and tertiary education institutions; and building awareness
amongst youth in specific target areas.

35. In order to ensure that the personnel quality base is appropriate and meets the profile requirements, recruitment will be executed in a decentralised manner by combat services and staff divisions, with centralised direction being provided by Chief Staff Personnel (CS1). A pool of professional recruiters will be established per combat service. In some exceptional instances recruitment may be decentralised to unit level, particularly so in the instance of extremely specialised environments and the reserve units.

36. Recruited members will adhere to the health, age, fitness, intellectual and other standards of the Defence Force, and as may be appropriate to the specific Corps or Mustering.

37. Focussed and directed recruitment of young men and women with leadership attributes will be key to the effectiveness of the future Defence Force. To this end, appropriate selection criteria and instruments will be used that focus on the candidate’s leadership abilities. The priority for the recruitment of potential leaders will lie with those candidates already in possession of a tertiary qualification. A grade 12 exemption certificate will however be the minimum requirement to enter the system as an Officer Cadet. The post profile of the non-leader group members will determine the minimum academic qualifications as this may vary between mustings.

38. This will be augmented by the direct probationary appointment of qualified professionals into the Regular and Reserve Components. To this end the University Reserve Training Program, as part of the Reserve Training System, will be used to acquire specialist and scarce skills.

39. Annual and separate intakes will feed the Regular and Reserve Components respectively.

DEFENCE CAREER MANAGEMENT

40. Career management will be managed by the combat services and staff divisions through a standardised career management process provided by Chief Staff Personnel (CS1) that aligns organisational requirements and individual career development or progression. Defence will ensure clear career-pathing and development programmes per mustering and speciality. To this end, a clearly defined Corps (or mustering) post profile and person profile will support the career management process, including stages for exiting the Defence Force.

41. The quality of defence personnel will be enhanced through dedicated remunerative and non-remunerative initiatives to acquire and retain scarce skills. Academic qualifications and scarce skills in both the Regular and Reserve Components will be recognised and incentivised.

42. The following principles will be pursued to enhance defence career management:

   a. Career and succession planning promotes the transfer of skills and competencies.

   b. A synergetic relationship is created between individual career plans and workplace skill plans with individuals taking co-responsibility for their own career management and development.

   c. Career paths are effectively communicated and individual career plans are regularly updated and compiled in consultation with the member or employee.

   d. Succession plans are available two (2) years in advance.
e. Commanders and Line Managers are actively involved in the career management process.

DEFENCE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

43. The continuous education, training and development of all defence members at all levels will be informed by a comprehensive Personnel Development strategy.

44. Defence Force members, including the Reserve Component, will be expected to pursue life-long learning and progression in their respective careers. Defence will encourage the use of education opportunities for all its members, be they foreign opportunities or local tertiary institutions, to enhance workplace skills and the capabilities of defence members. Education opportunities will be positively linked to workplace performance. Reserves must have access to vocational training during their service to ensure alternative private or public sector employment.

45. The following principles will be pursued to enhance defence education, training and development:

a. The Personnel Development System is aligned with the National Regulatory Framework and supports later access to the job market.

b. Defence commands accredited learning institutions and whose practices meet the national Qualifications Framework expectations.

c. Defence presents accredited learning programmes that satisfy its human capital requirement provide portable skills and qualifications.

d. Education, training and development opportunities support individual career plans and individual learning pathways.

e. Learning is accessible (e-learning).

f. Individual members take co-responsibility to access education, training and development opportunities.

MAINTENANCE OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL

46. The effective retention of defence personnel requires a well established and knowledgeable day-to-day personnel maintenance system. To this end the following principles will be pursued:

a. Defence personnel processes both support and are informed by the defence regulatory framework and defence personnel policies.

b. The personnel maintenance system is accessible by defence members and is supportive of defence members. To this end:

i. E-personnel will be pursued.

ii. Individual personnel transactions will be executed promptly and accurately.

iii. High volume and repetitive personnel transactions are performed against a measurable standard.
iv. Pro-active personnel processes and transactions are executed where possible and applicable.

c. A zero tolerance on negative audit findings is maintained.

DEFENCE PERSONNEL SEPARATION

47. The Defence Force will be maintained as a young, healthy and fit organisation. Due to its unique make up, the Defence Force cannot offer a life-long career to all of its members. Defence members will therefore be afforded opportunities throughout their defence career to prepare and qualify themselves for a second career as useful citizens in the mainstream economy of South Africa. Personnel separation will thus be integrally linked with a defence member’s career progression pathway and associated service contract.

48. A dignified, attractive exit mechanism will be developed to provide the process of severance with members at specified career gateways.

   a. Members that are classified as "uneconomical in service" must be exited in a sensitive manner.
   
   b. Members who no longer meet their post profile requirements due to age, health, fitness or competence standards may be transferred to other government departments where they may be more effectively utilised.

49. Personnel separation will be decentralised to the combat services. The following principles will be pursued in the separation of defence personnel:

   a. Defence maintains a system to prepare defence members for their transition to a second career (Transition Assistance Programme) through assisted labour market entry at identified exit stages.
   
   b. Placement assistance offices assist defence members in finding employment opportunities.

50. A seamless migration from the Regular Component to the Reserve Component must be ensured. On separation, defence members may volunteer to be retained as members of the Reserve Component, in which they are available for service on a part-time basis, or move to the membership of the military veterans and are placed on the National Reserve.

WIDER SPECTRUM OF DEFENCE ‘RANK AND SCALE’

51. In order to prevent the natural tendency of ‘rank inflation’, salary will be decoupled from rank and a far broader salary scale in each rank be implemented.

PERSONNEL PRIORITIES

52. Personnel short term priorities:

   a. Personnel Information System. Implementation of a single personnel information system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system as the first and primary intervention.
b. **Service Systems.** Establish service systems that sustain the feeder system of both the Regular and Reserve Components.

c. **Recruitment and Appointments Across Career.**
   i. All recruitment apart from specialist personnel moves through the Reserves, it is from here that Regulars are drawn for appointment into approved posts only.
   
   ii. Appoint only qualified persons in posts, other than training posts, (correct mustering and qualification). Non qualifying personnel to be placed supernumerary if no suitable post is available.
   
   iii. PSC to allow appointment of trainee PSAP Engineers and technicians once they have applied for Engineering Council of South Africa registration.

d. **Remuneration.**
   i. Establish sustained non-remunerative measures that support defence member retention.
   
   ii. Establish remuneration condition of services and benefits reflect the uniqueness of the military and which are aligned with market trends.
   
   iii. Establish a flexible remuneration system that makes provision for broad-banding and limits rank inflation by de-link rank from salary.

e. **Exit Mechanisms.**
   i. Establish a ‘Rank-Age Policy’, linked to Corps and Mustering requirements, that directs the individual career paths and exit stages of defence members.
   
   ii. Introduce longer minimum time in rank for senior officers across all race groups. Map career path that calls for specific appointments on route to senior appointments. This must be applied within a career progression pyramid system at ages 30, 40, 50. This is for the Regular Component only.
   
   iii. Establish an attractive exit mechanism, including an appropriate benefit structure, to support the exiting of defence members at identified points.
   
   iv. Introduce a system whereby redundant personnel can exit. Un-economical in service. Align personnel with the approved establishment tables and reduce supernumeraries to 2%. Non voluntary.

f. Introduce “Functional Command and Management” course for non-self accounting and accounting units that must be completed prior to taking up a command appointment.

53. Personnel longer term priorities:

a. The inadequate and fragmented defence personnel management strategy, policy and system addressed to provide adequate personnel strategic direction to the support of the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks.
b. Ongoing review of personnel delegations.

c. Ongoing simplification of personnel processes and eliminate non-value adding activities in the execution of personnel management.

DEFENCE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

54. Defence logistics is the integrated series of processes required to ensure the availability of matériel, facilities and services, as well as the movement of matériel and personnel, in support of defence operations from the 5th to the 1st line of combat service support.

a. This requires enhanced logistics interoperability, based on the establishment of a single integrated logistic information system and a single defence logistics process.

b. It implies **vertical** alignment with national and departmental direction and governance, and **horizontal** integration across the Defence Force, with a special emphasis on integration over the supply chain and life cycle management of systems and assets.

55. **Definitions.** The following nomenclature is used in the context indicated hereunder.

a. **Support.** Manage defence capabilities throughout their total life-cycle.

b. **Sustain.** Maintain defence operating capabilities over a period of time.

c. **Maintenance.** The repair, servicing and overhaul of defence equipment to bring it to a serviceable condition satisfying operating requirements.

d. **Maintain Defence Reserves.** To ensure the availability of resources (equipment and personnel) of appropriate quality and quantity as by reserve stock policy.

DEFENCE LOGISTIC SYSTEM

56. A single, comprehensive and rigorous logistic system that can be tailored to requirements and is capable of delivering combat service support both internally and externally in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine will be established.

57. The logistic system must:

a. Enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through the provision of appropriate, ready and sustained logistics.

b. Enable jointness, and interoperability.

c. Provide combat service support on a joint and multinational basis, yet recognising the uniqueness of systems operating on land, in the air, at sea and in the military health domain.
d. Integrate supply chain management, asset management, life-cycle management and quality management perspectives.

e. Consolidate reporting and planning.

f. Create a common defence force logistics language.

58. The system must further:

a. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations.

b. Support participation in international operations.

c. Accord equal priority to all defence strategic goals and strategic tasks.

d. Comply with the national regulatory framework, government priorities, internal governance and stakeholder requirements.

e. Maximise logistic outputs while minimising costs.

f. Reduce logistics risk to as low a level as reasonably practicable.

DIRECT DEFENCE LOGISTICS

59. Strategic direction for defence logistics will be centralised, while logistics execution will be decentralised. Defence logistics will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority being fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

60. Chief Staff Logistics is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control logistics through inter alia the provision of logistic policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.

b. Determining logistic output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.

c. Managing common-use systems by a single point of responsibility so as to achieve efficiency and economy of scale through standardisation and consolidation.

d. Positioning the defence industry, the private sector and defence institutes to support both defence life-cycle and supply chain management.

e. Determining strategic, operational and tactical reserve stock levels through a risk-based approach to ensure that the characteristics of demand and supply are affordably reconciled.

f. Supplying strategic direction to the Joint Logistics Command.

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225 Includes movable, immovable and intangible inventory.
EXECUTE DEFENCE LOGISTICS

61. Combat services and units at all levels will execute logistics. Logistic support capabilities at will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub sub-unit level. Logistic and financial delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascades to the lowest appropriate levels within the SANDF, but not beyond unit level.

62. Logistic support will be executed as follows:

a. 5th line logistic support from the national or international defence industry or through the National Reserve.

b. 4th line deeper level logistic support from defence logistic depots and logistic units.

c. 3rd line deployable support, including forward basing in the communication zone. (Typically on Division level.)

d. 2nd line intermediate support in the theatre. (Typically on Brigade level.)

e. 1st line organisational support from the units own internal support structures. (Typically on Battalion level.)

63. COTS (commercial off the shelf) and MOTS (military off the shelf) must be the first order consideration in both acquisition and procurement. A pragmatic approach based on local procurement will be applied whenever it is the most cost-efficient method.

DEFENCE LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

64. Logistics doctrine will informed by the defence mission and the spectrum of the strategic goals and strategic tasks. Logistics doctrine will be based on Defence Doctrine and will deliver a single, rigorous, comprehensive logistics process, founded on best practice military logistics principles and philosophy.

DEFENCE LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM

65. The logistics information system will be a seamless component of the defence enterprise system. The logistics information system will enhance effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity in the logistics system, providing (inter alia):

a. A 'push logistics' approach.

b. Real-time inventory and asset tracking.

c. Real-time fault diagnostics.

d. Optimal logistic data integrity.

e. Automated logistic accounting.

f. Automated logistic reporting.

g. Asset and inventory management aligned with national prescripts.
h. Supply chain management.

i. Item identification and codification.

j. Interactive and tracked electronic technical and other documentation.

k. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems

l. Work scheduling.

LOGISTIC EXPERTISE

66. The logistician’s role is to analyse the mission of the supported force, calculate the requirements, determine how to meet the requirements, advise the commander on the feasibility of alternative courses of action, support the commander’s selected course of action to the highest level possible, and warn the commander in time when this support is not possible.

67. The complexity and diversity of the logistic function requires a wide variety of professional and specialist life cycle and supply chain management personnel. Most of these are scarce skills, not only within Defence, but also nationally and globally, and therefore specific measures will be taken to ensure their availability, including remunerative and non-remunerative means as well as intensive education, training and development programs.

68. Special focus will be placed on ensuring the availability of appropriate, quality, competent logisticians through attracting, recruiting, educating, training, developing, retaining, motivating, correctly deploying and eventually intelligently redeploying sufficient competent logistics members.

DEFENCE LOGISTIC PRIORITIES

69. Logistic short term priorities are:

a. Logistics Information System. Implementation of a single logistics information system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system as the first and primary intervention.

b. Interim Measure. In the immediate absence of the single logistic information system, and to the best extent possible, enhance:

i. Logistic reporting, with particular reference to tangible capital assets, contingent liabilities and the understatement of accruals in the financial statements.

ii. The Defence Asset Register for both moveable and immoveable assets.

iii. The defence lease register.

iv. The management of Defence Force assets in both foreign deployments and embassies, with specific reference to establishing procedures concerning procurement, sustainment and disposal in the foreign country and the accounting and reporting thereof.

v. Supply chain management and eliminate non-coherent practices.
c. Introduce an operational supply support process.

d. Dispose of surplus, redundant and unserviceable ammunition to firstly improve safety and secondly to reduce fruitless accounting, warehousing and labour costs.

e. Dispose of surplus, redundant and unserviceable equipment stock to firstly reduce the cost of capital and secondly to reduce fruitless accounting, warehousing and labour costs.

f. Acquire, as a matter of principle, commercial and military-off-the-shelf solutions as opposed to designed-to-purpose solutions.

g. Increase equipment serviceability ratios through channelled increased funds to the operating budget, establishing more service contracts with industry and the recapitalisation of maintenance and repair institutions.

h. Migration from cash based accounting to accrual accounting which will result in asset management up to unit level for moveable and immovable assets.

i. Devolve logistics management and procurement delegations and accountability to combat services and staff divisions to the lowest extent possible.

j. Establish a quality logistic governance, risk and compliance process.

k. Accreditation of all functional logistic training institutions.

l. Intervention to both enhance the training of Regular logistician and to draw on Reserve logisticians, followed by the continuous improvement of the skills and capacity of logisticians throughout the Defence Force, retention of scarce skills and the development of all logistic personnel.

70. Logistic longer term priorities:

a. The inadequate and fragmented defence logistics strategy, policy and system must be urgently addressed to provide adequate logistics strategic direction to the support of defence materiel, facilities, movement and logistic services.

b. Internal capabilities and priority funding must be channelled and developed to halt and roll-back the disrepair of defence prime mission equipment which hinders the pursuit of the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks.

c. Internal capabilities and priority funding must be channelled and developed to halt and roll-back the disrepair of defence facilities and infrastructure which currently constrains force preparation and employment.

d. Implement best practice military supply chain and life-cycle management founded on a single logistic management information system.

e. Reduce Defence Force exposure to safety, health, environmental and quality risks which constrain operational sovereignty and lead to increased compliance or litigation costs.

f. Renew logistic capabilities, organisation, equipment, reserves, doctrine and knowledge.
DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

71. Defence finance is a key resource area and the defence budget will be determined by the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks, the derived force structure and ordered defence commitments.

72. A single, comprehensive, tailorable and rigorous financial system will be established that is capable of delivering financial support both internally and externally in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine from the 5th to the 1st line of support.

DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

73. Defence Finances will be managed in the manner prescribed in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended) and the Treasury Regulations (as amended). The management of defence financial resources will be informed by the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks and the derived force structure.

74. The financial management system must achieve the following objectives:
   a. Enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through the provision of appropriate financial resources.
   b. Consolidate financial planning, execution, control and reporting.
   c. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations as well as participation in international operations.
   d. Accord equal priority to all defence strategic goals and strategic tasks.
   e. Achieve financial effectiveness, efficiency and economy where reasonably practicable.
   f. Enable Services and Staff to function effectively through all phases of defence financial management, including: planning, budgeting, execution, controlling, reporting and accounting.
   g. Provide an inclusive multi-disciplinary service to provide quality products and services at the best possible cost.

DEFENCE PROGRAMMES AND REPORTING

75. Defence Programme Structure. The future defence programme structure will be:
   a. Civil Control and Strategic Direction Programme.
   b. Defence Capabilities Programme.
   c. Defence Commitments Programme.
76. Financial Support to the Ministry of Defence.

   a. The Civil Control and Strategic Direction Programme, relating primarily to the work of the Minister and the Secretary for Defence, will be delegated to the Secretary for Defence for further implementation. The Secretary for Defence will account for this programme.

   b. The Chief Staff Finance will provide the financial management capability on an agency basis to the Ministry of Defence, including the Office of the Minister and the Defence Secretariat, to execute the Civil Control and Strategic Direction Programme. This will entail:

      i. Financial planning services.

      ii. Budget control services.

      iii. Financial accounting services.

      iv. Financial reporting services.

77. Reporting. Defence will report to a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Defence on matters within the competence of the Committee.

DIRECT DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

78. Strategic direction for defence financial management will be centralised, while financial execution will be decentralised. Defence financial management will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority being fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

79. The Chief Staff Finance is responsible to assist the Chief of the Defence Force in discharging financial management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act and the annual Division of Revenue Act. These duties relate to the effective financial management of the Defence Force including the exercise of sound budgeting and budgetary control practices; the operation of internal financial controls and the timely production of financial reports.

80. Chief Staff Finance is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control defence financial management through inter alia the provision of financial policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

   a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.

   b. Determining financial output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.

81. The Chief Staff Finance is responsible providing the Chief of the Defence Force with integrated staff oversight and control related to:

   a. The defence estimate of expenditure.

   b. The defence allocation.
c. Defence financial reports.

d. Defence financial statements.

e. Defence treasury submissions for the Defence Accounting Officer.

f. Ensuring the veracity of resource data in cabinet memoranda.

g. The defence appropriation statement.

h. Replies to financial audit queries and audit reports.

i. The defence financial management system.

j. Defence financial management policies.

k. The defence financial delegations framework.

l. Defence personnel payments.

m. Defence supplier payments.

n. Defence financial control services.

o. Defence accounting services.

p. Submission of virement within the defence programme structure.

**EXECUTE DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

82. **Decentralised Execution.**

a. Service and staff divisions will establish own comprehensive financial management capabilities in accordance with the defence staff system.

b. Combat services and units at all levels will manage and account for own financial resources.

c. Such financial management capabilities will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub sub-unit level.

d. The functional control of finance will cascade to the lowest level via the staff line.

83. **Procurement.**

a. Greater collocation of finance and procurement will be sought to expedite defence supplier payments.

b. Procurement will be a finance function. The logistic function will commence upon delivery when goods are brought onto charge.

c. Logistic and financial delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not
beyond unit level.

84. **Finance as a Combat Service Support Function.** Defence financial management will be executed as follows:

a. **5th line** financial management support from the National Treasury, Reserve Bank and other financial institutions.

b. **4th line** deeper level financial support from the Chief Staff Finance and finance staffs at combat services and staff divisions.

c. **3rd line** deployable financial management, including forward positioning in the communication zone. (Typically on Division level.)

d. **2nd line** intermediate financial management in the theatre. (Typically on Brigade level.)

e. **1st line** organisational support from the units own financial management support structures. (Typically on Battalion level.)

**DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE**

85. Defence financial management doctrine will be informed by the defence mission and the spectrum of the strategic goals and strategic tasks. Financial management doctrine shall be based on Defence Doctrine and shall deliver a single, rigorous, comprehensive financial management process, founded on best practice military financial principles and philosophy.

**DEFENCE FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM**

86. The defence financial information system will be a seamless component of the wider defence enterprise system, providing reliable real-time logistic information, technology, networking and automation. The defence financial information system will enhance effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity in the financial system, providing (*inter alia*):

a. Real-time financial management.

b. Real-time fault diagnostics.

c. Optimal financial data integrity.

d. Automated financial accounting.

e. Automated financial reporting.

f. Personnel payments aligned with national prescripts.

g. Supplier payment integrated with supply chain management.

h. Interactive and tracked electronic technical and other documentation.

i. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems

j. Work scheduling.
87. Therefore, it is critical that the future, the defence financial information system must be based on the single, rigorous, comprehensive and tailorable financial management process.

**FINANCIAL EXPERTISE**

88. **Establishment of a Finance Corps.** The defence financial management system is a core component of defence combat service support which must be provided from the 5th Level to the 1st line within the theatre of operations. This necessitates that the vast majority of defence financial officials are required to be in uniform. To this end:

   a. The personnel within the existing Finance Management Division, and those other defence personnel previously de-militarised from the Finance Corps, will be offered the opportunity to take-up uniform once again. Those that do not wish to take-up uniform will remain in the financial management system, but may not be utilised beyond the 4th line of support.

   b. A Finance Corps will be established with its unique personnel management and personnel development systems.

   c. Finance functional training will be established whereby finance officials will be educated and trained in the functional areas identified within a finance learning path focussed on defence financial management practises and processes.

89. **Performance Agreements.**

   a. Whilst the Chief Staff Finance will enter into a performance agreement with the Chief of Staff, the Finance Managers at Service and Division level will enter into a performance agreements with the respective Service or Division’s Chief of Staff.

   b. Finance officials within the Finance Office at Service and Divisional level enter into performance agreements with the appropriate finance manager or supervisor.

   c. Finance officials deployed at lower levels of the Services and Divisions will receive their performance agreements from their direct Commanding Officer or supervisor, as appropriate.

90. **Ensuring Appropriate Finance Personnel.**

   a. The future defence financial management system will be reliant on specialist skills such as Chartered Accountants filling key posts. To this end:

      i. An occupational specific dispensation will be pursued to obtain and retain such specialist staff.

      ii. Agreements will be entered into with educational institutions to develop capable defence financial personnel into Chartered Accountants through specific training interventions.

   b. Specific measures will be taken to ensure to ensure sustained availability of financial personnel, including remunerative and non-remunerative means as well as intensive education, training and development programs.
c. Special focus will be placed on ensuring the availability of appropriate, quality, competent financial officials through attracting, recruiting, educating, training, developing, retaining, motivating, correctly deploying and eventually intelligently redeploying sufficient competent financial personnel.

d. The continuous staffing of the financial management system will be achieved by rotating personnel within the Services and Staff Divisions.

DEFENCE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES

91. Financial management short term priorities:

a. Implementation of a single financial management information system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system as the first and primary intervention.

b. The establishment of the Chief of the Defence Force as the Defence Accounting Officer, supported and capacitated by:

i. A Chief of Staff who assist the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging resource management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.

ii. A Chief Staff Personnel who assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging personnel duties related to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 and the Treasury Regulations and the Public Service Act, 1994 and the Public Service Regulations.

iii. A Chief Staff Logistics who assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging logistic duties related to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999.


v. A Chief Staff Finance who assists the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging financial management duties related to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended).

c. The establishment of organic financial structures and finance personnel to capacitate the Chief of the Defence Force and commanders at all levels to control defence resources and account therefore.

d. Rolling out a comprehensive system of financial, procurement and logistic delegations to the lowest appropriate level in the Defence Force.

e. Providing financial agency service to the Minister and the Defence Secretary.

f. The establishment of a Finance Corps.
g. Placing personnel within the existing Finance Management Division, and those other defence personnel previously de-militarised from the Finance Corps, in uniform, where appropriate.

92. Financial management longer term priorities:
   a. Migration to the accrual financial system and the complete adoption of the Standard Charter of Accounts.
   b. Elimination of all adverse audit findings in the financial field.
   c. Establishment of the defence financial framework in law.

DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

93. Defence information is a strategic resource over which the Defence Force must exert complete control, ensure inviolable security and maintain absolute autonomy, this from the 5th to the 1st line of combat service support. Appropriate Defence Information and Communication Systems will be informed by the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks and the derived force structure to be supported.

94. The concept of ‘information as a strategic resource’ will drive all thinking on defence information management, hence the use of the term “information resource management”.

DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

95. Common Systems. Common defence information and communication systems must be capable of delivering combat service support both internally and externally in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine. To this end the following principles will apply from the 5th to the 1st level of combat service support:

   a. Access to Defence Information.
      i. Information and Communication Systems must enable access to relevant defence information required for the execution of functional tasks securely, efficiently when and where required by acquiring, accessing and distributing information to remote locations in a secure manner. Efficient secure connectivity must be established between sensors and military, corporate and common information and communication systems.
      ii. Defence must maintain autonomy in terms of providing access to information residing on its information and communications system infrastructure.
      iii. Accurate, quality, non-duplicated and relevant information must be available to authorised users in the correct form, format and when required.

i. An aspect of modern warfare is the use of non-lethal weapon capabilities which invoke battle between adversaries for the exploitation and protection of the Information and Communication Systems. The protection of information as a strategic resource places emphasis on the requirement to develop a significant offensive and defensive capability to exploit and defend information systems.

ii. The defence information and communication systems security architecture must be aligned across all systems to consistently maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and communications.

c. Economic Optimisation.

i. Defence information and communication systems must be centred on modern, technologically advanced, efficient and effective, yet affordable information and communication technology capabilities. Such capabilities are constrained by scarce financial resources and thus emphasis will be placed on overall value-for-money on administrative systems based on proven technology.

ii. The development of shared defence information and communication systems will enjoy precedence over the duplication of systems with similar functionality. The emphasis will thus fall on a common information and communication technology architecture.

iii. COTS (commercial off the shelf) and MOTS (military off the shelf) must be the first order procurement considerations. A pragmatic approach based on local procurement will be applied whenever it is the most cost-efficient method.


i. Defence command-and-control and administrative information systems must provide accurate, relevant and timely information to all levels of command during force preparation, employment and support activities, to every sphere of business and military arenas.

ii. Information processing must synchronise and replicate information between geographical operational areas to maintain self-sustaining operating environments.

96. Unique Systems. Combat services and staff divisions are responsible for own unique information and communication technology service delivery, maintenance and disposal portion of the life-cycle management process.

DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM OBJECTIVES

97. Information Resource Management. The management of information as a strategic resource extends to the planning, policy maintenance, strategic control and research and development of integrated information management services, including the ‘life-cycle’, archiving and configuration management of information.
98. **Joint Information Systems Management.** The concept of information as a resource will drive future information systems management. Defence information requirements will be translated into joint information systems and infrastructure needed to meet such information requirements.

99. **Joint Information Warfare.** Joint information Warfare to defend defence information and communication systems and technology against attack and to adversely influence hostile forces’ use of their own information systems. Information System Security is the primary capability which protects own information systems against attack or unauthorised access. Information Warfare is primarily concerned with adversely influencing opposing forces’ utilisation of information systems.

100. **Joint Information Communications Infrastructure Management.** The management and technical support of the defence information and communication infrastructure extends to the life-cycle management of defence information product systems, technical support and interoperable, interconnected and standardised information technology infrastructure.

101. **Spectrum Management.** Spectrum management at international and national level extends to the coordination of spectrum use with entities such as commercial spectrum users and government institutions. This requires efficient joint management of the radio frequency spectrum within the Defence Force.

102. **Integrated Information Systems.** Information system integration extends across Defence Enterprise Information System portfolios through centralised strategic control and integration of defence enterprise information systems.

**DEFENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY**

103. There are mandatory criteria and changes in the information and communication technology environment requiring an appropriate defence governance, risk and compliance regime conducive to the realisation of affordable and appropriate Information and Communication systems and Technology.

104. A Defence Information and Communication System Interoperability Framework must be established, maintained and aligned with interoperability standards to ensure connectivity between defence administrative and command and control systems. Defence intellectual property related to the development of information and communication systems must be maintained and managed within this framework.

105. The successful implementation of a Defence Information and Communication Systems Strategy will guide the realisation of key information and communication technology outcomes in alignment with defence strategic goals and tasks. This in turn will support the setting of defence standards for the secure utilisation of appropriate information. The Defence Information and Communication Systems Strategy will address five strategic focus areas (Figure 84), being:

a. Optimised value of the defence information and communication technology investment.

b. Effective information and communication technology.

c. Integrated information and communication technology enablement.

d. Professional information and communication technology organisation.
e. Secure and protected information and communication technology.

106. The five strategic focus areas do not in any manner reflect priority or sequence of importance. All are of equal importance.

**DIRECT COMMON DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS**

107. Strategic direction for common defence information and communication systems will be centralised, while the execution will be decentralised to the Joint Information and Communication Systems Command. Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems (CS6) is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control common defence information and communication systems through *inter alia* the provision of logistic policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.
b. Determining information systems output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.

c. Managing common-use systems by a single point of responsibility so as to achieve efficiency and economy of scale through standardisation and consolidation.

d. Positioning the commercial sector to support both the life-cycle and acquisition of defence information and communication systems.

e. Supplying strategic direction to the Joint Information and Communication Systems Command.

EXECUTE COMMON DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

108. Defence Information and Communication Systems support will be executed as follows:

   a. 5th line information and communications systems support from the national or international commercial sector or the defence.

   b. 4th line deeper level information and communications systems support from within the Defence Force.

   c. 3rd line deployable support from the Information and Communication Systems Command within the communication zone. (Typically on Division level.)

   d. 2nd line intermediate support from the Information and Communication Systems Command in the theatre. (Typically on Brigade level.)

   e. 1st line organisational support from the unit’s own internal support structures. (Typically on Battalion level.)

109. The Joint Communications and Information Systems Command, within the joint communication systems policy and doctrine developed by Chief Staff Information and Communication Systems (CS6), will provide common information and communications support transversely across the Defence Force.

110. The Joint Communications and Information Systems Command is the information and communication systems integrator for the Defence Force across both common and universal/transverse systems and will provide the operational management of defence information systems through the objectives listed hereunder. This may occur at both Level 3 and Level 4 of the organisation.

THE DEFENCE FOOTPRINT

DEFENCE FACILITIES

111. In fulfilment of its constitutional obligations Defence utilises a large number of State facilities. This includes land for training and research purposes and fixed assets such as buildings, roads and runways for force preparation and employment. Defence is consequently one of the largest users of property in South Africa and controls land in each of the nine provinces of South Africa.
Africa. The defence property requirement stems from its core functions and activities and range from the larger training areas, Army bases, Air Force bases and ammunition depots, to smaller properties such as communication sites, shooting ranges and even remote observation posts of only a few square metres.

112. Government owns most facilities utilised by Defence. This land is legally owned by the South African Government with Defence having a reservation of use, although the deeds are held by the Department of Public Works which is the national custodian of all state land and facilities. Some defence land is Defence Endowment Property received from the Government of the United Kingdom in 1922 which is also classified as State Land. Such property is governed by an Act of Parliament, Act No 33 of 1922 (the Defence Endowment Property and Account Act). The remaining infrastructure is generally leased from the private sector. In addition, Defence leases properties for shooting ranges used by the Reserve Component, for Forward Airfields and sites used for the countrywide communication network. Defence also has "rights of use" agreements with land owners that allow certain land to be used for military purposes.

THE DEFENCE LAND REQUIREMENT

113. Defence currently has approximately 420 000 hectares of land under its control. However, the DOD strives to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the use of facilities and has achieved a considerable reduction in its footprint by surrendering unused land to the Department of Public Works. The Government-Wide Immovable Asset Management Act (Act 19 of 2007) has emphasised this matter and Defence strives to comply therewith. Since 1986, the Defence has consequently returned approximately 311 000 hectares of land to the Department of Public Works, largely as a result of a change in defence posture, internal rationalisation, restitution claims and urban and agricultural pressures.

114. Defence however requires land to prepare for its primary operational purpose. This includes the following general categories, each being in itself a significant consideration in determining the size of defence properties. However, it should be noted that more than one of these activities could take place on any portion of defence land.

   a. Training Combat Elements. The specific combat element and role for which training is required (for example deployment of mechanised or motorised infantry in conventional, peace-keeping or area protection roles) will determine the area of land needed to train the force. This means that the area needed for training will be determined by the combat elements (or combination of combat elements) to be trained.

   b. Type of Training. The types of training to be conducted also have an effect on the area of land needed for training. Smaller areas are required for dry training, field craft training and vehicle training than are required for training with live ammunition. A variety of geographical features and veld types should be present to simulate different scenarios within which skills are to be acquired.


   d. Spatial Implications of Safety Templates. The types of weapons and the combinations in which they are deployed have a profound influence on the area of land required. The safety arc for each weapon is clearly defined and must be strictly adhered to. Such
safety templates form an integral part of any military base where armed training takes place. The size of a military base where armed training is performed is to a large extent determined by the ammunition used in training and the linked safety templates. The size of a military training area usually increases with the use of higher order ammunition, which requires larger safety templates.

e. Base Areas, Administrative Areas, Maintenance Areas and Stores Depots. The sizes of these facilities are to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform this function.

f. Ammunition Depots. Ammunition depots are used to store large quantities of defence ammunition. Variables that have an influence on the size of these depots include the types of munitions to be stored and the prescribed safety margins. Different types of munitions, for instance pyrotechnics and projectiles, are stored in separate bunkers for safety reasons. Clearly defined safety distances are maintained between bunkers, as well as on the perimeter.

g. Weapon Ranges. The size of weapon ranges is determined by the maximum application distance and safety arcs of weapons to be employed.

h. Naval Bases. The size of these facilities is to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform their function and to allow for the training of personnel.

i. Air Force Bases. Apart from runways and infrastructure provision, a large number of variables, such as restricted air space, aerial approach zones, safety areas on the perimeter and radio frequency requirements, are taken into account in determining the size of an air force base.

j. Telecommunication Installations. A major consideration in determining the size of telecommunication installations is the required presence of a magnetically clear spectrum around the facilities.

k. Rifle Ranges. Rifle ranges are designed and established according to a set of clearly defined guidelines. Variables which might come into play include land use activities on adjacent properties and the distance from residential infrastructure.

115. The migration towards the Defence Blueprint Force Design means that the defence infrastructure footprint will have to be consolidated and more efficiently utilised. The Force Design will serve as the basis for considering defence facilities and environmental support requirements. The re-definition of core military activities and design will subsequently influence existing defence land and facilities and may result in land and facilities that are redundant and the disposal thereof will have a right-sizing effect on the defence facility and land portfolio. Any further reduction in the DOD footprint would have to be executed in a responsible and strategic manner so as not to impact on Defence Capabilities and the operational readiness of the Defence Force. Surplus and redundant facilities will be surrendered to the Department of Public Works for alternative utilisation or disposal.

116. Defence intends to decrease the number of leased properties by translating the portfolio of leased properties to that of ownership of defence properties. This may, where possible, be pursued by pursuing alternate funding models, such as cooperation with the Public Investment Corporation
CONSULTATIVE DRAFT

(PIC) or Public Private Partnerships (PPP) where possible within the framework established by the National Treasury.

117. Chief Staff Logistics (CS4) will establish a comprehensive DOD Facility Strategy that will include the DOD Footprint. In so doing new ways will be explored to manage Defence facilities in a consolidated and proactive manner, including co-use and cooperation agreements.

REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE OF DEFENCE FACILITIES

118. The matter of the Repair and Maintenance of DOD facilities has gained considerable prominence in recent years. Repair and maintenance is the responsibility of the Department of Public Works. However, funding constraints have severely hindered the maintenance of essential defence infrastructure, giving rise to a significant maintenance backlog which impacts directly on the operational readiness of the SANDF and its ability to prepare and employ forces.

119. Defence has consequently engaged in a significant Repair and Maintenance Programme (RAMP) in collaboration with the Department of Public Works. To a large extent this has been supported through the provision of additional funding through the annual MTEF Policy Options. These consolidated interventions will contribute to the reduction of the backlog.

120. The Defence Works Formation is to take over the full responsibility of the Department of Public Works and manage the renewal of defence assets. The Defence Works Formation, as well as SA Army Field Engineer Regiments in each province, will focus on the reduction of the repair and maintenance backlog of defence infrastructure, as well as arresting the further deterioration of DOD facilities.

CO-USE OF DEFENCE FACILITIES

121. There is great pressure to become more cost-effective in defence facility management, while at the same time ensuring that the Defence Force retains its proficiency. This necessitates the exploration of alternative ways to finance and maintain defence facilities.

122. The private sector has lodged many requests for the co-use of defence facilities in recent years. Under-developed land and under-utilised facilities can be made available for additional uses, providing there is coherence with existing defence facilities and military activities are not compromised. The principal restricting factor in this regard is security and safety. In many cases, alternative use will require a portion of land or facilities to be isolated from the main defence activities. Defence may give consideration to entering into joint ventures with developers and conservation organisations to minimise the cost of managing defence facilities and to improve defence infrastructure without drawing on additional state funds.

LAND RESTITUTION

123. Defence is committed to the equitable resolution of land restitution claims in the spirit of enhancing social justice. The Restitution of Land Rights Act was approved by Parliament in 1994 and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was established in 1995. Defence is affected by certain restitution claims that have been made against defence land. The restitution process provides a framework and various options which can be used to arrive at an appropriate solution through negotiation by the parties or adjudication by the Land Claims Court. Restitution can take the following forms: restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed; provision of alternative land; payment of compensation; alternative relief including a package containing a
combination of the above, sharing of the land, or special budgetary assistance such as services and infrastructure development where claimants presently live; or priority access to state resources in the allocation and the development of housing and land in the appropriate development programme.

124. Although Defence has prioritised the restoration of the land concerned, rather than other forms of restitution, this has not always been possible. In some cases the land has been retained and compensation has been made, or alternative land provided. Certain land claims remain in the restitution process and will be finalised in collaboration with the Land Claims Commissioner or in the courts. In all instances, Defence remains committed to the principle of equitable restitution.

125. **Principles.** Defence will apply the following principles in relation to land restitution:

   a. Commitment to the Constitution and the Land reform programme of the Government is reaffirmed.

   b. A pro-active approach towards restitution is adopted.

   c. Preference will be given to the restoration of land rather than other forms of restoration.

   d. Commitment to the speedy resolution of restitution cases.

   e. Creative alternatives explored in cases where land cannot be restored.

   f. Where defence land is handed back to claimants, the acquisition of alternate land will be assessed in terms of core defence functions and activities.

   g. The acquisition of alternative land arising from settlement transfers will be determined consensually amongst all relevant government departments and ministries.

   h. Commitment to transparency in the restitution process.

   i. Commitment to the resolution of land claims through negotiations and will only use the Land Claims Court as a last resort.

   j. Land under claim will be made available for restitution unless the Department of Defence deems it not feasible. Non-feasibility could be due to:

      i. Financial cost.

      ii. Unique location of the facility.

      iii. Unique military requirements.

      iv. Strategic value of the facility.

**DISPOSAL OF DEFENCE FACILITIES**

126. Base closure is a complex issue requiring careful consideration of processes, role players and time frames. The closure of defence properties presents both opportunities and serious challenges. Some of the major problems associated with defence base closure are the following:
a. The loss of employment opportunities in defence and associated industries as well as within local supporting economies.

b. Some defence properties are environmentally contaminated and often require very costly clean-up operations.

c. Maintenance and protection of the bases before reuse or ultimate disposal can be costly.

d. The development opportunities arising from the reuse of bases can be plentiful depending on the geographic location and infrastructure of the base concerned. Developmental factors will be a major consideration taken into account when evaluating the various land use and conversion options for obsolete bases.

127. State Land which is surplus to the requirements of all government departments is usually handed back to the Department of Public Works. Due to changes in force design and land claims, the remediation, clean-up, closure, handing over and subsequent disposal of redundant state land will need to take place in a coordinated manner.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENCE ESTATES AGENCY

128. A Defence Estates Agency will be established in legislation as a public entity under ownership control of the Minister of Defence to:

   a. Consolidate and more efficiently utilise defence properties.

   b. Decrease the number of leased properties where possible.

   c. Manage defence facilities in a consolidated and proactive manner, including co-use and cooperation agreements.

   d. Manage defence land and facilities in a sustainable manner aimed at minimising the negative activities of military activities on land and facilities.

129. The Defence Estates Agency will have a well-defined framework shareholder compact that gives clear direction on the manner in which the Agency will operate. The shareholder compact will set out the Agencies:

   a. Policy, budget and deliverables.


   c. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

130. The functional direction for the Agency will arise from the defence facilities strategic plan established by the Chief Staff Logistics (CS4).

131. Once priorities and the business plan are set, the management of the Agency will have as much independence as possible in deciding how those objectives are met. Provided that a clear framework exists, the Agency will be as free as possible to manage itself within that framework. This includes structure, recruitment and remuneration.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT APPROACH

132. The increasing emphasis on the sustainable use of natural resources requires a complete review of military operations including construction, base operations, and training management policies. Urban sprawl causes defence installations and facilities to compete with other local stakeholders for natural resources. Public complaints over dust and noise, demands for urban development of “prime” real estate, and increasing requirements for minerals, grazing land and water are all external forces that compete with the use of land by the military.

133. By effectively integrating environmental considerations into the planning and execution of all military activities, Defence can minimise the adverse effects of its activities as well as make a substantial social contribution towards the conservation and sustainable utilisation of environmental resources in South Africa.

134. Defence is committed to the responsible use and management of land and facilities under its control during the execution of its core functions to minimise and manage its impact on the environment. The role of the environment in defence is complex. Sound environmental management reduces the impact of defence activities on the environment and therefore environmental management is an integral part of the defence management system.

135. Sustainable environmental management of defence training areas will ensure that the quality of the defence land resources is maintained for realistic training in future. Incorporating environmental practices into military procedures and operations will have financial benefits such as reducing energy costs and clean-up, disposal or litigation costs.

136. Defence remains committed to the principles of Military Integrated Environmental Management through a Corporate Environmental Management Plan and an Operational Environmental Implementation Plan that prescribe how integrated environmental management will be operationalised in Defence. Accordingly, defence land and facilities will be managed sustainably in accordance with the relevant legislation, policies, norms and standards that are aimed at minimising the negative activities of military activities on land and facilities.

137. Military Integrated Environmental Management will be dealt with in an integrated manner as a recognised and dedicated defence support function through funded corporate programmes. Military activities will be fulfilled in accordance with environmentally sustainable best practices. This commitment applies across the scope of military activities applicable to strategic direction, preparation, support and the employment of forces.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

138. Human security is promoted and threatened by a variety of economic, cultural, political and environmental factors. Exploring linkages between the environment and security has long been a familiar theme of world politics. Geography confers advantages and disadvantages that are well known to military planners. Important resources are often unevenly distributed or hard to monopolize. Global environmental change and human security refers to efforts to link security to environmental change and therefore large-scale hazards to human security are posed by global environmental change include climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, changes in hydrological systems and supplies of fresh water.
139. The relationship between human security, global environmental change and Military Integrated Environmental Management is indicated in Figure 85 below.

**Figure 85: Military Environmental Management Model**

**ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY**

140. Environmental scarcity is determined by environmental change, population size and growth, and unequal distribution (or access to) resources. Of these factors, unequal access to resources is not bound by physical limits alone. Leading examples of emerging environmental change are: depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, depletion of fisheries, degradation and disappearance of biodiversity, degradation and loss of agriculture lands, food and health safety, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global warming. These challenges will likely be growing threats to environmental security and ultimately increasingly affect human security in future.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENT LIABILITY

141. The obligation to clean-up unexploded ordnance (UXO) and spillages on defence training areas constitute an environmental contingent liability that must be disclosed in the annual defence financial statements. Although defence training areas are swept for blinds and misfires after training exercises, they are not entirely cleared, and unexploded ordnance as well as contamination from explosive debris is left behind, which poses a threat to human life and the environment, either for new inhabitants of the area or for participants in the following training exercise. Procedures and models must be developed to identify, determine and disclose such contingent environmental liabilities.

ENVIRONMENTAL CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE

142. Defence environmental policy and activities are consistent with national environmental policy, and promotes co-operation with environmental bodies. Defence Regional Environmental Advisory Forums will be used to enlist the support of external experts in the management of military properties.

GRAVES AND BURIAL SITES

143. Some of the defence areas contain burial sites. Relatives and descendants are allowed to visit these graves when training activities permit and with due regard to their safety. Defence will remain sensitive to this issue and this practice will continue. This will be properly regulated in Regulations to standardise procedures and set public liability regarding access to such burial sites on military properties. This will be based on an inventory of all graves on defence controlled areas.

CLEAN-UP AND REMEDIATION OF DEFENCE TRAINING AREAS

144. Defence training activities have a variety of environmental impacts on land, water or air. The environmentally destructive effects and by-products of military operations, such as unexploded ordnance, shrapnel, targets and debris which leach explosives and heavy metals into groundwater, all forms of waste, pollution, fuel spills and other chemicals released as a result of military action, and the destruction of vegetation by military vehicles or explosives threaten the integrity of the physical environment and natural resources and have become central drivers for cleanup and remediation due to its inherent risk to personnel, the public and the environment.

145. Informed by safety considerations, Defence will regularly clear training areas after training exercises, as well as on an annual basis. This entails the clearing of all unexploded ordnance and other visually detected debris. To this end, an inherent Military Range Clearance (MRC) capability will be established. This process will use an integrated seven step process to include environmentally friendly detection of unexploded ordnance and subsurface clearance technologies as well as models and tools for determining the costing, prioritisation and Geographic Information System (GIS) decision support for the clean-up and remediation of all live fire military training areas.

ENVIRONMENT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

146. The incorporation of environmental considerations in the planning and execution of joint, combined and multi-national exercises as well as external deployments will be provided for in force preparation and force employment processes. Defence environmental personnel will be deployed to advise and assist on environmental best practice and ensure the implementation of the necessary remediation measures following the demobilisation of forces.
1. South Africa is one of the top thirty economic actors in the world, is located in a region that suffers instability, is drawing the attention of major powers keen on securing access to its resources, and is not aligned to any major power.

2. The logic of this situation argues for South Africa to have effective defence capability, which includes, as an integral element, a defence industry to support the Defence Force, granting a valuable measure of strategic independence.

3. A defence industrial sector will be developed that will:
   a. Meet the critical needs of the Defence Force:
   b. Add substance to South Africa's deterrent posture;
   c. Add substance to South Africa's standing as a country; and
   d. Provide the ability to employ defence equipment sales as a tool of foreign policy.

4. Further while that defence industry will depend heavily on government orders, it will also:
   a. Bring valuable technological spin-offs for the wider economy and industry;
   b. Play a crucial role in developing the country's intellectual and skills capital;
   c. Make a major contribution to GDP growth;
   d. Generate foreign currency earnings from export sales and the support of exported equipment and systems;
   e. Reduce foreign currency spending for defence equipment.

5. A vibrant, focused defence industry is, thus, a major asset to the country, strengthening defence and security capability, supporting foreign policy initiatives, and supporting the national development agenda.

6. The objective here must be to develop a healthy partnership between the Defence Force and its supporting industry, with the local industry in principle enjoying preference where it can practicably and cost-effectively meet requirements.
7. The intention of government is to maintain and further develop South Africa’s defence industry as a key national asset, and all national departments will be required to invest in the process and will utilise the industry’s capabilities.

8. This will give South Africa a defence and security industrial base that will provide:
   a. Strategic independence;
   b. ‘Sovereign’ capability in selected areas;
   c. Optimised equipment and systems;
   d. Economic benefit derived from necessary defence expenditure; and
   e. Increased access for Black businesses and Military Veterans to a technology-intensive industry.

9. ‘Strategic independence’ here means the ability of the Defence Force to perform its key functions for extended periods without a need for direct foreign support in respect of critical capabilities. This will chiefly require South Africa to retain the capability to:
   a. Support, maintain and repair critical equipment and systems;
   b. Manufacture critical munitions;
   c. Manufacture critical batteries;
   d. Manufacture such high rate-of-use spares and other items as cannot be either:
      i. Stockpiled in sufficient quantity;
      ii. Brought into production at short notice without direct foreign assistance; or
      iii. Acquired from multiple foreign sources via multiple channels, to negate an embargo by one or more governments.

10. ‘Sovereign capability’ here means the ability to ensure, under full national control and without reliance on any direct foreign assistance, certain capabilities identified as vital to national security, including secure communications, elements of electronic warfare and specifically, the relevant algorithms and relevant software. This will require:
   a. The capability to integrate and support such systems and equipment;
   b. The capability to develop and support relevant algorithms and software;
   c. The capability to develop and manufacture certain equipment locally, which does not exclude the use of imported components; and
d. The control of those capabilities by a South African entity (refer to paragraph 29 below).

11. 'Optimised' here refers to equipment and systems specifically developed or adapted to meet the demands set by:

a. A harsh and unforgiving operating environment: heat, dust, torrential rain, little infrastructure and few and poor roads;

b. A demanding operational environment: Low force densities that require dispersed operations, no clearly defined front line or even area of operations, insecure lines of supply;

c. The operational style developed by the Defence Force to meet those challenges: High-mobility/high-tempo, dispersed, joint operations; and

d. The need to be interoperable with selected legacy equipment and systems.

12. Examples of such optimised equipment are wheeled combat vehicles (good operational mobility), long-range artillery (support of dispersed force elements) and rugged logistic vehicles, as well as communications equipment suited to those operational, geographic and climatic conditions.

13. 'Defence-Specific Definitions'. The definition of what is “critical”, where “sovereign” control is required, and where the benefits of “optimisation” justify the investment and cost, will be developed and set out in the Defence Industry Strategy, and amended from time to time as the strategic situation may require,

14. 'Economic Benefit'. The potential to leverage wider economic and industrial opportunity on the basis of necessary expenditure on defence and security equipment and systems has been demonstrated in several 'developing' countries:

a. Manufacturing and supporting defence matériel creates skilled and semi-skilled jobs and develops the experience and skills of the people involved, both within the defence industry itself and in the general industry companies that form part of the defence and security supply chain, executing sub-contracts or supplying some related equipment or components;

b. Development of defence equipment establishes, and can sometimes develop, new technologies, techniques and processes that ‘spin off’ to other sectors of industry to the benefit of the national economy, enhancing international competitiveness and supporting the national development agenda;

c. Defence research and development develops new technologies that also ‘spin off’ to other sectors, supporting the National System of Innovation and also further reinforcing the development agenda; and

d. People with skills and experience gained in the defence industry also ‘spin off’ to other sectors, expanding the national skills and experience base.
15. It is not the intention to recreate the exceptional breadth and depth of capabilities that was a feature of the defence industry during the period of the arms embargo, as that:

   a. Is not essential to South Africa’s national security;
   
   b. Would be neither cost-effective nor practicable at a time when defence companies worldwide are having to ‘globalise’ to survive; and
   
   c. Would tend to remove the industry from relevant global supply chains, making it increasingly difficult to win substantial export orders.

16. The intention is to focus on those areas and sectors of defence technology and manufacturing that offer real potential to meet the goals set out in paragraph 3, above.

17. It is also the intention to ensure that the flow of national contracts for defence and security research, development, manufacturing and support is such that:

   a. The Defence Force brings equipment and systems into service at a steady rate to ensure an efficient commissioning process and to avoid block obsolescence; and
   
   b. The domestic defence and security industry has a viable base load of work to:

      i. Sustain research, design, development, industrialisation and manufacturing capabilities and capacities;
      
      ii. Enable it to continuously renew itself in terms of human capital and capital equipment; and to
      
      iii. Serve as a base for export ventures.

18. It is, further, the intention that the Defence Force, like all other government entities, will contribute toward addressing national strategic concerns, especially developmental drivers such as education, health and economic development. The defence industry’s range of products and services will, therefore, also reflect the collateral utility of the Defence Force to the country.

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

19. The focus of national support for the defence industry, based on military priorities, will, therefore, be on exclusive local sourcing, insofar as practicable, in the following areas:

   a. Support of equipment, systems and weapons and the related training systems and facilities;
   
   b. Manufacture of critical munitions;
   
   c. Manufacture of critical, specialised batteries and other energy sources;
   
   d. Manufacture of critical and high-rate-of-use spares and other stores;
e. System integration, to:
   i. Allow optimisation of equipment and systems for specific Defence Force requirements; and to
   ii. Minimise political/strategic risk;

f. Modernisation and upgrading of equipment and systems to extend service lives;
g. Development of specific critical equipment and systems;
h. Development of specific optimised equipment and systems;
i. Sustained manufacture of equipment required in large numbers or amounts;

20. This will be accompanied by a focus on ensuring:
   a. The commercial viability of South African defence products, particularly with an eye to their acquisition by other regional and continental armed forces; and
   b. Cross-pollination of civilian and military capabilities.

KEY SECTORS

21. The focus of that support for those capability areas will be on the following sectors:

   a. Secure communications;
   b. Information technology, including data fusion technology;
   c. Intelligence gathering, analysis and evaluation technology;
   d. Electronic warfare technology;
   e. Rugged tactical vehicles optimised for operations in the African theatre;
   f. Mine and IED detection and protection technology; and
   g. Long-range artillery systems.
   h. Chemical, biological and radiological defence.
   i. Battlefield medical care optimised for the African theatre of operations.
   j. Modelling and simulation.

22. The aerospace sector will be considered for inclusion in this group of key sectors, if it is believed that there is real potential to develop a viable product or viable capabilities in particular niche areas. It may, for instance, be possible to:
   a. Expand South Africa’s capabilities in the field of unmanned aerial systems on the basis of existing capabilities in that field and in related fields, and on the basis of the airframe development capability resulting from UAV projects and the recently unveiled AHRLAC
concept aircraft;

b. Develop the AHRLAC concept aircraft into a viable operational system with real export potential; or to

c. Build on the Air Force’s medium to long-term requirements for combat support and medium transport helicopters to develop a local manufacturing capability and linked maintenance, repair and overhaul capability to support other helicopters in the wider region.

23. In addition, government will support niche capability areas in which the South African defence and security industry has a demonstrable edge or potential to gain such edge. Among them are:

a. Precision guided weapons;

b. Fire direction systems;

c. Unmanned systems; and

d. Products or technologies in any field in which an edge can be established.

24. Government will further support the establishment of ‘centres of excellence’ for each of the key sectors and areas of competence. This support will be part of the national drive to enhance the National System of Innovation, thereby creating imperatives for other national research bodies, such as the Department of Science and Technology, to invest in these sectors and areas of competence.

25. Government will also seriously consider support for entry into other sectors where there is real potential for success, perhaps in cooperation with other nations and particularly in cooperation with the IBSA partner nations and perhaps within the BRICS structure.

**EXPORT SUPPORT**

26. Finally, government will support export sales, technology transfers and joint ventures by the South African defence and security industry in all areas and sectors, provided that the exports, technology transfers or joint ventures do not:

a. Compromise national security;

b. Conflict with arms export or non-proliferation legislation and policy;

c. In any way expose ‘sovereign’ or strategic technologies; and

d. Hamper the future development of the South African industry.

27. That support will include:

a. Ministerial and wider government support for export marketing drives;

b. Streamlined export approval, including a cabinet level single point of contact and provision for accelerated approval in cases where that is required and where that is in line with national security interests and priorities;
c. ‘Favoured nation’ status for countries identified by foreign or defence policy, for instance the SADC countries, granting automatic approval for some classes of equipment in the absence of any specific case against such approval;

d. Pre-approval of long-term support contracts for identified countries;

e. Defence Force support to demonstrate equipment and to assist client evaluation teams, also forming part of wider defence diplomacy;

f. Immediate supply from Defence Force stocks where practicable and when there is no major implication for national security, with automatic provision for additional defence funding to replace those stocks;

g. Defence Force technical and training support for client forces, also falling within the ambit of defence diplomacy; and

h. Support for the acquisition of South African defence and security equipment, by means of financing assistance, providing export guarantees or similar measures.

i. Support for the acquisition of South African defence and security equipment, by means of offsets and industrial participation, particularly within the SADC and within the wider African continent. Such arrangements must be to the mutual benefit of both countries.

**DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION**

28. The Defence Industrial Participation requirements attached to the acquisition of equipment or systems from abroad, will in future be focussed primarily on:

   a. Ensuring the effective and efficient through-life support of the equipment, including its upgrading as required during its service life;

   b. Ensuring support for key sectors of the industry and/or the establishment of identified key technologies within the industry.

Export facilitation and access to international supply chains will be important factors, but will rank after the above in priority.

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**ACQUISITION POLICY**

29. The intent of the defence industry policy will be supported by a new acquisition policy that is focused on:

   a. Timely and efficient equipment acquisition; and

   b. Sustaining and further developing the South African defence industry.

30. To that end, Government will authorise the Department of Defence to develop a long-term, multi-year acquisition strategy that will:

   a. Enable the Defence Force to develop integrated acquisition plans that will:
i. Bring complete, coherent capability packages into service as single projects, rather than disparate elements of differing capability and unsynchronised service lives (e.g. acquiring equipment for a mechanised infantry battalion as a complete set);

ii. Allow long-term, coherent and integrated modernisation and upgrade plans to be developed and implemented; and

iii. Make possible synchronised inter-service capability planning for enhanced joint forces interoperability.

b. Enable the Defence Force to develop coherent long-term acquisition plans, to:

i. Largely avoid ‘boom and bust’ problems, such as block obsolescence and the loss of project management skills within services, corps and branches;

ii. Achieve long production runs and accompanying economies of scale; and

iii. Make possible properly planned ‘through life’ management of equipment.

c. Enable companies in the defence and security industry to plan their future properly on the basis of the Defence Force’s long-term, integrated capability requirement planning and multi-year manufacturing, modernisation/upgrade and support contracts.

31. The acquisition of technology-sensitive equipment, weapons and systems will be dealt with in such a way as to avoid the challenge of ‘block obsolescence’. One example is a ‘half-generation change-over’ of vehicle fleets, which ensures that no more than half of a particular vehicle fleet is approaching obsolescence at any time, while still giving the industry production runs of useful length. Other types of equipment, for instance some electronics, will require different methods.

32. The intent of the defence industry policy will be further supported by a revised procurement policy that is focused on the geographically decentralised procurement of general stores and services.

33. The purpose of this new procurement policy is:

a. To enable units to procure general stores (e.g. food, stationary, cleaning supplies) and services (e.g. repair of buildings, maintenance and repair of general equipment and civilian-type vehicles) promptly as and when they are needed;

b. To disperse Defence Force procurement expenditure across a wider spectrum of the economy and, particularly, among small and micro businesses; and

c. To embed units in their local economy, thereby further strengthening the linkage between elements of the Defence Force and the communities within which they reside providing stimulus to local economies and contributing to the developmental agenda of government.
34. The Defence Force will fund technology tracking and evaluation of new technologies, contracting research bodies and industry to ensure that it and the industry keep up with trends and developments.

35. Government will support research and development projects in the areas identified in paragraph 14 above, by means of funding:

   a. In-house research and development in niche, specialised or sensitive areas (for instance chemical/biological defence, armour technologies, sensors in the DMA entities);
   b. Background scientific and technology research and development by the CSIR and by universities;
   c. Focused research and development by companies of the defence industry; and
   d. Specific projects proposed by other companies that are of value to defence.

36. Preference in such support will be given to capabilities and technologies of strategic or other particular importance to defence, and to areas of dual-use capabilities and technologies with wider economic and developmental potential, such as solar power technology, water purification and generation, rapid and low-cost bridge-building and fuel cell and battery technology.

37. Government will also support selected ‘blue sky’ research and development that falls into either of the above categories.

38. With an eye to ensuring sovereign control over identified vital technologies and wider strategic independence, the government will control the extent of foreign ownership of South African defence industry companies.

39. Restrictions will apply in respect of equipment and systems related to capabilities that are required to be under sovereign control or are considered essential in the interests of strategic independence. In principle:

   a. The development, manufacture and support of equipment and systems over which sovereign control is deemed essential will, to the extent possible, be restricted to South African defence companies.
   b. The development, manufacture and support of equipment and systems related to strategic independence will, to the extent possible, be restricted to South African defence companies, but may also be contracted to South African based defence companies.

40. ‘South African Defence Company’; A ‘South African’ defence company is one held by at least 51% and fully controlled by South African owners, those being:
a. South African companies with no foreign shareholding exceeding 49% and fully controlled by South African citizens; and/or

b. South African citizens who do not hold any dual nationality; and

c. Whose executive management comprises South African citizens who do not hold any dual nationality; and which, further,

d. Is fully compliant with all relevant South African legislation.

41. This requirement does not preclude a ‘South African’ company participating in a joint venture project with a foreign company, even on a minority share basis, except in that there may be no direct linkage to ‘sovereign’ projects.

42. ‘South African Based Defence Company’: A defence company may be considered to be ‘South African based’ if:

   a. The relevant key manufacturing facilities are in South Africa; and

   b. Control of those facilities rests with South African companies or South African individuals (as defined in 40. a. and b. above) to the extent that development and manufacture can be continued despite a prohibition by the government of the country in which the ownership of the company resides; and

   c. It meets the requirement set out in paragraphs 40.d.

43. South African based companies may compete for the development, manufacture and support of equipment and systems in respect of which ‘strategic independence’ is required, and for the development, manufacture and support of all other equipment, systems, stores and supplies.

44. In exceptional circumstances South African based companies may be considered for ‘sovereign’ items, but only within the framework of contract-specific controls set to ensure sovereign control of that equipment or system.

45. Local defence companies owned and controlled by foreign owners are not considered to be ‘South African’ or ‘South African based’ in respect of ‘sovereign’ equipment or systems or those considered essential for ‘strategic independence’. They may compete for the development, manufacture and support of all other equipment, systems, stores and supplies, and their bids will enjoy an advantage over entirely foreign companies if all else is equal.

46. Such companies may also be allowed to compete for the supply of items required for strategic independence, if they can show that effective local manufacture and support can continue despite the opposition of the government of the country in which they are headquartered or in which the majority of the ownership resides.

47. All companies wishing to compete for Defence Force contracts must also have a record, or in the case of newer companies the demonstrated intent, to support the national development agenda as outlined in government policy from time to time, particularly in respect of a commitment to training and skills development and to deepening and expanding South Africa’s knowledge and technology base. Their performance and/or commitment in this respect, with due allowance for variances in what is practicable in a particular sector and in the case of smaller companies, will be a factor in evaluating bids.
FOREIGN COMPANIES

48. Local branches of foreign companies may compete for the development, manufacture and support of general equipment, systems, stores and supplies.

49. Foreign companies with no South African branch may be allowed to compete for such contracts, but may be required to establish a local branch to manufacture, support or assist with the support of the system or equipment if the contract is awarded to them, if:

   a. That is important to ensure effective support to the Defence Force; or
   b. There is a major economic impact; and if
   c. Such establishment is practicable.

50. All foreign suppliers will be required to meet the industrial participation requirements set by the Department of Defence and the Department of Trade and Industry, as stipulated by national economic and development policy, as well as other relevant legislation.

51. Commitment to supporting South Africa’s national development agenda, will as in respect of South African companies (paragraph 46 above), be a factor in evaluating bids.

STATE CONTROL OR OWNERSHIP

52. The State may retain (or acquire) control, majority or full ownership of companies active in sectors considered sovereign or otherwise particularly strategically sensitive.

53. The State may establish state-owned enterprises in sectors that are key to the intent of the defence industry policy and strategy, as developed from national security and defence policy objectives; but that are not commercially viable in South Africa.

54. Where a commercial entity is active in such a sector, but finds it is no longer viable as a business, the State may:

   a. Acquire that entity;
   b. Acquire control of that entity; or
   c. Invest in that entity or the relevant portion thereof, with regard for the protection and control of that investment.

55. Where the State chooses to acquire control or majority or full ownership of a company, the owners will be compensated to a fair value, taking into account the past investment in the company’s defence capabilities made in good faith by the owners to support the Defence Force.

56. State-owned entities that are potentially viable as commercial enterprises, and that are not engaged in areas that are either ‘sovereign’ or otherwise particularly sensitive, may be sold into private ownership, in whole or in part, provided that there is assurance that this entity will continue with work deemed essential to the Defence Force.
57. Private defence entities may not be sold, in whole or part, to foreign entities without the agreement of the Minister of Defence. In a case where the existing owners must divest themselves of their ownership of a defence industry entity, the State may choose to acquire that entity or a portion thereof at a fair value as per paragraph 54.

58. Similarly, private defence entities may not close certain capabilities or exit the industry without the agreement of the Minister of Defence. Where existing owners must take such action, the State may:
   a. Enter into an agreement with the owners to support retention of that capability, or to ensure the survival of the entity or a part of the entity; or
   b. Acquire the entity, in whole or part, if applicable, compensating the owners to fair value as per paragraph 54.

59. In some cases where this might be a logical course of action, the State may enter into a public-private partnership arrangement with a defence industry entity, for instance a 'government owned/contractor operated' arrangement in respect of a manufacturing facility.

60. All such acquisitions, disposals or other such arrangements will be in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations except where the exigencies of the defence and security environment might demand a departure, in which case a fair outcome for the other party will be ensured by negotiation or arbitration.

**DENEL**

61. Denel remains a publically-owned entity, owned by the Department of Defence, that has the primary purpose of developing, manufacturing or supporting such equipment, weapons and systems as are:
   a. Designated as 'sovereign' or 'strategic'; and
   b. The development, manufacture or support of which is not commercially viable.

62. Denel will, in carrying out such projects, make maximum optimal use of private South African companies in the defence industry and in the general industrial sector, acting as the prime contractor and, where it has the capability to do so, as the system integrator.

63. The relationship between the Defence Force and Denel will, despite its ownership by the Department of Defence, at all times remain a normal contractual one, managed by the Defence Matériel Agency.

64. Denel may also be contracted by other state entities to carry out projects that are key to national strategy, suited to its capabilities and not commercially viable, provided that it can do so without detriment to its primary purpose.

65. Denel may dispose of, wholly or partially, to private owners such divisions that are not involved in 'sovereign' projects or deemed essential to strategic independence or key to the intent of defence industrial policy, subject to the considerations in paragraphs 36 to 56 above.
66. The Department of Defence may allow investors, local and foreign, to acquire minority share holdings in those divisions in which it chooses to retain majority ownership. Any minority shareholding will be strictly monitored to ensure security and sovereignty.

**DEFENCE MATÉRIEL ORGANISATION**

67. Defence acquisition will be carried out by the Defence Matériel Organisation (DMO), which falls under the Minister of Defence, and which combines the functions formerly falling to:

   a. The Defence Matériel Division, and
   b. The Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR).

68. The DMO serves as the armaments acquisition agency for the Defence Force, working through an independent Defence Matériel Tender Board to ensure the necessary checks and balances in the acquisition of equipment, weapons, systems, munitions and related stores.

69. The DMO will also assist the Defence Force to be an 'intelligent buyer' by, in concert with local industry as may be appropriate, conducting, contracting or overseeing:

   a. Evaluation of acquisition, procurement, research, development and manufacturing models in other countries;
   b. Evaluation of life-cycle management practices in other countries;
   c. Research and evaluation in respect of foreign weapons, equipment and systems; and
   d. The planned and focused acquisition and development of new technologies identified as key to the future capability of the Defence Force.

70. The DMO will, in principle, not develop or manufacture equipment, nor compete in any way with local industry, but will conduct, contract or coordinate:

   a. Background technology monitoring and research, to be able to advise the Defence Force and local industry;
   b. Research and development in particularly sensitive areas (eg chemical, biological and radiological defence);
   c. Research and development in areas in which it is already engaged (eg armour technology); and
   d. Research and development in niche areas as may be identified by the Defence Force from time to time.

71. In the event of an urgent operational requirement that cannot be met by industry, from available resources, the DMO may arrange and oversee development and manufacture, be it by sub-contractors or in-house.

72. The DMO has the additional function of supporting and assisting the development of the South African defence industry and its capabilities. In this respect the DMO will work with the Defence Force and the industry to develop acquisition, procurement and logistic/technical support strategies.
that:

a. Ensure optimal acquisition, procurement and support for the Defence Force;

b. Support the national strategy to develop and strengthen the defence industry;

c. Support the industry’s export drive.

### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

73. The ownership of all and any intellectual property in respect of any equipment, system or technology developed under a direct government defence contract or indirectly as part of a direct government defence contract, will reside with the South African State, unless specifically ceded to another body or person, regardless of any patents that may be lodged.

74. Where the cost of development was shared by the developing company, companies or individuals, the ownership of the resulting intellectual property will be held pro rata by the State and those companies or individuals, except insofar as the power to ensure the required level of sovereignty and secrecy resides with the State.

75. The State will not divest itself of such intellectual property except with the agreement of the Minister of Defence that so doing does not present a strategic risk or, failing that agreement, proceeding if it is deemed in the national interest to do so, but noting the objection of the Minister of Defence.

76. The Minister of Defence, advised by the Chief of the Defence Force, will decide on the management of intellectual property related to equipment or systems deemed sovereign or critical to strategic independence.

77. The Chief of Defence Matériel, advised by the Chiefs of the services and divisions, will decide on the management of all other defence intellectual property as referred to in paragraphs 73 and 74 above.

78. The Chief of Defence Matériel is the responsible authority for the management of all Defence-owned intellectual property.

79. As a general principle the Defence Force will not patent its intellectual property, as that would:

a. Entail considerable and ongoing cost; and

b. Compromise the security of the technologies, processes or products concerned.

80. The Defence Force will, instead, ensure the protection of its intellectual property by the implementation of:

a. Best practice in the management of trade secrets; and

81. The ‘spin-off’ of capabilities and technologies from the defence industry and the defence research institutes into the wider South African economy and industry will be encouraged and supported.

82. Royalty arrangements will be managed contractually by the Defence Matériel Organisation for the Department of Defence, with the preferred method being non-monetary by means of re-investment in the defence industry, in defence research or in skills development relevant to defence.

83. Government will also encourage the exchange of ideas between defence companies and companies in other but related fields, to make a contribution to the wider dissemination of knowledge and skills in South Africa.

84. The only restriction in this respect will be that security considerations are taken fully into account, with the release of technologies and the exchange of personnel required to be approved by the Defence Force in any case where confidential matters are involved.

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY STRATEGY

PHASES

85. The following guidelines set out the broad concept for the development of the national defence industrial strategy.

86. Government’s broad strategy for the defence industry has five overlapping phases:

   a. Secure the retention of selected capabilities and capacities and the consolidation of the existing state-owned capacities into the Defence Matériel Organisation;
   b. Ensure sustainment of those capabilities and capacities;
   c. Support the economic turn-around of South African and of South African based defence companies.
   d. Create conditions for further development of the South African defence industry.
   e. Recover, recreate or develop sovereign capabilities.

87. While these phases are essentially sequential, they will in some cases be overlapping or interlocking.

88. The implementation of this strategy will be carried out in step with the development and implementation of the acquisition and procurement policies set out in paragraphs 29 to 33 above.

89. The defence industrial strategy will be aligned and interlinked with government’s wider economic and industrial development strategies, including:
a. Support for small business enterprises; and
b. Furthering the general BBBEE and Military Veterans policies as they develop.

**PHASE 1: SECURING EXISTING CAPABILITIES**

90. The first step towards achieving the desired defence industrial capability is to secure the existing capabilities and capacities as a base from which to expand. Integral to this is the establishment of the Defence Matériel Organisation.

91. This phase will centre on placing short-term contracts locally that are focused on:
   a. Ensuring the immediate survival of particular companies;
   b. Ensuring the immediate retention of particular capabilities and capacities;
   c. Meeting identified requirements of the Defence Force; and
   d. Underpinning pending and potential export orders.

92. Such contracts will include orders for:
   a. Refurbishment of existing equipment that it is intended to keep in service;
   b. Upgrading and modernising certain equipment and systems;
   c. Replenishment of reserve ammunition stocks and spares; and
   d. Continuing existing research and development projects.

93. The Department of Defence may also assist key companies financially to ensure their immediate survival and/or to upgrade facilities. Such assistance must be provided within the regulations of the Public Finance Management Act or in terms of a waiver of those regulations.

94. The South African defence and security industry is a national asset that requires a national approach to ensuring its vitality and survival. All national departments will invest in its capacities and draw on its capabilities as is relevant to their responsibilities.

**PHASE 2: SUSTAINING EXISTING CAPABILITIES**

95. The second phase is to ensure the sustainability of the identified defence companies.

96. This will be done by means of:
   a. Placing multi-year contracts for identified items that are required for training (e.g., munitions, spares) or to replenish the reserve stocks of the Defence Force;
   b. Placing multi-year contracts for the support of equipment and systems in service;
   c. Placing multi-year contracts to meet immediate and near-term equipment needs of the Defence Force, in some cases in phased batches to enable the Defence Force to coherently rebuild certain capabilities while simultaneously providing industry with an extended order book;
d. Adopting an acquisition strategy that makes maximum use of common systems to achieve greater interoperability and easier support in the field on the one hand and greater economies of scale on the other. This strategy will not, however, be allowed to place commonality above mission utility;

e. Informing local companies of planned acquisitions and likely budgets, to enable them to plan ahead and invest appropriately;

f. Expanding the present levels of R&D funding;

g. Actively supporting exports if equipment in production and upgrading of systems and equipment already in service with other forces;

h. Establishing and supporting relevant ‘centres of excellence’; and

i. Supporting relevant undergraduate, post-graduate and technical courses at South African universities and other tertiary educational establishments.

Phased Batches

97. The Army might, for instance, order combined batches of its new infantry combat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and tactical logistic vehicles to fully equip one unit (e.g., a mechanised infantry battalion) at a time. That would enable it to field a fully employable capability, rather than a unit with some new vehicles and many older ones that are not compatible in mobility and protection and have different spare parts requirements.

98. The overall equipment programme could then be phased, with units of different types and differing vehicle needs being re-equipped in a sequence that ensures a smooth order flow for the three vehicle families, to enable the companies involved to plan coherently. Careful planning will give both a balanced force capability development for the Army and balanced production runs for the industry.

99. While this approach will, nevertheless, break up the production runs of all three types to some extent, the companies involved will have long-running production orders over fifteen to twenty years to meet the overall requirement, which will enable them to plan properly.

100. This concept can be applied to most large-scale equipment projects for the Army, and can also be applied at a joint level in respect of certain equipment types required by all of the services, for instance communications equipment and some guided weapons.226

101. The extended production life of these vehicle types and other equipment that is handled on a similar basis will also:

   a. Facilitate any later decision to expand force levels;

   b. Ensure the ability to support short-notice replenishment of munitions or spares and replacement of equipment lost on operations; and

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226 For example, both the Navy and the Army have a requirement for Umkhonto surface-to-air missiles, while both the Air Force and the Navy have applications for the Mokopa helicopter-launched missile. Careful planning of the orders for these missiles will give Denel Dynamics and its sub-contractors a steady base-load of work while ensuring that the services maintain a viable holding of missiles.
c. Support the industry’s export efforts by reassuring potential client nations that the equipment, weapons or systems will be supported and upgraded over an extended period.

PHASE 3: SUPPORTING THE TURN-AROUND

102. The third phase is intended to support a turn-around of the industry aimed at ensuring its long-term viability.

103. This will be achieved by, within identified existing capabilities and within capabilities that can be quickly and efficiently established:

a. Giving the Defence Force medium-term and long-term authority to commit funds to equipment projects and programmes.

b. Standardising on platforms in production or about to enter production to extend production and facilitate through-life support, albeit not favouring commonality at the expense of mission-suitability.

c. Adopting a 'half-generation change-over' policy for equipping the defence force. This will guard against block obsolescence and give both the Defence Force and the industry the benefit of predictable longer production runs.

d. Extending orders for in-production equipment and systems and items about to go into production, to equip approximately half of the existing fleet or envisaged fleet in each case.

e. Actively supporting the export of equipment that is in current production for the Defence Force.

f. Making the Defence Force’s medium-term and long-term requirements and likely budget levels visible to the industry.

h. Supporting joint ventures with foreign defence companies.

i. Guiding and supporting industry-funded research and development to meet future requirements and to pursue some potentially relevant ‘blue sky’ concepts.

PHASE 4: CREATING CONDITIONS CONducive TO Future DEVELOPMENT

104. The fourth phase is intended to establish a base from which the industry will be able to develop into the future and expand its capabilities.

105. This will be achieved by identifying jointly with the industry those areas into which the industry can logically expand and then support that expansion:

a. To meet identified ‘sovereign’ and ‘strategic independence’ requirements;
b. Where there are sufficiently substantial local requirements;

c. Where there is sufficient export or joint venture potential; or

d. Where there is substantial potential for valuable spin-offs into the economy.

106. Export and joint venture potential, together with local requirements, exists in several fields, including guided weapons, artillery systems and areas of electronic warfare, and can be recreated in the field of tactical communications systems if that capability is restored.

107. Areas of potentially substantial economic spin-off exist in software development and in the local manufacture of various military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) items required by the Defence Force that also have civilian applications.

Fleet Expansion and Sustainment

108. The envisaged expansion of the SA Navy could, for instance, provide a sound basis on which to establish a viable naval equipment and systems industry, encompassing:

a. The development of new capabilities (ship-building and fitting out); and

b. The sustainment and expansion of other capabilities (naval systems).

109. The key to achieving this lies in taking advantage of the fortunate confluence among:

a. The number of ships of different types envisaged;

b. The time it will take to build those ships; and

c. The length of their practical operational lives.

110. Naval vessels of the types envisaged for the SA Navy take between two and three years to build, fit out and bring into service, and have an operational life of between twenty (smaller vessels) and thirty (frigates and larger vessels) years.

111. The currently envisaged fleet design could serve a basis for developing and sustaining a South African naval industrial capability:

a. Building and fitting out the new ships envisaged in the current fleet design would provide some twenty years of work;

b. By the time that programme has been completed, the existing frigates will be near the end of their realistic operational lives and will need to be replaced, providing another decade of work; more if the frigate force is expanded to a more realistic strength of six to eight ships; and

c. By the time the replacement frigates have been delivered, the first of the smaller vessels acquired under the programme will have reached the end of their practical operational lives and need to be replaced.

112. A coherent, long-term fleet expansion and sustainment strategy can, thus, produce an indefinite ship-building and outfitting programme that will:
a. Enable shipyards and naval systems companies to develop long-term plans that will:
   
   i. Bring greater efficiencies in building and supporting ships for the SA Navy; and
   
   ii. Allow them to compete for export orders, both in the naval field and in the general commercial marine industry; and

b. Have considerable ‘spin off’ into general industry, especially in metal-working, minor engineering and electronics.

113. A similar, albeit much larger, programme has recently been initiated by the Canadian government with exactly this dual military and commercial benefit in mind.

PHASE 5: ‘SOVEREIGN’ CAPABILITIES

114. Where capabilities that have been identified as requiring sovereign control are in fact controlled by foreign companies, government will either:

   a. Acquire those capabilities from their owners at a fair price; and in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations, or, failing that
   
   b. Re-establish the necessary capabilities within one or more South African entities.

115. In either case this will be accompanied by a focused programme to develop the skills base required for this to be done effectively and efficiently, where possible drawing back into the industry South African individuals with relevant expertise and experience to lay the foundation and to mentor their successors.

KEY AREAS

116. The following sections set out in outline what is envisaged within each of the identified key areas of industrial capability. These capability areas apply particularly in respect of the key sectors identified above (paragraphs 21 to 25), but are also cross-cutting in respect of all sectors.

EQUIPMENT SUPPORT

117. This refers to a coherent system of through-life system management, from acquisition to disposal, including:

   a. Support during the acquisition of foreign-sourced matériel;
   
   b. Commissioning equipment and systems into service;
   
   c. Routine maintenance and overhaul;
   
   d. Battle damage, operational damage and accident repair;
   
   e. Controlled long-term storage and re-commissioning after extended storage;
   
   f. Decommissioning and disposal; and
g. Support for equipment passed on to other armed forces in the context of defence diplomacy in congruence with foreign policy and national security objectives to develop a system of closer defence ties within the SADC and the continent.

118. **Support in Operational Areas.** A related issue is the ability of the industry to support key equipment in the field. This may require the deployment of civilian industry staff into an operational area or on operations. In such cases:

   a. The company concerned remains responsible for the normal remuneration package of such members of its staff and must ensure that the employers of any sub-contracted staff adhere to this rule;

   b. The company concerned, and any sub-contractors, are responsible for the payment of any deployment, danger or similar allowances and any family support allowances or any expenses incurred in providing support to the families of deployed members of their staff. These amounts may, however, be included in the contract price but must be made fully visible in any contract or tender documentation;

   c. The Defence Force will be responsible for the transport, protection, accommodation and subsistence of such company staff to and within the operational area, with those costs being for its account, to be charged against the cost of the operation concerned. Defence industry staff deployed in an operational area will be required to adhere to all instructions issued by the local command in respect of movement and security;

   d. Civilian members of defence industry companies who deploy with South African forces on an operation will be appointed to the Reserve for the duration of that deployment, in an acting rank commensurate with their posts and responsibilities. This will ensure that all South African personnel fall under a single legal system and that such industry staff enjoy the protections accorded to military personnel in the event of capture by opposing forces or arrest by neutral forces. They will be issued, on a temporary basis, with appropriate clothing and personal equipment, which may include firearms if this is considered necessary.

**CRITICAL MUNITIONS AND BATTERIES**

119. This refers particularly but not exclusively to:

   a. All munitions likely to be used in large quantities.

   b. Munitions for locally-developed weapons.

   c. Specialised munitions with limited shelf-life.

   d. Specialised batteries for:

      i. Communications and other electronic equipment;

      ii. Missiles, torpedoes other guided weapons;

      iii. Remotely operated systems.
HIGH-RATE-OF-USE SPARES AND CRITICAL STORES

120. This refers to, among others:

a. Spares for weapons and weapon systems;
b. Spares for communications and other electronic equipment;
c. Spares for combat vehicles and tactical logistic vehicles;
d. Spares for combat and transport aircraft and helicopters;
e. Spares for naval vessels;
f. Field rations;
g. Pharmaceuticals, medical stores and spares for medical equipment;
h. Uniforms; and
i. General field equipment.

121. It is necessary to keep in mind that some of these spares and stores will be expended in the course of disaster aid and similar operations.

SYSTEM INTEGRATION

122. System integration capability is critical, because it allows the Defence Force to acquire optimal sub-systems and equipment from different suppliers in order to:

a. Develop optimised equipment and systems without the cost of developing sub-systems;
b. Field and support equipment and systems without being entirely dependent on the original manufacturer and that company's home government;
c. Integrate complex system environments with other systems to construct 'system of systems environments', which will further interoperability and give the ability to integrate additional systems as required;
d. Develop system backbones or links to facilitate interoperability among the forces of the SADC countries and, from time to time, with other allied forces; and
*e. Modernise, upgrade and convert equipment and systems optimally without having to obtain the approval of the original manufacturer or its home government.

EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION AND UPGRADE

123. Most modern platforms (aircraft, ships and vehicles) and systems have a service life of twenty to thirty years. If the Defence Force is to make optimal use of those platforms and systems, it will need to modernise and perhaps upgrade them several times during that period to ensure optimal effectiveness and to meet evolving threats.
124. Many platforms that are overtaken by developments in warfare can nevertheless remain useful if converted to another role.

125. Having the ability within the country to modernise, upgrade and convert equipment and systems allows the Defence Force to optimally manage its equipment both in terms of its utility and in terms of cost-effectiveness.

126. This capability is in many respects a combination of the ability to support equipment and of a systems integration capability.

**CRITICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS**

127. Critical equipment and systems are those that are essential to the conduct of operations or those in which ‘being different’ can provide a useable tactical edge.

128. Examples include:
   a. Secure communications systems;
   b. Information operations systems;
   c. Electronic warfare systems;
   d. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection, management and evaluation systems;
   e. Precision weapons and fire direction systems

129. What is important here, is that in these areas it is not always necessary to be better in order to enjoy an operational advantage; sometimes merely being different will provide sufficient operational advantage to gain the tactical upper hand or strategic advantage.

130. It is also not always necessary to develop or even manufacture all of the hardware, as sovereign software and integration capabilities can provide sufficient protection and a real edge.

131. Having the ability to develop, manufacture and support such systems will also provide the capability to optimise them to suit the Defence Force’s needs.

**OPTIMISED EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS**

132. The operational environment and the operational style of the Defence Force are such that there is a real need for optimised equipment in some categories, and real potential advantage to be gained in others.

133. Examples in the ground forces environment include:
   a. Wheeled combat vehicles with long operational radius and off-road mobility that is optimised for the savannah environment;
   b. Air-deployable vehicles sufficiently rugged for the African environment;
   c. Rugged logistic vehicles with adequate operational radius;
d. Long-range artillery (support for fast-moving, dispersed forces);

e. Optronic sensors optimised for high ambient temperatures and high temperature gradients, as well as for use in very dusty and sandy environments and in the face of torrential rain;

f. Communications and other electronic equipment designed to operate despite the harsh environment (heat and cold, dust, torrential rain);

g. Long-range tactical communications equipment;

h. Light weapons and equipment suited to combat in informal settlements (danger of over-penetration, fire hazard, generally fragile structures); and

i. Translation/interpretation equipment for African languages, French and Portuguese.

134. Examples in the Air Force environment include:

   a. Helicopters and light aircraft adapted to operate in ‘hot and high’ conditions and in situations with considerable dust and sand contamination.

   b. ‘Precision area weapons’, weapons that can be delivered precisely to achieve an area effect where it is intended, to deal with the challenge of dispersed forces that are difficult to see in heavy bush, where a normal precision weapon would lack adequate area effect.

135. Examples in the naval environment include:

   a. Ships and shipboard helicopters and UAVs able to operate in the high sea states prevalent in Cape Waters;

   b. Ships and vessels with the range and endurance to operate effectively along a coast with few harbours, and with few facilities in most harbours;

   c. Cooling systems able to cope with high ambient air and water temperatures.

136. It will not be practicable to autonomously develop optimised equipment in all cases, but will be possible to do so:

   a. Where the numbers required justify local development and industrialisation, as in the case of many weapons, most military vehicles and some general equipment;

   b. In partnership with original equipment manufacturers, for instance in the case of tactical helicopters and ships.

LARGE-SCALE ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT

137. There is a good logic for manufacturing locally, without necessarily developing locally, equipment that must be acquired or procured in large numbers or quantities. Quite apart from military advantage, that will further job creation and sustainment, reduce import expenditure and also potentially lead to export earnings.
138. Examples include:

   a. Infantry weapons;
   b. Tactical communications equipment, i.e. the ‘hardware’;
   c. General equipment including tactical generators, light field engineer equipment, field kitchens and other general operations equipment;
   d. Trucks and general purpose vehicles;
   e. General-purpose and specialised trailers; and
   f. Small craft for naval and army (river crossing) use.

139. Also falling into this category are general-purpose vehicles that can be acquired to the normal civilian standard, where the focus will be on acquiring such vehicles that are manufactured in South Africa.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL DEFENCE

140. South Africa does not intend to use, acquire or develop chemical, biological or radiological (or nuclear) weapons; nor is there any near-term likelihood of South Africa becoming involved in armed conflict with a country that has such weapons. But this aspect of defence capability cannot simply be ignored:

   a. There have been several cases in recent times of non-state groups carrying out attacks specifically intended to cause maximum civilian casualties, disruption and panic;
   b. South Africa is not immune to such attack, either aimed at South Africa, or at nationals or interests of other countries in South Africa;
   c. Chemical, biological and radiological (‘dirty bomb’) weapons are ideally suited to this form of attack;
   d. There are documented instances of non-state actors employing chemical (e.g. nerve gas in Japan) and biological (e.g. anthrax spores in the United States) weapons, and there is considerable potential for similar employment of a radiological weapon, particularly in a country such as South Africa where there is extensive use of radio-active materials in industry and medicine; and
   e. The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons research in several parts of the world holds risk of such materials, or even weapons, falling into the hands of non-state groups.

141. It is, therefore, necessary for South Africa to conduct research and development work in this field in order to be able to:

   a. Understand the risks and dangers involved;
   b. Develop the necessary intelligence collection and sensor technologies to guard against such attack;
c. Acquire or develop and manufacture protective equipment for critical facilities (e.g. national command centre);

d. Acquire or develop and manufacture protective equipment and clothing for emergency response teams;

e. Acquire or develop and manufacture protective equipment and clothing for military personnel;

f. Acquire or develop and manufacture relevant inoculations, antidotes and supportive medicines for personnel who may be exposed to such agents or weapons;

g. Acquire or develop and manufacture decontamination equipment and materials.

142. Given that it is the responsibility of the Defence Force to protect and defence South Africa against attack, the responsibility for ensuring that the necessary capabilities are to hand is that of the Defence Force. It is, therefore, also the responsibility of the Defence Force to initiate, fund and support the necessary research to allow effective and efficient acquisition and/or development and manufacture of the necessary equipment, clothing and medicines.

GENERAL STORES

143. The Defence Force requires various general stores and civilian-standard equipment in large quantities and numbers.

144. While there is no critical need to manufacture such items in South Africa, that can make economic sense in some cases, and particularly so when there is also a substantial civilian market for the same or an essentially similar item.

145. There may be a particular opportunity here to support small and micro-businesses and Military Veterans, especially where there is logic to procuring particular stores or items from businesses in the immediate area of a Defence Force base.

POSITIONING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

146. A vibrant defence industry is a critical component of an effective defence capability. As such this industry will be identified, recognised, supported and prioritised as a Strategic Manufacturing Sector by the Department of Trade and Industry.

a. Government should also ensure that all ministries and department support the defence insofar as companies of the industry can meet their requirements cost-effectively; and

b. Government should work with the National Defence Industry Council (see below) to ensure that the importance of this industry and the benefits that it can bring to the wider economy are properly elaborated and made known to the public.
NATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY COUNCIL

147. Given the direct importance of this industry to South Africa’s defence and security, its indirect but considerable importance to economic and industrial development, and its potential as a tool of foreign policy, it is proposed that a National Defence Industry Council be established with the dual task of:

a. Establishing and maintaining the focus of a national vision in respect of the defence industry;

b. Furthering the optimal development of this industry; and

c. Ensuring its optimal integration with:
   i. The national development plan; and
   ii. South Africa’s regional and wider foreign policy strategy.

148. This National Defence Industry Council will be chaired by the Minister of Defence or in the unavoidable absence of the Minister by the Secretary for Defence, and will have a small permanent secretariat within the Ministry of Defence. Its members will include:

a. The Chief of the Defence Force;

b. The Chief of the DMO;

c. A senior representative from each of the:
   i. South African Police; and
   ii. Intelligence services; both of which are potential clients of the industry.

d. A senior official from each the Department of:
   i. International Relations and Co-operation;
   ii. Trade and Industry; and
   iii. Science and Technology;

e. Senior industry executives representing the main sectors of this industry.

149. In order to be effective in steering and supporting the defence industry, the Council will meet quarterly to consider the state of the industry and the challenges it faces, and to make any necessary determinations and recommendations.
FOCUS

150. Prioritisation of defence acquisition is driven by the interaction between the evolving strategic situation and the composition and equipment state of the Defence Force. This is, therefore, also an evolving process during which priorities will be adapted to match operational requirements.

151. The strategic situation at the time of drafting this review suggests a force development and re-equipment prioritisation over the near to medium term focused on:
   a. Crisis response capability;
   b. Border security capability; and
   c. Force projection and sustainment capability in a peace support context.

152. From the medium term onwards, it will be necessary to re-equip the medium and heavy forces and the relevant supporting elements to ensure that they:
   a. Retain deterrent credibility; and
   b. Provide deployable peace enforcement and conflict containment capability.

153. Some of the projects to meet medium term requirements will have to commence during the near term to ensure that those capabilities are available in the medium term, partly because of the numbers required (for instance of vehicles, which are optimally built and delivered over an extended period) and partly because of long lead times (for instance in building and commissioning ships).

154. The near-term and medium-term re-equipment of the Defence Force must, therefore, be handled as an integrated process of overlapping projects. In fact, some key longer term projects must also be initiated during this period.

155. While the detail of what must be acquired, in what numbers and when, will be set out in the force design and development strategy, the broad requirements can be set out in three overlapping phases.

156. Some of this equipment will have to be acquired from abroad, but much of it can be developed and manufactured in South Africa in line with the new defence industry policy and strategy, and all of it can be largely supported locally.

IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT

157. Immediate capability enhancement requirements exist where the Defence Force lacks adequate capability to perform current missions or missions likely to arise in the near term. This situation exists in respect of five capability areas, set out below.

158. Extended Special Forces Capability. Terrorism and paramilitary threats will be a factor that South Africa must reckon with in the near term and over the coming decades, both in the context of South Africa’s expanded regional security role and as direct challenges or threats. Countering those
challenges or threats will require enhancing and expanding the capabilities of the Special Forces:

a. **Enhancing** Special Forces capability requires acquisition of additional equipment, weapons and systems, which may include a small number of dedicated aircraft of several types for insertion/extraction operations.

b. **Expanding** Special Forces capability requires establishment of additional Special Forces units focused on particular missions, for instance urban counter-terrorism, and the acquisition of the relevant equipment, weapons and systems.

159. **Border Safeguarding.** The Defence Force has been assigned the mission of border safeguarding. This will require establishing additional units, and acquisition of equipment, weapons and systems optimised for that role, including:

a. Agile, protected patrol vehicles;

b. Surveillance equipment, such as fixed and mobile acoustic, optronic and radar sensors and unmanned air vehicles, particularly micro-UAVs for patrol-level use;

c. A static backbone communications system integrated with tactical air/ground and Police communications systems;

d. Non-lethal weapons of several kinds; and

e. A data collation/fusion system to facilitate intelligence-led operations.

160. **Air Space Surveillance and Protection.** A related requirement is for enhanced air space surveillance and protection, which will require acquisition of:

a. Static, mobile and airborne radar systems able to acquire and track aircraft flying low and using terrain masking; and

b. Aircraft able to intercept and shadow suspect aircraft flying at low altitudes and low speeds.

161. **Extended Maritime Security Capability.** The expansion of Somali-based piracy into the Mozambique Channel has highlighted the importance and urgency of expanding South Africa’s maritime security capability. The immediate requirements include:

a. Maritime surveillance or patrol aircraft;

b. Offshore patrol vessels;

c. Inshore patrol craft;

d. Additional shipboard helicopters; and

e. Equipment for shoreline patrols.

162. **Crisis Response Capability.** South Africa’s expanding regional security responsibilities require the development of an effective crisis response capability beyond that inherent in Special Forces. This requires:
a. Acquisition of suitable equipment and weapons for the parachute and air-landed battalion groups, including protected vehicles that can be transported by medium transport aircraft and light vehicles that can be delivered by parachute;

b. Expansion and rejuvenation of the medium airlift capability;

c. Establishment of a heavy/long-range airlift capability that, together with the expanded medium airlift capability, will enable the Defence Force to deploy a parachute battalion group or an air-landed battalion group within 48 hours from:

i. South Africa to anywhere within the continental SADC region, to support local forces; or

ii. A forward base within the SADC continental SADC region to anywhere in a contiguous country.

d. Establishment of an in-flight refuelling capability to:

i. Enable effective fighters support for crisis response deployments; and to

ii. Enable extended range Special Forces operations.

URGENT CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT

163. Urgent capability enhancement requirements exist where Defence Force lacks adequate capability to perform likely near/medium term missions, and where existing equipment is obsolete and must be replaced if key capabilities are to be retained. There are seven capability areas involved here, as set out below.

164. **Infantry Combat Vehicles.** The mechanised infantry battalions have wide utility, being suited to peacekeeping in high-risk situations and to peace enforcement, and forming a key element of deterrent capability. The Ratel vehicle family is obsolete, old (30 years) and difficult to maintain, and must be replaced urgently if the mechanised infantry is to remain credible and effective.

165. **Armoured Personnel Carriers.** Armoured personnel carriers are the main equipment of the motorised infantry battalions, which form the core of peace-support capability, and are vital elements of other units, including the medical battalion groups of the Military Health Service. There are three related requirements for new APCs:

a. The Casspir and Mamba armoured personnel carriers of the motorised infantry no longer provide adequate protection against weapons available to irregular forces and bandits, are old (30 years) and difficult to maintain, and must be replaced urgently if these units are to remain effective;

b. The Mfezi protected ambulances of the medical battalion groups are equally old and difficult to maintain, and must also be replaced; and

c. The spread of improvised explosive devices into Africa further means that there is a requirement for ‘mine-resistant/ambush-protected’ (MRAP) patrol vehicles and personnel carriers to equip a proportion of these units.
166. **Logistic Vehicles.** No defence force can function without reliable logistic vehicles that are suited to the nature of its operations and the terrain of the theatre of operations. The existing Samil fleet of trucks is old (30 years) and difficult to maintain, and will lack the mobility to effectively support modern combat vehicles. The bulk of the fleet must be replaced with suitable vehicles, including protected variants, as a matter of urgency.

167. **Light Artillery.** Several recent conflicts in Africa have demonstrated an escalation in the capability and level of aggression of the forces involved, including serious attacks on peacekeeping units. The Army needs light artillery that can be deployed quickly as a part of a rapid deployment peace support contingent, to provide counter-battery and defensive fires to protect airfields and bases. It currently has no such artillery, although a suitable 105 mm long-range gun and ammunition family are in development.

168. **Aerial Weapons.** The Air Force must urgently acquire suitable weapons for the Gripen, the Hawk (in its alternate light attack role) and the Rooivalk if these aircraft are to be able to support ground forces effectively.

169. **Combat Support Ships.** The extension of the Navy’s area of operations to include the Mozambique Channel and its approaches, and the likelihood of a further extension to counter piracy along the west coast of Africa, requires urgent acquisition of a second combat support ship to enable frigates and offshore patrol vessels to be employed efficiently. That ship must be followed by replacement of SAS Drakensberg, which has been in service since 1987.

**FORCE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS**

170. There are also many requirements for enabling or supporting equipment that is essential to the effective employment of deployed forces. Among them are:

   a. The replacement of old and unsuitable water purification, field kitchen and field accommodation equipment;

   b. The replacement of obsolete field workshop equipment;

   c. The replacement of old field hospital equipment; and

   d. The re-establishment of the Air Force tactical airfield unit capability, to enable support of aircraft away from Air Force bases.

171. The Defence Force must also acquire communications systems and related equipment suited to both its deterrent role and its regional and continental security responsibilities.

172. Another urgent requirement is to acquire munitions and explosives of all kinds to allow effective live-fire and explosives training and the rebuilding of stocks.

**LONGER-TERM FORCE REJUVENATION AND CAPABILITY EXPANSION**

173. Given the long-term nature of defence planning and defence acquisition planning, it is wise to also set out some key longer-term equipment requirements that will arise if the Defence Force is to remain an effective deterrent and is to meet South Africa’s regional security responsibilities. Some of these projects will have to be initiated in the near term if the required capabilities are to become available within a reasonable period:
174. **Expeditionary Operations.** If the Defence Force is to meet South Africa's growing regional and continental security responsibilities, it must develop the capability to deploy and sustain medium forces outside the SADC region. That will require, in addition to the air lift capability discussed (paragraph 162.c.), the development of a sealift capability that will:

a. Enable the deployment of a mobile battalion group in a single lift; and

b. The retention of one sealift platform offshore the deployment area to serve as a secure helicopter base, headquarters and logistic base for the landed force, while follow on forces are brought up by air and sea.

175. That will require acquisition of at least two and preferably three ‘joint support ships’ with full helicopter operations capability and the ability to deploy landing craft to allow forces to be put ashore in the absence of a functioning harbour.

176. **Air Defence.** The Defence Force currently lacks any modern air defence weapons other than a single battery of very short range missiles (Starstreak). There are, therefore, clear requirements to:

a. Acquire additional ‘very short range’ missiles to enable deployed units to protect themselves against air attack in a country in which a peace enforcement operation is taking place, be it by disaffected or hostile air force elements or by improvised attack aircraft such as used in Biafra in the 1960s and Sri Lanka in the 1990s;

b. Acquire mobile and mechanised air defence systems:
   i. For medium forces that may be deployed for peace enforcement; and
   ii. To ensure credible deterrence by providing for the protection of air bases, critical installations and deployed forces.

177. **Main Battle Tank.** The main battle tank remains a core element of mobile forces in the deterrent role, and recent operations in several parts of the world (including Bosnia and Kosovo) have demonstrated the very considerable value of the main battle tank in peace enforcement and similar operations. The current Olifant is essentially a 1950s tank that has undergone several upgrades, and is now obsolete in almost all respects. While it can be retained for a time as a training system, it is no longer credible as part of deterrent capability and lacks the reliability to be effective in supporting a peace enforcement operation, and must, therefore, be replaced as soon as possible.

178. **Medium Transport Helicopter.** While the Oryx will remain effective through 2020, it is essential to begin planning for its replacement now, as replacing the Oryx will probably require development of a ‘hot and high’ optimised variant of the type selected. That is a factor that could provide interesting opportunities for the South African industry, if the new helicopter will be acquired in numbers adequate to South Africa's actual needs in the context of its regional and continental security responsibilities. Those opportunities could include:

a. The development of the new variant together with the parent company (as was done with Oryx);

b. The manufacture of the helicopter for the SA Air Force;

c. The manufacture, in agreement with the parent company, of additional helicopters of this ‘hot and high’ variant for other air forces with similar requirements; and
d. The development of a Rooivalk replacement on the basis of the new helicopter.

CONCLUSION

179. This chapter serves to set out the policy in respect of South Africa's defence industry and to set out basic strategy guidelines. The future defence industry strategy will be developed by the Defence Matériel Organisation for the Defence Force and in conjunction with the industry and with inputs from the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Science and Technology. This strategy will be updated as required to take into account the evolving strategic situation and developments in defence technology and the international defence industrial environment.